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Wood was one of the most, if not the most, important materials required to enable 
the First World War to continue being fought. Without it the mines and factories of 
the Home Front would have stopped producing and the Western Front could not have 
existed. The unprecedented amounts of forest produce suddenly required for wartime 
uses had to be met in the UK by a government, forestry profession and timber trade 
massively underprepared and hugely over-reliant on imports. However, even though 
these supplies were largely successfully maintained throughout the war, no single 
history has illustrated all of the many facets required to achieve this, or the effects 
these had on woodlands and forestry practices.  
The initial tasks in correcting this lack of knowledge has been to establish who 
instigated and managed the British Empire’s forestry efforts and the measures they 
took to ensure adequate supplies for the British Home and Western Fronts. It is these 
initial ‘top-down’ areas of the broader questions relating to the wartime forestry work 
that this thesis covers. Although, in regards to some aspects of the British war effort, 
arguments have been made that appropriate civilian expertise was not well utilised, it 
is argued here that what forestry expertise was available to the British Empire was 
suitably used in both civilian and military controlled roles.  
Based largely on primary high level governmental and military sources, with 
secondary sources providing contextual and comparative information,  this thesis has 
developed into a largely administrative study illustrating that management structures 
were gradually rationalised and centralised, therefore avoiding large amounts of 
confusion and duplication. Furthermore that the measures used, such as introducing 
permit schemes to buy or sell timber and utilising ever-increasing amounts of French 
woodlands, were sensible and workable given the wider context of the war. Although 
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concerns were raised over the post-war state of UK and French forests, maintenance 
of supplies largely took priority. 
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1 Christopher Phillips, ‘Managing Armageddon: The science of transportation and the British 
Expeditionary Force, 1900-1918’, (unpublished doctoral thesis, University of Leeds, 2015). 
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Forestry, whether defined as a profession or the methods used to provide wood 
products, has always had an enormous impact upon mankind’s living conditions. It 
should therefore be no surprise that forestry played a vital role in enabling the First 
World War to continue being fought. The war is commonly seen as one of new 
technologies and sciences marking a dramatic landmark in the march towards 
modernity. For many the war confirmed that this was an age of steel, iron, high 
explosives, and mass industrial production. Within the war humans became cogs in 
the machinery that left millions dead, landscapes destroyed, numerous social and 
cultural features irreversibly altered, and an age in which wood could be of real use 
was seemingly left far behind.2 Within the minds of historians and the popular 
perception of this destructive war, the mention of forests or woodlands will generally 
conjure up either the names of those infamous woods in Belgium and northern France 
that witnessed such vicious fighting to control, or the sketches, photographs, paintings 
or poetry portraying the devastation of nature wrought by artillery.3  
However, by August 1914, wood had not been consigned to the past as a vitally 
useful material, and indeed it still has not. Wood continued to play essential roles in 
manufacture, housing and transport, as forests did in the cultural psyche of the nation.4  
Therefore during the war the enormous demand for timber, fuel and numerous other 
forms of forest products, like many other natural resources, became unprecedented. It 
was timber that supported the thousands of miles of trenches, dug-outs and mine 
                                                 
2 Vejas G Liulevicius, War Land on the Eastern Front: Culture, National Identity, and German  
Occupation in World War I, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), pp. 1-2; P.E. Dewey,  
British Agriculture in the First World War (London: Routledge, 1989), pp. 4, 5. 
3 I. G. Simmons, Changing the Face of the Earth: Culture, Environment, History, (Oxford: Basil 
Blackwell, 1989), p. 315.  
4 Gifford Pinchot, ‘Foreword’ in Raphael Zon and William Sparhawk, Forest Resources of the World, 
Volume 1 (New York & London: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1923), p. vii. 
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shafts. Troops and animals struggled along wooden duckboards or roads of planks or 
saplings lain across broken ground. Wooden bridges were constructed over captured 
trenches, streams and rivers. Timber buildings and wood-burning stoves offered 
shelter and warmth behind the lines, and telegraph poles and pulp for paper spread 
news of the war. Without millions of tons of timber for mines each year the factories, 
locomotives and ship engine rooms would have ground to a halt through lack of coal. 
Wood was considered by some contemporaries as not merely a resource, but one of 
the munitions of war. 
Even though this importance was recognised at the time, the many political, 
diplomatic, military, environmental, social and cultural facets of ensuring supplies 
receive scant mention in the existing historiography. As shall be seen in the 
historiographical review below, no single work exists combining all of the facets and 
approaches necessary to analyse the efforts of the British Empire to secure sufficient 
quantities, and the impact of these efforts on various environments, the forestry 
profession, or the social and cultural perceptions attached to forests. The initial 
intention of this work was, therefore, to provide an academic study illustrating the 
details of the establishment and management of the effort alongside information and 
arguments regarding the physical work undertaken, the social and professional 
backgrounds of those who undertook it, and the effects of the effort on forestry 
throughout the empire. However, although much research has been undertaken along 
each of these lines, the limited word count available here has meant a decision that 
this thesis will concentrate solely on the high level organisations (HLOs) who 
established and managed the effort. This is in order to create a modern academic base 
upon which either myself or other scholars can carry out studies on further aspects of 
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the forestry effort whilst in itself making a distinctive and important contribution to 
our knowledge of this important but under-studied topic.  
The central conclusion reached is that even with the limited woodlands available 
in Britain and dire pressures on transportation, the measures put in place to source and 
manage this resource were sensible and efficient. This is especially true given the 
unprecedented nature of this effort. It is illustrated by the fact that although at times 
there were serious concerns, and occasional local shortages, supplies were 
satisfactorily maintained. Another important conclusion reached is that, with regards 
to forestry, the war was not the bringer of drastic change in administration and 
management, as some have seen for other aspects of society or the military, and neither 
was it a conservative or even reactionary agent. Even with the establishment of the 
Forestry Commission in 1919, often seen as a direct result of the war, forestry had 
little in common with Trotsky’s Marxist view of war as the ‘locomotive of history’. It 
had more in common with Arthur Marwick’s gentle and inevitable views of social 
improvements, or John Turner’s findings that many such political initiatives were 
continuations of pre-war calls, in this case from forestry experts, for greater state 
intervention in various fields.5 As such, the high level organisations (HLOs) and 
measures taken during the war that are outlined here can most accurately be labelled 
as accelerators, not instigators, in terms of post-war forestry.  
To illustrate such conclusions four chapters will be used. Firstly a very brief 
chapter outlines important contextual elements to assist the reader in later stages of 
the work. This focuses on the very poor pre-war state of forestry in Britain, whilst 
                                                 
5 John Turner, British Politics and the Great War: Coalition and Conflict, 1915-1918, (New Haven: 
Yale University Press, 1992), pp. 2, 10, 387; Liulevicius, War Land on the Eastern Front, pp. 1-4; 
Arthur Marwick, The Deluge: British Society and the First World War (London: Macmillan, 1965), p. 
314, as quoted in Turner, British Politics, pp. 10-11; also see ‘Introduction: The War, Change and 
Continuity’ in Stephen Constantine, Maurice W. Kirby and Mary B. Rose (eds.), The First World War 
in British History (London: Edward Arnold, 1995), pp. 1-8, and passim. 
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highlighting that, due largely to knowledge learned from the empire, calls had been 
made from the 1850s onwards for improvements in forestry management. It also gives 
more detail on the myriad of wartime uses found for wood produce, in order to further 
illustrate the important contribution of this thesis to the historiography of the conflict. 
The timings and causes of noticeable shortages during the war, for instance the 
massive reductions in shipping space, will then provide a chronological base for the 
work. 
Chapter 2 will concentrate on the timings and reasons behind the establishment 
of the HLOs that came to manage forestry, including their intended roles, beliefs, 
structures, inter-communications operations, and how successful they were judged to 
be. The chapter is based upon a largely chronological analysis of each organisation in 
turn, giving an overview of bodies prominent within the thesis and highlighting 
reasons in the wider context of the war why replacement, or parallel running, 
organisations were established at specific times. A superficial study would suggest an 
overly bureaucratic approach in relation to the layers of organisations and sheer 
number of committees and subcommittees involved in different areas of the timber 
effort. However, the chapter will also il lustrate that despite many changes in managing 
bodies, there was in fact a high degree of continuity in the high-level staff effectively 
running these. A good deal of common sense can also be seen  in the organisational 
structures put in place so rapidly, especially given the unprecedented levels of urgent 
demands arising from different and often competing areas of the war effort. 
Furthermore it will be seen that environmental concerns, which had been quite widely 
raised in relevant scholarship and government before the war, were unsurprisingly a 
distinctly low-level priority. This was especially true in the early stages of the effort. 
With the establishment of the relevant forestry subcommittee of the 1916 
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Reconstruction Committee, post-war self-sufficiency and environmental issues were 
recognised, but this ‘Acland Committee’ played no role in the wartime management 
of the resource.   
The third chapter will examine the methods used by the above organisations to 
acquire and best distribute the required quantities. Themes include outlining the 
statutory powers which organisations were given to control the effort, from licensing 
sales to requisitioning stocks, the continued efforts to purchase greater amounts of 
imports and how this was affected by wider shipping-space issues and controls at 
various times. It will look at how the recognition that more self-sufficiency in terms 
of home grown timber for the war effort began to be put into practice, from increasing 
felling, economising non-war usage, rationing uses, controlling prices and looking to 
alternative materials, each measure meeting some success. Arguably the most 
important measure, begun by the HLOs in mid to late 1916,  was to begin utilising the 
better-managed French forests to increase amounts obtained for the armies on the 
Western Front, reduce cross-Atlantic and Channel transport, and enable more home 
grown timber to remain for industries in the UK. The diplomatic efforts and 
agreements put in place to increase utilisation will be addressed, such as those to 
clarify relationships between French forestry officials and British or Canadian forestry 
units. The chapter will show how measures of all conceivable types were eventually 
taken to meet the timber needs of the military and industry. 
The final chapter then illustrates how the HLOs either took control of, or 
themselves established, the forestry units that carried out the majority of the felling 
and converting throughout the war. By far the most important of these in terms of 
numbers employed and timber cut were the Canadian units who would become the 
Canadian Forestry Corps (CFC). However, important contributions were also made in 
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France by British Royal Engineer Forestry Companies and on the Home Front by the 
smaller Newfoundland Forestry Corps, the measurers, fellers and sawmill staff of the 
Women’s Forestry Service (WFS) and the New England Sawmill Units, who although 
civilian lumbermen were amongst the first Americans to enter the European theatre.  
The chapter will begin with a brief contextual section regarding human resource 
levels at different important stages of the war in Britain and Canada, where the 
majority of the empire’s forestry troops came from. This will focus on the position of 
forestry ‘manpower’ in relation to similar vital war resources, especially in agriculture.  
This will show that whilst some forestry roles were considered amongst protected 
trades, once these were introduced, the numbers required along with the introduction 
of specialist units from the empire and increasing use of women meant there was not 
the level of concerns among planners as there was for agricultural and industrial 
workers.   
Each of the units named above will then be compared under three overarching 
themes, namely establishment and expansion of numbers, management and 
reorganisation, and required skillsets. Establishment will outline who requested each 
unit, why and when as well as who agreed to this and who organised and recruited 
them. It will also detail important periods in terms of how, when and why their 
establishment levels were increased. As well as providing a first single location to 
discover why, when and how all of the forestry units were established, the chapter also 
continues several main themes running throughout the thesis relating to HLO efforts. 
As shown in chapters 2 and 3, there was no one organisation initiating and managing 
all aspects of forestry, and the recruitment of skilled forestry manpower was no 
exception. These units grew from various different sources, military, civilian, British, 
Canadian or American, depending on the context of the war.  
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Management and reorganisation looks at aspects such as funding of units at 
different stages, reasons for and effectiveness of structuring and restructuring of units, 
and how they fitted into the overall Allied chain of command, including for allocation 
of work.   Taking into account the numerous contextual issues, such as resource 
requirements and transport or manpower issues, it is shown that sensible and 
appropriate methods were used to command and expand the units with several bodies, 
civilian and military, being happy to fund, raise, equip and occasionally pay to 
maintain units. Thanks to the increasing centralisation of the HLOs that had taken 
place (see chapter 2), the units also fitted easily in a reasonably clear command 
structure. Furthermore, individual units were often also able to adapt their size and 
structure to suit the work tasked to them and the environment they found themselves 
working in. There is at times a feeling that the units, whether officially employed by 
the military or civilian authorities, occupy a liminal space between these two centres 
of control. Yet it is also clear throughout that it is their designation as specialist 
forestry personnel within these units that simplifies their management by the HLOs.        
It is the degree to which forestry skills were desired by the HLOs in establishing 
these units that is studied in the last section of chapter 4. It also argues that non-forestry 
skilled labour, such as Army Service Corps drivers or Labour Corps personnel, was in 
constant demand in order to assist forestry units. Although not always achievable, it 
was preferred that the makeup of the forestry units themselves were appropriately 
skilled and/or experienced lumbermen or engineers. This was especially true in terms 
of officers. Given the overall thesis conclusion that the forestry effort was well-
administered, unlike some aspects of the Empire’s war effort, it is important to note 
that the research in this chapter shows that, similarly to the establishment and 
structuring of the HLOs above them, forestry units were led in their recruitment stages, 
Page 19 of 386 
 
 
and then officered at all levels, by such appropriate personnel. Overall, this chapter 
shows that the HLOs generally raised and controlled the units through logical 
measures in a difficult human resource and other priorities context.    
As with other areas of importance and great interest to the author highlighted in 
this introduction, it should be noted here that conclusions that would have 
complemented these chapters, such as the geographical, social and professional 
backgrounds of the forestry unit personnel, the forestry methods they utilised, the 
importance and makeup of attached labour units and many logistical issues will all 
have to be covered in further works based on the foundations established here. 
Important Historiography 
Given the vital importance of wood products to the continuance of the war, 
relatively little has been written about the overall effort to secure supplies. The 
information that can be found in secondary sources exists mainly in works on isolated 
aspects of the topic. These include early histories of military forestry units or small 
sections within chronologically longer histories of specific forest areas or forestry. 
However, the many and varied elements of the high level management of the forestry 
effort have, thus far, not been brought together into a single overarching academic 
study. Reasons for this might be the abundance of more advanced technological, 
scientific, explosive and deadly facets of the war, or perhaps the relatively small 
numbers of personnel involved in comparison with those who passed through other 
military branches. Regardless, given the vital nature of this material on the battle and 
industrial fronts, it is an area no less important to our understanding of the fighting of 
this ‘total war’ than any other.  
Certain categories of secondary works have proved useful to different aspects of 
the overall study, from early military unit histories, through environmental and forest 
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histories and on to more recent precedents combining the two. The divisions between 
these categories are not firmly set, some themes and content overlap. Nonetheless, this 
approach serves to illustrate the main types of secondary sources utilised in 
establishing a basis for this thesis. The categories also reflect a roughly chronological 
order which, whilst not containing any surprises in terms of types of historical 
approaches utilised during particular timeframes, does trace a path to highlight the 
precedents for a combined  environmental-military approach that have been set in 
recent decades.  
Wartime and early post-war forestry related articles, memoirs and unit histories, 
numerous for the Americans, less so for the Canadians and distinctly lacking for the 
Royal Engineer Forestry Companies, are often based on minute detail regarding senior 
figures, unit movements and occasionally structural positions, as are many of the 
national official histories. These are, therefore, classed among the pre-1960s ‘drum 
and trumpet’ style histories, and provide a lot of useful information whilst being 
understandably positive on conditions, management and achievements given the 
timings of their releases.6 Charles Wesley Bird and J.B. Davies’s The Canadian 
                                                 
6 Herman L. Porter, A Review of Activities with the 126th Company Canadi n Forestry Corps while 
Stationed at Ampthill, Bedfordshire, England, (circa. late 1918 to 1919, reprinted Ampthill: Ampthill 
& District Archaeological & Local History Society, 2001), n.p; Joe Leggett, Growing Up in Griggs 
Green: Recollections of Life at the Time of the First World War and the Canadian Army (Liphook: 
Bramshott & Liphook Preservation Society, 1999); Roland Hill, 'Canadian Forestry Corps Work in 
France', American Forestry Vol.25 No.301 (January 1919); Roland H. Hill, 'The Canadian Forestry 
Corps', in W. A. Williamson and Hill, Roland H. et al. (eds.), Canada in the Great World War: An 
Authentic Account of the Military History of Canada from the Earliest Days to the Close of the War of 
the Nation, (Toronto: United Publishers of Canada Limited, 1920); Perez Simmons and Alfred H. 
Davies (eds.), Twentieth Engineers, France, 1917-1918-1919 (Portland: Twentieth Engineers 
Publishing Association, 1920); Cuthbert P. Stearns, History of the Spruce Production Division, 
United States Army and United States Spruce Production Corporation (Portland: Press of Kilham 
Stationery & Printing Co, n.d c.1919);  No Author, ‘War Material from French Forests’, American 
Forestry Vol.24 No.290 (February 1918), pp. 69-76; colonel G. H. Addison, Work of the Royal 
Engineers in the European War 1914-1918: The Organisation and Expansion of the Corps 1914-1918 
(Chatham: Institution of Royal Engineers, 1926), pp. 23-24, 51-60, 62, 65, 68-9; Major-General H. L. 
Pritchard (ed.), History of the Corps of Royal Engineers, Volume V: The Home Front, France, 
Flanders and Italy in the First World War (Chatham: The Institution of Royal Engineers, 1952), pp. 
38-42, 76-8, 166, 539,559, 565-6.                                                 
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Forestry Corps: Its Inception, Development and Achievements (1919) provides the 
most relevant example for this work because it includes some discussion of working 
relationships with their managing bodies.7 Bird worked for the Board of Trade Timber 
Supply Department, and Lieutenant J.B. Davies was a member of the Canadian 
Forestry Corps (CFC), so they were perfectly placed to write on such matters. The 
work of various RE units is well covered in the volumes of the History of the Great 
War Based on Official Documents published between 1922 and 1949. These provide 
numerous examples of the many military uses for forest produce, see chapter 1 for 
examples, although forestry specific units receive scant mention and these volumes 
have correctly been described as a mass of detailed information with very little critical 
analysis.8 Praise for the co-ordination and mutual assistance of the allies is paramount, 
and as such these works cannot be considered especially objective. However, some 
minor criticisms of the forestry effort can be detected within official or contemporary 
accounts. This includes some regarding the French Forestry Authorities, although this 
is alongside a great deal of respect for their scientific approach to forestry.9 
 
As with the British forestry units themselves, those HLOs managing the effort and 
as such of primary importance to this work have received very little appraisal. Two 
attempts at histories were made both by personnel who had been closely involved, but 
                                                 
7 Charles Wesley Bird and J. B. Davies, The Canadian Forestry Corps; its Inception, Development 
and Achievements. Prepared by Request of Sir Albert H. Stanley, (London: HMSO, 1919), passim. 
8 History of the Great War Based on Official Documents, 1916, vol.1, pp. 277 fn 2, 284; History of 
the Great War Based on Official Documents, 1916, vol.2, p. 542; Keith Simpson, 'An Annotated 
Bibliography of the British Army, 1914-1918’, in Ian F. W. Beckett and Keith Simpson (ed.), A 
Nation in Arms; the British Army in the First World War. (Barnsley: Pen & Sword, 2004), p. 254.       
9 No Author, ‘War Material’, pp. 69-71, 74; colonel J. A Woodruff, ‘An Appreciation: To the Officers 
and Soldiers of the Twentieth Engineers and Attached Service Troops’, American Forestry Vol.25 
No.306 (June 1919), np., [Taken from ‘General Order No. 3 HQ 20th Engineers (For.) U.S.M.P.O. 
717 Dec, 1918’]; Henry S. Graves, ‘The Forest Engineers’, American Forestry Vol.25 No.306 (June 
1919), p. 1109; Lieut-col W. B. Greeley, ‘The American Lumberjack in France’, American Forestry 
Vol.25 No.306 (June 1919), pp. 1093-1108; Major Barrington Moore ‘French Forests in the War’ 
American Forestry Vol.25 No.306 (June 1919), pp.1113-1136; Capt. Ralph H. Faulkner, ‘A Lesson 
from France’, American Forestry Vol.25 No.306 (June 1919), pp. 1155-1157. 
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neither appears to have been completely finished and certainly not published. The first, 
Professor L. T. Hobhouse's attempt to write a history of the Timber Supply 
Department (Board of Trade) did not get past the stage of note collection.10 The other, 
by Bird, who it should be remembered was also jointly responsible for the Official 
History of the CFC, was nearly completed and although not published was kept in the 
Board of Trade’s library before being archived. Although not dated, evidence within 
the work suggests it was finished some time during 1922.11 It has not been established 
whether or not Hobhouse or Bird ever intended or attempted to have their works 
published. The fact that they were not suggests that such aspects of the war effort were 
seen as being as less important, or perhaps less interesting, compared with the many 
combat unit histories released in the post-war years. It may also have been considered 
that lessons from the work of the organisations covered were being taken forward 
during the immediate post-war period through the establishment of the Forestry 
Commission and Imperial Forestry Conferences. 
Despite primarily being a collection of primary sources, with some initial notes 
made, Hobhouse’s intended chapter headings indicate what he felt important topics 
for contemporaries would be. Furthermore, each of his five sections have been covered 
within Bird’s more complete history, which contains twenty chapters covering many 
aspects of timber control, from reliance on importation in the early stages of the war 
through to early post-war reforestation work. Bird certainly provides significant detail 
regarding the organisations and events covered, much of which has been utilised in 
this study in a very condensed and paraphrased fashion and then checked against 
primary sources and shown to be accurate. Furthermore, in a similar vein to published 
                                                 
10 TNA/BT/71/2/32105, Professor Hobhouse, History of T.S.D. 
11 TNA/BT/71/21, C.W. Bird, The Supply and Control of Timber During the War; With Special 
Reference to the Work of the Board of Trade’s Timber Supply Department, (circa. 1922), see p.208 
for clues to when written. 
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unit histories above, he paints a rosy picture of the interaction, smooth running, and 
achievements of the HLOs, especially with regards to the increased levels of self-
sufficiency, which research in this thesis can only echo.12   
It can be seen, therefore, that within these early unit or organisational histories the 
efforts to provide timber, or unconverted forms of wood, were recognised as important 
and highly praised. The American and Canadian origins and emphasis on the forestry-
related unit histories, and mentions of forestry units in early post-war official 
publications, are understandable, not only given the much greater numbers of skilled 
lumber forces and equipment provided by these nations, but also as forestry was, and 
still is, an extremely important industry in these countries. It may also be due to their 
closer national connections with forests, wildernesses and National Parks. The 
historiography certainly indicates that interest in American Forestry units and the 
effects of their work on French forests and post-war American industrial bodies has 
lasted far longer than for their Canadian and British equivalents.13 Furthermore, and 
not surprisingly, a lot of what has been put onto modern websites regarding aspects of 
                                                 
12 Ibid., passim. 
13 See for instance; George T. Morgan, 'A Forester at War: Excerpts from the Diaries of colonel 
William B. Greeley, 1917-1919', Forest History Vol.4 (Winter 1961); David A. Clary, 'The Biggest 
Regiment in the Army', Journal of Forest History Vol.22 No.4 (October 1978); James E. Fickle, 
'Defense Mobilization in the Southern Pine Industry: The Experience of World ar I', Journal of 
Forest History Vol.22 No.4 (October 1978); George S. Kephart, 'A Forester in the Great War: 
Reminiscences of Company E, 10th Engineers, in France', ibid.; Daniel R. Mortensen, 'The 
Deterioration of Forest Grazing Land: A Wider Context for the Effects of World War I', Journal of 
Forest History Vol.22 No.4 (October 1978); Marcella M. Sherfy, 'The National Park Service and the 
First World War', Journal of Forest History Vol.22 No.4 (October 1978); N. Frank Schubert, ‘All 
Wooden on the Western Front’, Journal of Forest History Vol.22 No.4 (October 1978), pp. 180-1; 
John R. Jeanneney, 'The Impact of World War I on French Timber Resources', Journal of Forest 
History Vol.22 No.4 (October 1978); David A. Clary, 'The Woodsmen of the AEF; A Bibliographical 
Note', Journal of Forest History Vol.22 No.4 (October 1978), p. 185; Gerald W. Williams, 'The 
Spruce Production Division', Forest History Today (Spring 1999), p. 6; Harold M. Hyman, Soldiers 
and Spruce: Origins of the Loyal Legion of Loggers and Lumbermen, (Institute of Industrial 
Relations, UCLA, 1963); Edward B. Mittelman, 'The Loyal Legion of Loggers and Lumbermen - an 
Experiment in Industrial Relations', Journal of Political Economy Vol.31 (June 1923).            
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the effort has been based largely, sometimes almost exclusively, on one or other of 
these earlier works.14 
A further important category within the historiography, which began appearing 
from the 1970s onwards, are those largely military histories that occasionally contain 
brief sections on specific elements of the forestry effort, but more usefully cover 
contextual issues in depth. These include administrative structures and initiatives, 
political and diplomatic efforts to ensure that effective working relationships were 
maintained between government and industry or between the Allies, and labour and 
manpower concerns. There are also discussions of increasing roles for women, 
administering Canada’s overall military effort to compare with the CFC, the use of 
other natural resources, especially in heavy industries, and agriculture during the 
war.15 Amongst these histories on specific elements of the war, Ian Brown’s British 
Logistics on the Western Front 1914-1919 stands out for containing a small but useful 
amount of work specifically on the forestry supply agreements negotiated between the 
                                                 
14 For instance see,  World War I: New England Sawmill Units in Scotland, 
http://www.20thengineers.com/ww1-book-neunits.html, most of which comes from Simmons and  
Davies, Twentieth Engineers, France, 1917-1918-1919; Peter Broznitsky, Russians in the C.E.F:  
Canadian Forestry Corps, C.E.F, CFC, Introduction,  
http://www.russiansinthecef.ca/forestry/index.shtml, (Mitson Consulting Services, [accessed 1  
January 2012]; Jenny Higgins (revised), Newfoundland and Labrador in the First World War,  
‘Newfoundland Forestry Corps’, November 1914,  
http://www.heritage.nf.ca/first-world-war/articles/forestry-corps-en.php, [accessed 16 February 2012]. 
15 For just a few examples see; Turner, British Politics, for political moves during 1916; Elizabeth 
Greenhalgh, Victory Through Coalition; Britain and France During the First World War (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2005); Jehuda L. Wallach, Uneasy Coalition: The Entente Experience in 
World War 1 (Westport Connecticut & London: Greenwood Press, 1993) for details of committees 
established and details of the trials and tribulations of fighting such a resource based war with allies; 
Keith Grieves, The Politics of Manpower, 1914-18, (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1988), 
p. 156 for specific mention of timber supplies; Dewey, British Agriculture; Avner Offer, The First 
World War, an Agrarian Interpretation (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989); colonel Gerald W. L. 
Nicholson, Canadian Expeditionary Force, 1914-1919: Official History of the Canadian Army in the 
First World War (Ottawa: R. Duhamel, Queen's Printer and Controller of Stationery, 1962); Desmond 
Morton, When Your Number's Up: The Canadian Soldier in the First World War, (Toronto, Random 
House of Canada, 1993); Lucy Noakes, Women in the British Army: War and the Gentle Sex, 1907-
1948 (Abingdon, New York: Routledge, 2006); also see arguments on these contextual areas and 
arguments in many works on the war as a whole by eminent military historians such as such as Ian 
Beckett, Hew Strachan, Arthur Marwick and John Keegan. 
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British and French. However, the main importance of Brown’s work is that he 
revitalised investigation into the administrative work of those at high levels during the 
war. He shows, mainly in regards to the BEF’s transport systems, that the increased 
use of civilian experts, working in their speciality fields within the BEF, greatly 
improved efficiency, through administrative changes that introduced professional 
planning and structures. These men, most noticeably Sir Eric Geddes but there were 
other and earlier examples, were used to running national-sized systems, such as train 
networks. Existing Army structures and institutions had proven unable to efficiently 
establish and maintain supply operations on such scales during the second half of 
1916. The huge expansion of supplies required to break through the defensive trench 
systems had been recognised and at times had delayed operations.16 Such measures, 
the use of civilian experts and reorganisation and centralisation of management 
structures, echo in many respects what occurred in forestry. Two years of ad hoc 
problem solving, was then recognised as no longer sufficient, and from late 1916 there 
was an increase in the rate of reorganisation and central controls. In forestry, however, 
the use of civilian expertise can be seen from an earlier stage.      
A popular style of history, by Murray Maclean, an ex-crop farmer with an interest 
in growing trees and the experiences of men and animals in the Great War, does 
provide a brief review of the British uses, military organisations, logistics and political 
agreements involved in the forestry effort.17  However, it is largely based on 
photographs and the three pages of text on forestry are unfortunately unreferenced. 
                                                 
16 Ian Malcolm Brown, British Logistics on the Western Front, 1914-1919, (Westport, Connecticut: 
Praeger, 1998), passim, for timber agreements with France, pp.131-3, and important sections or 
conclusions on the demands of 1916 and subsequent streamlining of administration, communications 
and use of civilian experts under Geddes pp. 1-2, 12-13, 109-110, 120-8, 134, 139-43, 146-149, 155-
174, 179-204, 231-39. 
17 Murray Maclean, Farming and Forestry on the Western Front 1915 -1919, (Ipswich: Old Pond 
Publishing, 2004), passim.  
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Further short or web-based histories by a few local British Historical Associations and 
Societies have produced work relating to operations of the CFC in their areas and these 
have proved useful in providing micro examples of the effects of the higher-level 
efforts.18  
As well as providing context, studies such as those mentioned above contain wider 
historical themes of the war that are added to by this research into the forestry effort. 
Prominent examples include improvements in the macro-management of the war as it 
progressed, suitable people being placed in appropriate roles and the concept of ‘total 
war’, which within its many definitions and facets includes the expansion of state 
powers to control all of a nation’s resources. However, arguments regarding the extent 
to which a specific conflict can be labelled as ‘total’, based on the unreserved use of 
resources, have up to now focussed on manpower, industrial products and economies 
rather than natural materials.19 Yet  in a link between the concept of total war and 
environmental history, the eminent environmental historian John McNeill states that 
the ‘efforts in the two world wars were all-consuming,’ and environmental histories 
                                                 
18 Paul Cox, ‘The Canadian Forestry Corp in Woburn Sands 1917-1918’, Milton Keynes Heritage  
Association: The Woburn Sands collection,  
http://www.mkheritage.co.uk/wsc/docs/1917%20Canadians.html [accessed 6 June 2016], p. 1; Porter, 
A Review of Activities with the 126th Company Canadi n Forestry Corps, n.p.; Rodney Gunner. 
Canadian Lumber Camp Eartham and Slindon: 1917 till 1919, pp.1-12 [pdf. File 
‘canadian_lumber_camp_eartham_and_slindon.pdf’] through links on www.westsussexpast.org.uk    
19 Stig Förster and Jorg Nagler, 'Introduction', in Stig Förster and Jorg Nagler (ed.), On the Road to 
Total War: The American Civil War and the German Wars of Unification, 1861-1871 (Washington 
D.C: German Historical Institute, 1997), passim; Edward Hagerman, 'Union Generalship, Political 
Leadership, and Total War Strategy', in Stig Förster and Jorg Nagler (ed.), On the Road to Total War: 
The American Civil War and the German Wars of Unification, 1861-1871 (Washington D.C: German 
Historical Institute, 1997), passim; see debates in Arthur Marwick, Clive Emsley and Wendy Simpson 
(eds.), Total War and Historical Change: Europe, 1914-1955 (Buckingham, 2001), passim; Roger 
Chickering and Stig Förster, Great War, Total War: Combat and Mobilization on the Western Front, 
1914-1918, (Washington D.C: German Historical Institute, 2000), passim; Noel Whiteside, 'The 
British Population at War', in John Turner (ed.), Britain and the First World War (London: Unwin 
Hyman, 1988), pp. 85-98.                                                                                                 
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have provided much contextual information for this work and aided in comparing pre-
war and wartime attitudes to forestry among the HLO personnel.20  
Environmental and ecological factors such as topography, natural resources, 
weather and disease have always had a major role in altering the course and outcomes 
of battles, military campaigns and wars. As such they have naturally been regularly 
considered within the field of military history. However, detailed research into the 
dramatic effects of warfare on the environment have until the last few decades been 
much less common, but are now increasing within environmental history.21 Such 
works will, therefore, be utilised even more in the future works mentioned above on 
aspects of the forestry effort at lower levels and its effects on interwar forests and 
forestry practices.22  
Another useful category of the historiography for this research has been that 
containing histories of forestry or forested areas within a particular geographical 
region which include the First World War within their chronological span. Most 
importantly, these reach the conclusions that British forestry was in a very poor state 
prior to the war and as such the country was far too reliant on imports. There are also 
debates on how the empire could educate the centre on forestry matters, showing that 
there had been pre-war calls for centrally establishing more scientific forestry practices 
but that this was not recognised as sufficiently important, and that fortunately France’s 
state-managed forests were in a much better condition for timber production in 1914. 
                                                 
20 John Robert McNeill, Something New Under the Sun: An Environmental History of the Twentieth-
Century World (London: Penguin Press, 2001), p. 341. 
21 Ibid., pp. 341-347; I. G. Simmons, Changing the Face of the Earth, pp. 115-6, 314-9; J. R. McNeill, 
‘Forests and Warfare in World History’ notes from a lecture (circa 2002), accessed at 
http://www.foresthistory.org/Events/McNeill%20Lecture.pdf [accessed 18 December 2013]; Jeremy 
Black, Rethinking Military History, (Abingdon: Routledge, 2004), pp. 50, 53. 
22 McNeill, Something New Under the Sun, p. xxii; Lloyd C. Irland, 'State Failure, Corruption, and 
Warfare: Challenges for Forest Policy', Journal of Sustainable Forestry, Vol.27:3 (2008); Philippe Le 
Billon, 'Diamond Wars? Conflict Diamonds and Geographies of Resource Wars', Annals of the 
Association of American Geographers, Vol.98:2 (2008).                        
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Such works also reveal important issues and concerns within pre-war forestry that 
managing organisations had to consider, even if often only as secondary to the needs 
of the war.23 An especially important work is Edward Stebbing’s appraisal of the state 
of British forestry in 1916, and requirements for greater future efficiency, British 
Forestry: Its Recent Position and Outlook After the War (1916), portraying a 
particularly poor state of affairs. He sent a copy of the book to the Prime Minister, 
Lloyd George, in the hope that it would explain ‘the present and future position of 
timber supplies of this country’.24 Certainly, contemporary situations did not look 
good, and this was largely due to forestry’s neglect in the past, as will be shown in 
chapter 1. A growing section of works that add to the argument that improvements in 
forestry practices had been undertaken in imperial settings, and calls for implications 
of lessons learned had reached the UK by the 1850s, can be seen in research relating 
to imperial environmental history.25 As will be seen in this work, the First World War 
further brought these two spheres of forestry thinking together urgently.  
                                                 
23 Examples include; William Schlich, Forestry in the United Kingdom (London: Bradbury Agnew & 
Co., 1904); Edward Stebbing, British Forestry (London: Murray, 1916); NDG James A History of 
English Forestry (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1981), pp. 201, 207-17; E.G Richards British Forestry in 
the 20th Century: Policy and Achievements (Leiden & Boston: Brill, 2003), p. xxxiii; Sylvie Nail, 
Forest Policies and Social Change in England (Dordrecht: Springer, 2008), pp. 53-55; T.W. Birch, 
‘The Afforestation of Britain’ in Economic Geography Vol.12 No.1 (Jan, 1936), p.3; Roger Miles 
Forestry in the English Landscape: A Study of the cultivation of trees and their relationship to natural 
amenity and plantation design (London: Faber, 1967), p. 29; Woolsey, Theodore S. J., Studies in 
French Forestry; with Two Chapters contributed by William B. Greeley, (New York: J. Wiley & 
Sons, 1920); Raphael Zon and William Sparhawk, Forest Resources of the World, Volumes 1&2 
(New York & London, McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1923); Joshua A. West, ‘Forests and National 
Security: British and American Forestry Policy in the Wake of World War 1’, Environmental History 
No.8 (April, 2003), pp. 272-8, 287-9; J.M Powell, ‘‘Dominion over palm and Pine’: the British 
Empire Forestry Conferences, 1920-1947’, Journal of Historical Geography No.33 (2007), pp. 852-3. 
For French forests see Stephen Pyne, 'Frontiers of Fire', in Tom Griffiths and Libby Robin (ed.), 
Ecology and Empire: Environmental History of Settler Societies (Edinburgh: Keele University Press, 
1997), p. 28; an excellent work is Theodore S Woolsey, Jr. Studies in French Forestry (New York 
and London, 1920) which was started before the war, but completed and published after it. 
24 Stebbing, this was a private letter, Stebbing to Lloyd George, which I found inside the book in the 
Lloyd George collection in Special collections at the University of Kent. 
25 Examples include; Peter R. Gillis and Thomas R. Roach, Lost Initiatives: Canada’s Forest 
Industries, Forest Policy and Forest Conservation (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1986); 
Griffiths and Robin (eds.), Ecology and Empire; Gregory A. Barton Empire Forestry and the Origins 
of Environmentalism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002); Ravi S Rajan, Modernizing 
Nature: Forestry and Imperial Development 1800-1950 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2006); William 
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The final category is the environmental-military approach, a relatively new school 
that focuses on the way in which warfare has effected different environments. It 
includes contributions from academics with a wide range of disciplinary backgrounds 
and often discusses the actions of relevant HLOs to illustrate the environmental effects 
of militarisation.26 For example Professor Richard Tucker’s chapter ‘The World Wars 
and the Globalization of Timber Cutting’ is primarily interested in the organisations 
and infrastructures put in place around the world, often as a result of the First World 
War, that meant the Second World War proved far more devastating to global forests 
than its predecessor.27   
It can be seen, therefore, that whilst many works can be utilised to gain insight 
into elements and the context of the British Empire’s forestry effort, none have 
concentrated solely on the high-level management of obtaining wood and timber in 
sufficient quantities. A few brief details can be located on the organisations and 
agreements established to secure and manage this vital resource. Some early works 
give in-depth details of particular aspects of the work of some of the main forestry 
units, and some illustrate the devastating effects of war on the environment which, as 
will be shown, the directors of the effort would have had to consider. 
                                                 
Beinart and Lotte Hughes, ‘Environment and Empire’, in The Oxford History of the British Empire 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007); Jan Oosthoek, ‘The colonial Origins of Scientific Forestry 
in Britain’, online paper accessed at <http://www.eh-resources.org/colonial_forestry.html> [accessed 
30 April 2013].  
26 West, ‘Forests and National Security’, p. 270; Chris Pearson, Mobilizing Nature: The 
Environmental History of War and Militarization in Modern France (Manchester: Manchester 
University Press, 2012); Chris Pearson, Peter Coates and Tim Cole (eds.), Militarized Landscapes 
From Gettysburg to Salisbury Plain (London and New York: Continuum, 2010); Peter Coates, Tim 
Cole, Marianna Dudley and Chris Pearson, ‘Defending Nation, Defending Nature? Militarized 
Landscapes and Military Environmentalism in Britain, France, and the United States’, Environmental 
History Vol.16 Iss.3, pp. 456-491. 
27 Richard P. Tucker, ‘The World Wars and the Globalization of Timber Cutting,’ in Richard P. 
Tucker and Edmund Russell (eds.), Natural Enemy, Natural Ally: Towards an Environmental History 
of War (Corvallis: Oregon State University Press, 2004), pp. 110-141. West’s ‘Forests and National 
Security’ can also be seen as fitting into this category of an environmental-military approach. 
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Methodological Notes  
The initial intention of this project was to combine elements of military, 
environmental, political, diplomatic, social and cultural history interwoven 
throughout. A good example of this would be the 1916 negotiations between British 
and French politicians, senior military representatives and forestry professionals in 
order to allow increased utilisation of French forests prized for social and cultural 
reasons by the French State and its citizens, as discussed in chapter 3. However, as the 
work progressed and the word limit necessitated greater focus on the specific area of 
high level management it became apparent that the approach most needed is that of a 
‘top-down’ administrative history, which although currently unfashionable suits this 
work. It can therefore be most accurately labelled as a Military-Administrative 
approach, perhaps reviving an approach and subject matter more commonly used in 
works up to the 1980s.28 However, a major part of the work has remained to illustrate 
wherever HLO personnel did take environmental issues into consideration and the 
subject matter, trees, alone helps maintain an occasional environmental history feel.  
Another approach used in this study is to consider the use of other natural 
resources, especially in regards to agriculture, as contextual settings for, or 
comparisons with, the forestry effort. As shall become clear, there were many parallels 
in the problems faced and measures taken to control both agriculture and forestry 
during periods of the war, as well as obvious differences such as length of growth 
period. Both had suffered from political neglect and remained massively reliant on 
imports before the war, so both were affected by the lack of sufficient merchant 
                                                 
28 See for instance John Sweetman, War and Administration: The Significance of the Crimean War for 
the British Army (Edinburgh: Scottish Academic press, 1984), which in a 1984 review in ‘Albion: A 
Quarterly Journal Concerned with British Studies’, (Vol.17, No.4, Winter 1985), pp .514-515, Wilbur 
Devereux Jones calls the ‘latest probing into the confused and confusing area of British 
administration’.  
Page 31 of 386 
 
 
shipping space and U-Boat campaigns, eventually having to look to significantly 
increase home production. Furthermore, self-sufficiency of both suffered due to the 
loss of similar factors of production, such as labour, machinery and finances. They 
were also both considered at times as coming under the remit of the different boards 
of agriculture, and interested parties raised fears or hopes about suggested and enacted 
controls of areas such as prices, imports and exports, labour and continued 
independent trading. In both fields recognition also grew of the need for alterations to 
post-war practices as a result of wartime shortages.29 
 
Parameters 
Some basic statistical and measurement parameters for timespan, geographical 
and forest material as applied in this work will now be set out to clarify some of the 
important decisions made regarding these areas in setting boundaries to the thesis. The 
work will cover the period 1914-1918, although largely focusing on 1916-1918 by 
when the realisation of the extended and all-consuming nature of the war had become 
apparent, necessitating large scale new methods to secure timber. However, as 
mentioned above, chapter 1 will contain some contextual information regarding pre-
war forestry, and future works based on research carried out but not used in this thesis 
will include the war’s effects on British and British Empire forests and forestry 
professions. Geographically concentration is on the efforts to supply wood for the 
main British theatres of the war, the Western and Home Fronts. Information relating 
to other theatres such as the Indian Forestry Department’s struggle for qualified 
manpower and labour to provide the necessary timber for the Salonika expedition or 
                                                 
29 Dewey, British Agriculture, pp. 4, 5, 28-9 and numerous documents and readings seen throughout 
this research. 
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the timber sent to Gallipoli, have been excluded from an already extensively resourced 
thesis.30 Although concentrating on the efforts of Great Britain and its Empire, the 
forestry actions or opinions of other combatants are only used where considered useful 
comparisons. This is especially true of the USA as Britain’s ally from 1917, and a 
major contributor to the forestry effort after this time. With regards to materials 
included, those classed as directly helping the war effort are focused upon, these 
primarily being pit-timber, fuel wood and construction timber of all shapes and sizes, 
mainly softwoods but some hardwoods required for special purposes. One area that 
has been identified during this research as being especially deserving of future study 
is that of paper pulp. The efforts to supply this vitally important forest product 
necessitated much debate and work during the war, with shortages leading to a 
separate Paper Commission, controlling committees and import restrictions similar to 
those for timber.31 
Concerning available statistics, P.E Dewey regularly illustrates the difficulties of 
establishing accurate figures in many areas of the agricultural effort, and the pitfalls 
in unquestioningly using contemporary information.32 In terms of forestry, and most 
definitely in terms of amounts cut, converted or used, similar difficulties have been 
found in establishing definitive, accurate total figures. Earl Selborne, recognising in 
June 1917 that whilst efforts to organise the best possible production of timber was ‘a 
subject of great public interest’, knew that both the public and parliament had received 
only a few scraps of information.33 Accurate figures for production and usage were 
                                                 
30 See for example Hansard, House of Commons Sitting 20 October 1915, ‘Wooden Shelters’ [for the 
Dardanelles], col. 1774. 
31 TNA/CAB/23/1/70, Minutes of War Cabinet Meeting 70, 16 February 1917, p. 2. 
32 Dewey, British Agriculture, passim, for instance see p. 2, also chapter 4 on recruiting and farm 
labour gives a great idea of difficulties of statistical use from this period, pp. 36-59 and p. 73 ref 
fertilisers. 
33 Hansard, House of Lords Sitting 26 June 1917, cols. 635-6 
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clearly difficult to obtain at the time, and have remained so. Experts often made the 
case, before, during and after the war, that no accurate survey or assessment of the 
amount of useful woodlands existing in Britain, or lands suitable for afforestation, had 
taken place. Estimates of such quantities, however, were and have continued to be 
fairly commonplace.34 In July 1917, the President of the Board of Trade, controlling 
all supplies of timber by then, was asked to inform the House of Commons of the 
number of acres of softwoods that had been felled through the UK so far in the war, 
and what percentage of the pre-war acreage of the nation that was. He informed his 
colleagues that this would be impossible as obtaining such data from estate owners 
and merchants would overwhelm ‘an already over-worked Department’ egating any 
useful effects gained through such an exercise.35 Furthermore, as of January 1918 
expert foresters were stating that no overall record of wartime felling, in Britain at 
least, had been kept.36 As well as the numerous bodies involved and the often urgent 
need for timber, the sheer scale of timber operations must have been a factor in the 
lack of accurate record keeping. For instance German production of timber from their 
occupied lands in Eastern Europe got so large that they stopped recording how much 
was cut, and simply recorded the monetary value of timber shipments.37 Maclean 
states that definitive records of British or Allied production or usage were unlikely to 
exist, especially from the early stages of the war, and this remains the situation.38  
However, in both primary and secondary sources figures cut, converted, shipped, 
requested or used for particular periods, or by particular bodies, are given to illustrate 
                                                 
34 For instance see Hansard, House of Commons Sitting 17 February 1914, cols. 766-7; 
TNA/CAB/24/39/19, ‘Forestry Administration’, (January 1918), p. 1; Birch, ‘The Afforestation’, p. 3; 
Miles, Forestry in the English Landscape, p. 29. 
35 Hansard, House of Commons Sitting 23 July 1917, col. 856. 
36 TNA/CAB/24/39/19, ‘Forestry Administration’, p. 1.  
37 Liulevicius, War Land on the Eastern Front, p. 72. 
38 Maclean, Farming and Forestry on the Western Front, p. 96.  
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the impressive scale of the efforts involved, and this is the approach primarily adopted 
by this work. Furthermore, as reliable figures have been found they have been added 
to various spreadsheets relating to requirements, production, imports or use and these 
have been used in reaching conclusions in this study. As well as giving an idea of 
quantities involved, utilised where appropriate in the text, these spreadsheets also 
illustrate the difficulty in reaching any kind of definitive overall statistics. Some 
authors have made sweeping statements, such as that the CFC produced seventy per 
cent of allied lumber used during the war.39 However, such exact statements, without 
a great deal of qualifying and quantifying of figures as well as acknowledgements of 
the often haphazard ways of obtaining supplies in the early periods, are difficult to 
prove. Therefore, this work agrees with several contemporary and secondary sources, 
referenced above, in that exact figures for many periods of the war, especially the early 
stages, are impossible to ascertain. Therefore establishing accurate overall figures for 
many aspects of the effort is impossible.  
Differing units of measurements used including historical differences between the 
war and now and national differences, such as those between how the Canadian, 
American, European and British timber trades defined the ‘same’ units, can also 
complicate the use of statistical material. Where used within the text, as much 
statistical information as possible has been converted into as few variables as possible 
in terms of unit measurements of weight, volume, length and financial value, to allow 
meaningful comparisons. However, for more details on the units of measurement 
commonly used in this work see appendix ‘Measurements’. 
Regarding financial comparisons, websites used to convert old money to current 
costs are cited with the particular example. To give a contextual comparison between 
                                                 
39 Gunner, Canadian Lumber Camp Eartham and Slindon, p. 2. 
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finances involved in the timber effort and a particularly symbolic element of the pre-
war arms race, amounts spent on timber are occasionally compared to the cost of a 
new Dreadnought.40 It was felt, incorrectly, that to keep up with Germany Britain must 
budget for and build six Dreadnought battleships annually, between 1909–12, not 
good news for Liberal Ministers hoping to spend more on social reforms. Nonetheless 
the cry thanks to a ‘Conservative-inspired naval scare in parliament and the press’ 
became ‘We want eight and we won't wait’, and government managed to fund the 
building of eighteen of the giant warships by the end of 1912, at a cost of 
approximately £2.5 a piece; a 1915-16 Queen Elizabeth Class, ‘Super Dreadnought,’ 
costing 2.5m.41 Although it can also be said, in comparison, that at the end of 1915 the 
war was costing Britain £5m a day, and ‘the country’s deficit would mount to £600m 
by March 1916 and £2,000m a year later’, the Government Timber Buyer alone made 
approximately £50m worth of timber purchases in this capacity throughout the war.42 
This was equivalent to approximately twenty dreadnoughts. So although costs on 
timber were clearly small in comparison to the nation’s overall spending, they were 
not insignificant.  
Introduction Summary 
The British Empire forestry effort to keep the mines and factories of the Home 
Front producing, the trenches standing and the Allied armies on the Western Front in 
the war has been overlooked as a separate issue by the vast majority of the historians 
writing about the First World War. Therefore this thesis creates a basis for future 
                                                 
40 D. M. Cregier, ‘McKenna, Reginald (1863–1943)’, Oxford Dictionary of National Biography, 
Oxford University Press, 2004; online edn, Jan 2011 
<http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/34744>, [accessed 26 Nov 2016]. 
41 Ibid, p.14; TNA/BT/71/21, Bird, pp.14,7-10; and based on estimated cost of £2.5m for the Queen 
Elizabeth (1916), from Jane’s Fighting Ships (1914 Edition) as quoted by Barry Slemmings in ‘How 
Much Did a Warship Cost?’, <www.gwpda.org/naval/wcosts.htm> [last accessed 3 May 2014]. 
42 Turner, British Politics, p. 81. 
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academic work on numerous environmental, military, social and cultural aspects of 
this important element of the war, the effects of which are still visible in the work of 
organisations such as the Forestry Commission and in landscapes of the UK and 
France today. To achieve this it outlines and draws conclusions on the largely 
administrative thinking processes and work, as well as any environmental concerns, 
of those responsible for the overarching establishment and then management of this 
unprecedented task. It will review the many methods used to secure sufficient 
quantities, from permit systems to raising a whole corps of Canadian lumbermen to 
work as hard as humanly possible in British and French forests, showing how, 
notwithstanding understandable yet only occasional disagreements and 
misunderstandings, these measures were well conceived and executed. However, 
before reaching these conclusions the next two chapters will establish a firm base of 
knowledge in terms of the state of pre-war forestry, important uses and significant 
contextual periods during the war, as well as the raison d'être and work of the many 
advisory or controlling bodies involved. This not only begins the argument that within 
the chaos of the times a good degree of sensible thought and expert knowledge was 
used wisely, but also introduces these important figures and organisations which will 
help in better understanding the remainder of the work.      
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Chapter 1: The Poor State of Pre-War Forestry, Wartime Uses and Periods of 
Shortage Concerns. 
This chapter provides contextual information on pre-war forestry, wartime uses 
and some prominent periods of concern over timber shortages, further illustrating why 
this resource was of such importance to the continued prosecution of the war, and 
therefore to its historiography. It also provides important background knowledge 
particularly useful in contextualising the aims and measures undertaken by the HLOs 
throughout the remainder of this thesis.     
The Pre-War State of Forests and Forestry 
Anyone who goes through the New Forest and compares the miserable and 
scanty trees seen there with the magnificent forests of Germany, France, 
Belgium and Denmark, must be struck by the fact that in this country the 
Government have not used the Crown lands to the best advantage.1 
 
This statement, made in the UK parliament in April 1914 just four months before 
war began, aptly describes the condition of much of what little was left of British 
woodland, publicly or privately owned. Under successive monarchs and governments, 
stretching back for centuries, there had been little economic or nationalistic incentive 
for woodland owners to properly manage them for timber production. The country 
remained disastrously over reliant on imports.  
The first part of this section will focus on the negative aspects of pre-war forestry, 
such as financial and landownership reasons for lack of management, and 
overconfidence in external supplies. However, as well as providing proof of this poor 
state of affairs, the section will go on to argue that many positive aspects and measures, 
                                                 
1 Hansard, House of Commons Sitting 8 April 2014, cols. 2039-2040. In the online version of 
Parliamentary Debates the sixth from last word in this debate is ‘Grown’. However, in the paper 
version of the same debate it is ‘Crown’. See; ‘The Parliamentary Debates (Official Report), Fifth 
Series, Vol LX, House of Commons Third Volume of Session 1914 (London, 1914). Also, for a more 
modern view, see William E. Schmidt, 'Who's Merry Now? Sherwood Forest may be Sold', New York 
Times, Friday 8 April 1994, p. 4. 
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in terms of financial incentives or because of environmental concerns, had begun to 
be instigated. These were largely due to lessons from imperial settings, where forestry 
education and practice was well ahead of the UK. Calls were being made from at least 
the mid-nineteenth century to improve the UK’s timber situation through measures 
including centrally-led scientific management and afforestation. It will be shown that 
some educational and physical initiatives had begun by 1914, although not to the 
extent many experts wanted. However, such considerations would have been in the 
consciousness of those experts utilised by the high level forestry bodies during the war 
even if, as shall be seen, they remained secondary to acquiring sufficient supplies.  
Furthermore, there was by the outbreak of war a small body of forestry experts, 
professional or ‘gentleman’, who would become central within the HLOs.  
Historical reasons for poor forests 
Examples of and reasons for the particularly poor state of UK forests in 1914 are 
easy to find in secondary and primary sources. Over millennia the use of forests by a 
growing population through various agricultural and industrial revolutions, and 
devastating wars, had resulted in dramatic reductions in ancient virgin jungles.2 Th  
central reason to maintain Crown Forests, game preservation, had declined and their 
size had dramatically reduced. Through Tudor and Stuart times they also became 
prized as sources of timber, especially for naval purposes.3 Unfortunately a slight 
resurgence in interest in private planting as a hobby from the mid-seventeenth century 
began to fade towards the end of the nineteenth. It also remained of little importance 
                                                 
2 Board of Agriculture and Fisheries, Office of Woods, Forests and L  Revenues, Cd.7488 Joint 
Annual Report of the Forestry Branches for the Year 1912-1913, (London: HMSO, 1914), p. 7, see 
Chapter 3, pp. 16-24 for an ‘Historical Note on the management of the Crown Forests and Woods’ 
which gives brief details; David Ross, Scotland: History of a Nation,  (New Lanark: Lomond Books, 
2002),  p. 40 for brief details on Scotland’s ancient forests; Stebbing, British Forestry, pp. xii-xiii, 
xxi; Richard Grove, ‘Scotland in South Africa’, in Griffiths and Robin (eds.), Ecology and Empire, 
pp. 144-5; Miles, Forestry in the English Landscape, p. 28.   
3 Ibid., pp. 25-27; Cd.7488 Joint Annual Report of the Forestry Branches 1912-1913, pp. 7-8, 17. 
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to governments and industries due to growth in imports of better quality wood at 
cheaper prices and centralisation of land ownership.4 As early as the 1660s John 
Evelyn, a scholar, court official and Royal Society member, wrote the extremely 
important treatise Sylva, or a Discourse of Forest Trees and the Propagation of Timber 
in His Majesty’s Dominions (1664), leading to many subsequent editions. He 
recognised that most woods were planted for amenity and sporting purposes, and by 
the later stages of the nineteenth century private woods in Britain were still seen by 
many simply as game coverts and aesthetic ‘ornaments’ to big estates. Even forests 
run by public organisations were maintained solely for recreational rather than 
economic purposes. 5 
Land ownership had a particularly negative effect on forests, as agriculture was 
often preferred to timber production. Thanks to alterations in traditional systems of 
agricultural land tenure, larger landowners expanded their holdings from the 1750s 
onwards. This was at the expense of small landowning farmers and vastly increased 
numbers of tenant farmers. Yet both landowners and tenants recognised woodland as 
less profitable than cultivated fields.6 By 1914 land ownership was for the few, and 
although most of the nation’s calories were still imported, crop or grazing land was 
greatly preferred over woodlands.7 Britain’s gradual deforestation, lack of incentives 
for landowners to replant, increasing population and reliance on industry meant that 
by the late nineteenth century Britain was importing approximately ninety per cent of 
its timber.8 Several other financial and industrial factors also helped reduce the 
                                                 
4 Ibid., p. 8; Stebbing, British Forestry, p. xiii. 
5 Ibid., pp. xxvi-xxiii, 14; Schlich, Forestry in the United Kingdom, pp. 6-8, 24, 29, 51. 
6 Miles, Forestry in the English Landscape, p. 29. 
7 Dewey, British Agriculture, pp. 1-7, 240-42. 
8 Beinart and Hughes, ‘Environment and Empire’, pp. 10-11; Ministry of Reconstruction, Cd.8881 
Reconstruction Committee, Forestry Sub-Committee, Final Report : Reconstruction Committee, 
Forestry Sub-Committee, Final Report (London: HMSO, 1918), p.14;  Cd.7488 Joint Annual Report 
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importance of forestry in Britain, thereby increasing imports. These included a change 
to steel in the bulk of materials required for shipbuilding, and the removal of import 
duties from colonial timber in 1864 and all foreign timber in 1866. This also ended 
complex customs procedures and the need for large sums up front to pay duties, 
allowing smaller firms to compete with larger importers and agents and the Baltic and 
Scandinavian countries to massively increase their exports to Britain. Closer bonds 
with countries such as America, Canada and Australia, following the  mid-Victorian 
abolition of duties on agricultural imports, as well as technological improvements in 
railway and shipping networks all made imports cheaper and home grown timber even 
less profitable.9 
Britain was also able to afford to import a great deal more than she produced 
thanks to huge earning on overseas investments, excellent terms of trade and 
‘invisible’ earners such as shipping and insurance.10 Even though by the 1880s a 
‘considerable and prosperous’ home-grown trade in hardwoods had been established, 
this still needed supplementing with imports for furniture, railway construction and 
shipbuilding.11 The UK became a workshop rather than a producer of raw materials.12 
Arguments against the need for afforestation were made by those that saw the country 
as a trading nation whose economy and powerful position in the world markets would 
simply enable her to buy wood.13  This reliance on imports was central to many of the 
                                                 
of the Forestry Branches 1912-1913  (1914), p.10 for similar figures but in ‘loads’ of unmanufactured 
timber. 
9 Ibid., pp. 22-24; Stebbing, British Forestry, pp. 14, 164-65; Offer, Agrarian Interpretation, pp. 1-6;  
P.J Cain and A.G Hopkins, British Imperialism 1688-2000, (Harlow: Pearson Education, Second ed.,  
2002), p. 206; Turner, British Politics, p.172; Bryan Latham, History of the Timber Trade Federation  
of the United Kingdom: The First Seventy Years, (London: Ernest Benn Limited, 1965), pp. 16-17. 
10 Niall Ferguson, Empire: How Britain made the Modern World (London: Penguin Books, 2004), pp. 
241, 244-47. 
11 Latham, History of the Timber Trade Federation, p. 23; Schlich, Forestry in the United Kingdom,  
p. 8. 
12 Offer, Agrarian Interpretation, pp. 1-6.  
13 E.G Richards, British Forestry in the 20th Century, p. xvii. 
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obstacles faced by wartime forestry HLOs. Figures show a large and steady increase 
of loads of, and expenditure on, wood products from 1801 to 1841. From 1843 
onwards this becomes a sharp and fairly constant rise for each decade up to 1912.14 In 
1851 imports of timber amounted to 3.5 cubic feet per head of population, by 1911 
they had risen to 10.5 cubic feet per person.15 The yearly average for imports for the 
five years 1909 to 1913 was 10,204,000 ‘loads’, at an average cost of £27,561,421, or 
approximately ten Dreadnoughts per year. Some figures even suggesting this reached 
£40m, or nearly fifteen Dreadnoughts-worth, in 1913.16 As a comparison production 
of home grown timber in the UK was not reaching 2m tons per year by 1904, whereas 
imports were exceeding 10m, and an average pre-war consumption of 45m cubic feet 
per annum of home grown timber can be compared against approximately 560m cubic 
feet of imports.17 Total imports in 1913 equalled approximately 11.6m tons, with just 
0.9m tons produced domestically.18 Britain was still dangerously reliant on imports of 
timber for its industrial and civil needs as the war began.19  
                                                 
14 Cd.8881 Reconstruction Committee, Forestry Sub-Committee, Final Report, pp. 14-16, see tables 
on 1.16 for detailed breakdown of types of wood and the state they wer  imported in. These tables 
also illustrate how the loads of different types of wood imports reduced at different rates during 1915 
and 1916, for instance hardwood imports decreasing much more sharply than those of pit-props. 
Furthermore how although quantities of imports decreased in 1915 and 1916 the values of those 
smaller amounts still increased, reflecting price increases in timber. 
15 Ibid., p. 14; Cd.7488 Joint Annual Report of the Forestry Branches 1912-1913, p. 10. 
16 Cd.8881 Reconstruction Committee, Forestry Sub-Committee, Final Report, pp. 14-16; Nicholson, 
Canadian Expeditionary Force, pp. 499, 500. 
17 Schlich, Forestry in the United Kingdom, p. 8; Cd.8881 Reconstruction Committee, Forestry Sub-
Committee, Final Report, p. 14; Calculated approximately from figures in text, and fn.13, as 10.2m 
loads per year average multiplied by 55 cubic feet per load (half way between hewn softwood and 
sawn or split timber which made up the bulk of imports). 
18 TNA/CAB/24/34/46, ‘Minute by the Timber Controller for the War Cabinet on the Critical Position 
of the Timber Supply’, 1 December 1917; Hill, 'The Canadian Forestry Corps', p.302 puts at 11.5m
tons. For a more detailed review of the quantities and value of wood and timber in many different 
forms imported into, and exported from, the UK on an annual basis see the annual Statistical Abstract 
for the United Kingdom in each of the last Fifteen years published by HMSO. For instance Cd.9137 
Statistical Abstract for the United Kingdom in each of the last Fifteen Years from 1902 to 1916 
(London: HMSO, 1918), pp. 134-7, 140-2, 150-3, 158-9, 161-3, 184-5, 200-1, 206-7, 220-3, 228-9, 
234-5, 264-5, 268-71, 275, 278, 280; Nicholson, Canadian Expeditionary Force, pp. 499, 500; 
TNA/BT/71/21, Bird, p. 1. 
19 The best illustrations of this are in Schlich, Forestry in the United Kingdom, Stebbing, British 
Forestry; Cd.8881 Reconstruction Committee, Forestry Sub-Committee, Final Report, pp. 4-20; 
Beinart and Hughes, ‘Environment and Empire’, p. 113. 
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Britain was by far the largest recipient of timber imports in the world, receiving 
more than double the next largest importer at the time, which was Germany.20 Up to 
July 1914 the UK took in half of the world’s total imports of forest produce, mainly 
in various forms of softwoods.21 1904 figures for the major European combatants in 
the forthcoming war show that only two were net exporters, Austria-Hungary at 3.67m 
tons and Russia with Finland, at 5.9m tons.22 Combining figures for the Allied powers 
of Great Britain, France, Belgium, Italy, Portugal and Russia gives a net import total 
of 6.12m tons per year, slightly more than Russia’  annual net export amount. 
Germany was also importing a net amount more than her main ally Austria-Hungary’s 
net exports per year.23  
To source imports Britain, since at least the late eighteenth century, looked mainly 
to the northern coniferous belt, especially Russia, but also the Baltic States, Norway 
and Sweden, and to a lesser extent Canada.24 The majority of 1913-14 imports were 
received from Russia, Sweden and Norway, which between them supplied sixty-seven 
per cent. Smaller amounts also came from France, in pit-props, America, Canada, and 
a comparatively very small amount from Germany and Austria-Hungary.25 Russia’s 
importance can be seen in that, ironically given events in 1917, Stebbing’s main 
concern in 1916 was that post-war Russia would no longer have the capital to provide 
the massive amounts of timber Europe would need. He therefore urged diplomatic 
agreements be reached as soon as possible, even the possibility of Britain renting and 
                                                 
20 Schlich, Forestry in the United Kingdom, pp. 9-10. 
21 Stebbing, British Forestry, pp. 2, 5, 6, 67. 
22 Schlich, Forestry in the United Kingdom, p. 11. 
23 Ibid. 
24 Ibid., p. 15; E.G Richards, British Forestry in the 20th Century, p. xvii; Gillis and Roach, Lost 
Initiatives, passim, for instance see pp. 1-7, 24; Beinart and Hughes, ‘Environment and Empire’, p. 
113; Miles, Forestry in the English Landscape, p. 28; Latham, History of the Timber Trade 
Federation, p. 14; Stebbing, British Forestry, pp. 2, 5, 6, 67. 
25 Ibid. 
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managing areas of Russian forests.26 Canadian timber was more financially viable due 
to political changes in import duties at specific times, for instance during the 
Napoleonic Wars, but  duty levels coupled with freight charges meant similar or 
slightly better prices could be achieved on Baltic or Scandinavian imports.27 Therefore 
although the lumber industry was a major element of Canada’s export revenues, and 
at times employed nearly half of adult males, it often faced bias from British merchants 
until the 1930s. Indeed, most exports headed to America not Europe, although the 
Dominion had certainly been recognised as a valuable potential source by the late 
nineteenth century.28 Hardwoods and other forest products could also be obtained from 
the vast rain forests of tropical countries, many being within the British Empire.29 
Yet even with the empire and the world’s most powerful navy, threats to these 
vital timber supplies from northern Europe or across the Atlantic, as well as of other 
resources, had been well noted before 1914. Again as far back as the 1790s Baltic 
supplies were occasionally cut off by naval blockades, even though ‘naval stratagems’ 
had been put in place to keep these ports open. The import trade had been badly 
disrupted by the Crimean and American Civil War and by economic slumps in Britain, 
or around the world. It was also recognised with hindsight in 1918 that the country 
had been vulnerable at the start of the war not just because of the small size of its army, 
but also due to its reliance on imports of timber, food and chemical supplies.30 It i  
clear that by 1914 the state of the UK’s woodlands, timber production capabilities and 
forestry expertise had been largely ignored due to plentiful and financially viable 
                                                 
26 Ibid., pp. 5-6, 9, 155-159  
27 Latham, History of the Timber Trade Federation, pp. 14, 16-17. 
28 Gillis and Roach, Lost Initiatives, pp. 1-3, 24; Schlich, Forestry in the United Kingdom, p. 15. 
29 E.G Richards, British Forestry in the 20th Century, p. xvii. 
30 Hansard, House of Lords Sitting, 6 March 1918. 
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imports. Although the risk of blockade to supplies had been recognised, imports 
remained the principal source by a large margin.   
The poor quality, or appropriateness, of timber grown in the UK thanks to what 
Stebbing labelled the ‘English’ method of growing timber, which recent 
improvements in forestry education had not had time to correct in practical results, 
also contributed to reliance on imports. These included leaving a great deal of space 
between trees to encourage shorter thicker trees with large branches, preferred in 
shipbuilding, the species of softwood now wanted by many industries not being grown 
in Britain, and trees not being kept clear of knots as now preferred by the markets. The 
type of practices needed to make forestry a main industry in Britain before the war 
were only just achieving wider recognition, and due to this imports were still the 
cheaper option and were grown to better, more suitable, qualities.31 
The issues outlined above would cause major difficulties for the wartime HLOs. 
However, it will now be shown that, alongside fears of blockade, other financial and 
environmental arguments for improved forestry in the UK had been made before the 
war. Furthermore, some measures, from pushes for increased planting to better 
education, had been made at times over the centuries, and more importantly in the 
decades leading to 1914. 
Recognition, and some small positive steps 
Many woodland management techniques had been common practice in Britain 
throughout history, and in recent centuries the popularity of efforts to improve 
sustainability had waxed and waned to give mixed, but as shown above, largely poor 
results. Some conservation laws were passed, for instance following the restoration of 
                                                 
31 Stebbing, British Forestry, pp. 14, 161, 163-6; Cd.7488 Joint Annual Report of the Forestry 
Branches 1912-1913, p. 9. 
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King Charles II in 1660 and formation of the Royal Society in 1662, when institutions 
vital to the nation’s place on the world stage, especially the navy, were seen to be 
threatened by lack of appropriate home grown timber. From this time onwards there 
were numerous calls from experts or parliamentary committees for centralisation 
under the State, better education and training and increased ‘scientific’ afforestation 
by public bodies and individuals, for both financial and environmental reasons. The 
number of studies, recommendations and occasional regulations enacted do show 
recognition of the numerous problems. Furthermore, there had been the beginnings of 
some small incentives to plant trees and advances in education. However, by 1914 
there was still no consistent management policy or widespread and effective incentives 
to plant and scientifically maintain woodlands for timber production. The UK’s state 
ownership of woodlands was the smallest of any European nation, it was still one of 
the very few European countries with no central government forest policy or single 
controlling body, and little planting was taking place.32 
Evelyn had encouraged planting for the navy and received royal and private 
support, with millions of trees being planted for timber and some acts to protect 
woodland being introduced with limited successes in areas around the Forest of Dean 
and New Forest.33 Some ‘enthusiastic’ landowners, particularly in Scotland, took on 
                                                 
32 E.G Richards, British Forestry in the 20th Century, pp. xvii, 254-277, Appendix B.2 for 
chronological list of legislations up to 1977; Miles, Forestry in the English Landscape, pp. 25-27, 34-
6; Cd.7488 Joint Annual Report of the Forestry Branches 1912-1913, passim, especially pp. 1, 3, 4, 7-
9, 17; Cd.8881 Reconstruction Committee, Forestry Sub-Committee, Final Report, pp. 8-13; Grove, 
'Scotland in South Africa', p. 148-9; Schlich, Forestry in the United Kingdom, pp. 15, 17-18, 28-9; 
Stebbing, British Forestry, pp. 16-18, 163; Cameron Hazlehurst, ‘Scott, Alexander MacCallum 
(1874-1928)’, Oxford Dictionary of National Biography, Oxford University Press, 2004, 
<http//www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/72181>,  [accessed 23 May 2014 ]; Mr MacCallum Scott, 
Hansard, House of Commons Sitting 17 February 1914, cols. 766-8, the Committee’s actual report 
was Cd.6085 (1912) according to Cd.8881 Reconstruction Committee, Forestry Sub-Committee, Final 
Report,  p. 12; Hansard, House of Commons Sitting 3 March 1914, cols.232-3; Hansard, House of 
Commons Sitting 8 April 1914, cols. 2039-2041, especially line by Mr McKenna (Liberal – 
Monmouthshire Northern) in col. 2041, giving the government’s view; Hansard, House of Commons 
Sitting, 18 May 1914, cols. 212-3; TNA/CAB,24/39/19, January 1918, pp. 1-4; Latham, History of the 
Timber Trade Federation, pp. 53-4. 
33 Stebbing, British Forestry, pp. xi-xii; Miles, Forestry in the English Landscape, pp. 25-28;  
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the majority of home grown timber supply needs as private enterprises, and by the end 
of the seventeenth century planting for timber was a sound investment, although half-
hearted attempts to follow ‘the fashion’ generally ended with poor results.34 However, 
these uncoordinated private efforts did increase levels of knowledge and expertise, 
combining market needs with sound forestry principles.35 
By the start of the twentieth century there were also concerns over the effects of 
deforestation around the globe and the potential for a worldwide timber shortage. Even 
the larger world forests were no longer considered inexhaustible if lacking scientific 
management and deficits between plantings and use, especially as populations and 
industries grew. This was especially recognised in European forests that supplied the 
UK, the world’s major importer, a minimum result of which would be serious price 
increases.36 Timber imports and exports to and from Europe resulted in an annual 
deficit of over 2.5m tons by 1904. The continent as a whole was using more than it 
could produce and this deficit, like Britain’s total imports, was increasing annually.37  
The deficit therefore had to be made up by imports from the rest of the world. Yet 
unsustainable levels of deforestation and their effects had also been recognised further 
afield. In America massive forest clearances since 1850, twenty million hectares being 
felled between 1870 and 1879 alone, had enabled it to become an industrial world-
power 38 In imperial settings at least fourteen million hectares had been cleared in 
                                                 
Cd.7488 Joint Annual Report of the Forestry Branches 1912-1913, pp. 17-18. 
34  W. L. Taylor, Forests and Forestry in Great Britain, (Crosby, 1945), p. 10 as quoted in  
Miles, Forestry in the English Landscape, pp. 26, 28. 
35 Miles, Forestry in the English Landscape, pp. 26, 28, 31-32, 35-6; Grove, 'Scotland in South  
Africa', p. 145; Ross, Scotland: History of a Nation, p. 326; Stebbing, British Forestry, p. xiii;  
Cd.7488 Joint Annual Report of the Forestry Branches 1912-1913, p. 8. 
36 Schlich, Forestry in the United Kingdom, passim, see especially pp. 12-13, 15, 22; Stebbing, British 
Forestry, pp. 5, 9, 55-159. 
37 Schlich, Forestry in the United Kingdom, pp. 9-10. 
38 Michael Williams, 'Ecology, Imperialism and Deforestation', in Griffiths and Robin  
(eds.), Ecology and Empire, pp. 70, 172, 173; Stebbing, British Forestry, p. 162; Beinart and Hughes,  
‘Environment and Empire’, p. 115; Schlich, Forestry in the United Kingdom, pp. 7, 14; Gillis and  
Roach, Lost Initiatives, p. 31; Grove, 'Scotland in South Africa', pp. 147-49, 151. 
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Burma, New Zealand and Australia, either for use of the timber or to allow the growing 
of rice and other crops, or grazing of livestock.39 Forestry surveys were gradually 
being made of the world’s forests and the results just before the war illustrated that 
reserves were not as large as hoped for.40  
These shortage fears aided financial arguments for better managed timber 
production both in the empire and the UK itself. The benefits of well-maintained 
reserves on the economic status of a nation, for infrastructure and export reasons, had 
been recognised in imperial settings, especially India.41 Given the level of imports 
required by the UK, it was also recognised that there were strong internal markets for 
many types of forest products.42 This, coupled with the suitability of the UK’s 
environment, meant that the 1914 report into forestry could state that;   
It is known, in the first place, that there are very large areas of uncultivated 
land which would produce better results, financially, from the growth of timber 
than from the present methods of utilisation...Secondly, there are a group of 
social economic considerations of considerable weight, such as the provision 
of adequate supplies of those timbers which are essential in every way to the 
prosperity of this country…43 
 
Timber prices had been steadily rising since the 1880s, in conjunction with a drop 
in the quantity of material of suitable quality, and this was considered likely to 
continue.44  It was therefore argued that money spent on purchases from abroad would 
be better kept in the UK through a widespread programme of afforestation. This would 
reduce the need for imports, lessen the costs of home grown timber, create healthy 
                                                 
39 Williams, 'Ecology, Imperialism and Deforestation', pp. 174, 176-7. 
40 Cd.7488 Joint Annual Report of the Forestry Branches 1912-1913, p. 10. 
41 Stebbing, British Forestry, p. 162; B.H. Baden-Powell Hand-Book of the Economic Products of the 
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and Deforestation', pp. 176-7. 
42 Cd.7488 Joint Annual Report of the Forestry Branches 1912-1913, pp. 9-10. 
43 Ibid. 
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employment in plantations, therefore also appealing to society’s fears over the 
declining health of the nation due to urbanisation, as well as create jobs in numerous 
resultant new industries near new woodlands. This could help to revitalise rural areas 
and even lead to profits from the nation becoming a net exporter.45 One pre-war 
experimental Office of Woods site on an estate at Inverliever, previously used largely 
for grazing, suggested local employment could initially be increased by sixty per cent 
and that as the new plantations came to thinning age employment would rise still 
further.46 Forestry schemes could also help rural employment especially in the winter, 
when the bulk of land preparation work for planting could be carried out and when 
many seasonal agricultural labourers were forced to seek work in towns and cities. 
They might also provide work for unemployed people from urban areas at certain 
times of the year.47 In Ireland and Scotland arguments related to land use suggested 
that State investment in forestry would not only provide a capital asset in the form of 
timber for sale, but would maintain many existing industries and encourage new ones 
in agricultural and poorer areas much more effectively than agricultural developments 
alone.48  
Such employment might even reduce the emigration of some of the ‘best blood’ 
from the nation, although the potential success of this was questioned given the levels 
of skills needed for fulltime employment in forestry and some of the conversion 
industries. Therefore only relatively small numbers of positions, from managing 
                                                 
45 Schlich, Forestry in the United Kingdom, pp. 4-16, 24-27; Stebbing, British Forestry, passim, 
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forestry officers down to woodsmen, seemed likely to be created.49 Yet pro-
afforestation supporters could also point to the importance of forestry in parts of 
Europe, such as France and Germany, as well as trials in Scotland. The benefits these 
nations reaped from centuries of measures to protect State and private forests included 
making woodlands important sources of wealth and employment.50  
Furthermore, experts also argued that those UK woodlands maintained solely for 
game or aesthetic reasons could provide a profit from timber sales as well as serve 
leisure pursuits, as long as ‘excessive sentimentality were somewhat curbed’.51 Once 
the initial growing stage was complete, landowners who did plant would be able to 
make more money per acre from timber than from shooting or hunting rents on heath 
or mountain land. It was also argued that the UK contained plenty of suitable land, 
between 15m and 16.5m acres, which were then then making their owners either very 
little in grazing or shooting rents, or even being completely unused.52 If carried out 
correctly it was felt by some that well-managed timber producing forests could also 
remain areas of beauty and still contain areas for the hunting of game birds or deer, 
which it was felt would be far better specimens and more sport to hunt than those 
raised on heath land.53 There were certainly good economic arguments being made by 
experts and MPs for afforestation schemes and better State management in the run up 
to the war, but there were also environmental fears and reasoning leading to such 
calls.54  
                                                 
49 Stebbing, British Forestry, p. 2; Cd.4027 Report of the Departmental Committee on Irish Forestry, 
pp. 44, 45. 
50 Stebbing, British Forestry, pp. 17-18, 161. 
51 Schlich, Forestry in the United Kingdom, p. 24. 
52 Ibid., pp. 7, 18; Stebbing, British Forestry, p. 15. 
53 Schlich, Forestry in the United Kingdom, pp. 4-8, 18, 29. 
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Environmental fears focused on effects such as declining soil properties and 
desiccation, droughts, changes in regional temperatures, landslides, soil erosion, de-
fertilisation of arable land due to soil deposits, peat-bog creation, impact on human 
health and wellbeing, crop damage by wind, negative effects on water flow and purity, 
and the reduction of breeding habitats of birds useful for controlling crop damaging 
insects. All of these were, at times, argued to be linked to deforestation in various parts 
of the world, including the UK, some from at least the mid-eighteenth century 
onwards.55 Many of these concerns began in the empire, especially India and British 
North America, as reduction in British woodlands and growth of industrialisation 
meant the empire was increasingly looked to for imports.56 Imperial powers have 
always sought to extract and utilise raw materials of many kinds from their colonies, 
and this was especially true in the nineteenth century due to Europe’s second industrial 
revolution and the growth of a global economy. 57 European imperialism has become 
inseparable from the history of global environmental change, and particularly 
nineteenth-century forestry.58  
The UK’s climate, moreover, was considered ideal for many types of tree even if 
its soil types were mixed between good, bad and indifferent for different species. 
Overall the country was well-suited, particularly Scotland, and especially for 
coniferous timber, which made up over ninety per cent of imports.59 I  had been 
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recognised, therefore, that these islands could produce timber of similar quality to 
imports if proper forest management were introduced in the correct areas, such as 
schemes allowing enough space between trees and appropriate programs for thinning 
and pruning.60 Therefore, although pre-war no centralised forestry body had been 
established in the UK, that would have greatly helped and simplified the establishment 
processes and practical measures undertaken during the war, there was recognition of 
the benefits of forestry improvements. 
Positive Steps that had been taken   
Furthermore there had been some positive steps taken in the years before the war 
in terms of existing authorities or associations in the UK and Empire, a growing 
knowledge base of experts from these organisations, and improved forestry education 
and knowledge exchange. These will now be outlined as they would clearly help the 
wartime HLOs. However, it will then also be shown that these were not as far reaching 
or well-funded as many would have liked. 
In the fifty years before the war it was again imperial and American examples that 
led the way in establishing forestry regulations and governing bodies. Such forestry 
departments or associations would introduce or improve surveys, forest management, 
monoculture plantations and education, encourage private plantings through financial 
incentives, and establish State reserves or parks. These would often clash with locals 
and their traditional methods, often greatly altering traditional lifestyles, but on 
occasion also educating European imperial conservators in new and more appropriate 
methods.61 For example, an Imperial Forest Department was established in 1864 in 
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India, becoming a large administrative and management structure, employing fifty-
four foresters by 1869 and over a hundred by 1885. 62 
In the UK the main establishments in the pre-war years in some way related to 
forestry included the Office of Woods (Office of Woods), the various Boards or 
Departments of Agriculture around the UK, and the Development Commission. 
Various trade associations, which grouped private companies into bodies the 
government could more easily link with to attempt to control and improve education, 
were also established or grew.63 The Office of Woods was responsible for the 
administration of woodlands belonging to the Crown until 1919, as such playing a part 
in the wartime effort, as shall be seen in chapter 2.64 Under the control of the 
Commissioner of Woods it recruited its first academically trained forest officer in 
1899 and began to employ professionally trained staff in the early 1900s, including 
experts, some trained in the Empire, who would play central roles in the wartime 
HLOs.65 
The 1885-7 Parliamentary Select Committee on nationwide forestry suggested 
that a ‘Forest Board’, under a government department, should be established from 
interested bodies to further aid education, and these powers were given to the Board 
of Agriculture in 1889.66 At one time or another the Boards of Agriculture for England 
and Wales, Scotland, or Ireland each had responsibility for the development of aspects 
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of forestry. This illustrates that forestry was regarded as a potentially important 
element within the rural economy, but that the usefulness of a single central body had 
not been grasped.67  The Board of Agriculture and Fisheries was constituted as the 
Statutory Forestry Authority for Great Britain by the 1889 Act which created them. In 
1911, however, the Board of Agriculture for Scotland was also created, limiting the 
parameters of the Board of Agriculture and Fisheries to England and Wales.68 They 
became responsible for encouraging forestry education, through publishing technical 
works and demonstrations, as well as some research and development, and this 
involved the employment of a small number of professionally trained officers.69  
The Department of Agriculture and Technical Instruction for Ireland had come 
into being in 1899, with powers to aid, improve and develop State forestry in Ireland.70 
By the start of the war the Development Commission, established in 1909 partly to 
fund improvement schemes including in forestry and illustrating ‘a new attitude on the 
part of the State’ towards this issue, had formed English and Welsh counties into 
natural groups and appointed a Forestry Adviser to each area.71 In Scotland the Board 
of Agriculture for Scotland was waiting for the decision of the Development 
Commission on their application for a grant to employ advisory and research 
officers.72 As shall be seen in chapter 2, these Boards of Agriculture would continue 
employing forestry staff, sometimes with Development Commission funding, who 
would assist in the work of the wartime HLOs.73 The Development Commission was 
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partly intended to provide the main ‘administrative machinery’ for forestry. However, 
the Boards of Agriculture remained the executive departments, therefore retaining the 
powers to put plans into effect. The financial and executive controls were therefore 
separated.74  
As well as these slight improvements in terms of responsible bodies and 
regulations, both academic and practical based forestry education developed. This was 
considered necessary for both environmental and commercial reasons and it was in 
this facet of forestry that advanced the most in the pre-war years. Education and 
training were advocated by experts as being the foundation of long-term plans for 
improving the forests and woodlands of the nation. This was also led by imperial and 
American needs and examples, but again this lead was beginning to be followed in the 
UK.75 This meant that, although at a relatively early stage, the British Empire was 
better prepared for a major forestry effort than it would have been ten or twenty years 
before in terms of expertise. Some fears were even being expressed before the war that 
the numbers now educated and trained in the UK coupled with a lack of job 
opportunities in areas such as Ireland, might lead to those educated in the home 
countries being lost to imperial positions. 76 
The Imperial Forest School, established at Dehradun in India in 1878, had led the 
way and trained foresters, who were in turn sent out to advise and establish forestry 
organisations in other British Colonies, noticeably the Cape and Canada.77 John 
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Croumbie Brown called in the mid-nineteenth century for the establishment of schools 
of forestry to serve Britain and its empire for both practical and in his view religious 
reasons.78 In the UK the report of the 1885-7 Select Committee on forestry focused 
primarily on education, and recommended that a school for foresters should be 
established in Britain, along the lines of Dehradun.79  Experts entering forestry 
professions would often come from subjects such as Natural Sciences, having gone on 
to take Forestry Diplomas at Oxford, Cambridge or Edinburgh Universities, the Royal 
College for Science in Dublin, or the Royal Indian Engineering College at Coopers 
Hill, which became informally known as Coopers Hill Forestry School. 
Recommendations for educational improvements at university and agricultural college 
level, alongside trial research areas, remained the preferred options of advisory bodies 
for forestry improvements, over more practical measures such as large-scale 
plantings.80 
As well as this improvement in academic education for the sons of private 
landowners or those destined for research work or as plantation managers, there was 
recognition of the need for education and practical experience for student woodmen. 
Central to this was the establishment of demonstration areas, several of which were 
established in areas such as the Forest of Dean and Avondale, in County Wicklow, 
often having their own ‘schools’ offering a combination of education and practical 
experience in a range of scientific subjects. Having spent reasonable sums of money 
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on these, it was felt by 1914 that they had become good training grounds.81 I structors 
at such institutions also provided advice to private woodland owners and gave local 
lectures as and when requested. Local authorities in heavily wooded areas were 
encouraged to provide scholarships for existing foresters to attend these.82 In Ireland 
it was even felt, by 1908, that boys in rural primary National Schools needed to be 
taught the basics of both agriculture and forestry, such as recognising the difference 
between species of trees. It was argued that these classes would have to provide the 
‘skilled forest workmen’ of the future and therefore an interest needed awakening in 
them.83 This would help with pupils’ future employment on the staffs of local 
landowners or within a proposed national scheme. Forestry, it was felt, should become 
their trade in Ireland or abroad.84 
These universities and demonstration schools also led and aided forestry research. 
Although hampered by the lack of central control, demonstration areas were used as 
examples of what could be achieved in wider afforestation schemes across the UK. 
However, much research remained in the hands of private ‘gentleman’ experts such as 
Sir John Stirling Maxwell.85 The lack of centralisation must also have adversely 
affected the dissemination of results and lessons from research. However, before the 
war some examples can be found of closer liaison between forestry organisations in 
terms of high-level staff. From 1906 onwards whoever was President of the Board of 
Agriculture and Fisheries automatically became a commissioner of the Office of 
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Woods, and the 1914 joint report of the two bodies stated that they had been working 
in close co-operation for ‘some years’. Other high-ranking officers could also hold 
roles across different organisations, for instance R.L Robinson, Superintending 
Inspector for the Board of Agriculture and Fisheries, was also appointed Consulting 
Forest Officer in the Office of Woods in 1912.86 Crown Woods were still managed by 
the Office of Woods, but the onsite work of local agents was given technical assistance 
by Forestry Inspectors from the Boards of Agriculture. Greater levels of administrative 
and technical work were to be shared between the bodies as their aims and work, those 
of managing Crown Woods and developing forestry in the UK, were increasingly seen 
as beneficial to each other.87  
Well-known experts also moved from role to role, country to country, spreading, 
sharing and reshaping ideas, and creating historiographical arguments such as whether 
‘Scientific Forestry’ or ‘Empire Forestry’ had their origins in Europe or America.88 
Examples of the administration and education introduced above to improve systematic 
forest management were often labelled as ‘Scientific Forestry’, defined as ‘the 
systematic planting, cultivation, and sustainable exploitation of wood land’.89 This 
area formed an essential part of wider contemporary thoughts on ‘Scientific 
Conservation’, elements of which will be seen in chapter 3 in the negotiations 
regarding the British use of well-maintained French forests from 1916.90 Amongst the 
keywords in their ‘lexicon of imperial forestry’, William Beinart and Lotte Hughes 
include ‘valuable’, ‘conserve’, ‘regulation’, ‘authority’, and ‘control’, and it is these 
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that stand out in the imperial forestry measures becoming popular in the fifty years 
before the war.91 
Although, as stated above, the major advances in pre-war forestry that assisted 
wartime HLOs were in terms of creating greater numbers of experts and some 
fledgling overarching bodies, some small afforestation had also taken place, or been 
encouraged on suitable land through loans, practical advice, tax breaks to private 
landowners and local authority corporations or water Boards across the UK, or 
reducing transport rates.92 By the outbreak of war Development Commission loans 
had been given, or promised to four city corporations in England as well as to the 
Edinburgh & District Water Trust and Lanarkshire County Council in Scotland. The 
Development Commission had also, in at least a small inkling of State-led 
afforestation, agreed to fund planting in local authority water catchment areas, 
although by March 1914 only one such scheme had been approved.93 More was also 
being requested in terms of expert advice and help to private landowners to encourage 
planting.94  
The creation of State reserves to promote scientific forest management, as well as 
control water, preserve areas of natural beauty, encourage recreation and protect game 
in the forests was again mainly something that had taken place in North America or 
India. However, the concept had been raised and some parcels of land purchased for 
afforestation projects in the UK by the Office of Woods, 16,780 acres in total. 
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Development Commission staff had also surveyed approximately 500,000 acres of 
rough land and started thirty-five experimental plots or forestry centres in existing 
woods across the UK. The Department of Agriculture and Technical Instruction for 
Ireland had also purchased 8,000 acres of woodland in a poor state by 1914 which 
were being ‘steadily replanted and managed in accordance with the principles of 
scientific forestry’. Stebbing suggested that what could have been called a ‘State 
Forestry Department’ had come to exist in Ireland before the war. In Scotland 250,000 
acres had been surveyed, but none of the demonstration or trial areas suggested had 
been acquired, for various practical and legal reasons. However it is clear that whilst 
such aims and recommendations were often made across the UK, little had been 
achieved in term of increasing home grown timber production by August 1914.95 
Although governments and economists over the previous twenty years had paid it 
some regard, and though various bodies had resulted from these ‘voluminous 
recommendations’ and ‘animated discussion amongst experts,’ only the very 
beginnings of practical measures were in place.96 Stebbing, in a scathing manner, 
noted in 1916 that although some in Britain had seen forestry as a resource requiring 
scientific management, it had been the last country in the world to enter ‘the area of 
forest production and conservancy’.97  
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There are several noteworthy reasons for this lack in practical advances. Not 
everyone had been convinced that afforestation was necessarily a duty of the State, 
that scientific forestry would produce better results and pay greater dividends, or that 
a State-run organisation would be best placed to carry out research or improvements 
through centralised control. Others were understandably waiting to see the results, 
environmental and economical, of relatively recent trials.98 Even with the many 
parliamentary committees, commissions, public enquiries and Acts recommending 
improved forestry, there had generally been a ‘failure to grasp the problem as a whole, 
and its bearing on national safety and rural development’.99 Political and practical 
reasons also played a part. For instance in Ireland the transfer of responsibility for 
existing forested land from private landowners to the State had not been written into 
the Land Purchase Acts, as some on the 1907 Department of Agriculture and Technical 
Instruction for Ireland Committee had wanted. This led to the belief that the Act was 
resulting in poor management of existing woodlands, as forestry is harder to undertake 
successfully in small parcels of land.100  
Yet the most commonly cited reason was, as always, lack of adequate funding for 
those organisations overseeing forestry improvements. Agriculture often won the race 
for money and, as stated above, the financial and executive controls were separate, 
with the body responsible for funding possessing little knowledge of forestry. The 
single Development Commission official with any experience at all was a retired 
                                                 
98 Ibid, pp. 17-18; Cd.7488 Joint Annual Report of the Forestry Branches 1912-1913, p. 9; Hansard, 
House of Commons Sitting 8 April 194, col. 2039. 
99 Cd.8881 Reconstruction Committee, Forestry Sub-Committee, Final Report, pp. 8-13; E.G 
Richards, British Forestry in the 20th Century, pp. 254-277, Appendix B.2; Stebbing, British 
Forestry, p. 16; Cd.7488 Joint Annual Report of the Forestry Branches 1912-1913, p. 8; Schlich, 
Forestry in the United Kingdom, p. 1; Wood, ‘Fifty Years of Forestry Research’, p. 1.   
100 Cd.4027 Report of the Departmental Committee on Irish Forestry, pp. 3, 4, 13, 14, 27, 37, 45, 57, 
58. 
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Indian official, who lacked any experience of British forestry and was ‘quite out of 
touch with British foresters’.101 This lack of funds was summed up in June 1914;  
...in the first half decade of the 20th century forestry was the centre of a great 
deal of public attention; but the actual steps taken by the State were mainly 
academic in character. No possibility of giving effect to a practical policy by 
means of funds voted by Parliament arose until the Development Fund was 
established in 1909.102 
 
It was hoped by some that issues of afforestation would be treated as cross party 
questions for the long-term future of country, yet some sections of the press were hotly 
debating the suggestion that afforestation held many positive opportunities for the 
country and whether or not the money already allocated to it was being spent in the 
most efficient way.103 Regardless of such debates, it was also argued that the public 
were still not truly aware of the vital nature and social, environmental and commercial 
benefits of afforestation.104 Recognition of its many benefits had not ended widespread 
apathy towards forestry. However, it is sufficient to note here that such benefits had 
most certainly been drawn to the attention of the government of 1914, as well as to 
many of their predecessors.   
Pre-War Forestry Conclusion  
The History of the Great War Based on Official Documents of the war calls the ‘story 
of 1915...a commentary on the straits to which the British Empire was reduced by lack 
of preparedness for war’. Although this related more to army size and munitions, the 
statement can equally be applied to forestry.105 What is clear from this overview, 
however, is that the war came at a pivotal time in the history of imperial and domestic 
                                                 
101 TNA/CAB/24/39/19, ‘Forestry Administration’, p.1; Cd.7488 Joint Annual Report of the Forestry 
Branches 1912-1913, pp. 1, 4; Cd.8881 Reconstruction Committee, Forestry Sub-Committee, Final 
Report, p. 10; Stebbing, British Forestry, p. 19. 
102 Cd.7488 Joint Annual Report of the Forestry Branches 1912-1913, p. 9. 
103 Hansard, House of Commons Sitting 8 April 1914, cols. 2039-2041. 
104 Stebbing, British Forestry, p. 11. 
105 History of the Great War Based on Official Documents, 1915 vol.2, p. v. 
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forestry, just as some green shoots of a much needed recovery were beginning to be 
seen. Once the high-level measures deemed necessary during the war have been 
further explored in the remainder of this thesis, it becomes apparent that post-war 
initiatives, such as the establishment of the Forestry Commission and regular British 
Empire Forestry Conferences, were a natural continuation of progress made prior to 
1914. They were not an unprecedented diversion from the path forestry was already 
on or simply a direct result of the experiences and lessons of the war.  
Several further conclusions particularly relevant to the central purposes of this 
work can also be taken as important contextual information for the following chapters. 
Due to historical lack of management the woodlands of the UK were small and in poor 
condition in terms of providing good quantities of quality produce. This neglect was 
largely due to overconfidence in the inexhaustible nature of the world’s forests, 
especially those within the British Empire, and in the ability to ship sufficient 
quantities regardless of contexts such as war. Many recommendations and entreaties 
from government reports and private individuals had been made in the decades leading 
up to 1914. These were largely made because of, or based upon, economic, social and 
environmental lessons previously learned in imperial settings. The central facets of 
these pleas were for greater centralisation and control, improved and expanded 
education, training and research, increased afforestation on existing and new publicly 
owned lands, and financial incentives and practical advice to private landowners.  
Little had been enacted in terms of centralisation, although several bodies can be 
seen as taking a lead in separate forestry matters, especially the Office of Woods, 
Boards of Agriculture, Development Commission and trade associations.  Although a 
few small sites had been agreed or planted, mainly for research or water catchment 
reasons, very little had been achieved in regards to actual afforestation or production 
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capabilities that would have positively helped the work of the wartime HLOs.   There 
had been improvements in the knowledge, education and training of forestry staff at 
all levels, giving a better human resources pool than would have existed several decade 
before. At the higher levels this included both professional and gentleman experts. 
However, experts such as William Schlich, Edward Stebbing, Lord Lovat, Sir Stirling 
Maxwell and C.W Bird all felt that in practical terms far too little had been done to 
improve the situation of home grown timber, and thus reduce reliance on exports, in 
the generations before the war.106 A 1918 memorandum by such experts to the War 
Cabinet succinctly summarises achievements related to their pre-war and wartime 
appeals:  
The result has been utterly disappointing. No advance has been made in the 
science or practice of forestry outside the Crown Woods…no coherent policy has 
been adopted, the work of afforestation has not even been begun.107 
 
Uses 
Having confirmed the state of pre-war forestry, a brief section based on research 
undertaken at the very beginning of this project will try to achieve the very difficult 
task of illustrating the unprecedented number of vital uses this resource was needed 
for, and the massive quantities of it therefore suddenly and unexpectedly required. 
This information, in conjunction with examples of the poor state of UK woodlands 
and practices outlined above, demonstrates clearly why the urgent attention at high 
levels of the war effort investigated later in this study were so necessary, and why this 
topic is therefore so important to our understanding of the war and its effects. Even at 
a time when timber use was still an essential element of industrial and everyday life, 
                                                 
106 Schlich, Forestry in the United Kingdom, passim; Stebbing, British Forestry, passim; Cd.8881 
Reconstruction Committee, Forestry Sub-Committee, Final Report, pp. 4-13; TNA/CAB/24/39/19, 
‘Forestry Administration’, pp. 1-4; TNA/CAB/24/42/89, copies with additional signatories, February 
1918; TNA/BT/71/21, Bird, passim.  
107 TNA/CAB/24/39/19, ‘Forestry Administration’, p. 1. 
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the myriad of uses it would be put to during the war could not be predicted 
beforehand.108 
Nevertheless, from reasonably near the onset of war one of timber’s major uses 
became apparent. Troop and war-workers’ accommodation and washing, feeding, 
working and entertainment facilities, which millions would pass through, would have 
to grow from very small pre-war capacities, requiring huge supplies of timber.109 Even 
after Nissen huts had become widely used by the end of 1916, temporary ‘huts’ of 
various types and designs were still in massive demand. 110 Wood fuel sources, to heat 
homes, barracks and trenches were needed, especially as wartime coal prices rose. 
Branches, off-cuts, poor quality timber and charcoal all became increasingly 
important.111 
Mining, especially for coal, but also for other natural resources and under the 
enemy’s defences was essential to the war effort and required vast quantities of wood 
in different forms. The vital nature of sourcing sufficient supplies of pit-timber 
necessitated a great deal of effort from HLOs, as will be seen throughout this study, 
and could have formed a PhD thesis as a topic in itself.112 Trench systems would 
become an intricate network of thousands of miles of front, reserve and 
                                                 
108 Hill, 'The Canadian Forestry Corps', pp. 300-1; Bird and Davies, The Canadian Forestry Corps, 
pp. 6, 34; Liulevicius, War Land on the Eastern Front, pp. 72, 95. 
109 History of the Great War Based on Official Documents, 1914 vol.2, pp. 17-18; History of the 
Great War Based on Official Documents, 1916, vol.1, p. 6; History of the Great War Based on 
Official Documents, 1916, vol.2, p. 540; Nick Bosanquet, Our Land at War: Britain’s Key First 
World War Sites, (Stroud: Spellmount, 2014), pp. 32, 33, 43; TNA/BT/71/21, Bird, pp. 2, 7. 
110 History of the Great War Based on Official Documents, 1916, vol.1, p. 278; History of the Great 
War Based on Official Documents, 1916, vol.2, p. 540 inc. fn 3; Bosanquet, Our Land at War, p. 37; 
Pritchard, History of the Corps of Royal Engineers, p. 566. 
111 History of the Great War Based on Official Documents, 1916, vol.1, p. 6; Maclean, Farming and 
Forestry on the Western Front, p. 96; Hansard, House of Lords Sitting 21 February 1917; Hansard, 
House of Commons Sitting 6 November 1918. 
112 History of the Great War Based on Official Documents, 1915, vol.2 pp. 31, 103 inc. fn 1, 252 fn 1, 
253, 255, 257, 263; History of the Great War Based on Official Documents, 1916, vol.1, p. 286; 
History of the Great War Based on Official Documents, 1916, vol.2, p. 575 fn 3; History of the Great 
War Based on Official Documents, 1917, vol.2, pp. 35-8; Hill, 'The Canadian Forestry Corps', pp. 
300-1; TNA/LAB/2/1488/LE37858/110/1914 for 1914 fact finding mission to Canada and 
Newfoundland.  
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communications trenches, which although precedents had been seen in earlier wars 
none of the combatants had equipped themselves for constructing. They would require 
revetments, duckboards, supports for all types of dug-outs, ladders and millions of 
defensive picket posts and supports for barbed wire.113 The quality and quantity of 
timber required for a trench system depended on geographical conditions such as soil 
type and water tables, but demands for such wood ‘became prodigious’.114  Supply 
systems to these trenches, from sleepers and even wooden rails for heavy and light 
railways, to slab, plank or ‘half-round log’ roads of different types, and for bridges 
down to duckboard footpaths all required huge quantities of wood. 115 Stebbing’s view 
as a professional forester in 1916 was that the amounts of timber being used to 
construct trenches and fortifications, as well as light railways, could contribute 
towards a serious post-war timber shortage in Europe.116   
                                                 
113 Cpt C.E.P. Sankey, ‘The Campaign of the Future’ in The Royal Engineers Journal (January, 
1907), as quoted in History of the Great War Based on Official Documents, 1914, vol.1, pp. 376-79; 
History of the Great War Based on Official Documents, 1914, vol.2, p. 210; History of the Great War 
Based on Official Documents, 1915, vol.1, pp. vi, 5, 161; History of the Great War Based on Official 
Documents, 1915, vol.2, pp. 161-2, 226 fn 1; History of the Great War Based on Official Documents, 
1916, vol.1, pp. 284-5 for full descriptions; Schubert, ‘All Wooden on the Western Front’, p. 180; 
John Swettenham,  To Seize the Victory; the Canadian Corps in World War I (Toronto: Ryerson 
Press, 1965), p. 76; Maclean, Farming and Forestry on the Western Front, pp. 97-98; G.S.O, G.H.Q. 
Montreuil-Sur-Mer (London: Philip Allan & Co., 1920), p. 140; Yann Hodicq, Exploitation of Timber 
by the British Army in Northern France,<http://www.remembrancetrails-northernfrance.com/learn-
more/the-rearguard/exploitation-of timber-by-the-british-army-in-northern-france.html> [accessed 18 
February 2012], n.p; Tim Cook, At the Sharp End: Canadians Fighting the Great War, 1914–1916, 
(Toronto, Penguin Canada, 2007), p. 220-21, 233. 
114 Maclean, Farming and Forestry on the Western Front, p. 96; History of the Great War Based on 
Official Documents, 1914, vol.1, p. 379; Schubert, ‘All Wooden on the Western Front’, pp. 180-1; 
115 Hill, 'The Canadian Forestry Corps', pp. 300-1; Bird and Davies, The Canadian Forestry Corps, 
p.43; Liulevicius, War Land on the Eastern Front, p. 98; Andrew Rawson, British Army Handbook 
1914-1918, (Stroud: Sutton Publishing Ltd, 2006), pp.108-9; History of the Great War Based on 
Official Documents, 1914, vol.1 pp. 210-211, 383; History of the Great War Based on Official 
Documents, 1914, vol.2 p. 398; History of the Great War Based on Official Documents, 1915, vol.1, 
pp. 82-83, 83 fn 1, 177; History of the Great War Based on Official Documents, 1915, vol.2, p. 317; 
History of the Great War Based on Official Documents, 1916,  vol.1, pp. 276-8; History of the Great 
War Based on Official Documents, 1917, vol.1, pp. 102, 131-3, 189; History of the Great War Based 
on Official Documents, 1917, vol.2, pp, 52, 185, 198, 213-218, (‘The Road and Track 
Communications’, extracted from a report of colonel E.F.W. Lees, D.S.O., R.E., C.R.E. Guards 
Division), 245-47, 324 fn 4, 328, 329, 340, 352. 
116 Stebbing, British Forestry, passim, especially pp. 3-4.   
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A massive amount of timber and labour were especially required during 
preparations for, and advances following, an offensive.117 Engineer plans for the Arras 
offensive in early 1917 included for no fewer than twelve routes to the front to be kept 
in good repair. At the head of each would be stored enough planks and slabs to provide 
two five-mile extension roads, one up and one down, a total of at least one hundred 
and twenty miles of wooden roadway. For this at least 50,000 tons of timber were 
required.118 In August 1917 alone some 375,000 trench boards were sent to the front, 
enough to make 400 miles of duckboard paths.119  Brigadier-General Edmonds, author 
of many of the volumes of the History of the Great War Based on Official Documents, 
called the maintenance of new plank roads ‘the most important of the preparations for 
the forward move of most of the supporting artillery’.120 From a forester’s perspective, 
however, even worse than the large amounts of timber especially harvested for such 
uses, was the use of young pole growth, or sapling woods, which were, especially in 
the earlier days of the war, ‘sacrificed wholesale’ to make corduroy roads.121  
Fascines to aid tanks to advance were often essential. In preparation for the Battle 
of Cambrai, Chinese labourers used 400 tons of brushwood in constructing fascines.122 
Maclean puts the total amount of brushwood required for fascines between May 1917 
                                                 
117 For just a few instances see Schubert, ‘All Wooden on the Western Front’, p. 181;  Pritchard, 
History of the Corps of Royal Engineers, pp. 302-3; Cook, At the Sharp End, p. 475; Tim Cook, 
Shock Troops: Canadians Fighting the Great War, 1917–1918 (Toronto, Penguin Canada, 2008), pp. 
315, 327; Swettenham, To Seize the Victory, pp. 155-6, 186, 209; Rawson, British Army Handbook 
1914-1918, p. 108; History of the Great War Based on Official Documents, 1914, vol.1, pp. 329, 333, 
353; History of the Great War Based on Official Documents, 1914, vol.2, p. 398; History of the Great 
War Based on Official Documents, 1915, vol.2, pp. 11, 56, 97, 101, 110, 134, 226 fn 1, 231, 281; 
History of the Great War Based on Official Documents, 1916, vol.1, pp. 277-8, 281; History of the 
Great War Based on Official Documents, 1916, vol.2, p. 542 inc. fn 5; History of the Great War 
Based on Official Documents, 1916, Appendices, pp. 91, 102, 103, 120-1; History of the Great War 
Based on Official Documents, 1917, vol.1, pp. 52, 188-91, 294; History of the Great War Based on 
Official Documents, 1917, vol.2, pp. 176, 213-18, 245-6 fn 3. 
118 History of the Great War Based on Official Documents, 1917, vol.1, pp. 188-9. 
119 Pritchard, History of the Corps of Royal Engineers, p. 566. 
120 History of the Great War Based on Official Documents, 1917, vol.2, p. 282. 
121 Stebbing, British Forestry, pp. 3-4.  
122 History of the Great War Based on Official Documents, 1917, vol.3, pp. 14-15 fn 2. 
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and November 1918, for smaller versions required in trench repairs as well as for those 
carried by tanks, at 85,098 tons.123 Packing cases were also a common and well-
discussed use, most noticeably in terms of ammunition, with the Ministry of Munitions 
often fearful of running out, but for many other products too.124 Wood for packing 
cases, like pit-wood, could form its own study, as could aircraft timber supplies, 
Admiralty uses and paper-pulp.125 There were countless other uses, including rifle 
stocks, tool handles and many other RE supplies. Even the resultant shortages of 
particular types of timber for beehives was recognised as important during war.126 It 
can undoubtedly be argued that without constant and extremely high levels of use of 
wood the war would not have developed as it did, and the war effort could not have 
been maintained. How this supply was maintained, therefore, deserves a thorough 
examination.    
Chronology of use levels, recognised shortages and contextual events. 
Astounding as many figures cited in the sources are, it should be noted that, as 
explained earlier, exact amounts felled, purchased, shipped or used in numerous forms 
are extremely difficult to determine accurately for many periods of the war. A factor 
explaining this uncertainty was the urgent need and resultant lack of record-keeping 
in the early weeks and months on the Western Front, where wood was collected locally 
                                                 
123 Maclean, Farming and Forestry on the Western Front, p. 98. 
124 Hansard, House of Commons Sitting, 20 February 1918, col. 741; Hansard, House of Commons 
Written Answers 2 April 1917, col. 955; Hansard, House of Commons Written Answers 25 May 
1917; Hansard, House of Commons Written Answers 7 June 1917.  
125 TNA/CAB/24/13/73, ‘Letter from the Ministry of Munitions to the Secretary of the War Cabinet’ 
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by troops for many roles. General shortages, perhaps due to urgent needs in different 
parts of the front or geographical differences, meant very differing supply levels at 
various times. Furthermore, as shall be seen in the subsequent chapters, many different 
bodies were responsible for obtaining this material, for many different end uses and 
users, and utilising different sources and methods to do so. Unfortunately Royal 
Engineer and Quartermaster-General’s records do not keep separate records of timber 
stocks. Instead, for much of the war these were included under general terms such as 
‘engineering stores’. However, Major-General Pritchard, in his Official History of the 
Royal Engineers, states that of the massive amounts of engineering stores that were 
required for the Western Front approximately seventy-five per cent were either timber, 
or articles including a timber element.127  
Yet, even without exact figures and totals a chronological run through of some of 
the usage levels and periods of shortage concerns related to the forestry efforts will 
help to give a contextual overview of the levels of timber supply throughout the war. 
It will also introduce some of the important events affecting the organisations and their 
methods which are analysed in subsequent chapters. 
Few figures can be located for 1914 timber usage. The Western Front was only 
starting to develop its great thirst for wood, and the true material scale and potential 
length of this war were yet to be realised by most. As will be seen, fears were raised 
with regards to stocks of mining and hutting timber on the Home Front. However, little 
seems to have been raised in regards to concerns from the BEF, who clearly had other 
pressing issues to deal with, or by other government departments at this stage. 
Concerns regarding hutting timber in the UK certainly continued into early 1915 
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amongst claims that poor quality timber was being used for troop accommodation.128 
Complaints were also made regarding trees being felled unofficially by troops during 
their training, as official supplies were not adequate. This was for various uses but 
especially fuel.129 The History of the Great War Based on Official Documents creates 
a confused picture for the wood situation in France and Belgium in early 1915. It states 
that materials for construction of revetments, dug-outs and obstacles were often 
lacking, but later on that timber was amongst the supplies that were available in 
plentiful amounts.130  
Throughout 1915 few records of actual usage were kept, but by August at least 
estimates of monthly requirements were being produced. The August estimate 
amounted to a total of 8,000 tons; 4,000 for firewood, 2,000 for poles and pit-props 
and 2,000 tons of sawn timber for planking. As Maclean states, these are surprisingly 
low figures.131 However, it seems very likely that at the same time as such estimates 
were being sent by GHQ to the War Office in London, the RE Director of Works and 
the Army Service Corps in France were also obtaining timber from the French Forestry 
Authorities and private landowners. Throughout 1915 orders from both the RE and 
Army Service Corps to French authorities rose from 3,800 to 12,000 tons per month.132 
Earlier concerns over threats to merchant shipping had reduced by summer 1915, the 
Germans fearful of forcing the USA onto the Allied side, and overall the situation for 
most forms of wood seemed under control.133 This suggests that in regards to timber, 
                                                 
128 Hansard, House of Commons Sitting 8 and 9 February 1915. 
129 Hansard, House of Commons Written Answers, 10 March 1915. 
130 History of the Great War Based on Official Documents, 1915, vol.1, pp. 4-6. 
131 Maclean, Farming and Forestry on the Western Front, p. 96. 
132 Pritchard, History of the Corps of Royal Engineers, p. 559. 
133 Dewey, British Agriculture, p. 26; Cook, At the Sharp End, p. 524. 
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business could remain largely ‘as usual’ up to the beginning of 1916, as has been 
argued for other resources, industries and businesses up to mid/late 1915.134 
Whilst during 1916 thoughts also turned more officially to the post-war situation, 
as illustrated by the establishment of the Reconstruction Committee in this year, and 
its Forestry Subcommittee in July, the priorities of the HLOs remained the obtaining 
of supplies from any possible sources as usage grew dramatically and shipping space 
was increasingly restricted from the middle of this year onwards.135 However, some 
evidence of growing concerns, and perhaps forethought, can be seen at the start of 
1916 as requests started being sent by the British to Canadian Government for units 
of lumbermen to be raised. As will be seen in chapter 4 these were to continue and 
increase in terms of numbers requested as 1916 dragged on. By mid-1916 the 
submarine threat had receded, yet shortages in building and other forms of timber in 
the UK led to high-level concerns and price rises. These created parliamentary debate 
and even persuaded the Treasury to allow the War Office and Ministry of Munitions 
to build homes for their employees that used concrete instead of timber.136 
Furthermore there were, for the first time, discussions in May 1916 regarding supplies 
reaching the Western Front beginning to lag behind demand. However, as will be 
discussed in more detail in chapters 3 and 4, this was largely due to the strain being 
placed on transport networks to the front and on labour for cutting and converting 
                                                 
134 For instance see David French, ‘The Rise and Fall of Business as Usual’, in Kathleen Burk (ed.), 
War and the State: The Transformation of British Government, 1914-1919 (London, George Allen & 
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wood, as well as more supplies needing to be diverted to the French Army.137 In 
correspondence through May requests were made to increase the auxiliary Army 
Service Corps Horse and Motor Transport Companies at the Rouen Base, for the 
purpose of transporting timber. From the area around this base 12,000 tons of timber 
was being sent each month by rail to the front, with a further 16,000 tons being cut 
and stored at Rouen. However, it was estimated that by July this amount would have 
increased to 25,000, and by November 1916 to 54,000 tons per month to be taken from 
forests near Rouen. This could be broken down into 21,000 tons of fuel, 18,000 tons 
of defence timber, 15,000 tons of sawn timber.138 This represents a considerable 
increase from the estimated total of 8,000 tons of requirements of August 1915, and 
illustrates GHQs concerns regarding the labour and transport that would be required 
to utilise French forests to obtain their growing forestry produce requirements.139 
Further evidence of the concerns over timber supplies in mid-1916 comes from the 
French Minister of War, writing in June, that thanks to the realisation of the 
importance of the work and the CFC’s ‘professional efficiency’ already witnessed in 
Britain and France, he was sure the CFC would succeed in either making up the 
deficiency of lumber, or at least alleviating it.140 
Regardless of GHQ’s efforts, Edmonds states that in preparations for the Battle 
of the Somme, beginning 1 July 1916, the supply of timber was at no stage 
sufficient.141 Timber for many purposes had to be obtained either by purchase from 
French firms or by units cutting what they required in local woods and forests.142 The 
                                                 
137 TNA/WO/95/30, App.5.A.V, letters Commander-in-chief to Secretary War Office, 9 and 20 May 
1916; TNA/BT/71/21, Bird, p. 2. 
138 Ibid. 
139 Ibid.  
140 As paraphrased in Bird and Davies, The Canadian Forestry Corps, p. 35. 
141 History of the Great War Based on Official Documents, 1916, vol.1, pp. 284-5. 
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HLOs noted shortage concerns over the summer, shipping losses increasing sharply 
again from September, yet it can once again also be seen that different experiences 
were had by different units within a short time span.143 This can be explained by 
different supply issues and prioritisations to different geographical areas of the front. 
Some noted that there ‘was sufficient timber available for building log, slab and plank 
roads’ from October 1916 onwards, yet elsewhere it is claimed that by the end of the 
year timber for plank and slab roads was becoming scarce again, although this was 
partly due to their growing popularity. 144 
In total, by the end of 1916 the War Department was being asked to provide the 
British Army in France, and ordnance services in the UK, with an estimated 21,600 
tons of wood fuel, 141,000 railway sleepers, 30,000 pickets, and some 14,160 
standards, or 46,728 tons, of various types of prepared timber; all on top of the 35,000 
tons a month of forestry products that the Army was already producing for itself in 
France.145 Usage levels clearly rose throughout 1916, at the same time as the army’s 
logistics and labour services were under increasing strain, and the German strategy of 
unrestricted submarine warfare was about to be unleashed. These increases and 
shortage concerns also came at the time that many were accepting that the war would 
now be a drawn out conflict consuming unprecedented resources of all kinds, 
especially following the failure to achieve a decisive breakthrough on the Somme. The 
first BEF monthly conference specifically on timber supplies took place on 1 
September 1916 to estimate monthly requirements, also discussing the possibility of 
using coal instead of wood for fuel that winter to save nearly 30,000 tons of imports. 
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It was felt unlikely that enough coal could be obtained from French mines but the 
QMG was to approach the French anyway, as quantities of wood for fuel were lacking 
whilst savings in import tonnage were still required.146 The army’s estimated 
November 1916 requirements were now 65,000 tons, and Brown says timber supplies 
were still a grave concern in December 1916.147 
Furthermore into 1917 the concerns growing from mid-1916 worsened due to 
even further shipping losses. On the 1 February the Germans began unrestricted 
submarine warfare, paralysing timber imports from Scandinavia. Steadily increasing 
losses between February and April led Sir John Jellicoe, the First Sea Lord, and others 
to predict a British collapse if sinkings continued at these rates. Yet the crisis 
continued, peaking in the late summer before the convoy system was introduced on a 
general scale in October 1917, after which losses began steadily to reduce.148 Further 
good news for the Allies had come earlier, on 6 April 1917, just two months after 
Germany began unrestricted submarine warfare, when America declared war on 
Germany partly because of the U-Boat campaign. 
Although the Board of Trade started a survey of timber stocks in the hands of 
private merchants at the end of 1916, see chapter 3, which had shown reasonable 
quantities available, they were still very concerned about a timber ‘famine,’ and by 
May 1917 the position was ‘critical’, leading to delays, cancellations and 
unemployment in war-related construction works around the UK.149 
                                                 
146 Brown, British Logistics, p. 133. 
147 Ibid; TNA/WO/95/30, App.5.A.V, letter Commander-in-chief to Secretary War Office, 20 May 
1916. 
148 TNA/BT/71/21, Bird, p. 3; Swettenham, To Seize the Victory, pp. 151, 152, 180, 181, 193; Burton 
Hendrick, The Life and Letters of Walter H. Page, Volume 2 (London: William Heinemann Ltd, 
1923), pp. 273-294; Cook, At the Sharp End, p. 524; Cook, Shock Troops, p. 310; Turner, British 
Politics, p. 211. 
149 TNA/BT/71/21, Bird, pp. 3, 33-4, 48; Hansard, House of Commons Written Answers 17 May 
1917; Hansard, House of Lords Sitting 17 May 1917, col. 181; Hansard, House of Commons Sitting 
12 June 1917 cols. 1771-2; Hansard, House of Commons Written Answers 16 July 1917, col. 46; 
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The Directorate of Timber Supplies (War Office) concluded on the 15 May 1917 
that the monthly consumption of wood for war needs by the major government 
departments, added to the monthly amount needed to be shipped from the UK to the 
army on the Western Front, amounted to 214,300 tons (195,000 tons of softwoods, 
19,300 tons of other woods).150 However, at this time home grown timber production 
from various sources totalled just 75,000 tons, leaving a deficit of 139,300 tons per 
month. Furthermore, quantities of imports, mainly from Norway and Sweden in 
neutral ships, would be very low. Therefore the existing stocks of imported softwood 
would ‘hardly outlast the end of June’.151 Shortages were also causing delays on the 
Western Front. It has been argued that a pause of nine days in the advance of the Third 
Army at the earlier Battle of Arras in April was due to insufficient stockpiling of 
timber slabs and road metal, on account of the prioritisation of transport of artillery 
ammunition over engineering stores.152 This again led to Army REs cutting down as 
much timber as possible in their own areas. However, Third Army supplies were still 
short, whilst in First Army’s area a good supply of sleepers and slabs were being 
provided. 153 Even with such local discrepancies during major offensives noted, the 
Commander-in-chief Field Marshal Haig felt that by September 1917 ‘the Army had 
become practically self-supporting as far as regards timber’, with over three-quarters 
                                                 
Hansard, House of Commons Sitting 26 July 1917, cols. 1433-4; Hansard, House of Commons Sitting 
8 August 1917; Hansard, House of Commons Written Answers 7 November 1917; Hansard, House of 
Commons Written Answers 14 February 1918; Hansard, House of Commons Sitting 7 March 1918;  
Congested Districts Board for Ireland, Cd.9139 (1918), Twenty-sixth report of the Congested Districts 
Supplies Board, of proceedings under the Congested District  Board (Ireland) Acts, 1891-909, pp. 6, 
11; Swenarton, Homes Fit for Heroes, pp. 48-49, 51, 58-9 and correspondence between Treasury and 
War Office in July-August 1915, PRO T161/68 s5222/2 (from Swenarto , Homes Fit for Heroes, 
p.201 endnote 9).  
150 Admiralty and Controller of Shipping, Air Board, Ministry of Munitions, War Office, Office of 
Woods, and for maintenance of railways in Britain; no civilian uses included. 
151 TNA/CAB/21/80, note and estimates from Bampfylde Fuller, Director of Timber Supplies (War 
Office), to Captain Clement Jones, secretary to Lord Curzon’s Committee, 15 May 1917. 
152 History of the Great War Based on Official Documents, 1917, vol.1, pp. 190-1, 546-7. 
153 Ibid., pp. 190, 295, 547. 
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of a million tons of timber being supplied for use of the British Army by forestry units 
between May and October.154  
Furthermore, Chief Engineers at different levels were still blaming transport 
difficulties, and occasionally poor relations with units either side of them, for local 
shortages rather than stocks.155 The monthly average amount of timber delivered to 
RE timber yards during 1917 was 51,000 tons; however by the end of the year monthly 
deliveries to these timber yards were 75,000 tons with an additional 25,000 tons 
delivered to transportation store yards, illustrating a large increase in supply during 
the year.156 As shall be seen, this can be put down to the efforts of the HLOs and the 
forestry units they put to work in France.  
The rapid increase in use of French timber during 1917 and subsequent gradual 
easing of the overall supply situation continued in 1918. Some figures for the final 
year of the war equated to a staggering average of 5,479 tons of construction timber 
from French forests being used per day by the British Army.157  This period, it should 
be remembered, also including disruptions to some forestry operations by the German 
offensives of spring 1918 and then relatively mobile warfare over unbroken ground 
during the final Allied advance. Urgent demands for large quantities of timber were 
still being passed to forestry units in France and Britain during 1918, but a lack of 
evidence of timber shortages during 1918 strongly suggests that the measures put in 
place by the HLOs worked.158 Furthermore, the official statistics of the military effort 
of the empire, released by the War Office and including some figures on timber supply 
                                                 
154 Sir Douglas Haig ‘Passchendaele Despatch’ as quoted on <www.1914-1918.net> [last accessed 17 
February 2012]; ‘Haig’s Despatches’, p. 144, as paraphrased in Nicholson, Canadian Expeditionary 
Force, p. 500. 
155 History of the Great War Based on Official Documents, 1917, vol.2, pp. 215-16. 
156 Pritchard, History of the Corps of Royal Engineers, p. 566. 
157 Hodicq, Exploitation of Timber by the British Army in Northern France, n.p. 
158 Library and Archives Canada (LAC), LAC.RG9-III -D-3.Vol/box:5018.File:765. War diaries, 
No.54 District, CFC, 1917/04/10-1919/05/23, 125 Company, March 1918. 
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by various government bodies, indicate that whilst import amounts decreased rapidly 
between 1916 and 1917, home grown timber production increased impressively in the 
same timeframe, see table below.159  
 







1913 11,589,811 900,000 12,489,811 
1914 8,432,646 900,000 9,332,646 
1915 7,665,524 900,000 8,565,524 
1916 6,318,872 1,000,000 7,318,872 
1917 2,875,143 3,000,000 5,875,143 
1918 
(Estimated) 
2,400,000 4,250,000 6,650,000 
 
Although total amounts did not reach 1913 levels during the war it must be 
remembered that unnecessary building and industrial processes would not have 
obtained permits to purchase timber, see chapter 3. Also, military forces in France 
were producing large quantities, especially from 1916 onwards, which reduced 
amounts needing to be shipped from the UK, or imported directly to France from 
Scandinavia, the US or Canada.  
Conclusions 
This chapter has illustrated that wood supplies were unquestionably one of the 
munitions of the First World War but that unfortunately Britain’s woodlands were so 
depleted, at somewhere between just four to six per cent of the total land surface of 
                                                 
159 The War Office, Statistics of the Military Effort of the British Empire During the Great War 1914-
1920 (London, 1922; Reprinted by The Naval & Military Press Ltd, Uckfield), pp. 717-18. 
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the country, one of the worst averages in the world, the average in Europe being around 
twenty-five per cent. Maintaining supplies would be difficult if imports levels were 
affected.160 The nation had no real home grown timber industry and was still far too 
reliant on imports, even as world supplies were not being adequately replenished and 
prices were steadily increasing. Forestry organisations had started to make some 
progress in regards to training more personnel, but it can be seen that at such an early 
stage of development it was mainly to the empire, especially India or Canada, that the 
nation would have to turn for experienced foresters and woodsmen. However, by the 
end of the war the CFC alone would be producing in France and Britain an annual 
amount equivalent to the 11.5 - 11.6m tons that the UK was importing annually before 
the war, solely for military and war industry-related purposes.161  
It can be seen that records for 1914 and 1915 are relatively sparse but that timber 
use grew as the Western Front solidified, large offensive operations attempting to 
break it began, and the industrial efforts to supply such a war increased. This increase 
continued into 1916 when the worst of the shortages were felt on the Home and 
Western Fronts, especially after shipping space issues were compounded by the 
German submarine campaign. The end of 1916 into 1917 therefore saw the beginning 
of firm official measures to address concerns over both immediate and post-war 
supplies of timber, and 1917 and 1918 saw usage continue to grow, while supplies 
began to catch up thanks to the initiatives of the HLOs to improve self-sufficiency. 
The details of how this was achieved will be investigated throughout the remainder of 
this thesis.   
  
                                                 
160 Schlich, Forestry in the United Kingdom, p. 17 (4% of UK dry land under Woodlands); Stebbing, 
British Forestry, p. 15 (4%); TNA/BT/71/21, Bird, p.1 (4%);  E.G Richards, British Forestry in the 
20th Century, p. xvii (6%). 
161 Hill, 'The Canadian Forestry Corps', Appendix 2, p. 302. 
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Chapter 2: The High Level Organisations (HLOs); Establishing and 
Structuring. 
Due to the state of pre-war British forestry, the many vital wartime uses of wood 
that would emerge, the unprecedented volumes these would require, and the 
difficulties that would be encountered in shipping during the war, major administrative 
and management changes would be needed. This chapter will illustrate the important 
alterations made in regards to the HLOs central to the effort, to improve efficiency as 
the major political and military contexts of the war changed. It will outline the reasons 
for involvement, establishment or reorganisation of all the main forestry and timber 
trade organisations, alongside important high-level personnel and main roles expected 
of them. The central arguments that appear from these themes are that, in such 
unprecedented circumstances, common sense prevailed in managing this effort. 
Reorganisations were carried out when recognised as necessary to improve efficiency, 
administration was not overly bureaucratic, high level positions were staffed by 
appropriate civilian experts from the outset, and although environmental concerns 
were considered, they were much less of a priority than obtaining necessary quantities. 
Furthermore, as with other resources, late 1916 to mid-1917 marked a clear shift in 
policy under Lloyd George’s coalition government that markedly increased 
centralisation and control over management of vital industries such as forestry.   
The roles and measures that these HLOs would have to undertake were wide and 
varied, and will be covered in detail in chapter 3, but the major categories included 
determining overall requirements, establishing existing stocks, securing additional 
quantities through purchasing or producing wood and timber from varied domestic 
and foreign sources, placing controls on uses, sales, shipping, and prioritising and 
allocating those supplies obtained. However, this plethora of solutions required input 
Page 79 of 386 
 
 
from numerous government and military departments, as well as sections of civilian 
trades and the forestry profession. Bird, in both his co-authored book on the CFC and 
his unpublished work on the overall timber effort, paints a very rosy picture of the 
achievements of, and relations between, those managing timber supplies, and on the 
whole this will be seen to have been accurate.1 However, this would not be a simple 
task, without any errors, confusion or duplication. Throughout the war many bodies 
had to press their cases for securing available supplies, or funds for timber, with 
various controlling bodies and the Treasury. Those requiring major levels of supplies 
included the Boards of Agriculture, Board of Trade, Office of Works, War Office, 
Admiralty, Air Boards then Ministry, and Ministry of Munitions. Priorities between 
them naturally altered as the war progressed, but demands generally grew.  
Therefore, a great deal of thought, consultation, coordination and restructuring 
were essential to retain or improve efficiency in the HLOs responsible for supplying 
these end-users. Subsequently the bodies controlling access to wood supplies 
expanded, changed in terms of number, names, responsibilities and powers, or 
occasionally ended and were replaced in their work by another HLO. Trying to follow 
the details of these administrative changes can be extremely confusing and at times 
incomplete in terms of the overall management, in a historiography generally 
concentrating on other facets of the war. This chapter, whilst illustrating the 
conclusions stated above regarding good administration and use of expertise, also 
therefore provides an overview to clarify exactly what HLOs became responsible for 
different roles and the thinking and actions that took place to structure the management 
of forestry supplies.   
                                                 
1 TNA/BT/71/21, Bird, passim. 
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A short contextual section on the perceived British love of bureaucracy and Lloyd 
George’s approach to centralisation and use of civilian experts from late 1916 in other 
areas of the war effort provides a base for the chapter. Then, although seemingly 
simplistic, it has been found that the most effective method to achieve the aims is to 
review the reasons behind the use or establishment of the forestry HLOs, and their 
central intended roles, in a chronological order. However, a strictly chronological 
review is in no way possible due to the complex lifespans, interactions and occasional 
duplication of roles amongst the HLOs. Therefore this section has been sub-divided 
into those HLOs mainly concentrating on either purchasing, producing, overseeing all 
aspects of the effort as centralisation increased, those allocating timber obtained, and 
finally the bringing together of various relevant bodies in France and Belgium under 
the new Forestry Directorate. Each of these categories will be outlined in 
chronological order.  
Following this overview of the establishment and central roles of the main HLOs, 
sections will further illustrate further central arguments. These will include examples 
of the continuity of high level staff between these organisations, the sensible structural 
alterations made within them as required, environmental concerns raised at the time, 
contemporary praise they received, and statistically based examples of their 
achievements. Throughout this structure, as well as detailing those HLOs involved in 
the effort, it will be seen that as far as possible the structuring, then restructuring, of 
the HLOs were carried out for specific and valid reasons given the changing wider 
contexts of the war, and as such lesson were learnt and acted upon. The administration 
of the effort was not overly bureaucratic as the British war effort has at times been 
accused of, see paragraph directly below, although it can easily appear so at times. 
That both of these positive features were in part due to a continuity in use of high level 
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staff, most of whom had been pre-war forestry experts, and that aided liaison and 
knowledge exchange. Finally, although environmental concerns were raised, they had 
to play ‘second-fiddle’ to the war’s needs.  
Context - Establishing, Structuring, Liaison and Specialists in HLOs during the 
war. 
It can be argued that a love of bureaucracy and committees to advise committees 
exists in today’s British Government and Civil Service. Similar arguments were made 
by contemporises during the war, and by historians since. Whether in munitions, 
housing, agriculture, administering Dominion troops in Britain or numerous other 
areas, ideas, opinions and decisions went back and forth between Cabinets, Ministries, 
Departments, the War Office, Controllers, committees, different committees, 
subcommittees, and advisory or consultative committees. Often, but not always, these 
contained correctly skilled officers or members. However, a sense of confusion and 
duplication was understandably occasionally created.2 This view of over-bureaucracy 
is also often associated with increased government intervention following Lloyd 
George coming to power in December 1916. Intervention and levels of control through 
numerous ‘Controllers’ and a small War Cabinet, at times seemingly having executive 
powers over the war effort, was seen as dangerous by some, preventing the House of 
Commons from exercising control and creating confusion and loss of confidence 
within it.3  
Beginning any new organisation or project is going to be administratively arduous, 
but especially if established urgently under such trying circumstances. As Tim Cook 
                                                 
2 Turner, British Politics, pp. 87, 110, 223, 375; Dewey, British Agriculture, passim, for instance pp. 
23-28, 70-71, 29-91; Swenarton, Homes Fit for Heroes, pp. 77-78; Cook, Shock Troops, p.46. 
3 As one example of a feeling of too much in the way of appointing ‘Controllers’, including the 
Timber Controller, see Hansard, House of Commons Sitting, 20 February 1917, cols. 1177-8. Mr 
Ponsonby made the case that even before the war there had been a growing tendency to divorce the 
Executive from the Legislature, especially in regards to the House of Commons.   
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argues, regarding the chaotic situation administering Canadian troops in England early 
in the war, inefficiency can be expected in ‘any department established in the panic of 
war’.4  
Such complex situations were often not helped by mistrust between political, 
military and trade leaders.5 The most shocking civilian administrative errors, Turner 
illustrates, were due to poor communications. These were made worse when ministries 
or strong ministers refused to co-ordinate with, or poached experts from, others.6 One 
answer to such communication issues, favoured by Lloyd George and others, such as 
the controversial Canadian Minister of Militia Sir Sam Hughes, was to put stronger 
personalities, men of ‘push and go’, in overall charge to improve efficiency.7 Yet these 
men would still require some expert advice before decisions could be sensibly made 
and it became increasingly clear that as supplying the war became more of an all-
encompassing business, the way to win was to ‘employ business specialists’.8  As shall 
be seen, this policy was widely applied in terms of both the civilian and military 
forestry efforts and aided communication and therefore the success of measures such 
as redistribution of responsibilities and centralisation of overall management, whilst 
decentralising important local roles as much as possible. Such measures were also 
recognisable in agriculture and wider political reforms as the war continued.9 
                                                 
4 Cook, Shock Troops, p. 46. 
5 Turner, British Politics, p .110. 
6 Ibid., pp. 110-111. 
7 Dewey, British Agriculture, pp. 96-99; Kenneth O Morgan, ‘George, David Lloyd, first Earl Lloyd-
George of Dwyfor (1863–1945)’, Oxford Dictionary of National Biography, Oxford: OUP, 2004. 
Online ed. Ed. David Cannadine. May 2011, <http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/34570> 
[accessed 13 Aug. 2017]; LG to WHP, as recounted in WHP’s notes and as quoted in Burton 
Hendrick, The Life and Letters of Walter H. Page, Volume 2 (London, 1923), p. 259; SLMSC, 
Records of the Massachusetts Committee on Public Safety & its Executive Committee February 10 
1917 to November 20 1918, Box 1, ‘Meeting of 19 February 1917’, pp.30-1. 
8 SLMSC, Records of the Massachusetts Committee on Public Safety & its Executive Committee 
February 10 1917 to November 20 1918, Box 1 ‘Meeting of 19 February 1917’, pp.30-1. 
9 Dewey, British Agriculture, pp. 96, 97, 99; Turner, British Politics, pp. 110-111.  
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A turning point in the overall British administration of the war was clearly reached 
at the end of 1916. Political changes began in May 1915 when Asquith’s coalition 
cabinet and War Committee proved ‘largely paralysed’ in terms of decision-making 
through personal and political differences.10 Some had realised that this would be a 
long war. Kitchener as Secretary of State for War saw this from the outset, and from 
at least September 1915 he and the new CIGS, Sir William Robertson, agreed that 
victory could only be achieved through attrition, the exhaustion of the enemy’s 
resources of men and munitions before their own.11 However, many in political and 
military power did not see this until well into 1916, so financially ‘vigorous cooking 
of the books’ continued in the hope that a victory could be quickly achieved during 
1916.12 Furthermore, 1916 then became a year largely of negative events, in military 
terms on the Somme, in the Middle East and in Eastern Europe, and there was also 
alarm at the Easter Uprising in Ireland. Military conscription had been introduced in 
stages in January and June, and a poor harvest led to fears of food shortages, also 
aggravated by the threat of increased submarine actions. Britain’s financial strength 
was drained by purchases of munitions from the USA and by the end of the year 
authorities feared that a run on sterling would bring the war to an end on unfavourable 
terms, or even defeat.13 
Since October 1915 Lloyd George had led ‘a critical minority’ demanding 
reconstruction of the government’s machinery for taking decisions and the reassertion 
of civilian control over strategy. They wanted to enforce controls on military and 
civilians alike. However, it was the parliamentary crisis at the end of November 1916, 
due to the factors above, which enlarged his following. Surprisingly, the political 
                                                 
10 Turner, British Politics, pp. 94-103, 112-151. 
11 Ibid., p. 95. 
12 Ibid., pp. 82, 83, 109, 127-8. 
13 Ibid., pp. 5, 126. 
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‘revolution’ was confined to the highest levels. Asquith was levered out of office on 6 
December by Lloyd George and a new coalition government presented to the House 
of Commons. Except for expressing ‘disgruntlement’ at the previous government’s 
handling of the war the House of Commons had played little part in the ‘conception’ 
of this new government and was therefore bewildered, although the public seemed to 
accept it calmly.14  
The coalition abandoned the full Cabinet and established a smaller War Cabinet of 
five Ministers, who agreed with Lloyd George on major issues, and took supreme 
powers of decision in matters of the war. They would be supported by a number of 
new ministries to control vital economic functions. The new War Cabinet met almost 
daily under Lloyd George’s chairmanship, and in theory they only had to deal with 
major decisions due to the power delegated to those in charge of the new ministries. 
In practice, however, the War Cabinet held larger and larger meetings and after the 
spring of 1917 began to delegate its work to subcommittees and individual members, 
never achieving the desired ‘compact supreme executive body’ ideal, and 
improvements through the ministries often took many months to show.15 However, as 
will be seen forestry, was included within the new coalition’s aims to take tighter 
control over and improve efficiency over vital facets of the war effort through 
centralisation of roles and control measures. 
The HLOs; establishing the management structures.  
This section will provide the context and thought processes behind the numerous 
changes in forestry related HLOs during the war. It will show that although there was 
some confusion or duplication such instances were relatively quickly recognised and 
                                                 
14 Ibid., pp. 5, 6, 121, 126. 
15 Ibid., pp. 6, 153. 
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corrected. The main measures to correct them generally existed of the relevant parties 
discussing the issue, and reorganising the bodies that managed them to clarify both 
responsibilities and administrative lines of communication. It will also include very 
brief descriptions of their key roles, but details of these will be seen in chapter 3 when 
illustrating the main methods used by these HLOs.  
Purchasing 
Efforts to secure purchases of timber or wood clearly competed with those to 
secure many other natural and manufactured resources, with supplies often being 
required urgently and in unexpected amounts. As with any original undertaking, trial 
and learning from error was required, yet it was the existing timber trades that 
contained much of the expertise that could help. The Timber Trade Federation 
included agents, brokers, merchants and timber firms, either with or without their own 
yards, representing thousands of members in distinct geographical or business-type 
branches.16 They clearly had a large role to play, not only supplying timber but also 
having expert representatives to work in or advise the relevant HLOs.  
Questions facing the Timber Trade Federation in the months before war broke out 
included some general issues that the war would greatly affect, such as workers’ rights 
and issues following the National Insurance Act (1911). With regards to statistical 
revisions, the federation worked with the Board of Trade on returns regarding imports 
of wood. In transport, they engaged with the Royal Commission on railways to address 
issues such as delays, charges and the carriage of short lengths of timber. The London 
Section continued to protest to the Port of London Authority about the inadequate 
accommodation at the docks for timber cargoes. Issues regarding where sources were 
being imported from were also considered, including standard forms of contract for 
                                                 
16 TNA/BT/71/21, Bird, pp.4-5. 
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Swedish, Norwegian and Finnish purchases, but also looking to the ‘New World’ in 
terms of freight charges to and from Canada. There were also concerns about the 
proposed Ministry of Lands.17 All of these areas, labour, transport, and import sources 
would be of paramount importance to the wartime forestry effort, and there was clearly 
a resource of specialists in administering these to whom government could turn.  
Although war was bound to be difficult for most sections of the trade, due to loss 
of labour and increasing levels of controls, it expressed early on a desire ‘to place its 
resources and its experience in so important a matter as the supply and control of the 
distribution of Timber at the service of His Majesty’s Government’. This was a pledge 
they repeated in October 1917, adding that the trade ‘assures His Majesty’s 
Government of its wholehearted desire to cooperate in measures for bringing the 
present War to a definite and victorious conclusion’.18 As discussed in chapter 3 they 
did manage to apply considerable pressure in deciding and altering some control 
measures, and from 1915 the Executive Committee also exercised a general 
administrative control over the Timber Trade Federation work, based on sectional 
reports and therefore resembling the structure adopted by Lloyd George’s coalition in 
December 1916.19   
In August 1914, however, the main governmental bodies concerned with forestry 
in the UK were, as shown in chapter 1, the Office of Woods managing the Crown’s 
Forests, the various Boards of Agriculture, and the Development Commission which 
was technically responsible for increasing lands under forest on behalf of the State. 
However, in terms of product use the Board of Trade can be said to have had an overall 
                                                 
17 Latham, History of the Timber Trade Federation, pp. 60-1. 
18 Resolution no.1 of Timber Trade Federation meeting, 17 October 1917, as quoted in Latham, 
History of the Timber  
Trade Federation, p. 68. 
19 TNA/BT/71/21, Bird, p. 5. 
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responsibility for the timber requirements of the nation through its dealings with the 
commercial trade.20 The Office of Works purchased timber for the government and 
army, and several other government departments, including the Admiralty, purchased 
their own wood directly for specific requirements. Furthermore, the mining industry 
in particular relied heavily on obtaining its own imports of pit-wood.21 It is clear that 
there was no central body that could immediately manage the overall supply effort. 
However, the Office of Works, Board of Trade and mining industry all recognised 
early on the urgent need for special measures to secure supplies.    
From October 1914, the Office of Works purchased large amounts of imported 
timber, and established their own timber purchasing section.22 At first, the Treasury 
found it hard to persuade departments such as the War Office to use the Office of 
Works.23 However, as late as 1916 they were still the largest governmental buyers of 
construction timber, and were still suggesting schemes for more satisfactory 
purchasing and distribution arrangements.24 They were so busy purchasing timber in 
May 1916 that their main expert, Mr (later Sir) Frank Baines was felt at ‘a grave risk 
of breakdown, not only in his health but in the work for which he is responsible’.25  
Until at least the spring of 1915 the War Office restricted all of its purchasing to 
‘approved’ suppliers. Many tried to corner the market in materials and skilled 
manpower to fill orders, many of which proved greater than their capacity and were 
not fulfilled. This disrupted sectors of industry that already had a labour force which 
                                                 
20 Latham, History of the Timber Trade Federation, pp. 24-35. 
21 TNA/BT/71/21, Bird, pp. 12-14; War Office, Statistics of the Military Effort, p. 717. 
22 TNA/BT/71/3/55295, Memo regarding the control of timber during the war (24 March 1919); 
TNA/BT/71/21, Bird, p. 200.  
23 Swenarton, Homes Fit for Heroes, pp. 50-51, 53-54. 
24 TNA/AY/107, Letter Imperial Institute to Office of Woods c.18 May 1916; TNA/BT/71/1/6456, 
‘Draft Agreement Between the British and the French Governments for the Co-ordination of 
Requirements and Supply of Timber’. 
25 Ibid., Letter Harcourt to Wyndham R Dunstan at the Imperial Institute, 17 May 1916. 
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was unbalanced by the War Office rush to recruit men.26 I  the timber trades, even 
though the Timber Trade Federation wanted to supply government requirements well 
into 1915, by October 1914 demands for hutting timber alone from contractors 
working for the government led the Office of Works to appoint the firm of Messrs 
Montague L. Meyer as official Government Timber Buyers. They were to carry out 
direct purchasing of timber from foreign and domestic sources for government 
purposes, an early example of centralisation under civilian experts.27 This 
understandably led to complaints from parts of the trade and formed a part of later 
profiteering scandals. In discussions at the 1915 Timber Trade Federation AGM, 
Meyer’s appointment was challenged, accusations of trade conspiracies already 
having been made in parliament. Federation members felt they were not primarily 
concerned with the government methods to secure supplies, and seemed happy with 
how Meyer were carrying out their duties. However, they took ‘strong exception to 
the suggestions…that the timber trade had entered into a conspiracy or ring to raise 
prices against the Government’. The allegations were withdrawn following their 
representations.28 
Meyers not only purchased timber for the government but also took on storage and 
transport roles. In total they shipped 250,000 standards, approximately 825,000 tons, 
which they had purchased abroad, directly to France. At times in 1916, they were 
supplying 25,000 standards, approximately 82,500 tons in softwoods, a month to the 
Western Front, and required a staff of 650 in over twenty different sections. It is 
interesting to note that the Government Timber Buyers paid staff at lower rates than 
similar posts in official government departments, yet directly reclaimed costs from the 
                                                 
26 Turner, British Politics, p. 58. 
27 TNA/BT/62/1/21, memo October 1918, p.2; TNA/BT/71/21, Bird, pp. 2, 12. 
28 Latham, History of the Timber Trade Federation, pp. 64-5. 
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Government. This did at least mean that their operations and structures came under 
Treasury scrutiny. This could be strict as the Treasury maintained close control of 
expenditure during the war, even once funds had been allocated, and Meyers were 
subject to inspections and audits.29 As stated in the introduction, Meyers purchased 
£50m worth of timber in their capacity as the Government Timber Buyers during the 
war, equivalent to approximately eighteen Dreadnoughts, a good degree of 
centralisation of efforts by a civilian company that would have minimised 
bureaucracy.30 
The Board of Trade was also heavily involved early on in the war, most importantly 
with regards to maintaining imports of pit-props, traditionally obtained largely from 
Baltic ports. It was recognised immediately that these would be closed to trade by war 
with Germany and the Coal Mining Organisation Committee, established by the Home 
Office to maintain production, raised urgent concerns. The Board of Trade took it upon 
themselves to start enquiries into alternative sources.31 By mid-August they confirmed 
that they had already collected a large amount of information regarding requirements, 
stocks and potential shortages from the collieries, and were collecting more all of the 
time.32 Although some duplication of roles had occurred early on, it was now agreed 
that the Board of Trade would be responsible for obtaining such information and 
managing the requirements and importing of pit-wood. They were also instructed to 
take any steps considered necessary to stimulate pit-prop imports, therefore needing 
                                                 
29 TNA/BT/71/21, Bird, pp. 12, 14, 215-18; Swenarton, Homes Fit for Heroes, pp. 50-51, 53-54. 
30 TNA/BT/71/21, Bird, p. 14. 
31 TNA/LAB/2/1488/LE37858/110/1914, passim; C.F. Rey, W. Windham et al, Cd.7728 Reports to 
the Board of Trade Upon the Supply of Imported Pit–Timber with Special Reference to the Resources 
of Newfoundland and the Maritime Provinces of Eastern Canada (London, 1914), passim; 
TNA/BT/71/21, Bird, p. 2. 
32 TNA/LAB/2/1488/LE37858/46/1914, note by C.F Rey (Secretary of the Board of Trade) to Sir 
H.L. Smith (Permanent Secretary of the Board of Trade 1907-1919) on current pit-wood situation, 19 
August 1914. 
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to continue establishing stock and use levels but also employers’ labour requirements, 
prices and additional overseas supplies.33  
As with so many wartime resources, UK and international transport space and costs 
for timber, especially rail and shipping, resulted in a lot of discussion throughout the 
war, but the Board of Trade liaised early in this instance with appropriate bodies. It 
met with representatives of organisations including the Timber Trade Federation, 
Mining Association, Marine Department and shipping and rail companies to establish 
requirements, availability, sources and costs of supply. It also identified Canada and 
Newfoundland as the prime new markets.34 The Board was a firmly rooted existing 
structure within government, and in these early stages of the war a minimal number of 
existing teams, normally just that under Mr Rey and one or two others, became 
involved. However, as seen below, the Board of Trade was consistently involved in 
the timber effort, and for large periods it would be at the heart of it.  
Whilst the Board of Trade at this stage would deal with stocks, consumption, 
employers’ requirements and especially overseas supplies it was established that the 
Boards of Agriculture would, whilst still dealing with general forestry matters, 
investigate the potential for increasing home-grown supplies, again focusing on pit-
wood in this period. An informal committee under Mr Samuel was established 
including representatives of the Boards of Agriculture and the Office of Works, 
including R.L Robinson, who, as noted in chapter 1, was one of the main examples of 
continuity among high level experts across different organisations.35 Another example 
                                                 
33 Ibid, see notes regarding ‘Supply of Pit-Props’, n.d (c.late August 1914) and note Rey to Smith 19 
August 1914. 
34 TNA/LAB/2/1488/LE37858/18/1914, including for example notes by Rey 24 August 1914 and 14 
September 1914; TNA/LAB/2/1488/LE37858/46/1914, including notes regarding ‘Supply of Pit-
Props’, n.d (c. late August 1914). 
35 Ibid., note by Rey to Smith 19 August 1914; Hansard, House of Commons Sitting 2 May 1917, col 
339; TNA/BT/71/21, Bird, p. 16 
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of good communication can be seen in that Samuel’s committee collected information 
and statistics on home grown timber, exchanged ideas on administration, disseminated 
advice to growers, and tried to reduce transportation charges and set priorities. 
However, the committee was flawed in that it had no separate funds and each 
representative would return to, and act individually, within their department. 
Furthermore, although the committee dealt with the Office of Woods to obtain timber 
for merchants and was consulted by the Board of Trade, these two HLOs did not have 
representatives on the committee, and would not, perhaps could not, commit 
financially to its efforts.36 Therefore, although some duplication and flaws are 
noticeable, it is clear that there were early attempts made to streamline the efforts.  
However, in May 1915, Prime Minister Asquith restructured his cabinet into a 
coalition, to head off demands for a general election. The public and MPs on both 
sides of parliament were unhappy due to scandals over artillery shell shortages, the 
Dardanelles campaign, the content or even existence of an overall strategic plan for 
the war, and the machinery for making high level polices. A central element of the 
coalition cabinet was Lloyd George’s move to the newly created Ministry of 
Munitions,37 yet any improvements in supplies were not going to be immediate and as 
Lord Joicey stated in the House of Lords a month later; 
I judge a system by the results, and I submit that there has been failure. When 
the German Government want timber, or shells, or iron, or steel, they get six 
of the very best experts in that country to advise them and deal with the 
question of purchase. Had the War Office done that at the early part of this war 
we should not be in the position we are in today.38  
 
Whilst this debate primarily regarded artillery shells, Lord Joicey’s use of terms 
suggests that a poor situation was perceived by some regarding the timber purchasing 
                                                 
36 Ibid. 
37 Morgan, ‘George, David Lloyd’, n.p.; Swenarton, Homes Fit for Heroes, pp. 49-50; Turner, British 
Politics, pp. 4, 58. 
38 Hansard, House of Lords Sitting 23 June 1915, col. 112 
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processes, and the lack of a central panel of experts. The joint Boards of Agriculture 
and Office of Woods Samuel Committee was clearly toothless in regards to practical 
improvements in regards to purchasing supplies, but it would not be until the 
beginning of 1916 that further centralisation would occur, but at least this would be an 
inter-allied initiative.   
In early 1916 a diplomatic agreement was reached between France, Belgium and 
Britain to establish the Commission Internationale d’Achats de Bois, or International 
Commission for the Purchase of Wood. The British and French Governments signed 
the agreement establishing it on 19 February 1916, the Belgians two days later.39 As 
Wallach, Brown and Greenhalgh point out, large coalitions always face difficulties in 
working together over matters such as administrative, supply and transport problems, 
as well as on the battle-front itself. Logistical coordination and pooling of supplies in 
a ‘central authority’ is extremely desirable. In the First World War overcoming such 
issues necessitated the establishment of many and varied inter-allied committees and 
boards, as the need arose in a particular field. Although sometimes advisory rather 
than having directive powers, these would alter in make-up and defined roles to try to 
achieve greater efficiency of coordination as and when required.40  
As well as buying agents representing each nation, the Commission Internationale 
d’Achats de Bois itself included representatives of the British C-in-C in France and 
the CFC.41 Under the agreement of February 1916 a Commission for Joint Purchases 
was established immediately in London to undertake the main work of the Commission 
Internationale d’Achats de Bois. This constituted a purchasing office formed of one 
                                                 
39 TNA/WORK/6/745 for original of agreement in French; TNA/BT/71/21, Bird, pp. 2, 26. 
40 Wallach, Uneasy Coalition, passim, for instance see pp. 12-16, 97, 172, 181 (appendix C); Brown, 
British Logistics, p. 133; Greenhalgh, Victory through Coalition, passim.   
41 TNA/WO/95/32, QMG War Diary October-December 1916, 24 October 1916 note 6, replacement 
representative of C-in-C on CIAB (Major General A.M. Stuart, Director of Works, replaced Lieut.-col 
G.K Wait); Hill, 'The Canadian Forestry Corps', Appendix 2, p. 302. 
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French and one British representative, who came from the Office of Works, who 
would collate demands, allot quantities obtained to each country based on the 
requirements of the respective national ministries, provide through any means it could 
the necessary tonnage for its purchases, and arrange delivery direct to the intended 
army. The Commission for Joint Purchases liaised directly with, and followed the rules 
already established by, the Commission Internationale de Ravitaillement, or 
International Committee of Supply.42 In some respects the Commission Internationale 
d’Achats de Bois appears to have performed well in co-ordinating purchases and 
transport of timber, obtaining much cheaper rates than market prices and many of its 
roles remained largely unaltered during the war, and it received much praise from 
Bird, but it was not perfect.  
Bird argued that the Commission Internationale d’Achats de Bois ‘embodied the 
inter-allied co-operation’, but there were times, such as near the end of 1916, when 
British demand was so high that additional purchases were sought abroad by the 
Government Timber Buyers. Even though special terms were agreed with the 
Commission Internationale d’Achats de Bois with regards to where and how much 
could be bought during such single nation transactions, this does go against the 
founding concept of the Commission Internationale d’Achats de Bois.43 Furthermore, 
in August 1916 the War Office informed GHQ that the French representative on the 
Commission Internationale d’Achats de Bois had raised concerns regarding the 
amount of timber still being purchased directly by various parts of the British Army 
in France. The Commission Internationale d’Achats de Bois stressed their belief that 
requirements could be obtained more efficiently and cheaply through themselves. 
                                                 
42 TNA/BT/71/21, Bird, pp. 26-27. 
43 Ibid., pp. 27, 28. 
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However, that this was not always being taken advantage of suggests supplies were 
not always reaching the units requiring them at local levels.44 On 8 August 1916 a 
conference was held at British GHQ to discuss the possibility of setting up a ‘Central 
Purchasing Committee for Supply of Timber for Allies’.45 That it was felt necessary 
to discuss such a body in order to try and simplify ‘the workings of supply in London’ 
and seek additional French and Belgium assistance, again illustrates that the 
Commission Internationale d’Achats de Bois and Commission for Joint Purchases had 
not managed to fully meet the demands at the front. One reason put forward for this at 
the conference, and as stated above a regular theme, was that freight had become 
increasingly hard to obtain.  
As well as pushing for greater use of French forests, the Conference’s final 
recommendations included that British timber requirements should be submitted to the 
War Office to collate and process, which in itself would be bypassing or duplicating 
the work of the Commission Internationale d’Achats de Bois. It also provides a first 
indication that the War Office would become more involved in timber management, 
which as seen below they would take over in February 1917.46 Furthermore, it was 
stated that the British Armies would from now on not buy directly from British timber 
merchants, but would utilise the Office of Works or other organisations formed to act 
as their agents, illustrating that the Commission Internationale d’Achats de Bois, six 
months after establishment, was either not well known or its efficiency not respected.47 
                                                 
44 TNA/WO/95/31, QMG War Diary August-September 1916, note of 19 August about War Office 
letter received 7 August. 
45 Ibid., entry for 19 August and Appendix VIII.166, ‘Conference Held on 8 August, 1916, to consider 
Formation of a Central Purchasing Committee for Supply of Timber for Allies, and Reduction of 
Shipping’. 
46 TNA/WO/95/31, QMG War Diary August-September 1916. 
47 Ibid. 
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The Comité Interallie des Bois des Guerre, the Allied Committee on War Timber 
was also established in 1917, in Paris, and effectively acted as a subcommittee of the 
Commission Internationale d’Achats de Bois and the War Timber Commission, an 
executive body formed as part of an agreement between the British and French 
Governments on 15 November 1916, see below for further details.48 The Comité 
Interallie des Bois des Guerre was primarily formed to bring the buying agents of the 
Allied governments even closer together in coordinating the timber needs of the Allied 
Armies. Through the committee it was hoped supplies would be acquired as cheaply 
as possible directly from the producing country, and transported to France. It was also 
hoped that the resultant reduction in competition in the world’s timber markets, 
between these three nations, would help to keep prices down.49  
 The majority of the responsibility of the Commission for Joint Purchases for the 
purchasing of timber for the British war effort was transferred to the War Office and 
then Board of Trade, as they established successive overarching timber management 
departments. Also, responsibility for purchasing in areas of the world that had not been 
large exporters of timber to Britain were taken on by bodies such as the Allied Mission 
in Washington and Imperial Munitions Board in Canada, both of which will be 
reviewed in more detail in chapter 3.50 
However, although collating requirements and purchasing roles were therefore 
largely taken away from it, the Commission Internationale d’Achats de Bois continued 
to purchase wood for the Timber Program Committee, a subcommittee of the Allied 
Maritime Transport Council. Furthermore, rather than the Commission Internationale 
                                                 
48 TNA/BT/71/6456, for working copies and drafts in British and French; TNA/FO/93/33/266, for 
signed agreement in French; the details which will be reviewed in chapter 3; Bird and Davies, The 
Canadian Forestry Corps, pp. 10-11; TNA/BT/71/21, Bird, pp. 34-5.  
49 Ibid., pp. 2, 26-8; Brown, British Logistics, pp. 132-3. 
50 TNA/BT/71/21, Bird, pp. 27-28, 65-66. 
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d’Achats de Bois coming to an end, as purchasing roles were taken from the 
Commission for Joint Purchases, the representatives of the responsible departments, 
the War Office and the Board of Trade, simply became officers on the Commission. 
In fact the British Controller of Timber Supplies was eventually made its chairman. In 
April 1917 an Admiralty representative was added to the Commission Internationale 
d’Achats de Bois structure, in February 1918 American and Italian representatives 
joined, and by November 1918 all of the Allied nations requiring timber were on the 
committee.51 This illustrates that, although failing in some of its original aims, the 
body was considered useful in its international liaison and coordination roles, again 
showing continuity in high level personnel and knowledge sharing. Yet it was 
dissolved quickly after the armistice, in March 1919, suggesting that governments 
were keen to step back from economic involvement with each other and 
centralisation.52 
Producing more home grown timber in Britain 
Even with these attempts to increase purchases of timber through various 
centralised HLOs, during 1915 it became clear that improvements of production of 
home grown timber were also required. Again, these were initially measures taken by 
the individual Allies, yet as will be seen this became an inter-allied undertaking.  
During November and December 1915 the first new HLO relating to forestry was 
established, the Home Grown Timber Committee.53 At this time, the first German 
submarine campaign, coupled with large demands for uses such as in hutted camps 
and at munitions factories, brought attention to the desperate need to improve home 
                                                 
51 Ibid, pp. 27-28. 
52 Ibid. 
53 Ibid., p. 16; Stebbing, British Forestry, p. 203; Hansard, House of Commons Sitting, 6 December 
1915, col. 987 when a call for a committee of timber supplies was answered by Acland that he was 
hoping to make a statement to the house soon on the terms of reference and members of such a body. 
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grown timber supplies.54 It had also been recognised that there were increasing 
problems with the supply of labour for cutting wood and as such greater control was 
needed.55 Therefore Lord Selborne, then President of the Board of Agriculture and 
Fisheries, established the Home Grown Timber Committee under the overall direction 
of his department, although also closely linked with the Boards of Agriculture in 
Scotland and Ireland. 56   
Its central aim was to supplement what the import trade could provide from the 
UK’s woodlands. As Stebbing argued, just after its establishment, this was a well-
timed move as the nation desperately needed to utilise a great deal more of its own 
resources.57 However, the Timber Trade Federation were unhappy with its 
establishment, believing Selborne had taken the decision without consulting fellow 
ministers or the trade and that the Home Grown Timber Committee would enter into 
competition with them for standing timber and manpower. Yet once again good 
practice and communication prevailed and after several meetings between a Timber 
Trade Federation deputation and the Home Grown Timber Committee, satisfactory 
arrangements were agreed. Ultimately, the Home Grown Timber Committee had to 
utilise the Timber Trade Federation for several areas of expertise that the Government 
bodies lacked at times. These included setting fair maximum prices and the exact 
wording of control orders, on which see chapter 3.58 
Foremost amongst the Home Grown Timber Committee’s roles was to acquire 
areas of standing trees and arrange their conversion, but they were also charged with 
                                                 
54 TNA/BT/71/3/55295, Memo regarding the control of timber during the war (24 March 1919); Bird 
and Davies, The Canadian Forestry Corps, p. 6. 
55 Ibid. 
56 Hansard, House of Commons Sitting 2 May 1917, col. 339; War Office, Statistics of the Military 
Effort, p. 717; Stebbing, British Forestry, p. 7; Bird and Davies, The Canadian Forestry Corps, pp. 6, 
8, 18; TNA/BT/71/21, Bird, p. 2; TNA/BT/62/1/21, Memo October 1918, p. 2. 
57 Stebbing, British Forestry, pp. xxv, 7. 
58 Latham, History of the Timber Trade Federation, pp. 65-7. 
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purchasing stocks of timber already in the UK, at a time when both the Government 
Timber Buyers and Commission Internationale d’Achats de Bois would have felt this 
within their remits as well, although these two organisations did concentrate on 
imports, and the Home Grown Timber Committee on converting standing trees.59 At 
first the committee was solely to meet the needs of government departments, mainly 
the Office of Works, but eventually they would provide various forms of wood for a 
host of other organisations contributing to the war effort. A subcommittee of the Home 
Grown Timber Committee was also formed to resolve issues in obtaining mining 
wood, the Pit-wood Joint Subcommittee, which combined representatives of the Home 
Grown Timber Committee, Coal Mining Organisation Committee and Board of 
Trade.60  
Even with production improving, see achievements section below, not all were 
convinced the Home Grown Timber Committee was the most effective organisation 
to improve home-grown supplies. In October 1916 the Conservative MP for 
Canterbury asked Lloyd George, then Secretary of State for War, if the management 
of all forestry related work, in Britain and France, could be put under the control of 
the ‘expert’ Canadian engineers and lumbermen. His reason for suggesting this was 
that ‘scientific’ forestry and timber work had been so uncommon in the UK prior to 
the war that there were few experts available.61 This suggestion was put to the Home 
Grown Timber Committee, but little came of it, as at higher levels of control it was 
good business management and administration skills that were required, as much as 
the knowledge of forestry practices.62 Furthermore the UK, as shown previously and 
                                                 
59 Bird and Davies, The Canadian Forestry Corps, p. 6; TNA/BT/71/21, Bird, p. 16. 
60 Ibid., pp. 21, 23-24; TNA/BT/71/1/6564 Joint Sub-Committee on Pitwood, passim.  
61 Hansard, House of Commons Sitting, 10 October 1916, col.7.  
62 Ibid. 
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below, did have some forestry and timber trade experts by 1914, enough to man high 
level positions in important organisations.      
In appraising the work of the Home Grown Timber Committee, Bird concluded that 
they had stimulated production, diverted those in the trade towards more necessary 
classes of work and secured ‘very favourable’ prices for the government and their 
official buyers, even if these were hampered at times by the high prices contractors 
and other buyers for government work were willing to pay. Furthermore, Home Grown 
Timber Committee operations were expanding rapidly as its life came to an end.63 Its 
last meeting was held on the 25 January 1917, and shortly after this the government 
decided that management of all aspects of work connected with timber should be 
further centralised. The committee was therefore dissolved on 31 March 1917, and its 
work passed to the new Directorate of Timber Supplies at the War Office.64 It is clear 
that the Home Grown Timber Committee was a successful organisation in its time, 
looking to improve self-sufficiency, and it was an important building block in the 
forestry effort.  
Centralising: purchasing, producing, stock keeping, establishing needs, allocation.    
However, towards the recognised turning point in the administration of the war, the 
end of 1916, it was realised that still more timber was required and greater 
centralisation became the preferred method. An earlier report, dated 23 June 1916, by 
the Commanding Officer (CO) of the CFC, Colonel McDougall, on the possibilities 
of his men working in France had already suggested the establishment of a committee 
of all the British and French organisations interested in obtaining wood supplies, to 
consider how best to meet demands.65 This was achieved when the War Timber 
                                                 
63 TNA/BT/71/21, Bird, pp. 18, 24. 
64 Ibid., p. 24; TNA/FO/93/33/271, ‘Administration Modifications in Commission’, letter Foreign 
Secretary to French Ambassador, 30 March 1917. 
65 Bird and Davies, The Canadian Forestry Corps, p. 10. 
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Commission was formed through the agreement between the British and French 
Governments on 15 November 1916.66 In some roles this body appears very similar to 
the Commission Internationale d’Achats de Bois established nine months earlier, of 
which the War Timber Commission was simply a larger and more executive version, 
especially in that in its remit of directing high level operations and policies, it was also 
tasked with stopping competition between the Allied governments or British 
Government departments, such as that competition recently experienced for British 
Columbia timber. However, the War Timber Commission was importantly also 
established to ensure that supplies were increasingly obtained from British and, even 
more importantly, French forests. The main task of the War Timber Commission was 
therefore to establish the quantities of particular types and forms of wood needed by 
the armies, the urgency in which this was needed, and then correlate and pass this 
information to the relevant obtaining organisation, including the CFC, even though 
they remained under the direct control of the Timber Supply Department (GHQ) when 
in France, see chapter 3, and ensure economies in transportation requirements. It 
therefore took a position, in the overall wood-management structure, above the 
Commission Internationale d’Achats de Bois who began to take its general directions 
from the War Timber Commission.67 
In the UK it was also felt that the War Timber Commission, although limited to 
dealing with timber supplies solely for the war effort until the beginning of 1917, 
would need to be responsible for controls over the private trade and exports, which 
somewhat surprisingly had been allowed to continue uncontrolled to meet civilian 
                                                 
66 TNA/BT/71/6456 for working copies and drafts in British and French; TNA/FO/93/33/266 for 
signed agreement in French; Bird and Davies, The Canadian Forestry Corps, pp.10-11; 
TNA/BT/71/21, Bird, pp. 34-5.  
67 Ibid., pp. 27, 32-34. 
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needs.68 Again, the exact details of the controls put in place will be reviewed in more 
detail in chapter 3.  The War Timber Commission was also able to act as a high level 
‘Consultative Committee’ that the Director of Timber Supplies at the War Office could 
consult with regards to agreeing wider issues, such as reducing timber estimates 
submitted by various departments in order to bring the total into an amount that was 
manageable given current shipping restrictions and home production.69 
The War Timber Commission was to receive detailed statements of the 
requirements of the armies from the British C-in-C and French and Belgian Ministries 
of War, the urgency of these demands, and the amounts being felled by various British 
and French bodies. If possible requirement statements were to show six months ahead, 
but were to be no less than three months ahead. This seems sensible insofar as enabling 
them to establish exact overall requirements, compare amounts being produced, and 
inform those such as the Commission Internationale d’Achats de Bois and Admiralty 
of the outstanding balance to be purchased and shipped.70 Whilst import figures 
fluctuated between November 1916 and March 1917, amounts of timber produced in 
Britain and France from all sources, and supplied mainly to the British Army, did 
increase.71 However, the system by which the War Timber Commission was informed 
of the requirements of the various militaries did not work well. There were also 
objections to the fact that the War Timber Commission, a non-military body, had 
control of the Canadian lumber units, who had signed attestation papers.72 
Furthermore, as the submarine campaign intensified at the beginning of 1917 it was 
decided that private and military use of wood would have to be considered and 
                                                 
68 Ibid., pp. 34-5. 
69 TNA/CAB/23/3/34, Minutes of War Cabinet 116, 9 April 1917. 
70 TNA/BT/71/21, Bird, p. 32. 
71 Ibid., pp. 35-6 for table of figures. 
72 Ibid., Bird, p. 35. 
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controlled together to enable adequate self-sufficiency to maintain supplies. The Army 
Council wrote to the C-in-C BEF France that ‘the activity of enemy submarines has 
seriously interrupted the shipment of timber from the Swedish and other markets and 
drastic measures are therefore necessary in order to conserve existing stocks of timber 
and economise its use’.73 Although it had been suggested that the War Timber 
Commission could take control of all of the management of supplies, it was instead 
decided by a War Cabinet Committee, established in December 1916 and deciding in 
January 1917, that the War Office should take greater responsibility.74 This seems to 
go against the coalition’s aims of more civilians taking back control and the desire to 
manage both civilian and military use from the same organisation.  However, the War 
Timber Commission lost mainly of its practical roles when the War Office established 
a new department at the beginning of February 1917, known as the Directorate of 
Timber Supplies (War Office), for the overall control and management of softwood 
supplies for the army. Furthermore, this would, as seen in chapter 3, lead to the 
beginnings of tighter controls for all sorts and uses of wood.75  Although its 
overarching powers were short lived, the War Timber Commission can be seen as the 
first HLO that evolved to attempt to monitor and manage the purchasing of imports as 
well as to increase local timber production in an effort to ensure overall supplies, in 
this case specifically for the Allied armies. 
Therefore, in line with the high-level political moves towards centralisation of 
controls occurring at this time, the War Cabinet committee on the subject of improving 
                                                 
73 TNA/BT/71/4/78217, letter to C-in-C BEF from the Army Council, 10 February 1917. 
74 Ibid., Interdepartmental Consultative Committee re: Establishing Timber Directorate; see Army 
Council Order of 4 February 1917, letter Secretary to Army Council to Commander-in-chief BEF. 
75 Ibid., Letter to C-in-C BEF from the Army Council, 10 February 1917; The Times, ‘Controller of 
Timber; Sir Bampfylde-Fuller’s War Post’, 20 February 1917, p. 9; TNA/BT/71/3/55295, ‘Memo 
showing necessity for the control of timber at the beginning of submarine campaign…’, 22 March 
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timber supplies, the First Commissioner of Works, and the interdepartmental 
Committee on Timber Supplies under Lord Curzon, see below, all recommended or 
approved  that the War Office should establish a Directorate of Timber Supplies.  The 
War Cabinet agreed that the resultant Directorate of Timber Supplies (War Office) 
should absorb all the roles of the Home Grown Timber Committee and other timber-
related bodies, such as the War Timber Commission. It was also decided that it should 
be aided by a new timber specific interdepartmental advisory committee and that Sir 
Joseph Bampfylde-Fuller be approved its first Director from the 15 February.76 
Another reason for establishing both the Directorate of Timber Supplies (War Office) 
and Lord Curzon’s committee on timber supplies, at this time must also have been that 
on 16 February the War Cabinet were going to instigate a 500,000 tons reduction in 
overall imports, which was to include an estimated 200,000 tons reduction in timber, 
following Germany’s resumption of unrestricted submarine warfare on 1 February. By 
the spring/summer that would bring serious concerns over all kinds of imports, 
including food, at a time when lack of sufficient labour in numerous areas was also 
seen to be problematic.77  
Although at times known as the ‘Timber Supply Department’ of the War Office, 
including by themselves on official headed paper, they will be known in this work by 
their most common title, the Directorate of Timber Supplies (War Office).78 The 
Directorate was placed within the Contracts Branch of the War Office and was 
responsible for conserving existing stocks, regulating purchases of imports, ensuring 
                                                 
76 TNA/BT/71/4/78217, letter to C-in-C BEF from Army Council, 10 February 1917; The Times, 
‘Controller of Timber’, 20 February 1917, p. 9; TNA/CAB/23/1/70, Minutes of War Cabinet Meeting 
70, 16 February 1917, p. 3; Bird and Davies, The Canadian Forestry Corps, p.11; TNA/BT/71/21, 
Bird, pp. 40, 43 fn.(x), 48-51.  
77 TNA/BT/71/4/78217 see also War Office internal notification of the new body, such as War Office 
Memorandum No.913, 7 March 1917 which states that the new Directorate was ‘to be known as the 
Directorate of Timber Supplies’; Turner, British Politics, pp. 6-7.    
78 Ibid., War Office Memorandum No.913, 7 March 1917.    
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that the small amount of shipping available was carrying types required for war 
purposes, encouraging economy in civilian and military use, and developing home-
grown supplies.79 Bampfylde-Fuller certainly agreed with the current belief in 
centralisation, writing to the War Office Secretary that ‘in order to carry out a vigorous 
policy of developing home supplies and economising consumption, it is essential that 
the greater part of the functions […] be concentrated in a single authority’.80  It was 
eventually agreed with the Boards of Agriculture and Office of Works that the 
Directorate would not only take on the roles of the Home Grown Timber Committee, 
but also the War Timber Commission, giving it responsibility for purchasing and 
extracting, home and abroad.81  It carried on working under the principles established 
by the diplomatic agreements between the Allied Governments with regards to the use 
of French forests and the ‘joint purchase of timber and its allocation in accordance 
with military necessity’.82  
The War Cabinet also illustrated its desire for centralised administration in asking 
the Directorate of Timber Supplies (War Office) to compile a national program for the 
organisation of ‘supply and transport of all kinds of timber’. This was to be based on 
the many reports on import restrictions that had gone before, reports on possible 
sources of labour then being prepared by government departments such as the 
Directorate of National Service, Ministry for Education and Foreign Office, and in 
                                                 
79 TNA/BT/71/4/78217, letter to C-in-C from Army Council, 10 February 1917; The Times, 
‘Controller of Timber’, 20 February 1917, p. 9; TNA/BT/71/3/55295 ‘Memo showing necessity for 
the control of timber at the beginning of submarine campaign…’ 22 March 1919; Bird and Davies, 
The Canadian Forestry Corps, p.11; TNA/BT/71/21, Bird, pp. 40, 200. 
80 TNA/BT/71/4/78217, Memo Directorate of Timber Supplies (War Office) to Secretary to War 
Office, 26 February 1917, p. 11. 
81 Ibid., Memo Directorate of Timber Supplies (War Office) to Secretary to the War Office 6 February 
1917 and Letter to C-in-C BEF from Army Council, 10 February 1917 and War Office Memorandum 
No.913, 7 March 1917; The Times, ‘Controller of Timber’, 20 February 1917, p. 9; TNA/BT/71/21, 
Bird, p. 38. 
82 TNA/BT/71/4/78217, letter to C-in-C BEF from Army Council, 10 February 1917; TNA/BT/71/21, 
Bird, p. 35. 
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consultation with any other departments that might be concerned with the forestry 
effort.83  
The War Office was chosen as the managing body at this stage, as opposed to the 
Office of Works, Board of Trade or Boards of Agriculture, as better liaison was felt to 
be needed between French and Belgium military hierarchies and Canadian lumber 
units that came under the British military system. Also, although the Office of Works 
had been obtaining and supplying timber for all sorts of military works in the UK, 
supplies of wood to the BEF, whether imported or taken from French forests, were by 
the end of 1916, being arranged through a branch of the War Office called F.W.5.84 
This team had been formed under the RE’s Fortifications and Works Directorate and 
were acting as the representatives in Britain for the Director of Works and Chief 
Engineer BEF in France, as well as becoming involved in the administration work for 
the Canadian lumber units, and being represented on the now more ‘executive’ body 
the War Timber Commission.85 In a sign of the desperate state of the wood situation 
it was also now seen as responsible for suggesting alternative materials and equipment, 
organising personnel and equipment for engineering roles, including contractors who 
might be prepared to work in French forests.86 The Board of Trade as a managing body 
was likely also discounted as a possibility at this time as focus had definitely turned 
to reducing imports of all types whereas the War Office was seen to be in a good 
position to deal with Military Service Act exemption claims from the timber industry. 
Furthermore, it was estimated that nearly sixty-six per cent of timber requirements in 
1916 had been directly for military purposes.87 Lastly, by the time the Directorate of 
                                                 
83 TNA/CAB/23/1/77, Minutes of War Cabinet Meeting 77, 21 February 1917, p.2. 
84 History of the Great War Based on Official Documents,1914 vol.2, p. 19;  Maclean, Farming and 
Forestry on the Western Front, p. 96; Pritchard, History of the Corps of Royal Engineers, p.562 
85 Ibid., pp. 77-78.  
86 Ibid. 
87 TNA/BT/71/21, Bird, p. 40. 
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Timber Supplies (War Office) took control of softwoods the War Office had already 
taken control of several commodities, such as wool and leather, setting a precedent. 
Bird stated that all those concerned with making the decision agreed that the War 
Office should be responsible for the management organisation.88  
When asked why the control of timber had been passed from the Boards of 
Agriculture to the War Office, Lord Curzon, then Lord President of the Council and 
thus Leader of the House of Lords, one of the five members of the War Cabinet, 
‘chairman of innumerable subcommittees’ including ones on timber and import 
restrictions, and Chairman of the committee that had taken the decision, gave several 
reasons.89 These included that supply concerns at the time were almost entirely related 
to military purposes, the CFC were under the War Office, the main additional labour 
required to bolster the normal forestry trade were soldiers and finally all of those on 
the committee, including the representative of the Boards of Agriculture, felt it was 
the best option at the time.90 
Bampfylde-Fuller saw the work of his Directorate as falling into three main 
‘branches’; purchasing, controlling use of home grown timber and encouraging greater 
home-grown production. Initially he saw purchasing for military purposes as including 
that for the Ministry of Munitions who, as shall be shown later, continued to maintain 
their own Timber Supply Department throughout the war.91 Tellingly a slightly later 
list of Directorate of Timber Supplies (War Office) roles also gives the function as the 
‘supply of timber for the use of the Army and of all Directorates in the War Office’ 
                                                 
88 Ibid. 
89 David Gilmour, ‘Curzon, George Nathaniel, Marquess Curzon of Kedleston (1859–1925)’, Oxford 
Dictionary of National Biography, Oxford University Press, 2004; online edn, Jan 2011 
<http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/32680>, [accessed 3 Nov 2014]. 
90 Hansard, House of Lords Sitting 26 June 1917, cols. 638-9; Hansard, Written Answers House of 
Commons Sitting 17 May 1917, col. 1806.   
91 TNA/BT/71/4/78217, Memo Directorate of Timber Supplies (War Office) to Secretary to the War 
Office, 26 February 1917, p. 11. 
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making no mention of pit-wood or the Ministry of Munitions.92 However, the 
Directorate of Timber Supplies (War Office) were clearly meant to replace the Office 
of Works as the central purchasing body for foreign supplies and home grown timber, 
and therefore took on the services of the Government Timber Buyers,93 another 
example of experience in roles passing from organisation to organisation. In order to 
fulfil this role, the body took on some responsibilities associated with the Commission 
Internationale d’Achats de Bois and War Timber Commission, in terms of reducing 
competition in foreign markets, through direct liaison and close working with the 
French delegation in London.94  
Controlling home grown timber use was to be achieved through efficient utilisation 
of existing stocks, licensing imports, and restricting use of timber in the UK.95  As 
discussed in detail in chapter 3, the control of the use of softwoods through controls 
such as licensing imports and sales, was a key role that this new body would pass to 
its successor at the Board of Trade, and that the War Office and Army Council would 
continue to help the Timber Supply Department (Board of Trade) with in regards to 
legal precedence.96 The initial responsibility of developing home grown timber 
supplies did include pit-timbers, railway sleepers and other civilian uses as well as 
direct military ones, reflecting their importance in the war effort, but by March this 
was reworded to a more general ‘stimulation of the production of timber in the United 
Kingdom’.97 With regards to home-grown pit-wood the War Office simply continued 
                                                 
92 Ibid., War Office Memo No.913, 7 March 1917. 
93 TNA/FO/93/33/271, letter Foreign Secretary to French Ambassador, 30 March 1917; 
TNA/BT/71/21, Bird, p. 38 
94 TNA/BT/71/4/78217, letter to C-in-C BEF from Army Council, 10 February 1917. 
95 Ibid., Memo Directorate of Timber Supplies (War Office) to Secretary War Office 26 February 
1917, p. 11; TNA/BT/71/21, Bird, p. 202. 
96 The Times, ‘Controller of Timber’, 20 February 1917, p. 9; TNA/BT/71/4/78217, War Office 
Memo No.913, 7 March 1917, p. 1, points 2 and 3. 
97 Ibid., p.1, point 4. 
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making use of the Local Pit-wood Committees already established between the Home 
Grown Timber Committee, Coal Mining Organisation Committee, Board of Trade and 
local landowners.98 The Directorate of Timber Supplies (War Office) was therefore 
tasked with continuing the essential work of the Home Grown Timber Committee, 
including the provision of woodland and arrangements for its working by the CFC, as 
well as centralising purchasing.99  
However, even given these convincing arguments to establish an all-encompassing 
management structure at the War Office, the Directorate of Timber Supplies (War 
Office) proved another short lived organisation. An earlier interdepartmental 
committee, under Sir H. Babington-Smith, had produced a detailed report on shipping 
that had recommended a more central management structure for controlling timber 
and an initial committee on ‘Restriction of Imports’ under Lord Curzon had 
investigated this and largely approved. However, in mid-February 1917 the War 
Cabinet also instructed Curzon to reassemble this committee in order to address the 
more specific question of how to further reduce timber imports, now by 300,000, 
rather than 200,000, tons per month.100 Curzon’s committee met several times in quick 
succession in early May to discuss timber restrictions as shipping prioritisation had to 
be for food, ammunition and transportation of coal to France and Italy.101 It was to 
investigate the purposes wood was being used for, the difference between 
requirements and supplies, how to improve home grown timber production, whether 
                                                 
98 TNA/BT/71/21, Bird, p. 205. 
99 Bird and Davies, The Canadian Forestry Corps, p. 11. 
100 TNA/CAB/23/1/70, Minutes of War Cabinet Meeting 70, 16 February 1917, pp. 2, 3 [note; 
Babington-Smith Committee report is ‘War Cabinet Paper G.-124’]; TNA/BT/71/21, Bird,  pp. 48-
51; TNA/CAB/23/1/74, Minutes of War Cabinet Meeting 74, 19 February 1917, pp. 1-2; 
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the War Cabinet decision to restrict timber imports so drastically should be rescinded, 
or whether a combination of both increased imports and home grown timber would be 
required to meet the current deficit.102 The committee primarily focussed on methods 
to increase quantities of home grown timber production as a means of reducing the 
amounts required to be obtained through imports. In regards to improving self-
sufficiency they focussed on labour shortages, transport problems and price concerns. 
However, they also considered broader issues including the introduction of suitable 
central ‘timber’ policies, particularly in regards to establishing who was best suited to 
manage the effort, what level of shipping restrictions were practicable as well as 
licensing and other methods to encourage economising.103 This short-lived 
subcommittee of the War Cabinet can therefore be seen as a high level policy advisory 
body, that considered many issues and potential solutions that had been considered at 
earlier stages of the war, but were given impetus due to drastic reductions in shipping 
space availability. Amongst their recommendations were no real surprises, chiefly 
being the movement of the central management of supplies from the War Office to the 
Board of Trade and increased use of POWs as labour in forests.104  
The War Cabinet therefore noted a decision made by Lord Cu zon’s Committee, 
which had previously agreed with the War Office becoming the managing body, that 
control over timber supplies be transferred from the War Office to the Board of Trade 
at the end of May, and a ‘Controller’ appointed. This decision had also been reached 
in conjunction with the Secretary of State for War and President of the Board of 
Trade.105 This further illustrates, within the forestry effort, the well-known principles 
                                                 
102 Ibid.; TNA/BT/71/21, Bird, p. 51. 
103 Hansard, House of Lords Sitting 26 June 1917, col. 640; TNA/CAB/21/80, Lord Curzon’s 
Committee on Timber Supplies, see minutes of all three meetings. 
104 Ibid. 
105 TNA/CAB/23/2/60, Minutes of War Cabinet 142, 22 May 1917; TNA/BT/71/21, Bird, pp. 48-51. 
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of Lloyd George’s coalition discussed above, that power for decisions be put in the 
hands of a few, and that civilian-led bodies should wrest control of the strategies away 
from military departments. The transfer of responsibility for managing wood supplies 
in the UK from the Directorate of Timber Supplies (War Office) to the new Board of 
Trade Timber Supply Department officially took place on 1 June 1917.106  
This department was headed by the new Controller of Timber Supplies, Mr (later 
Sir) James B. Ball, appointed on the 26 May.107 Ball had been engineer-in chief of the 
London, Brighton and South Coast Railway, his services being lent by that company 
to the government.108 The Timber Supply Department (Board of Trade) would oversee 
purchases and use in the UK until mid-1919, but its final roles, mainly catching up 
with accounting work and dealing with claims for private timber felled, were still 
ongoing in 1922, although it was hoped to finish these by the end of that year.109 There 
were several particularly practical reasons why this responsibility was passed from the 
War Office to the Board of Trade, rather than maintained by them or given back to the 
Boards of Agriculture, as some in Parliament had wanted.  
The Earl of Selborne, a recent President of the Board of Agriculture and Fisheries, 
regretted that the role had been taken from the Boards of Agriculture and given to the 
War Office in the first place. He now wanted to know why, when reallocating 
responsibility for the ‘exceptionally important’ role of securing timber for military and 
civil uses, the Board of Trade was selected over the Boards of Agriculture, which had 
been established with the ensurance of supplies of timber through expert forestry 
                                                 
106 TNA/BT/71/3/55295, Memo regarding the control of timber during the war, 24 March 1919; 
TNA/BT/62/1/21, Department of the Controller of Trading Accounts of the Board of Trade; memos, 
correspondence and financial development and trading reports.  
107 Hansard, House of Lords Sitting 26 June 1917, col. 637; TNA/BT/13/75, note by A.H. Stanley 
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practices as one of their roles.110 Amongst the answers received by Selborne and 
others, both in and outside of Parliament, were that by May 1917 the supply situation 
in the UK had become critical and was affecting more than just military concerns.111 
Furthermore, that in the three to four months since the War Office had taken 
responsibility two important aspects had altered that affected the choice of best 
management organisation.  Firstly, the Army could no longer spare men for cutting 
timber due to other demands on their manpower, and those civilian labourers being 
brought from ‘all parts of the world’ to work in the forests could not necessarily be 
taken under control of the War Office.112 Secondly, when responsibility had initially 
been passed to the War Office the supplies it had to arrange from Britain were for 
purposes in both the UK and on the Western Front.113 However, as will be shown 
below and in chapter 3, the BEF’s timber management and supply structures had also 
been reorganised, with more arrangements made with the French Government in 
which timber-growing areas were given over to British control. The Directorate of 
Forestry (GHQ) was now supplying greater quantities directly to the front, and aiming 
to increase this. Therefore the War Office in London had less need to be concerned 
with this aspect of supplies, and the Secretary of State for War came to believe that 
the roles of the Timber Supply Department (War Office) could be better managed 
under the Board of Trade than himself.114 Furthermore the Minister for Agriculture, 
Prothero, felt that, in regards to forestry, the Board of Agriculture and Fisheries had 
been gradually stripped of roles and therefore ability or expertise by this point. Lastly, 
it was also raised in Parliament that the War Office had become ‘heartily sick’ of 
                                                 
110 Hansard, House of Lords Sitting 26 June 1917, cols. 635-6, Earl Selbourne; Hansard, House of 
Lords Sitting 20 June 1917, cols. 545-7, Lord Heneage. 
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timber management, given the amount they already had to do.115 The War Cabinet 
themselves had therefore asked Lord Curzon’s Committee to investigate the benefits 
of moving these responsibilities to the Board of Trade.116 The President of the Board 
of Trade agreed with the reasons given by the Secretary of State for War and therefore 
Lord Curzon’s Committee had no hesitation in suggesting its approval.117  
The Board of Trade clearly appeared a sensible choice for several other valid 
reasons. It was, at this time, closely monitoring the effects of the shipping controls put 
in place by their Department of Import Restrictions. They also had a Coal Mines 
Department particularly interested in pit-wood, and at the end of 1916 they had started 
a survey of timber stocks held by private merchants. Although this survey had shown 
that there were still reasonable supplies available from merchants, the Board of Trade 
was greatly concerned in the first few months of 1917, that a timber ‘famine’ might 
occur.118 Furthermore timber prices had increased to three or four times their pre-war 
levels, this having a particularly negative effect on the price of coal, and it was felt 
that the Board of Trade was best placed to put appropriate controls on these prices.119 
It was therefore announced on the 31 May 1917, in the Board of Trade Journal, that 
the role was being undertaken on the basis that: ‘The problems connected with the 
supply of timber now have only an indirect connection with the War Office,’ and a 
separate department at the Board of Trade had therefore been established for the 
control of ‘all’ timber, although in practice this equated to most military and all civilian 
use in the UK.120 As seen below, different organisations at GHQ were increasingly 
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119 Hansard, House of Lords Sitting 26 June 1917, col. 637, Viscount Haldane. 
120 Ibid., col. 636; TNA/BT/71/3/55295, Memo regarding the control of timber during the war, 24 
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supplying the front directly from French forests, and the Timber Supply Department 
(Board of Trade) role did not initially include responsibility for more specialist woods, 
such as those for aircraft production or Admiralty purposes. However, during 1917 
and 1918 it gradually expanded into UK-based roles since it occasionally needed to 
acquire specialist hardwoods, as well as rattans and canes which were of great 
importance in the munitions industries.121  
Purchasing timber abroad remained an important method used by the Board of 
Trade, and a Purchasing Advisory Committee was established to help with this. Again 
this represented a high level committee that included not only the Controller of Timber 
Supplies and other representatives of the Timber Supply Department (Board of Trade) 
but also representatives from the Government Timber Buyers, Messrs Montague L. 
Meyer, and the timber trade.122 The Purchasing Advisory Committee worked in close 
connection with the Commission Internationale d’Achats de Bois, the War Mission in 
the USA, the Imperial Munitions Board in Canada, and the Ministry of Shipping.123 
As well as those members of the trade sitting on the Purchasing Advisory Committee, 
the move from the War Office to the Board of Trade also brought about the formation 
of two further advisory committees, the Merchants’ Advisory Committee and the 
Home Grown Timber Merchants’ Advisory committee. These further illustrate the 
desire to rely heavily on existing civilian expertise, yet the Timber Trade Federation 
would still not always be content with Government measures, as indicated in chapter 
3.124 
Given the continuance of severe concerns over shipping space, the most important 
role of the Timber Supply Department (Board of Trade) was to increase home grown 
                                                 
121 Hansard, House of Commons Sitting 12 November 1917; TNA/BT/71/21, Bird, pp. 3, 4. 
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timber availability. In attempting to do so the department, like the Directorate of 
Timber Supplies (War Office) before it, followed similar procedures to the Home 
Grown Timber Committee.125 They also prioritised the work the War Office had 
undertaken to buy new areas of woodland and obtain the necessary labour, often in the 
form of German POWs, to convert it.126 The department also looked to control the use 
of home-grown and imported wood. This included granting permits, setting maximum 
prices and administration work resulting from various ‘Orders’ restricting purchases, 
imports and/or sales of specific categories of wood, as will be seen in chapter 3.127 
The Timber Supply Department (Board of Trade) were also centrally involved in 
the continuing efforts to obtain sufficient mining timber. In February 1917 the Home 
Office Coal Mining Organisation Committee was superseded by the Coal Mines 
Department of the Board of Trade.128 A few months later, as the Board of Trade was 
also taking on responsibility for forestry, eight new Pit Timber Committees were 
established, each with an H.M Inspector of Mines as a chairman and technical 
assistance. These committees began to meet with a view to recruiting volunteer coal 
miners to work at timber felling in woodland areas secured for them by the Timber 
Supply Department (Board of Trade).129 Pit-wood, however, would continue to be a 
concern throughout the war as 1918 correspondence between the Coal Controller and 
Board of Trade illustrates.130  
Yet the efforts in regards to establishing a more centralised HLO to run a large 
number of the important facets of the forestry effort can be seen in the reorganisations 
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needed and taken to get to the Timber Supply Department (Board of Trade). This body 
was the pinnacle of timber control in the UK from May 1917 until well after the end 
of the war, and its evolutionary stages as detailed above were sensible given the 
various context of the war effort and its timber needs. However, allocation of supplies 
to the numerous different end-users at times needed specific organisations to be 
established and in the UK this resulted in late 1917 in the Timber Allocation 
Subcommittee of the wider War Priorities Committee.  The Timber Allocation 
Subcommittee provided an essential prioritising link between the Timber Supply 
Department (Board of Trade), as the major source of supplies in the UK, and the main 
utilizers, the War Office, Ministry of Munitions and Admiralty.       
Allocation of raw materials, energy and transport were gradually brought under the 
control of ministries and controllers, as shown above, and the final such body was the 
War Priorities Committee. Established in October 1917 it adjudicated between users 
such as the Admiralty and Ministry of Munitions over scarce resources like steel and 
rubber.131 It grew from a committee established by the War Cabinet in September to 
investigate the conflicting manpower needs of the army and aircraft production. The 
committee quickly realised, however, that in order to establish priorities it needed to 
incorporate labour demands for all forces and all material production programmes, 
thus becoming the War Priorities Committee. Amongst its roles was the allocation of 
materials, as well as manpower, all based on deciding between the departments still 
competing with each other for resources.132 The first stage in this task was the 
collection of information not only on requirements but also on the quantities and 
qualities of existing stocks either in use or in reserve. This necessitated a separate 
                                                 
131 Turner, British Politics, pp. 262-3; Grieves, The Politics of Manpower, 1914-18, p. 155. 
132 Ibid., pp. 155-7; TNA/CAB/40/4, Minutes of the Information Sub-Committee; TNA/CAB/40/23 
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Permanent Information Subcommittee to feed into the War Priorities Committee 
which was instructed to obtain details from the various departments and commissions 
managing and allocating supplies, including timber.133 Forms sent out asked for 
information on material either in stores or in use in the UK, France or Italy, but not 
other theatres of war. Categories of information requested included the current level 
of stocks, normal reserve levels, and anticipated position on 31 March 1919 given 
proposed deliveries. Also to be provided were the current, average and estimated 
future consumption and expenditure, as well as levels of labour. It was noted that exact 
figures on labour and expenses were difficult to obtain from some departments, and 
estimating future needs as wartime situations changed was never going to be 
straightforward or completely accurate.134  
However this collation of information was essential in establishing future 
requirements and prioritisation of materials.135 Therefore, following the establishment 
of the Permanent Information Subcommittee of the War Priorities Committee 
numerous further subcommittees were organised to collate information on specific 
materials.136 It was agreed at the first meeting of the Permanent Information 
Subcommittee that the Timber Allocation Subcommittee be established, and this was 
approved by the War Priorities Committee on 22 November 1917, meeting for the first 
time on 6 December, and on six subsequent occasions. 137  
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The allocation of available timber based on the ‘general priority’ set by the War 
Priorities Committee, was the raison d'être of the Timber Allocation Subcommittee.138 
It acted as a conduit through which the Timber Supply Department (Board of Trade), 
government departments, or their contractors, could liaise. This meant that the Board 
of Trade could explain to the end-users their various control and distribution measures 
and schemes.139 Therefore, not only were the controls more acceptable to these 
departments, but also schemes of work for securing and delivering supplies. For 
instance how much timber shipping tonnage was to be allocated to each department 
by the Timber Supply Department (Board of Trade) could be agreed so that they were 
as ‘satisfactory’ as possible to those requiring the wood at a certain place by a specific 
time.140  However, despite its name, the committee’s remit was not restricted to 
allocation from suppliers to users, based on an overall picture of the timber and war 
situations. It also interacted with the Timber Supply Department (Board of Trade) over 
matters such as the collation of purchasing requirements from Canada and the USA 
for all government departments, the economising and control of home grown timber, 
and it could if necessary, also allocate shipping tonnage for timber for a particular 
department, if their needs were considered urgent enough.141  
These end-user departments themselves could also establish internal bodies to liaise 
with the timber HLOs and allocate those supplies they did receive. Most noticeable in 
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139 Ibid., Ball’s report on the work of the Timber Allocation Subcommittee sent to the Secretary of he 
War Priorities Committee, 21 November 1918. 
140 Ibid. 
141 Ibid., and letter Chairman Timber Allocation Subcommittee to Secretary War Priorities 
Committee, 15 March 1918; TNA/MUN/4/3417 Department of Munitions Requirements and 
Statistics, including letter from the War Priorities Committee regarding the ‘extremely serious’ need 
to minimalize use of timber, which was sent to all of the main departments (Admiralty, War Office, 
Ministry of Munitions, Ministry of Shipping, Ministry of Food, Air Ministry, Office of Works, Board 
of Trade), 22 October 1918. 
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the research carried out for this thesis was the Ministry of Munitions. They established 
their own Directorate of Timber Supplies during 1917 which represented the Ministry 
on numerous timber-related committees mentioned above, in order to better secure 
and then allocate the very large quantities of timber needed by itself or its contractors. 
142 The Department of Timber Supplies at the Ministry of Munitions was run by Mr. 
D. Bain, C.B.E, the Ministry of Munition’s Deputy Director in charge of ‘Packing and 
Timber’. Sometimes referred to as the ‘Ministry of Munitions Controller of Timber’, 
he did eventually become their ‘sole channel’ for all wood requirements.143 Bain’s 
Directorate suggested and applied space saving import techniques and home grown 
timber self-sufficiency methods to secure the quantity and types it needed, especially 
in regards to ammunition cases. This included taking control of some national box 
factories and saw mills as well as establishing its own special drying kilns, in order to 
start relying more heavily on home grown timber for ammunition packaging.144 Bain 
had two Assistant Controllers, and the Directorate was split into three teams with roles 
similar to some of the priorities vexing the wider timber management organisations: 
                                                 
142 TNA/MUN/5/44/264/6 ‘List of Committees appointed by the Minister of Munitions or Upon 
Which the Ministry of Munitions was Represented, as of July 1918’, prepared by the Historical 
Records Branch; TNA/CAB/21/80, May 1917 Estimates of Ministry of Munitios requirements of 
softwood for June, July, August 1917, these came to a total of 157,446 tons; TNA/CAB/40/23 letter 
Controller Timber Supplies (Board of Trade) to Secretary War Priorities Committee, 28 November 
1917; TNA/MUN/5/31/263/23/35, or MUN/5/31/263.01/1-14 or MUN/5/44/263.92/1 for various 
charts of the organisation and functions of the Ministry of Munitions and Timber Supplies 
Department (Ministry of Munitions) at different stages throughout the war, although largely as at 11 
November 1918; TNA/BT/71/21, Bird, p. 5; TNA/MUN/4/3417, several examples of correspondence 
from contractors to the Timber Supplies Department (Ministry of Munitions) a d from the Timber 
Supplies Department (Ministry of Munitions) to the Controller Timber Supplies (Board of Trade) 
asking the Board of Trade to sell timber to specific contractors working for them. One example being 
the Crittal Manufacturing Company who were constructing aircraft shelters, coresp ndence dated 13, 
17 & 19 December 1917. 
143 TNA/CAB/40/23, letter Controller Timber Supplies (Board of Trade) to Secretary War Priorities 
Committee 28 November 1917; Hansard, House of Commons Sitting 2 May 1918; 
TNA/MUN/4/3417, correspondence between Timber Supplies Department (Ministry of Munitions) 
and the Department of Munitions Requirements and Statistics at the Ministry of Munitions, July 1917. 
144 TNA/MUN/5/389/1860/5, ‘History of the Munitions Supplies Dept. 1917-1919 by D. Bain’; 
TNA/MUN/4/3417, Correspondence between Timber Supplies Department (Ministry of Munitions) 
and the Department of Munitions Requirements and Statistics at the Ministry of Munitions, July 1917; 
TNA/BT/71/21, Bird, p. 5. 
Page 119 of 386 
 
 
compiling accurate figures of requirements and stocks, orders and permits to control 
supplies and use within the Ministry of Munitions, and salvage to improve self-
sufficiency. However, they also had teams with roles more specific to the Ministry of 
Munitions, such as a specialist team managing timber for trench warfare.145 Such 
centralisation within the major users could only help liaison and communication 
between these users and the HLOs overseeing the whole forestry effort, based in 
London. 
Developments in France: Centralisation.   
However, developments towards greater centralisation also took place in sourcing 
and controlling wood closer to the Western Front. Many of the bodies outlined above 
were responsible for supplies arriving in France. However, major changes can also be 
seen in control of the forestry effort at GHQ, to achieve greater self-sufficiency. Once 
again these are especially noticeable, as it was in civilian bodies, from late 1916 
onwards.   
The Order of Battle of the BEF in August 1914 included not just the RE, but at 
GHQ the Quartermaster General’s Branch and, under the Headquarters of 
Administrative Services and Departments, the Directorates of Supplies, Transport, 
Railway Transport, and Works.146 All of these had a hand in obtaining, transporting 
or managing supplies of various types of wood. However, understandably given its 
pre-war scale of use, there was no single body responsible for this resource. As trench 
warfare set in, and trench systems grew in size and sophistication, timber was acquired 
by British forces as, where, and when it could be. Individual armies, corps or smaller 
                                                 
145 TNA/MUN/5/31/263/23/35, Timber Supplies Department (Ministry of Munitions) organisation 
and functions as of 11 November 1918; TNA/MUN/5/44/263/92/1 Chart of Organisation of the 
Timber Supplies Department (Ministry of Munitions),  c. August 1918 to January 1919. 
146 History of the Great War Based on Official Documents, 1914, Vol.1, pp. 415-16. 
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units either cut it down or purchased it locally.147 Various levels of the military 
structure were therefore taking responsibility for obtaining and distributing supplies 
as necessary, from the private soldier upwards. As one Canadian infantry officer noted 
of conditions near the ‘firing-line’ in March 1915, ‘in some places the houses are in 
ruins; wood all taken for firewood…’ and as Mottram vividly depicts the British Army 
was said to have burnt a million hop poles, along with any other wood they could get 
their hands on.148  
Compensation claims for timber were settled in cash. A small committee 
established by the British QMG in October 1914 to deal with claims from French and 
Belgian civilians was expanded into a Claims Commission by the War Office in 
December 1914. In October 1915 it took on the duty of ‘acquiring all land required 
for military purposes in the Army areas…’ and within the many claims arising from 
war damage, occupation of buildings and factories, use of roads, vehicle accidents, 
pillage and theft and disputes over contracts was ‘appropriation of timber from 
forests’.149 
However, with regards to high level management of wood supplies in France and 
Belgium, several branches can be said to have been important in these early stages. 
The majority of timber and timber articles were considered as ‘Engineer Stores’, and 
unfortunately through much of the war they were not recorded separately by the 
QMG’s Office in its weekly reports of ‘Embarkation and Shipments,’ unlike many 
                                                 
147 See the earlier sections of this thesis on the ‘Uses’ and ‘Shortages’ in chapter 1; TNA/BT/71/21, 
Bird, p. 30.  
148 From Officer of 15th Battalion ‘Letters From the Front’ in Lieut., Mary Plummer,  Elizabeth Flager 
MacKeen, Jessie Pope et al., With the First Canadian Contingent: Published for the Canadian Field 
Comforts Commission, (Toronto & London: The Musson Book Company Ltd & Hodder & Stoughton 
Ltd, c. September 1915), p. 56; R.H. Mottram, The Spanish Farm, (London: Chatto & Windus, 1924), 
pp. 15, 221; R.H Mottram, The Twentieth Century, A Personal Record, (London: Hutchinson, 1969), 
p. 60; R.H Mottram, Through the Menin Gate, (London: Chatto & Windus, 1932), pp. 50, 71, 173.  
149 History of the Great War Based on Official Documents, 1916, vol.1, pp. 112-13. 
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other supplies, from forage to nurses.150  Fuel in these reports meant coke and charcoal 
for men in trenches, coal for offices in the first and second echelons, but not 
‘fuelwood’ often obtained locally.151 This failure to differentiate timber from other 
imports of Engineer Stores, up to at least December 1916, could imply that the QMG’s 
Office and others had not yet realised its essential status, although it could also be due 
to confusion between departments over who was responsible for tracking its stocks. It 
has been estimated, however, that approximately seventy-five per cent of RE stores 
were timber or articles using timber.152 
Early management and distribution of large supplies in France therefore rested with 
the QMG, RE Engineer in Chief and RE Director of Works, each of these making 
forecasts of requirements.153 It was the RE Engineer in Chief who ordered the amounts 
required and the RE Directorate of Work who provided storage and distribution.154  
These would be allocated monthly to the Chief Engineers of each army. As shall be 
seen in chapter 3, the French Forestry Authorities provided the RE Directorate of 
Works with much of their supplies, and from the end of 1915 began allocating forest 
areas in which the RE could arrange cutting and transport. Some basic and 
underequipped RE forestry operations were established by June 1916, but were very 
much struggling with demand.155 
The supply structure remained similar to this until mid-1916 when it was 
recognised that transportation to and through France was overworked and failing and 
                                                 
150 TNA/WO/95/30, 31 and 32, QMG War Diaries May-December 1916.  
151 TNA/WO/95/31, QMG War Diary August-September 1916. 
152 Pritchard, History of the Corps of Royal Engineers, pp.77-8. 
153 Ibid., pp. 165-6. 
154 TNA/CAB/21/80, Minutes of Lord Curzon’s Committee on Timber Supplies, meeting 8 May 
1917, p. 3, point 3: Lord Lovat (Director f Forestry in France) informed the meeting of the processes 
for estimating and ordering supplies prior to the establishment of the Directorat  of Forestry (GHQ). 
155 Pritchard, History of the Corps of Royal Engineers, pp. 165-6, 559; Bird and Davies, The 
Canadian Forestry Corps, pp. 10, 34; TNA/BT/71/21, Bird, p. 39. 
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increased use of expert Canadian lumbermen in French forests was essential.156 I  
June 1916 Kitchener therefore agreed that Colonel, later General, McDougall should 
visit France and report back on how forests could be put to better use by the CFC, 
either currently working in Britain or being raised in Canada.157 McDougal’s report 
of the 23 June 1916 was based on a four-day trip by himself and two officers to the 
timber-cutting operations already being carried out by RE units.158 Although not all of 
the report’s recommendations were enacted, it was certainly followed in terms of many 
of its recommendations regarding the organisation of HLOs, and types of forestry 
work suitable in France. These will be discussed in chapter 3. With regards to HLOs 
and agreements, the report recommended greater co-operation between organisations 
supplying timber, either from the UK or France, to the armies to ensure that none was 
imported to France that could be obtained there. Evidently the existing ‘improvised’ 
and under great pressure forestry organisation in France needed reorganising, 
preferably under an officer experienced in forestry work. This organisation would then 
pass any requests from the armies to London along with recommendations on the 
source of timber, given known sites in France. Lastly, all forestry companies should 
still ultimately be controlled from London, by a single ‘Chief’ with a knowledge of 
the requirements and ongoing or potential sites of operations in both countries, as they 
would be best placed to determine the most efficient solution. This seems like a good 
bit of personal empire-building, but, with regard to McDougall’s later overall 
command of all CFC operations from London, it did work.  However, management of 
the supplies, either imported or cut by the increasing Canadian presence in France, 
still required streamlining as per McDougall’s recommendations.  
                                                 
156 Brown, British Logistics, pp. 132-3; Bird and Davies, The Canadian Forestry Corps, p. 8. 
157 TNA/BT/71/21, Bird, p. 30; Bird and Davies, The Canadian Forestry Corps, pp. 10, 34-5. 
158 Ibid. 
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In late 1916 purchasing for and transport to France was still the responsibility of 
the War Timber Commission in London. The Commander-in-chief was then 
ultimately responsible for deciding allocation of supplies, arranging transportation of 
imports and produce from French forests, and salvaging and sending back to the UK 
any material that could be reused.159 At this stage these tasks would, therefore, still 
have been allocated to the staffs of the QMG, Engineer in Chief and Directorate of 
Works at GHQ. For instance the QMG office was often involved in timber supplies, 
liaising with the French mission at GHQ over British requests to extract timber from 
particular French forests.160 The QMG office also began holding monthly conferences 
to ‘consider and consolidate’ timber supply demands for a particular month, generally 
aimed at three months following the conference.161 
Up to late 1916 at least, there were overall logistical problems in getting supplies 
to the front, largely due to what Ian Brown argues was an ad hoc approach to transport 
administration and problem-solving by career soldiers rather than professional 
planners.162 During the battle of the Somme, July to November 1916, although Cook 
argues that efficiency in getting supplies to the front had improved, Brown shows very 
thoroughly that the BEF’s supply system nearly broke down. Lack of supplies, 
especially ammunition, were common as problems shifted from production levels to 
‘theater [sic] supply’, and the BEF continued to grow.163  It was recognition of this 
that led to the work of Geddes from October 1916 in streamlining and 
                                                 
159 TNA/BT/71/21, Bird, p. 39. 
160 TNA/WO/95/31 QMG War Diary August-September 1916, see entries for 13 September1916 and 
18 September 1916. 
161 See for example TNA/WO/95/31 QMG War Diary August-September 1916 (inc. Appendix IX.45) 
conference held 1 September 1916 to ‘consider and consolidate demands for timber for the month of 
December’; TNA/WO/95/32, QMG War Diary October-December 1916, (inc. Appendix X.49) 
conference held on 1 October 1916 to consider and consolidate demands for timber for the month of 
January 1917.    
162 Brown, British Logistics, passim, for instance see pp. 109-122. 
163 Cook, At the Sharp End, pp. 473, 474; Brown, British Logistics, pp. 1- 2, 109-134. 
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professionalising this transport administration, an excellent example of the successful 
introduction of civilian experts which as seen throughout this chapter was a central 
part of the forestry effort from its beginnings.164  
The first major reorganisations in terms of forestry administration in France came 
several months after the pivotal period of December 1916. It was felt by GHQ that 
supplies received through British and international organisations working in London, 
such as the War Timber Commission and Commission Internationale d’Achats de 
Bois, and the different departments involved in France were inadequate.165 The BEF 
was also under some pressure from the French Government to clarify and improve the 
timber situation and practices.166 In February 1917 the War Office therefore suggested 
to the Commander-in-chief that a single officer be put in control of all of forestry 
operations then being carried out under the RE Directorate of Works, who had also 
requested a separate directorate for timber, and a Director of Canadian Operations in 
France.167 Therefore, at the same time that it was taking control of operations in the 
UK, through the Directorate of Timber Supplies (War Office), the War Office also 
sought a more centralised control of forestry in France. At the beginning of March the 
establishment of the Directorate of Forestry (GHQ) was approved. It was felt this 
should be a RE Directorate, essentially growing from their RE Directorate of Works, 
which also spawned independent directorates for Stores, Roads, Docks, Lands and 
RAF Works. It was decided, however, that the Directorate of Forestry at GHQ would 
come directly under the control of the QMG.168 It became effective on 2 April 1917 
                                                 
164 Brown, British Logistics, passim, for instance see pp. 109, 143, 147-9, 174, 231-3.  
165 TNA/BT/71/21, Bird, p. 3. 
166 Hodicq, Exploitation of Timber by the British Army in Northern France, n.p.  
167 Bird and Davies, The Canadian Forestry Corps, p.11; Pritchard, History of the Corps of Royal 
Engineers, p. 166. 
168 Ibid., pp. 539-60, 565; Addison, Work of the Royal Engineers, p. 23; Maclean, Farming and 
Forestry on the Western Front, p. 97; Nicholson, Canadian Expeditionary Force, p. 499. 
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and the RE Directorate of Works passed responsibility for the supply of wood to the 
new Director of Forestry, the pre-war forestry expert Lord Lovat, recognised at high 
levels of government for high energy in devotion to his duties.169 Lovat’s Deputy 
Director, Major R.L.B Thompson, was appointed from the staff of the Directorate of 
Works and promoted to Colonel, and twenty-three experienced officers were 
employed.170  
The Directorate of Forestry (GHQ) was established to take overall control, from 
the War Timber Commission in London and various other bodies at GHQ, of the 
direction of all works by the CFC and Royal Engineer Forestry Companies already 
working in French forests by the spring of 1917.171 To achieve this it had numerous 
main roles. It firstly had to estimate requirements, although Lovat was keen to point 
out the difficulties in getting these accurate, then negotiate with the French authorities 
to provide areas of forests, prepare ‘sawing specifications’ and issue ‘Rights of 
Access’ for the forestry units in liaison with the French Commission Forestière 
d’Expertises.172 Once the resultant timber was obtained it was responsible for 
allocating stocks available to particular areas or schemes, and keep track of stock 
levels in the RE timber yards it was delivered to. It was also tasked with establishing 
a larger stock in order to respond to sudden needs from the front.173 This closer control 
                                                 
169 TNA/BT/71/21, Bird, p. 202; Pritchard, History of the Corps of Royal Engineers, p. 565; G.S.O, 
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over exactly what quantities and type of wood was cut in France, when it was cut, and 
who it was supplied to, also allowed GHQ to provide the Directorate of Timber 
Supplies (War Office), and its replacement the Timber Supply Department (Board of 
Trade), in London with smaller and slightly more accurate requirements for additional 
timber.174 
In February 1917 the role of allocating supplies between the Allied armies had not 
been passed from the War Timber Commission to the Directorate of Timber Supplies 
(War Office), as many roles had, but to the French Ministry of War in Paris and the 
British C-in-C.175 Although not contributing to the picture of centralisation of all 
elements, this did make organisational and logistical sense given the urgent need for 
supplies by a particular army at a particular time, especially in preparation for 
offensives. However, in May 1917 a month after the Directorate of Forestry (GHQ) 
had been established, it was decided that an equivalent cross-national organisation, 
similar to the War Timber Commission in London, was also required nearer the front 
to better allocate timber between the Allies. Two conferences, held on 2 and 25 May, 
between the French Government and Directorate of Forestry (GHQ)  representatives, 
resulted in agreement that an inter-allied committee should be formed to better direct 
the work of the CFC in France, towards meeting the most pressing needs. The resultant 
committee would grow into Le Comité Interallié des Bois de Guerre. The committee 
included Lovat and Lieutenant-Colonel Sutherland from the Directorate of Forestry 
(GHQ), General McDougall of the CFC and French representatives. In July 1917 an 
American representative, Captain P.D.L Lyall, was also added.176 The Comité 
Interallie des Bois des Guerre can, as stated above, be seen as a subcommittee of the 
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175 TNA/BT/71/4/78217, letter to C-in-C BEF from the Army Council, 10 February 1917. 
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Commission Internationale d’Achats de Bois and War Timber Commission with the 
responsibilities of coordinating timber buyers across the Allies and distributing the 
supplies obtained in France, as well as purchasing additional supplies from Spain, 
Portugal and Switzerland.177 By the end of 1917 Haig was praising the work of the 
forestry units, the Comité Interallie des Bois des Guerre and the French Forestry 
Authorities who had negotiated the use of their natural resources.178  
Reorganisations in timber management within the BEF were slightly slower to 
occur than in central government in London, but did follow similar patterns in terms 
of looking to increase self-sufficiency through more centralised and defined areas of 
control, and use of appropriate experts. The major reorganisation also occurred at 
similar times, and for similar reasons as those in the UK, namely late 1916 into 1917 
due to acceptance that the war could continue for some time, unrestricted submarine 
warfare could disrupt shipping space already needed for other important imports, 
transport networks were struggling and therefore resources produced as close to the 
point of use were needed. In timber terms, due to good forest management by the 
French State in the hundred years before the war, this proved possible. 
Conclusion to establishing and reorganising the HLOs; lessons learnt and acted 
upon. 
 
The Timber Supply Department (Board of Trade) and Directorate of Forestry 
(GHQ) can, therefore, be seen as the pinnacles of the British organisations that took 
control of the wartime effort to obtain the necessary supplies of timber needed by the 
Home and Western Fronts. Allocation, based on availability and urgent needs was also 
                                                 
177 TNA/BT/71/21, Bird, p. 27. 
178 Bird and Davies, The Canadian Forestry Corps, p. 38, they state that Field-Marshal Sir Douglas 
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eventually centralised in the Timber Allocation Subcommittee and in France in the 
Comité Interallie des Bois des Guerre. These organisations grew from earlier models, 
as contextual changes were recognised as necessitating them. It is clear that the 
policies of increased state intervention, as seen from December 1916, and applied 
across many areas as well as forestry, were not ‘knee-jerk’ reactions or a complete U-
turn from laissez-faire to state control. They came through organisations and views 
that had evolved slowly in the first two years of war the purposes of which became 
increasingly important and difficult as requirements grew and increased in urgency, 
but shipping losses and additional space needed for more vital supplies also grew. 
However, standardised solutions across materials had emerged in terms of continuing 
to look for locations to import from, when shipping was available, whilst increasing 
self-sufficiency by bringing together and trying to streamline committees and 
subcommittees of civilian experts on various materials, issues of concern such as 
transport or machinery, or geographical areas.179 Forestry fits well into this recognised 
wartime approach in terms of methods used and the timings they were introduced.    
Continuity in Internal HLO Structures 
As well as sensible reorganisations of responsibilities and streamlining as needs arose, 
the internal structures of some of the important HLOs also bore striking resemblances 
even as their names and managing organisations changed. This would have helped to 
ensure greater efficiency as roles passed from one to another, often in quick 
succession. 
To achieve its aims the Home Grown Timber Committee structured itself and its 
work simply. The country was divided into administrative areas, each with officers 
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responsible for purchasing timbered land then arranging its working and transport of 
the products. Initially England and Wales were divided into five areas, with Scotland 
and Ireland remaining single areas. However, these large spaces proved difficult for 
divisional officers to manage as required quantities increased, so additional suitably 
trained officers were employed and the UK subdivided into more numerous 
administrative areas.180 Four Home Grown Timber Committee subcommittees were 
established to streamline the management processes and enable the Executive 
Committee and Director to concentrate on making policy decisions. The 
subcommittees carried out detailed investigation into one of either supply, labour, 
conversion or transport issues. The main committee received reports on their findings 
to enable quicker and better-informed decisions.  This basic structure, along with the 
addition of the Pit-wood Joint Subcommittee, as stated above a combination of the 
Home Grown Timber Committee, Coal Mining Organisation Committee and Board of 
Trade, survived until the Home Grown Timber Committee disbanded at the end of 
March 1917.181  
The Directorate of Timber Supplies (War Office) also eventually consisted of four 
branches. Although with broader parameters than the Home Grown Timber 
Committee subcommittees, they covered similar areas. Timber Section 1(TS1) dealt 
with establishing requirement levels, purchasing supplies, and issuing licences for 
imports and sales. TS2 was named, and promoted, ‘Economies’, and TS3 was labelled 
‘Forestry’ dealing with acquisitions of standing wood and its conversion. TS4 dealt 
with the re-occurring essential issues of labour, equipment and transport that regularly 
held back supplies. TS4 also managed the Directorate’s field staff, taken on from the 
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Home Grown Timber Committee, and those German POWs put to forestry work in 
Britain, as well as the necessary machinery for cutting, conversion and transport. 
However, CFC units in the UK continued to take their directions from TS3 ‘Forestry’ 
as part of the home grown timber effort.182  
The Timber Supply Department (Board of Trade) largely maintained the same 
structure as the Directorate of Timber Supplies (War Office), which essentially moved 
as a whole to the Board of Trade, although some alterations were made for efficiency. 
In regards to administration, to avoid confusion in the months following the move to 
the Board of Trade, the Army Council and War Office authorised the Controller of 
Timber Supplies (Ball) to act on their behalf under DORA reg.2C. One of the first 
things Ball did was to improve the office and paperwork arrangements that the War 
Office had in place. He tried to rationalise the different ‘Registration’ arrangements, 
of which there were approximately six being operated by the War Office, and to define 
unit roles clearly to remove any residual overlapping of tasks.183 This inevitably led to 
some slight structural changes. When responsibility transferred to the Board of Trade 
the best structure for the four Directorate of Timber Supplies (War Office) ‘TS’ teams, 
were still being finalised, yet they were moved over as whole units to the Board of 
Trade, so work was not lost or undue confusion caused. However, this also meant that 
at this time they were also working largely separately from the rest of the Timber 
Supply Department (Board of Trade) creating some early ‘imperfect knowledge of 
each other’s function’.184  
At the beginning of 1918, however, a separate ‘Branch V’ was established 
specifically to deal, in close consultation with the Government Timber Buyers, with 
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buying and transporting all wood from overseas, essentially focussing on the USA and 
Canada.185 Furthermore, sections TS3 ‘Forestry’ and elements of TS4, who had 
responsibility for field staff and German POWs, were combined immediately into 
Branch III, in charge of home grown timber operations.186 Communication between 
Branch III and the CFC was closely maintained by Liaison Officers stationed in CFC 
operational areas. These were overseen by Major G.L. Courthope, M.C. M.P., an 
Assistant Controller of Timber Supplies, and described in 1919 as ‘a leading authority 
on forestry questions’ as well as being ‘President of the English Forestry Association 
and of the Royal English Arboricultural Society’.187 Clearly he was a suitable 
Assistant Controller and understandably included in several wartime advisory 
committees on forestry.  
Just as important as labour, were sufficient supplies of transport and new and 
replacement plant and stores for sawmills.188 Therefore these elements of TS4 formed 
‘Branch IV’, established under an Assistant Controller.  They did not solely work to 
assist their own field divisions and CFC units, but helped private firms, in a sign of 
the desperate need for home grown timber. However, the administration of home 
grown timber orders and permits was left to Branches I and II, TS1 and TS2 under the 
War Office, enabling them to take even tighter control of consumption in the UK, 
whether home-grown or imported.189 The Board of Trade also felt the need to reduce 
the number of field divisions in England and Wales, which had grown under the War 
Office, and place one officer in charge of each. Frequent meetings were then held 
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between Branch II at HQ and the Divisional Officers to tackle any general concerns 
and share experiences.190 
In France and Belgium the Directorate of Forestry (GHQ) oversaw work carried 
out through an Army Area Forestry Group, including an HQ and ‘Forestry Control’ 
team, and a ‘Lines of Communication’ Forestry Group which included an HQ for 
several groups and forest districts, not necessarily on the direct British lines of 
communication, but throughout France.191 These ‘districts’ would manage the timber 
units in their areas and supply the results to RE timber yards. Distribution from RE 
yards was then still the responsibility of the Directorate of Works and Transport 
services.192 Technical staff from all of the main forestry areas would meet GHQ staff 
weekly, at the Directorate of Forestry (GHQ) offices, to liaise with each other over 
issues including changes in demands of volumes or types of timber and the regularly 
updated six-months supply forecasts they received. They also discussed current 
output, working conditions encountered in the forests, and how good forestry practices 
could be maintained.193  
The internal structures of the pinnacle HLOs that emerged can therefore be seen as 
well laid out and sensible given the types of work required of them, for instance acting 
as interfaces between different needs from different end-users and those converting 
the trees in the woodlands of Britain or France. Some continuity, for instance from the 
Home Grown Timber Committee to the War Office and then Board of Trade 
management organisations, can also be easily traced in terms of staff and structures.  
Furthermore, it will now be shown that there was also continuity in the high level 
personnel in these bodies.  
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Continuity in HLO Staff and their Advisory Committees. 
Knowledge and experience were passed from one organisation to the next or to 
other bodies operating simultaneously, through staff transfers, advisory committees 
and close contact in many meetings, noted discussions, interviews and memoranda. 
The Board of Trade recognised by mid-August 1914 that several of their employees, 
such as C.F Rey, Mr Ashley and R.L Robinson, who had been Head of the Office of 
Woods, was Superintending Inspector of Forestry at the Board of Agriculture and 
Fisheries, was effectively in charge of Office of Works forestry, and later became 
Secretary to the Acland Committee, plus other forestry experts at the Board of 
Agriculture and Fisheries, were duplicating investigations into and responses to some 
enquiries.194 The subsequent agreement, that the Board of Trade would be responsible 
for pit-wood requirements and imports, meant these organisations ‘narrowly escaped’ 
irritating duplication of work.195 It was also agreed that to reduce such duplication the 
Board of Agriculture and Fisheries’ Samuel Committee would restrict itself to 
considering the possibilities of obtaining home grown timber, and that the Boards of 
Trade and Agriculture would liaise closely.196 
Employees of the Board of Trade, such as Rey, met with organisations during 
August and September 1914 to establish details of availability, supply and prices 
related to pit-wood services. These included the Timber Trade Federation, Mining 
Association, Marine Department and transport companies. On 25 August a meeting 
between the Board of Trade, the Director of Canadian Forestry Mr Campbell, and 
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Robinson, at that stage representing the Office of Woods, discussed the possibility of 
a supply of pit-props being obtained from areas of Canada.197 A few days later the 
Board of Trade even met with the head of Amalgamated Press, Lord Rothermere, to 
see if use could be made of its existing Newfoundland Timber Department.198 I  
September 1914 The Board of Trade also began to deal directly with Britain’s Trade 
Commissioner in Canada and Newfoundland, Mr Hamilton-Wickes. Interaction 
between the Board of Trade in London and Canada and Newfoundland was at times 
slightly complicated, but this largely arose due to confusion between who was to take 
certain actions, Hamilton-Wickes or William Windham, who was in Canada on a 
Board of Trade fact-finding mission. However, any confusion and duplication was 
minor and corrected quickly by the Board of Trade.199 
The Home Grown Timber Committee’s initial Chairman was F.D Acland who, as 
already noted, was the Parliamentary Secretary to the Board of Agriculture and 
Fisheries who would later be appointed as Chairman of the Forestry Subcommittee of 
the Reconstruction Committee.200 Although not directly dealing with wartime supply 
issues, membership of the Acland Committee was all-encompassing in terms of British 
forestry at the time, and many names crop up with respect to the wartime effort. 
Various producers were represented, such as the Boards of Agriculture, the Office of 
Woods and large landowners. The main consumers, the Office of Works, Ministry of 
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Munitions, Admiralty, War Office and Board of Trade, all had at least one 
representative. Forestry expertise was provided by pre-war specialists, including Sir 
Stirling Maxwell, and representatives from the University of Cambridge and Scottish 
Office.201 This was an indication of the way expertise and experience would come 
together and permeate the wartime forestry effort in order to advance it efficiently. 
The Home Grown Timber Committee’s first Director was John. D. Sutherland. 
Formerly of the Scottish Office and later holding a high level role with the Directorate 
of Timber Supplies (War Office), Sutherland would eventually be appointed Assistant 
Director of Forestry in France, with the temporary rank of Lieutenant-Colonel.202 
Senior members of the Home Grown Timber Committee also formed the basis of the 
Pit-wood Joint Subcommittee, established to deal with all issues relating to home 
grown timber for use in mines. Acland chaired this committee, as well and the Home 
Grown Timber Committee, and H.G. Richardson was secretary of both.203 T e Local 
Pit-wood Committees established in mining areas by the Home Secretary, consisted 
of representatives of local mine and forest owners as well as the Home Grown Timber 
Committee, and their brief was to investigate and collate requirements for the Pit-
wood Joint Subcommittee and coordinate liaison between mines and landowners to 
improve sources. The Pit-wood Joint Subcommittee would, in turn, advise the Local 
Pit-wood Committees on the national situation, this illustrating the high levels of 
liaison.204    
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Boards of Agriculture Forestry Advisory Officers, who had also been working with 
educational centres before the war, were also placed at the disposal of the Home 
Grown Timber Committee to utilise their local knowledge.205  By the time the British 
asked the Canadian Government for help in February 1916 some of the staff that had 
transferred to the Home Grown Timber Committee from the Boards of Agriculture 
already knew the Canadian Director of Forestry in Ottawa, and this would help in their 
later dealings with the Canadian Lumber units. Sutherland also provided valuable 
advice and ensured good cooperation with the Canadians. 206  Although in these early 
days it was difficult to employ enough suitably trained officers to work in all of the 
Home Grown Timber Committee divisions around the UK, not surprisingly given the 
embryonic state of British pre-war forestry coupled with the enlistments to Kitchener’s 
Armies, they were gradually found.207 The Department of Timber Supplies at the 
Ministry of Munitions also assembled appropriate staff for their needs, including 
surveyors, technical assistants, inspectors and foremen. They also sought ‘Technical 
Assistance’ from timber experts Messrs. Kilner and Drew.208  
As seen above, there were apprehensions over the decision to pass control of timber 
supplies from the Board of Agriculture and Fisheries, charged when established with 
improving supplies with expert forestry, to the War Office.209 However, Bampfylde-
Fuller, the first and only Director of the Directorate of Timber Supplies at the War 
Office, had at times run agricultural departments in Indian provinces as well as ending 
up as Lieutenant-Governor of Eastern Bengal and Assam before the war, and so he 
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and Functions as of 11 November 1918; TNA/5/44/263/92/1, Chart of Organisatio of he Timber 
Supplies Department (Ministry of Munitions), c. August 1918 to January 1919. 
209 Hansard, House of Lords Sitting 26 June 1917, cols. 635-6, Earl Selborne; Hansard, House of 
Lords Sitting 20 June 1917, cols. 545-7, Lord Heneage.  
Page 137 of 386 
 
 
was clearly used to administering large and important organisations.210 Furthermore, 
although the Home Grown Timber Committee had started out as just a few officers 
lent by the Boards of Agriculture, when handing responsibility to Bampfylde-Fuller 
all but a very few of its 178 administrative staff and skilled forestry officers, were 
taken on by the Directorate of Timber Supplies (War Office).211 Concerns over lack 
of expertise were further quashed as each of the heads of the War Office Timber 
Sections had relevant experience. To head TS1, largely dealing with foreign 
purchases, Captain W. Roberts Crow, an imported timber merchant of the firm W.R 
Crow and Sons was appointed, and he later became an Assistant Controller of Timber 
Supplies in charge of Branch I of the Timber Supply Department (Board of Trade). 
Other personnel in Crow’s section, such as a number of inspectors tasked with 
regulating prices, were also taken from the timber trade.212 
Unusually TS2, ‘Economies’, did take on all new staff when established. However, 
its role centred on creating and running a permit system for the sales of imported 
softwoods, so it was more administrative in nature. Their high level staff did, however, 
often have relevant engineering qualifications. The team was initially headed by W.S. 
Gale, an architect and surveyor who had been working in the Aeronautical Inspection 
Department. His successor, from May 1917, was G.M. Harriott who amongst other 
professional qualifications was a Member of the Institute of Civil Engineers.213  
TS3, ‘Forestry’, dealt mainly with increasing home grown timber supplies and 
therefore liaised with and provided assistance for the CFC. This team not only took its 
initial director, Sutherland, from the Home Grown Timber Committee so he could 
continue in a similar role, but also large numbers of its administrative and field staff 
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as well. In London this amounted to some 130 members, including an accounts 
department of approximately thirty-five clerks and secretaries, who had already been 
sitting on various committees, and a large number of permanent civil servants on 
loan.214 Concerns were raised as to whether the expertise of forestry officers employed 
by the Board of Agriculture and Fisheries, under the Home Grown Timber Committee, 
was still being utilised for selecting areas for cutting and negotiating prices.215 It was, 
however, stressed that the majority of these Boards of Agriculture Home Grown 
Timber Committee field officers had been transferred to TS3, along with its labour 
and the majority of its equipment and plant including its 164 mills. Even orders placed 
by the Home Grown Timber Committee for more equipment were simply transferred 
to the Directorate of Timber Supplies (War Office).216  
Sutherland’s replacement at TS3, after his move to the Directorate of Forestry 
(GHQ), also illustrates contemporary recognition of the need to utilise those trained in 
other parts of the empire, as the army had found in terms of officers when drastically 
expanding its size in 1914 and 1915. Mr Hugh Murray had been Senior Conservator 
of Forests (Bombay) but now took charge of this team which was looking to increase 
home grown timber production in the UK. He maintained this role with the War Office 
and then Board of Trade until the end of the war.217   
TS4, responsible for labour, equipment and transport, was commanded by 
Lieutenant-Colonel A.C. MacDonald R.E., a Canadian who had trained at the Royal 
Military College of Canada. However, between graduating from there in 1885 and 
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1915 he worked as a civil engineer in various parts of north, central and South 
America. Before his role at the Directorate of Timber Supplies (War Office) he had 
also been in charge of the building of many of the army camps in England.218 
Furthermore, Captain Gammell, who had been appointed by the Home Grown Timber 
Committee in 1916 to manage the use of German POWs in British forests, also 
maintained this role in TS4.  
Continuity can also be seen in forestry management in Ireland and Scotland. In 
Ireland, the War Office’s Directorate of Timber Supplies had to make no changes to 
the structure or staff concerned with managing forestry work. This was due partly to 
the comparatively small amount of forestry work being undertaken in Ireland, when 
compared with the rest of Britain, and as the work was being left to civilian 
contractors. Furthermore it was being managed by A.C. Forbes, who had worked for 
the Department of Agriculture for Ireland, who had been loaned by them to the Home 
Grown Timber Committee and then taken on by the Directorate of Timber Supplies 
(War Office).219 However, one of the common questions raised in parliament 
regarding the timber effort, largely by Irish Nationalist MPs, was why Irish forestry 
and its timber trades were not so well represented in the management and advisory 
bodies? They wanted these increased or for Ireland to be given its own versions of the 
forestry HLOs, who could then establish specific controls so that Irishmen could look 
after Irish interests. Answers came back that the controls to be enforced by governing 
bodies applied to all of the UK. Furthermore, that Forbes, who essentially ran the 
timber effort in Ireland for the different governing bodies during the war, was a 
member of the Home Grown Timber Committee and subsequent managing bodies. 
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Moreover, Irish timber trade representatives and Chambers of Commerce from several 
Irish cities would, or had been, included on Advisory Committees for the HLOs.220 
However, when the Unionist MP John Lonsdale suggested more help for Irish 
merchants to obtain wood for packing cases and a separate Directorate of Timber 
Supplies for Ireland, other Hon. Members shouted ‘Home Rule!’, a sign of the tensions 
over Ireland throughout the war, and the sense of humour MPs could bring to serious 
debates.221   
In Scotland the Directorate initially retained the services of Mr Richardson as their 
Executive Officer. He had been in charge of production in Scotland under the Home 
Grown Timber Committee. However, in April 1917 he returned to the Board of 
Agriculture for Scotland and was replaced briefly by Sutherland, who also carried on 
as head of TS3 until he left on 5 May to take up his position as Assistant Director of 
Forestry (GHQ).222 Senior management roles were therefore generally very 
appropriately staffed. However, as an indication of the continuing difficulties of 
recruiting sufficient forestry experts as the task grew in scale and locations, the 
accountant at the Edinburgh Office of the Directorate of Timber Supplies (War 
Office), Mr. Sinclair, was forced to become Executive Officer and manage the 
direction of work in Scotland, even though suffering from ill health.223 Yet he, as 
Sutherland had been, was also helped with forestry matters by Dr. Borthwick, 
‘Forestry advisory officer to the Board’.224 
At the time of its establishment the Directorate of Timber Supplies at the War 
Office were advised by the War Cabinet not only to consult experts attached to the 
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Home Grown Timber Committee but also those such as Professor Somerville of 
Oxford University, Sir Hugh Shaw-Stewart or Sir Herbert Maxwell.225 Another 
prominent and important feature, illustrating the War Office’s r cognition of being 
new to the field of large-scale forestry and its willingness to use existing expertise, 
was the number of advisory committees of such experts that it established. Firstly a 
Consultative Committee, which the Army Council had insisted upon in transferring 
responsibility to the Directorate of Timber Supplies (War Office), was formed during 
March-April 1917, and met for the first time on 1 May.226 Letters asking for 
representatives were sent to the Office of Works, Board of Agriculture and Fisheries, 
Ministry of Munitions, Admiralty, Ministry of Shipping, Air Board, Board of Trade, 
the Controller of Mines at the Board of Trade, and the Railway Executive 
Committee.227  Within the replies to this request are several names that further indicate 
the continuity of experts between organisations.  For instance the Board of Agriculture 
and Fisheries representative was its Superintending Inspector of Forestry, R.L. 
Robinson.228 The Ministry of Munitions nominated Bain, their ‘controller of timber 
supplies’ with previous experience of timber supplies at the Office of Works.229 The 
Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty felt that the Admiralty’s interests in timber, 
given its own purchases and usage levels, were so important that they should have at 
least two representatives on this committee from the Navy Contracts Department. The 
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Admiralty also recognised the need for the Ministry of Shipping to be represented.230 
The Railway Executive Committee sent Mr. Stanier, a Great Western Railway Stores 
Superintendent who was also acting as the Secretary of the Timber Sub-committee of 
the Railway Executive Committee.231 
Leading forestry experts and landowners, such as Lord Lovat and Sir Stirling 
Maxwell, Lord Powis, the Duke of Somerset, Sir Hugh Shaw-Stuart, and once again, 
R.L Robinson, many of whom had worked for or advised the Boards of Agriculture 
before the war and then the Home Grown Timber Committee, were formed into the 
Timber Advisory Committee. This was intended to represent the interest of large 
landowners, others concerned with the ‘disposal of standing timber,’ and those 
interested in questions relating to sylviculture.232  A Merchants Advisory Committee 
was also appointed to advise the War Office. It consisted of five merchants chosen by 
the Timber Trade Federation, as well as two from well-respected firms not belonging 
to the federation. They joined Bampfylde-Fuller, Captain Crow (Head of TS.1) and 
representatives of the Government Timber Buyer (Messrs. L. Meyer) on the 
committee. It first met on 30 March 1917, and held several meetings during the short 
life of the Directorate.233 A small Advisory Committee of Scottish Merchants was also 
formed on which Sutherland was the main Directorate of Timber Supplies (War 
Office) representative.234 Furthermore, an advisory committee of home grown timber 
merchants was established, including men such as A.W. Ardran, President of the 
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National Federation of Sawmill Proprietors, J. Heaton (Jnr), Chairman of the Home 
Grown Section of the Timber Trade Federation, and at least two representatives from 
Scottish timber merchant associations.235 It was also felt that the Directorate of Timber 
Supplies (War Office) would generally utilise ‘trade experts’ to manage the timber 
situation.236 The Merchants Advisory Committee also then fed staff into later 
management. For instance C.O Hughes, who had represented the trade on this 
committee, joined the Timber Supply Department (Board of Trade). His replacement 
on the committee was in turn replaced by Mr R.J. Williams, of Messrs. Denny, Mott 
& Dickson, who became the official timber-buying agents of the Admiralty. These are 
yet more illustrations of suitable use of experienced personnel.237 
It can be seen therefore that the change from Boards of Agriculture or Office of 
Woods control, through the Home Grown Timber Committee, to the War Office did 
not create much discontinuity with regards to staff at senior management, field officer 
or administrative level. A further example of continuity between the organisations, 
and also of economising on forest produce in the form of paper-pulp, can be seen in 
that memos emanating from the Directorate of Timber Supplies (War Office) as late 
as May 1917, when they were already passing responsibility on to the Board of Trade, 
were still occasionally written on Home Grown Timber Committee headed paper.238 
Not surprisingly, given the short existence of the Directorate of Timber Supplies (War 
Office), similar continuity can be seen when responsibilities later passed to the new 
Timber Supply Department at the Board of Trade.  
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Concerns were once again raised over the potential for expert forestry and 
administrative voices to be lost to this ‘exceptionally important role’ when 
responsibility was passed on for the second time in several months, some expecting ‘a 
watering down of expertise with each move’.239 Yet rather than a complete change, 
this move appears, as in the case of the Home Grown Timber Committee and 
Directorate of Timber Supplies (War Office), more like a merger that aided 
rationalization. Bird writing soon after the war, and with an obvious personal interest 
in making the Board of Trade management of timber supplies appear as efficient as 
possible, argued that the move to the Timber Supply Department (Board of Trade)
streamlined operations further, removed more duplications and corrected some  
‘inequalities’ that had led to friction. Essentially he felt it made the timber effort 
gradually ‘more and more homogeneous’.240 Bird’s views, whatever his personal 
reasons for painting a rosy picture, have been found to be generally accurate through 
this research. Continuity once again occurred in the important areas of advisory 
committees and forestry experts.  
The civil servants, such as accounting staffs, taken on by the Timber Supply 
Department (Board of Trade) were largely those from the Office of Woods, Office of 
Works, Boards of Agriculture who had gone to the Home Grown Timber Committee 
and then the Directorate of Timber Supplies (War Office) when it was formed, and 
were simply passed on once again.241 However, one concern was whether the experts 
and interested landowners of the Timber Advisory Committee would continue to 
advise the Timber Supply Department (Board of Trade).242 It was confirmed that the 
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Timber Advisory Committee would be taken on by the Board of Trade, along with 
many other such advisory bodies, but that some alterations might have to be made.243 
The Timber Advisory Committee retained many of the usual suspects, including 
Stirling Maxwell, but the ‘alterations’ appear in that Lovat and Robinson were now 
absent and, interestingly, that it was now to include a representative of nurserymen, 
illustrating a recognition of the long-term nature of forestry.244 New advisory 
committees were also formed with the Chambers of Commerce of London, 
Manchester, Bradford, Glasgow and Belfast. These were included mostly in regards 
to attempts to reduce timber in packing.245  
Experts that had been lent to the Home Grown Timber Committee and Directorate 
of Timber Supplies (War Office) by other bodies simply continued their roles under 
the Board of Trade. Whether from universities, the Boards of Agriculture, Office of 
Woods, or the India Office, such as W.H. Lovegrove, the Conservator of Forests for 
Kashmir, experts were lent to the effort, generally on a long-term basis and through 
numerous changes in HLOs.246 It was not only in advisory roles that experts were 
utilised, and reutilised, but also in timber-related trade positions. It was decided that 
the Timber Supply Department (Board of Trade) Special Representative on the British 
War Mission to Washington, appointed in January 1918, should deal with all matters 
relating to timber in the US and Canada. Colonel Reginald M. Beckett of the CFC and 
previously of the important timber firm of Dobell, Beckett & Co, was chosen.247 Even 
when bespoke forestry or trade experts were not available, the Controller of Timber 
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Supplies with his connections was able to obtain on loan several managers from 
railway companies with experience in organising large operations within large 
organisations.  
As well as senior management, expert advisers and clerical staff, the Timber Supply 
Department (Board of Trade) also took on forestry field officers from their 
predecessors, with a few minor tweaks to roles.248 The work in Scotland and Ireland 
was now decentralized further and Assistant Controllers appointed to take charge of 
these areas, but these were still men who had been involved from the start in these 
areas. In Scotland the Controller of Timber Supplies persuaded the forestry expert Sir 
John Stirling Maxwell to accept the position on a voluntary basis. Maxwell’s 
Executive Officer in Scotland was Sinclair who had been in charge after Sutherland 
departed his post under the Directorate of Timber Supplies (War Office) for France.249 
In Ireland the ever reliant Forbes who, as shown above, had been loaned by the 
Department of Agriculture for Ireland to run operations for the Home Grown Timber 
Committee and had stayed in a similar role for the War Office directorate, was simply 
made Assistant Controller of Timber Supplies (Ireland).250   
Similarities in terms of HLO use of varied committee members, continuity of staff, 
and recognition and elimination of duplication can also be seen in other examples in 
the forestry effort. Although only meeting three times, Lord Curzon’s Committee on 
forestry matters made some particularly important decisions in the management of the 
wartime timber effort, having brought together many important figures. As well as 
Curzon himself, Bampfylde-Fuller the Director of Timber Supplies (War Office), Lord 
Lovat who was by then Director of Forestry at GHQ, Sir Albert Stanley the President 
                                                 
248 Ibid., pp. 205-6; Hansard, House of Lords Sitting 1 May 1917, cols. 996-8. 
249 TNA/BT/71/21, Bird, p. 206. 
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of the Board of Trade, Sir H. Llewellyn Smith the Permanent Secretary to the Board 
of Trade, and G. Calthrop, the Controller of Mines were all included.251 Two suitably 
experienced Canadian lumbermen were appointed by the War Timber Commission as 
Liaison Officers to communicate directly between the French Government and 
Canadian Forestry units operating in France.252  
The War Timber Commission itself also established an HQ at the Office of Works 
offices in London and included representatives from the Office of Works, War Office, 
Admiralty, QMG Department and for a short time the Home Grown Timber 
Committee.253 The French were represented by members of their War Ministry, 
Ministry of Agriculture and the 4th Bureau of the French Staff, the Belgian War 
Ministry also being represented.254 As the Directorate of Timber Supplies (War 
Office) took responsibility for obtaining softwoods for the British Army from March 
1917 and the Commission Internationale d’Achats de Bois continued its role of overall 
management of foreign purchases, the membership of the War Timber Commission 
was actually widened, reflecting its increasingly overarching policymaking status. 
Bampfylde-Fuller became its chairman and representatives of the Ministry of Shipping 
were added.255 
However, as well as aiding knowledge exchange, duplication of work was also 
quickly identified by the members due to the cross population of this and numerous 
other high-level committees, commissions and boards.256 By mid-1918 it was 
                                                 
251 TNA/CAB21/80, Lord Curzon’s Committee on Timber Supplies, Report of First Meeting, 8 May 
1917. 
252 Bird and Davies, The Canadian Forestry Corps, p. 36. 
253 Bird and Davies, The Canadian Forestry Corps, pp. 10-11. 
254 Ibid., p. 11. 
255 TNA/BT/71/21, Bird, pp. 27, 35. 
256 Ibid., p. 35; TNA/CAB/40/23, general correspondence regarding the appointment of the Timber 
Allocation Sub-Committee, specific examples include letters sent by the War Priorities Committee on 
22 and 23 November 1917, from the Controller Timber Supplies (Board of Trade) to the Secretary 
War Timber Commission on 28 November 1917, the War Priorities Committee to the Timber 
Allocation Subcommittee 23 September 1918, from Ministry of Munitions t  the Secretary War 
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therefore decided that to aid coordination between the growing number of 
subcommittees, the Secretary of the War Priorities Committee, Col. F. J. Byrne, would 
be an ex-officio member of all of them.257 Also, from at least July 1918, confirmation 
of establishment and make up of new subcommittees, along with their agendas and 
meeting minutes, were very well circulated in an effort to keep all relevant parties 
informed.258  
In a report to the War Priorities Committee on the work of the Timber Allocation 
Subcommittee, ten days after the armistice, Ball stressed that its major role and 
achievement had been to provide close liaison between the main users of timber, the 
priority government departments, and the Timber Supply Department (Board of 
Trade) who ended the war responsible for its purchasing, importation, production and 
distribution in the UK.259   He argued that the Timber Allocation Subcommittee, of 
which he had been chairman, had personally also helped him in his parallel role as 
Controller of Timber Supplies and that the interaction of the Timber Supply 
Department (Board of Trade) with the priority users through the Timber Allocation 
Subcommittee had resulted in programmes that had averted overlap and wastage of 
timber.260   
With regards to senior management and advisory roles it is apparent that, as Bird 
states, they were indeed ‘occupied by gentlemen with extensive experience of the 
                                                 
Priorities Committee 29 November 1917 and 3 December 1917, memos Secretary War Priorities 
Committee to Chair Timber Allocation Subcommittee dated 16 and 17 May 1918; TNA/CAB/40/24, 
minutes of the meetings of the Timber Allocation Sub-Committee, correspndence in October 1918 
reference adding Major G.W. Parkinson, M.C of the Air Ministry Works and Buildings Department.  
257 TNA/CAB/40/23, letter Colonel Byrne to the chairmen of all of the War Priorities Committee Sub-
Committees, 3 June 1918. 
258 Ibid., for instance see letters Secretary War Priorities Committee to Chair Timber Allocation 
Subcommittee 5 and 29 July 1918.  
259 TNA/CAB/40/23, Report on the work of the Timber Allocation Subcommittee by Ball, sent to the 
Secretary of the War Priorities Committee, 21 November 1918. 
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timber trade or forestry’.261 This section has illustrated that throughout the war, as 
HLOs and their numerous subcommittees changed name or governing body, a core of 
suitable expertise and invaluable knowledge from all branches of the forestry and 
timber trades was maintained, from controllers to field teams and administration 
offices.  
Environmental Concerns Raised or Considered By the HLOs 
Even though concerns regarding deforestation were raised by some experts prior to 
and in the early years of the war, at this time of national emergency little heed was 
given to environmental concerns in establishing the roles of these HLOs.262 The work 
of the Acland Committee (the Forestry Subcommittee of the Reconstruction 
Committee) on potential post-war issues was kept separate from those concerned with 
providing supplies for the war. However, its establishment illustrates that future 
environmental concerns regarding forestry were raised and considered from as early 
as July 1916, but they were not paramount for the HLOs considered here.263 Yet the 
existence and work of the Acland Committee would have been known by those in the 
organisations discussed above as there was cross-population of members with this 
committee as well. This knowledge might have helped those ultimately responsible 
for supplying wood for the war effort to prioritise immediate needs over sustainability. 
Throughout the research into the HLOs looking to obtain supplies, only occasional 
evidence has been found of specific environmental concerns, and most of these were 
raised but not acted upon in UK, as will be seen below. In terms of concerns raised by 
                                                 
261 TNA/BT/71/21, Bird, p. 208. 
262 See chapter 1 of this thesis or Stebbing, British Forestry, passim. 
263 Cd.8881 Final Report of the Forestry Sub-Committee of the Reconstruction Committee, p. 3; 
Ministry of Reconstruction, Cd.8916: A List of Commissions and Committees set up o Deal with 
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French Forestry Authorities, as their forests were increasingly used, these had to be 
taken into consideration by the British authorities, as will be made clear in chapter 3.  
In the early days of ‘Business as Usual’ and hopes in the UK for a short war, timber 
merchants cannot be harshly blamed for wanting to make profits in a climate of sudden 
and extreme need for their product. However, once the Home Grown Timber 
Committee had ceased to operate, as of March 1917, the Board of Agriculture and 
Fisheries’ sole interest in regards to the wood question became the ‘extensive’ felling 
going on in their areas at the time. They were still the Statutory Forestry Authority for 
England and Wales, and as such did raise concerns regarding the effects these could 
have on post-war forestry.264 In terms of the bodies at the War Office and Board of 
Trade some consideration was given to sustainability measures, and some were hoped 
for, but little achieved in practical terms.265 In a memorandum to the Secretary of the 
War Office in February 1917’ Bampfylde-Fuller, along with recognising the desperate 
need to increase output from UK woodlands, also stated that his new organisation 
‘should also keep in view the question of reconstituting forests and safe-guarding the 
future interests of forestry in this country’.266 However, even though the work of the 
Directorate of Timber Supplies (War Office) was initially intended to include the re-
afforestation of cleared areas, little could be done in practical terms in this respect 
given more urgent priorities.267 Bampfylde-Fuller also felt that the Board of 
Agriculture and Fisheries should be represented on the Advisory Committee to his 
Directorate of Timber Supplies because of its interest, as the Statutory Forestry 
                                                 
264 TNA/BT/71/4/78217, Letter from Mr Robinson (Board of Agriculture and Fisheries) to Sir 
Bampfylde-Fuller (Director of Timber Supplies, War Office), 9 May 1917. 
265 TNA/BT/71/21, Bird, p. 202. 
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Authority for England and Wales, in the effects of the amount being cut.268 However, 
R.L Robinson, then Superintending Forestry Officer at the Board of Agriculture and 
Fisheries, subsequently stated that the first meeting of this committee was solely 
concerned with ‘consumption and supply of timber’ and that as such the Board of 
Agriculture and Fisheries was somewhat superfluous now that the Home Grown 
Timber Committee had been handed to the War Office.269  
Some politicians took a keen interest in areas ‘denuded of trees’ and what 
government was doing to help reforestation.270 One Irish Nationalist was incorrectly 
informed that three Boards were carrying out such work in Great Britain, and had 
already been allocated 40,000,000 trees to plant, whereas no one was taking 
responsibility for such work in Ireland along the lines of the recommendations of the 
Irish Afforestation Commission. Although the Board of Agriculture and Fisheries 
were at that stage in January 1918 of considering afforestation in England and Wales 
after the war, including raising large numbers of seedlings, it was nowhere near 
40,000,000 and they were definitely not ready for planting.271 Furthermore it was 
stated in response, by the Chief Secretary for Ireland, that some planting was being 
carried out, but that this was ‘not on a scale to keep pace with fellings’.272 
Requirements for the war effort meant home grown timber production was being 
extended in Ireland at the beginning of 1918, and although the consent of the 
Department of Agriculture and Technical Instruction for Ireland was needed in some 
cases, in most it had no power to prevent fellings.273 Throughout the UK little could 
be achieved in regards to re-afforestation, except for urging its importance on 
                                                 
268 Ibid., letter Bampfylde-Fuller to Robinson (Board of Agriculture and Fisheries), 12 May 1917.  
269 Ibid., letter Robinson (Board of Agriculture and Fisheries) to Bampfylde-Fuller, 9 May 1917. 
270 Hansard, House of Commons Sitting 17 January 1918, cols. 468-69. 
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landowners who had signed contracts to make use of their trees, and keeping details 
of timber operations for future reference.274 Environmental concerns were, therefore, 
not high on the priorities of the HLOs obtaining supplies but they were given some 
consideration during the war. However, it was the efforts to streamline the 
management structures and what levels of supplies were maintained that would 
determine how contemporaries would either criticise or praise their efforts.   
Contemporary Praise and Criticism for the HLOs 
Praise for the various high level departments and bodies involved in the war effort 
was bound to be high and regular in the days, months and years immediately following 
the successful completion of the war. For instance, see the notes on the work of Bird 
and articles in various American forestry journals in 1918 and 1919 in the 
historiographical review. However, this praise can also be used not only to illustrate 
the sincere appreciation of many contemporaries, and views of the work done, but also 
the importance attached to the type of work carried out by these management 
organisations, away from the front, and why their establishments, roles and efforts 
were considered so vital.  
An excellent example of this is found in the letter that General Smuts wrote, on 
behalf of the War Cabinet, to Sir James Ball, in his role as Chairman of the Timber 
Allocation Subcommittee, in December 1918. In thanking him for that committee’s 
assistance to the war effort through its assistance of the Permanent Subcommittee of 
the War Priorities Committee, he made the feelings of the Government clear in regards 
to the need for greater centralisation and control,   
The colossal war effort of this country introduced an element of competition 
for labour, for manufacturing capacity and for supplies of all sorts which 
might have led to serious confusion had it not been for the assistance of an 
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organisation for bringing together the several competing interests. In this 
organisation your Committee has assisted materially in overcoming the 
difficulties with which we have had to cope. Believe me, Yours 
sincerely…275 
 
However, not all were happy with the efforts made, and a body of forestry experts 
submitted a damning memorandum on forestry administration to the War Cabinet in 
January 1918, six months after the Board of Trade had taken responsibility. Rather 
than defending previous efforts, the Controller of Timber Supplies, J.B Ball, added to 
the memorandum that previous arrangements had been allowed to lapse as there was 
not a single central body with ‘sufficient authority to keep things up to the mark’ and 
that things in mid-January 1918 were beginning to head in the same direction as earlier 
in the war. Importantly, A.H Stanley, the President of the Board of Trade, concurred 
with this view.276 Yet, no obvious rearrangement resulted from this plea for even 
greater centralisation, and the work and organisational structures continued as before. 
Furthermore, some argued in March 1918, that the country had been vulnerable in 
1914 and 1915 due to its massive reliance on imports, including timber, and that was 
why numerous new ministerial or departmental bodies, or semi-official versions of 
these, had had to be established to introduce new methods to take closer control. 
Furthermore, given these necessities, the number of directorates and committees 
established and staff employed by them was relatively small, and indeed successful 
given the forestry work achieved.277 It is such positive contemporary conclusions that 
this research most concurs with.   
                                                 
275 TNA/CAB/40/23, letter General Smuts to Ball 18 December 1918, see also reply of 19 December 
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276 TNA/CAB/24/39/62, ‘Note by the Timber Controller on the Memorandum on Forestry 
Administration drawn up by Lord Lovat and Other Gentlemen’, 16 January 1918. 
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Ribblesdale and Earl Curzon in cols. 276, 283-4, 306. 
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Example Achievements of the HLOs. 
Such conclusions are even more evident when taking account of the relatively few 
examples of actual shortages of wood identified, on which see chapter 1, and that when 
they were this was more likely due to transport issues. Also just a small selection of 
the increases in figures achieved under these HLOs also suggests that overall they 
were a success. 
During 1916 the Home Grown Timber Committee supplied 150,000 tons for 
military purposes, an average of 12,500 per month.278 Production increased steadily, 
and by February 1917 it was supplying 24,000 tons per month of sawn timber from 
England and Scotland for the war effort.279 The Home Grown Timber Committee 
expected to produce 450,000 tons in 1917, nearly 40,000 tons per month, illustrating 
its confidence that its measures were beginning to work given the 300,000 tons 
increase on 1916.280 The majority of the sleepers, telegraph poles and other forms of 
timber it acquired or produced in Britain were sent to France, reducing dependence on 
North Sea and cross-Atlantic shipping.281    
The Pit-wood Joint Subcommittee initially found it difficult to come to 
agreements with mine owners in England, Wales and Scotland. However, a conference 
brought forest and mine owners together, and resulted in a contract implemented in 
Scotland for the supply of approximately 51m lineal feet of pit-wood, and for the 
Home Grown Timber Committee to agree contracts to supply 32,000 tons of pit-wood 
by April 1917, primarily to collieries in south Wales, along with an additional 15,000 
tons to provide the Board of Trade with a reserve stock.282 
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279 TNA/BT/71/4/78217, memo Bampfylde-Fuller to Secretary War Office, 26 February 1917, p. 7. 
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Finally, Lovat was proud of the fact that under his Directorate demand for imports 
to France had fallen from 180,000 tons per month to 125,000 by May 1917, although 
he stated that this was an absolute ‘bedrock’.283 Most importantly, however, the 
Commander-in-chief believed that by September of 1917 the Directorate of Forestry 
(GHQ) had enabled the Army to become practically self-supporting in terms of timber, 
supplying over 750,000 tons of timber to the British Army alone between May and 
October 1917.284 This being 300,000 tons more than the Home Grown Timber 
Committee had expected to produce in the UK during the whole of 1917. By 
November 1918 the Directorate of Forestry (GHQ) was managing some four hundred 
and twenty five officers, 11,000 other ranks, and 6,000 POWs in France. It produced 
over two million tons of timber in the last year of the war alone, an average of 166,666 
tons each month.285   
Conclusion: Common Sense and Continuity in Trying Circumstances.  
As well as simply detailing the main organisations and their roles or agreeing with 
positive contemporary views, this chapter illustrates that although the forestry effort 
could appear at times to fit into the ‘over-complicated’ and too bureaucratic British 
stereotypes, a great deal of work was undertaken to create and develop a system as 
efficient as possible. This system managed to supply the Home and Western Fronts 
with these sudden and unprecedented wood and timber requirements. Furthermore, 
given the particularly small and disjointed beginnings this system had to grow from, 
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Bird’s overall assertion was correct hat ‘one of the most individualistic branches of 
trade and commerce was brought under close but not inharmonious control’.286 
The War Timber Commission, Timber Supply Department (Board of Trade), 
Directorate of Forestry (GHQ) and Timber Allocation Subcommittee were the 
pinnacles of the organisations managing the timber effort for the British Empire, and 
often the French forces. These were evolutions, reorganised, updated and rationalized 
from earlier bodies as needs became apparent. It has also been shown that the major 
changes took place at times when higher political machinations were occurring, such 
as May 1915 and December 1916, themselves induced by the context of the war’s 
wider progress. Forestry can, therefore, be seen to fit into the standard pattern 
recognised in the historiography of closer more centralised controls being brought in 
with Lloyd George’s moves to the Ministry of Munitions and then Downing Street.  
A major factor in the surprisingly few examples of duplication and confusion this 
management structure created was the consistency of staff utilised. Interaction and 
liaison were well maintained, especially at directive and senior levels where 
experienced, knowledgeable and relevant forestry and timber trade personnel were 
utilised well throughout the war. However, at this level environmental concerns could 
not be given too much weight, even with pre-war and occasional wartime warnings. 
Some recognition of the need for future sustainability was indicated in the 
establishment of the Acland Committee, and this did give freer reins for those involved 
in the HLOs to concentrate on obtaining supplies.      
The consistent management roles to do this can be categorised as establishing 
requirements and current stocks, maintaining as high a level of imports as possible 
compatible with shipping restrictions, increasing home grown timber production, 
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deciding on allocation based on current context and urgencies, and establishing 
controls to maximise efficiency of production and use. It is to these HLO methods that 
the following chapter turns to in more detail. 
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Chapter 3: HLO Methods: the measures taken to secure the necessary 
supplies. 
 
Chapter 2 detailed how and why the main forestry HLOs were established and 
how these evolved as needs altered, generally towards a greater level of central control 
over facets of the timber and wood effort. This chapter will now examine the many 
and varied methods that these HLOs used to achieve their goal of keeping the Home 
and Western Fronts adequately supplied with forest produce. It will be seen that many 
central conclusions evident in previous chapters can also be seen when investigating 
the controls put in place by the HLOs. As well as simply illustrating how the supplies 
were maintained as well as possible, the amount of administrative efforts between 
different concerned bodies will reinforce the thesis theme of a complicated situation 
sensibly handled, as previously seen not something always argued about the British 
war effort. It will demonstrate that the HLOs, themselves becoming more centralised 
as seen in chapter 2, in turn implemented another of the December 1916 Coalition’s 
philosophies, increased levels of State control on a particular element of the war effort. 
Timber and wood certainly became resources closely ‘controlled’ by centralised 
bodies, as the historiography has previously shown many other areas did, from 
munitions to agriculture. The measures taken to control these resources, whilst not 
always being happily accepted by all concerned, will be seen to have been introduced 
based on widespread high-level liaison, or if not then at least amended following 
introduction. 
One of the central measures recognised as key to success was the need for greater 
self-sufficiency in the UK and France, as reflected in the establishments of many of 
the HLOs, such as the Home Grown Timber Committee and Directorate of Forestry 
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(GHQ) detailed in chapter 2. It will be shown that the great importance attributed to 
this means of obtaining supplies was understandable given the distinct lack of shipping 
space, especially following the resumption of unrestricted submarine warfare by 
Germany in February 1917. A major part of the reasoning of the architects of this 
campaign was their calculations regarding Scandinavian pit-props, and how stopping 
this supply would bring the British coal industry to a standstill.1 Although the 
campaign was ultimately unsuccessful, arguments exist about its effectiveness, and 
official sources, including Parliamentary debates and cabinet meeting minutes, 
illustrate that shipping space was one of the main concerns for political and military 
planners throughout the war, and timber was a bulky resource that grabbed their 
attention.2 
However, the diplomatic efforts to ensure suitable forested areas of France were 
made available to British and British Empire forestry units highlight inter-Allied co-
operation in good terms, again not something that has always been argued for elements 
of the War. Whilst outlining these diplomatic agreements, the concerns that the French 
Forestry Authorities had regarding the use of their woodlands will also be detailed in 
order to supplement those concerns raised by organisations or individuals in Britain, 
as outlined in chapter 2. It will be seen that, unlike in the UK where concerns were 
noted but led to little in the way of practical action in terms of afforestation, the French 
Forestry Authorities tried to ensure that good forestry practices were followed, even 
with the pressure to supply high quantities in response to urgent demands. The overall 
                                                 
1 Holger H. Herwig, 'Germany's U-Boat Campaign', in Roger Chickering and Stig Förster (eds.), 
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February 1917, pp. 2-3; TNA/CAB/23/1/74, Minutes of War Cabinet Meeting 74, 19 February 1917, 
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conclusion reached is similar to that arrived at in regards to the establishment of the 
HLOs, that in the many methods they introduced to meet this unprecedented situation 
a good deal of administrative work was undertaken in sensible directions, leading to 
maintained supplies.    
        To satisfactorily cover the methods used, whilst evidencing these themes and 
conclusions, the measures have been split into three categories, controlling more, 
buying more, and producing more. An obvious fourth category of necessary measures, 
that of obtaining the necessary levels of manpower, skilled and unskilled, by the HLOs 
will be covered in chapter 4 as stated in the thesis introduction. However, the first 
category addressed in this chapter are those measures that increased State control over 
stocks and uses. This category will begin with a brief contextual review of the 
important contemporary events and arguments regarding greater levels of State 
control. It will be seen that in relation to major changes the timings of these coincide 
with those covered in chapter 2 regarding centralisation, most specifically that 
December 1916 marked a clear turning point. The methods to ensure better control 
will then be illustrated including increasing the legal powers available to the HLOs to 
introduce tighter controls, at times involving arduous legal wranglings, as well as 
establishing and monitoring stock levels, determining future requirements, and 
allocating supplies based on this information and contextual priorities. An important 
element in State intervention was the introduction of various permit and licence 
schemes related to transporting, buying, selling or pricing different types of timber, in 
order to direct supplies to essential users and uses. Maximising available stock through 
methods such as requisitioning, salvaging, encouraging economy and investigating 
alternative materials were also used by the HLOs to help maintain stocks.  
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The second category looks at the measures aimed to increase the amounts bought 
by the HLOs. These include supplies from both home-grown and imported resources 
and as such include a raft of controls on shipping imports and pricing of supplies as 
well as detailing from where imports could still be obtained.  Finally, in the third 
category, those measures aimed to improve the vital component of producing 
increased amounts of timber nearer to where it was actually needed will be 
investigated, especially as transportation of such bulky material became increasingly 
difficult. This section will also look at encouragements introduced to try to produce 
more UK grown timber, as this was necessary even following the successful 
implementation of agreements and procedures to use forests throughout France. 
From the Privy Council order prohibiting the importation of furniture woods, 
hardwoods and veneers in February 1916 to the 10 April 1919 Pit-wood Order (1919), 
at least sixty-one control orders including elements relating to types of wood, its 
transportation or its use were made or amended. See Appendix ‘Control Orders & 
Notices’ for a full list.3 Relatively few regulations affected types of wood or timber 
supplies before February 1917, those that did were mainly aimed at controlling wider 
transport arrangements, especially shipping restrictions, as opposed to primarily or 
solely aimed at a particular type of forest produce.4 However, once the War Office and 
then Board of Trade became responsible, a steep increase in orders being made and 
notices released can be seen in national newspapers and trade journals.5  Bird was 
                                                 
3 For examples of notices published in trade journals see TNA/BT/71/2/23994 (mainly from 1918); 
TNA/BT/71/21, Bird, Appendix 1, ‘Notes on Defence of the Realm Regulations and Orders 
Regarding the Control of Timber’, p. 1 and Appendix 2, ‘Post Armistice Period’, p. 2. 
4 Ibid., Appendix 1, p. 1; TNA/BT/71/3/55295, Memo regarding the control of timber during the war 
(24 March 1919), such a conclusion was also stated in post-war notes dated 21 to 24 March 1919 on 
the controls that had been put in place by the Board of Trade. 
5 War Office, ‘Army Council Order: Imported Soft Wood’, Fourth Supplement to the London Gazette 
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therefore accurate in claiming that between January 1917 and the end of the war timber 
supplies, as with so many other resources, could most definitely be labelled as 
‘controlled’.6 Ultimately evidence that the controls and measures put in place did work 
can be seen in the lack of widespread, desperate or long-lasting shortages. By 
November 1918 a stock of surplus softwoods had even been created in Britain by the 
Timber Supply Department (Board of Trade). 
Controlling Use 
Greater Government intervention 
To prevent defeat in this ‘total’ war British Governments increasingly realised 
they would need to tighten controls over parts of British commerce, industry and 
society.7 This was especially true of Lloyd George’s coalition from December 1916 to 
December 1918, and the war greatly altered relationships and the distribution of power 
between government and organised business, as well as trade unions and other rank-
and-file movements. Before the war government intervention in business was mainly 
supported by Conservative/Unionist MPs in matters such as protectionist trade tariffs, 
but was strongly resisted by Liberal Governments in favour of laissez-faire policies.8 
For instance pre-war governments had seen Acts to alleviate housing problems as a 
means to promote private development, with no need for direct intervention.9 
As seen in chapter 2 the Government Timber Buyers were appointed in October 
1914 to try to centralise government purchases, transport and storage of timber,
nevertheless strict controls over timber and many other materials were lacking early 
in the war. This was not, however, simply a ‘slavish adherence’ to laissez-faire. In 
terms of numerous industries and agriculture there were examples of interventionism 
                                                 
6 TNA/BT/71/21, Bird, p. 38. 
7 Turner, British Politics, p. 1.  
8 Ibid., pp. 1, 2, 109. 
9 Swenarton, Homes Fit for Heroes, p. 189. 
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on relatively small scales, or there were good practical reasons and arguments not to 
interfere.10 By the spring of 1915 arguments on the merits and drawbacks of increased 
levels of intervention in industries important to the war effort were rife between 
different political parties and factions.11 Kitchener wanted improved results by 
concentrating labour and materials on existing War Office suppliers. Some in Cabinet, 
including the President of the Board of Trade, wanted to allow expansion without any 
controls, through the price mechanism. However, Lloyd George argued for high levels 
of intervention to expand industry’s capacity to produce munitions, and during spring 
1915 his support was increased as he successfully created a sense of emergency and 
urgency, to which increased state controls appeared a good answer.12 Th  May 1915 
political crisis, mainly due to the shell shortages scandal, led Asquith to form his 
coalition cabinet, yet even with Lloyd George’s move to the Ministry of Munitions 
this administration was still recognised for its procrastination.13 However there was 
substantial intervention before December 1916 in the normal course of trade when 
necessity demanded, whether to secure military supplies or sugar and meat.14  
Chancellor Reginald McKenna’s first wartime Budget in September 1915 has 
been argued to signal an abrupt abandonment of Free Trade, even though he was a 
Liberal MP and free trade advocate. Duties on imports were explained not only as a 
way to raise revenue for making war, but also as a way to reduce imports and therefore 
demands for tonnage, as well as limiting civilian consumption. It was also made clear 
                                                 
10 Dewey, British Agriculture, pp. 23, 24, 91, 24; Turner, British Politics, pp. 59-60.  
11 Ibid., pp. 59, 84, 85, 343; Martin Pugh, ‘Runciman, Walter, first Viscount Runciman of Doxford 
(1870–1949)’, Oxford Dictionary of National Biography, Oxford University Press, 2004; online edn, 
Jan 2011, <http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/35868>, [accessed 20 May 2015]; 
TNA/CAB/37/123/21, Walter Runciman M.P., ‘Shortage of Merchant Shipping Tonnage’, 11 January 
1915. 
12 Turner, British Politics, pp. 59-60. 
13 Morgan, ‘George, David Lloyd’, n.p; Swenarton, Homes Fit for Heroes, pp. 49-50; Turner, British 
Politics, pp. 4, 58; Dewey, British Agriculture, p. 24. 
14 Ibid. 
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that they were wartime measures only. Tariff reformers thought it a small victory, 
more suspicious Liberals a sell-out.15 Some argue that agriculture was left to its own 
devices until the end of 1916, but policies to encourage self-sufficiency were slowly 
introduced at times earlier than this, especially during the spring and summer of 
1916.16 Reasons stricter proposals were declined in agriculture before the end of 1916 
included occasional reductions in losses to submarines and hopes over potential 
increases in the enlistment of agricultural workers. Although initial interventionist 
measures might not have gone far enough for many, Turner convincingly argues that 
recommendations made, or measures actually adopted, during the first two years of 
the war became the templates for later wartime controls. Throughout agriculture and 
industry the common types of measures discussed before the end of 1916 can be seen 
as forerunners of those that became prominent in forestry. Rather than compulsion, 
initial encouragements aimed to create greater output within usual market structures, 
through measures such as price controls to encourage production and sales of 
particular items.17 Therefore, it is too simplistic to say that no intervention took place 
before December 1916, but economic controls and interventionist policies were much 
slower to develop up to this period, even though threats such as those created by 
blockade had been recognised and well discussed.   
However, as Lloyd George’s coalition was settling in and German submarines 
were further reducing imports, the number of politicians keen to increase state 
intervention to alleviate shortages of all kinds grew. Firmer controls of important areas 
were introduced, for instance in relation to numerous types of imports and the 
establishment of centralised ministries and other HLOs, tasked with stopping the 
                                                 
15 Turner, British Politics, pp. 59, 84, 85; Cregier, ‘McKenna, Reginald (1863–1943)’, n.p. 
16 Dewey, British Agriculture, p. 31. 
17 Ibid., passim, for instance pp. 5, 23-35, 79, 36-197, 91; Turner, British Politics, pp. 1, 109, 126, 
172-6.  
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economy from drifting out of control and ensuring wartime supplies.18 Again the 
common methods widely introduced do reflect those introduced in forestry. A 
commitment to greater self-sufficiency within the UK alongside the regulation of 
consumption, the monitoring of local actions and giving new powers to appropriate 
departments through new legislative controls will all be described below. Such 
measures were often very similar to those recommended or tried in the first two years 
of the war, and often resisted by sections of parliament as well as by business and land 
owners, were now pushed through.19 
   This contextual situation with regards to types of interventions in other areas of 
the war effort being similar to those in forestry is also borne out in relation to timings 
of controls. As will be seen, up until 1917 controls consisted of those helping early 
attempts to establish timber stock levels, some restrictions on imports of specific, 
mainly furniture, woods and the Army Council being empowered in April 1916 to take 
land, trees, buildings and plant to produce timber, although this authority was rarely 
used. Firmer control measures such as banning imports, setting maximum prices, or 
permit schemes for sales, purchases and uses did not begin being introduced until the 
start of 1917, their frequency and detail increasing under the new coalition, as they did 
in other industries and agriculture.20 
The Powers to Control  
To enable this tighter control of forestry to be effected the HLOs responsible had 
to be empowered to legally enforce it. Although the compulsory powers allocated to 
the main forestry bodies were necessarily different in fine detail, they were 
                                                 
18 Ibid. 
19 Turner, British Politics, pp. 173-6. 
20 See the appendix to this thesis ‘Control Orders & Notices’ for chronological list of all controls 
implemented, including details; Turner, British Politics, pp. 5, 6, 121, 153; Dewey, British 
Agriculture, passim, for instance see pp. 23, 34, 91, 106.   
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fundamentally similar to those used to aid food production. The Defence of the Realm 
Act (DORA) regulations gave agricultural authorities access to unoccupied 
agricultural land and this was followed from January 1917 with powers to inspect land, 
enforce ‘Cultivation Orders’ and take over the running of a property if it was believed 
that the tenant/landowner was not producing sufficient amounts.21 A  seen above, the 
first powers to be given in regards to the timber effort were under ‘Order No.231 of 
1916’ (12 April 1916), which empowered the Army Council to take land, trees, 
buildings, plant, water supply or 'motive power', for the purpose of 'felling and 
converting timber’, as well as housing forestry workers.22  Although this had to be 
done through one of the military bodies, it was put in place so the Home Grown Timber 
Committee had access to some compulsory powers to encourage production. Legally 
at this time, however, powers had to be administered through one of the ‘War 
Departments’.23  
The controls put in place by the Directorate of Timber Supplies (War Office) were 
also authorised by the DORA, as they were working under the War Office, so the 
Army Council simply allocated powers to Bampfylde-Fuller in April 191724 
…relative to the requisition and taking possession of, and to the 
regulation, restriction and prohibition  of the manufacture, purchase, sale, 
delivery of or payment for or other dealing in, and to the felling, converting, 
storing, transporting, removing or distribution of timber and trees.25  
 
Regulation 15C gave the right to call for returns ‘and all other particulars’, 
meaning timber merchants had to furnish a census of stocks, machinery and 
employees. Regulation 2E could impose any limitation on manufacture or trading of 
                                                 
21 Ibid., pp. 92, 97-8. 
22 TNA/BT/71/21, Bird, Appendix 1, p. 1.    
23 Ibid.    
24 TNA/BT/13/75, letter Guedalla, War Office Contracts Solicitor, to Ball, Controller Timber Supplies 
(Board of Trade), 7 June 1917.  
25 Ibid., Army Council Minute/Order, 25 April 1917 and letter Controller Timber Supplies (Board of 
Trade) to Sir H. Llewellyn Smith (Board of Trade), 29 May 1917, point 1. 
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goods, could fix prices, and could force people to sell at those prices even if they did 
not want to.26 It could also prohibit, except under certain very specific circumstances, 
any dealings in timber. This had been used already with regard to wool, hay and straw, 
and the War Office had managed to obtain convictions for refusal to sell wool at a 
certain price.27 When used in conjunction with 2E, regulation 8A could also allow for 
any scheme of prioritization to be enforced. Regulation 2C allowed for the 
requisitioning of standing timber, plant and housing for workmen.28  Finally, 
Regulation 2B meant the Directorate of Timber Supplies (War Office) could 
requisition, or give notice of requisition. This could impose embargoes on sales or 
movements of goods, and could temporarily ‘freeze’ a market, for example fixing the 
prices of sawn timber. It was also the regulation that gave an existing body, Sir James 
Woodhouse’s Commission for agreeing compensation for requisitioned goods, the 
exact principles to operate under.29 Overall, therefore, it is clear that, as a War Office 
Contracts Branch solicitor stated, the DORA conferred ‘large powers in few words’ 
onto the Army Council, and hence the War Office’s Directorate of Timber Supplies.30  
Although Bird states that when the Timber Supply Department (Board of Trade) 
took over responsibility in May 1917 new control measures for timber supplies simply 
continued to be made under DORA regulations, by order of the Army Council on 
behalf of the Board of Trade, the truth was more complicated than this.31 As the Board 
of Trade took responsibility from the War Office, both parties knew it was important 
                                                 
26 Ibid., letter War Office to Board of Trade outlining DORA regulations that War Office wanted 
Board of Trade to administer (2b, 2c, 2e, 15c), 12 June 1917 and letter Guedalla to Ball, 7 June 1917. 
27 Ibid.   
28 Ibid. 
29 Ibid., including correspondence from War Office to Board of Trade, June 1917, including letter 
War Office Contracts Department to Controller Timber Supplies (Board of Trade), 7 June 1917; 
Dewey, British Agriculture, pp. 94-5. 
30 TNA/BT/13/75, letter Guedalla to Ball, 7 June 1917. 
31 TNA/BT/71/21, Bird, pp. 51-2. 
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for the Board of Trade to have similar powers to those held by the Army Council and 
Ministry of Munitions in regards to creating and amending statutory orders under 
DORA.32 Initially the Army Council looked to authorise the Controller of Timber 
Supplies (Board of Trade) to ‘exercise their powers under DORA’, as they had for the 
Directorate of Timber Supplies (War Office).33 However, it was recognised by 
solicitors from both sides that powers simply granted by the Army Council could only 
be a very temporary measure. Discussions therefore ensued with regards to the best 
option for giving the Controller of Timber Supplies (Board of Trade) the necessary 
powers.34 
At this time the DORA regulations relating to the Board of Trade (2F-2J) covered 
similar areas to those mentioned above for the War Office and could potentially be 
made to work for the Board of Trade. However, they were felt to be ‘far less neat and 
concise’ and the powers they conferred were ‘carefully limited and elaborately 
stated’.35 The wording did not give the Board of Trade as much power specifically 
over timber as it had in the Army Council sections, although it was still felt by some 
that they could be used to the same effect, although some would have to be conjoined 
with Army Council powers.36 For instance 2B, which the Directorate of Timber 
Supplies (War Office) had used to requisition stocks of sawn timber and fix its prices, 
                                                 
32 TNA/BT/13/75, correspondence War Office to Board of Trade during Jue 1917. 
33 Ibid., letter Controller Timber Supplies (Board of Trade) to Sir H. Llewellyn Smith (Board of 
Trade), 29 May 1917, point 1, also correspondence War Office to Board of Trade June 1917 including 
letter with draft ‘Authorisation Minute’ dated 1 June 1917 sent by the Board of Trade to Army 
Council for signing as a temporary measure to give the Controller Timber Supplies (Board of Trade) 
same powers as Directorate of Timber Supplies (War Office) had had until a Board of Trade order 
could be completed. Also see letter from War Office to Board of Trade 6 June 1917 enclosing Army 
Council authority for Controller Timber Supplies, also dated 6 June 1917, letter War Office to Board 
of Trade 12 June 1917, and note Guedalla to Controller Timber Supplies (Board of Trade) 25 June 
1917; TNA/BT/71/21, Bird, Appendix 1, p. 4.
34 TNA/BT/13/75, correspondence War Office to Board of Trade June 1917. 
35 Ibid., letter Guedalla to Ball, 7 June 1917. 
36 Ibid., memorandum Board of Trade Solicitors Office to Sir Herbert Llewellyn Smith, Permanent 
Secretary to the Board of Trade, 2 June 1917, letter Guedalla to Ball 7 June 1917 and Correspondence 
War Office to Board of Trade June 1917.  
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might also be used in conjunction with 2F, although provisions for making 
compensation would need amending in 2F and this could lead to complicated 
compensation arbitrations, rather than automatically utilising Woodhouse’s 
Commission with its ‘precisely stated’ claim principles.37 Furthermore, 2C was a 
regulation specifically related to standing timber, which the Directorate of Timber 
Supplies (War Office) had been empowered to use, and which provided powers, not 
obtainable elsewhere in DORA, to enter land.38 It was recommended that 2C needed 
to be expanded in order to be covered by the Board of Trade, as standing timber could 
be argued not to be an article of commerce. Therefore wording that left no doubt that 
articles of commerce at this time would include trees ‘whether standing, felled or 
converted’ would have to be included under 2F to 2J. By the summer of 1917, after 
much legal wrangling, regulations 2C, 2JJ and others allowed the Board of Trade to 
use, amend or create wide ranging powers over trees or timber ‘required for the public 
safety or defence of the Realm’, although still occasionally requiring Army Council 
approval.39  It was on 29 August 1917 that the Board of Trade also authorised their 
new Controller of Timber Supplies (Board of Trade) to exercise its powers under 
DORA that enabled him to requisition and fell and convert any trees or wood. 
However, it was not until April 1918 that contraventions of such Board of Trade orders 
became summary offences.40 Yet it is clear from the correspondence and resultant 
                                                 
37 Ibid., correspondence War Office to Board of Trade June 1917, including letter War Office 
Contracts Department to Controller Timber Supplies (Board of Trade) 7 June 1917. 
38 Ibid., memorandum Guedalla to Ball, 30 July 1917. 
39 Ibid., correspondence War Office to Board of Trade June and July 1917, see especially Board of 
Trade Solicitors Office to Sir Herbert Llewellyn Smith, Permanent Secretary to the Board of Trade, 2 
June, C.W. Bird to Controller Timber Supplies 23 June, and reply to Sir W F Marwood 25 June, 
Board of Trade Solicitors Office to Controller Timber Supplies (Board of Trade) 14 June, Guedalla to 
Ball, 30 July, copy of Order in Council of 22 August 1917, pp. 1-3; Sir Charles Cook (ed.,) Defence 
of the Realm Manual (6th Edition) Revised to August 31, 1918, (London: HMSO), p. 54 [notes of 
‘revokes’ going past at least 25 November 1918]; TNA/BT/71/21, Bird, pp. 51-2, Appendix 1, pp. 1, 
4.   
40 Ibid., Appendix 1, pp. 5, 6; Cook (ed.), Defence of the Realm Manual (6th Edition), pp. 46-47. 
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regulations that the need for whoever was controlling the forestry effort to have 
sufficient powers under DORA was well recognised. Powers had to be worded 
carefully and exactly to allow this.  
Involving the Timber Trade in establishing controls.  
It is, however, a sign of the urgent nature of the initial controls needed in early 
1917, as well as that the trade were initially shocked and horrified by government 
controls, that the 4 February Army Council Order, issued in the press the following 
day, was followed on the 8 February by an ‘explanatory circular’ sent to sections of 
the trade. This asked them to observe slightly different conditions to those stated in 
the release. Clearly press notices, although wording was carefully debated before 
release, were aimed primarily at grabbing attention and providing basic details, with 
clarifications being sent as and when needed to the trades. 41   
However, even with the powers in place to create and enforce such measures, as 
seen in chapter 1 and stated in the introduction to this chapter, the war did lead 
government departments increasingly to seek help from and collaboration with 
industrial and trade experts in extending the administrative ‘boundaries of the state’.42 
It was practical and convenient to consult with and utilise organised business or labour 
bodies during the war.43  By the end of the war the membership of the Timber Trade 
Federation had risen to 1,217 firms and the organisation regularly gave the standard 
assurances to government of its ‘wholehearted desire to co-operate’ with all its 
resources and experience to aid in the nation’s victory.44 The Executive Council 
claimed with pride that it was ‘now officially recognised as a medium of 
                                                 
41 TNA/BT/71/21, Bird, pp. 41-2. 
42 Turner, British Politics, p. 12. 
43 Ibid., pp. 12, 354. 
44 Resolution No.1 of Timber Trade Federation meeting of 17 October 1917, as quoted in Latham,  
History of the Timber Trade Federation, p. 68. 
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communication between Government Departments, Public Authorities, Railway 
Companies, Ship-owners, allied Associations and the timber trade’.45 However, from 
at least the  beginning of 1917, sections of the trade would continue to be unhappy 
throughout the war with many government actions and measures that at times they felt 
were too numerous, or ineffective and confusing as they had not been properly 
consulted beforehand.46   
After the Timber Supply Department (Board of Trade) had taken responsibility in 
May 1917 two Merchants’ Advisory Committees (Imports and Home-Grown) were 
established, and Timber Trade Federation members were commonly included on many 
other committees advising HLOs.47 In October 1917 the Controller of Timber 
Supplies(Board of Trade) also agreed that a further advisory committee representing 
every branch of the trade, throughout the country, be nominated to advise him, and 
further committees were established to help him. These caused ‘great activity in the 
Federation’s Sections’ all around the UK as concerns with various State measures 
arose.48 Yet records illustrate that the vast amount of correspondence and discussion 
to arrive at ‘agreed’ details for orders and notices was largely between government 
departments, rather than with the appropriate Timber Trade Federation body.49 
Furthermore, amendments to orders could take a great deal of administrative effort 
and time to be agreed upon. For instance the Army Council Order ‘Imported 
Softwoods’ (14 April 1917) limited and regulated their sale, severely worrying the 
Timber Trade Federation. In response they held an emergency meeting and formed a 
                                                 
45 Latham, History of the Timber Trade Federation, p. 73. 
46 Ibid., pp. 65-69; Resolution No.4 of Timber Trade Federation meeting of 17 October 1917,as 
quoted in Latham, History of the Timber Trade Federation, p. 69; Timber Trade Federation Report as 
quoted in TNA/BT/71/21, Bird, pp. 4-5. 
47 See chapter 2 of this thesis; Latham, History of the Timber Trade Federation, pp. 68-9. 
48 Ibid., pp. 69-71. 
49 TNA/BT/71/2/24847, The Timber Order 1918, various correspondence. 
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‘Retail Timber Members’ Section encompassing 144 members. Its negotiations with 
the Controller of Timber Supplies(Board of Trade) did lead to sales being allowed, if 
their value was less than £5 in any one week, without the necessity of the permits and 
licences introduced under the order. However, this relaxation does not appear to have 
been officially introduced until the ‘Timber Control Order (1918)’ of 16 July, over a 
year after the regulations were introduced.50 ‘Timber Control Order (1918)’, the 
culmination of many orders and controls, was, however, written by the Board of Trade 
in conjunction with a trade committee and the Government Timber Buyers. It replaced 
the majority of the previous orders, defined and covered various types of timber and 
instituted new forms of permits. It focused on issues relating to sales, purchasing, 
maximum prices and essentially introduced a rationing scheme in distributing 
imported softwoods.51  
Yet the historian of the Timber Trade Federation argues that their report on 1918, 
and minutes from a mid-October 1918 meeting of over 400 members, strongly 
suggests that the government’s increased and drastic interventions were leading to 
‘serious alarm’ and ‘grave apprehension’ at existing and proposed measures. Phrases 
such as ‘complete bondage’ were used, restrictions on imports were felt to be 
providing ‘the imminent practical extinction of the Imported Foreign Timber Trade’, 
and the Hardwood Branch was ‘in reality almost completely controlled by indirect 
methods’52 Other areas of industry were also unhappy with State intervention and its 
                                                 
50 Latham, History of the Timber Trade Federation, p. 69; TNA/CAB/40/23, ‘Timber Control  
Order (1918)’; TNA/BT/71/21, Bird, Appendix 1, pp. 6-7. 
51 TNA/CAB/40/23, ‘Timber Control Order (1918)’; TNA/BT/71/21, Bird, Appendix 1, pp. 6-7; 
BT/71/3/55295, 'Memo showing the necessity for the control of timber at the beginning of submarine 
Campaign, and the extent to which restriction and controls have been removed since Armistice', 1 
January 1919. 
52 Latham, History of the Timber Trade Federation, pp. 68-71, including ‘Resolution No.2 of Timber  
Trade Federation meeting of 17 October 1917’, as quoted on p. 68. 
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results, seeing it as always ‘cumbersome, expensive and irritating’.53 Somewhat 
hypocritically, however, following the armistice the Timber Trade Federation stated 
that overall the Timber Supply Department (Board of Trade) that had had most dealing 
with them, having taken over management of supplies at a time when they were at 
their hardest to obtain, did manage to carry out controls in a ‘highly intelligent, fair 
and efficient manner…in the face of immense difficulties and complications’.54 
Perhaps this was written in the euphoria of recent victory as the course of government 
and trade consultations in the war clearly did not run smoothly. However, it can be 
seen that those represented by the Timber Trade Federation were increasingly utilised 
by the HLOs in establishing controls as the war progressed.   
Establishing and monitoring stocks and requirements. 
With these contextual elements to controlling use outlined, this chapter will now 
move on to the actual methods and measures introduced by the HLOs. One of the first 
tasks in securing adequate supplies was to establish what supplies of specific types of 
wood were already available in stores around the UK. As shall be seen below, this was 
a much easier task than establishing what future requirements would be, but powers 
and advertising, mainly through notices in trade journals and national newspapers, 
were still needed to persuade stockholders to complete returns. The earliest attempts, 
as soon as the war started, were by the Board of Agriculture and Fisheries and Board 
of Trade to establish pit-woods stocks.55 Once the slight overlap of roles had been 
rectified, see chapter 2, the Board of Trade led the way and made a census of all stocks 
of pit-wood in the country. They did this under the ‘Article of Commerce (Returns 
                                                 
53 Report of the Committee on Industrial and Commercial Efficiency’, F.B.I. circular (in E.E.F 
microfilm papers, F137/148), as quoted in Turner, British Politics, p. 379. 
54 Timber Trade Federation Report as quoted in TNA/BT/71/21, Bird, pp. 4-5. 
55 TNA/LAB2/1488/LE37858/46/1914, note by C.F Rey (Secretary of Board f Trade) to Sir H.L. 
Smith (Permanent Secretary of Board of Trade) on current pit-wood situation, 19 August 1914. 
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etc.) Act, 1914’. All members of the Timber Trade Federation and any other merchants 
who appeared as supplying wood on returns from the Local Colliery Owners’ 
Associations, were contacted.56 With the establishment of the Pit-wood Joint 
Subcommittee and Local Pit-wood Committees from April 1916 these local liaison 
bodies also kept track of stocks of pit-wood, and how best these could be obtained 
locally.57 
It was then not until late November 1916, when the supply situation was 
worsening, that the newly established War Timber Commission decided the Board of 
Trade should carry out a further census of all stocks held by private merchants and 
consumers in Britain. This did show a useful potential supply of approximately 1.8m 
tons in merchants’ stores with 1.2m being held by consumers.58 However, at this time 
approximately 30,000 standards, or 90,000 to 99,000 tons, per month were required 
by the War Office, Ministry of Munitions and BEF. However, only approximately 
10,000 standards, 30,000-33,000 tons, were being received into the UK in imports.59 
Assuming these were maintained at 30,000 tons per month, and the requirements did 
not exceed 99,000 tons per month, this gives a short-fall of 69,000 tons each month. 
Therefore the 3m ton potential stockpile noted above, if all was requisitioned, could 
have maintained adequate supplies for thirty months. But maintaining levels of 
imports seemed impossible, the uses for timber continued to grow, and current owners 
might have already been using them or proposing to sell them for war purposes 
anyway. By April 1917 the Army Council, the Directorate of Timber Supplies (War 
Office) having taken responsibility, felt the need to issue an order under DORA. Dated 
                                                 
56 TNA/BT/71/21, Bird, p. 14; TNA/LAB2/1488/LE37858/46/1914, notes on obtaining pit-props c. 
late August 1914. 
57 TNA BT/71/1/6564, notes of first meeting of Pit-wood Joint Subcommittee, 18 April 1916; 
TNA/BT/71/21, Bird, pp. 2, 23. 
58 Ibid., pp. 33-34, 38-9. 
59 Ibid. 
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2 April it confirmed that ‘all persons engaged in the purchase or sale of timber to 
furnish such particulars as to their business as may be required by or on behalf of the 
Director of Timber Supplies’.60 From this month onwards the certification needed for 
sales or purchasing, see below, meant that any amounts the merchant could obtain had 
to be noted on the application forms or post-sale notices, and would be open for 
inspection by the authorities.61  Other means to establish stocks included the 4 July 
1917 ‘Home Grown Timber Prices (Great Britain) Order (1917)’, issued by the Army 
Council for the Board of Trade under DORA. It required the submission of particulars 
from timber businesses when requested, and called for returns of stocks, machinery 
and manpower levels.62 Permit and licensing systems can also be seen as helping the 
HLOs to keep track of stocks, as well as helping to ensure timber was only used for 
war purposes. Many permit systems introduced to control sales and purchases further 
required the purchaser to note the overall quantities the merchant had for sale, and 
submit this for the authorities to decide whether to inspect it.63 
A desire to continue and improve upon accuracy of stock information can be seen 
in the ‘Timber Control Order (1918)’. As well as standard forms on which sellers had 
to furnish all details of their sales, the order also specified that anyone 
engaged in the purchase, sale, transport, conversion, or manufacture of 
timber of any description shall furnish such particulars as to their business 
or transactions as may be required from time to time by or on behalf of the 
Controller.64  
 
                                                 
60 TNA/BT/13/75, Copy of Army Council Order, from London Gazette 3 April 1917; TNA/BT/71/21, 
Bird, Appendix 1, p. 2. 
61 ‘Army Council Order: Imported Soft Wood’, London Gazette, 16 April 1917, pp. 3569-70,  copy in 
Edinburgh Gazette, 20 April 1917, pp. 776-777; Latham, History of the Timber Trade Federation, p. 
67; TNA/BT/71/21, Bird, Appendix 1, p. 2.    
62 TNA/BT/13/75, letter War Office to Board of Trade 12 June 1917 and letter Guedalla to Ball, 7 
June 1917; TNA/BT/71/21, Bird, Appendix 1, p. 4. 
63 ‘Army Council Order: Imported Soft Wood’, London Gazette, 16 April 1917, pp. 3569-70,  copy in 
Edinburgh Gazette, 20 April 1917, pp. 776-777; Latham, History of the Timber Trade Federation,  p. 
67. 
64 TNA/CAB/40/23, ‘Timber Control Order, 1918’. 
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One of the keys to managing a successful business is to know what is held in 
stock. It is the base which enables decisions to be made on what is needed to buy or 
make. It can be seen that the managers of wartime forestry appreciated this and 
attempted to do it. The next key is to try to establish probable requirements. 
For the first few months of the war there is little evidence that collating timber 
requirements for the national effort occurred. The competition for wood between 
various bodies was intense, as previously illustrated. The Board of Agriculture and 
Fisheries and Board of Trade had occasionally tried to gauge requirements in regards 
to pit-wood.65 However, these were not attempts to collate regular estimates of all 
timber requirements. Similarly, some efforts by specific departments to collate their 
own needs were understandably made as they were each still responsible for sourcing 
their own supplies at this stage. For instance, as demands grew on the Western Front 
after August 1915, the War Office instigated supply levels based on ‘regularly 
calculated forward planning needs’ of approximately 50,000 tons per month for trench 
defence timber and fuel.66  It was not, therefore, until the more centralised Directorate 
of Timber Supplies (War Office) was established to oversee the effort that attempts 
were made to establish clear methods for collating all essential estimates, and relating 
these with efforts to secure supplies. In early 1917, however, individual requirements 
and requests were still being sent by separate departments of the Ministry of Munitions 
directly to the War Cabinet. These were refused consideration and the Ministry of 
Munitions asked to collate estimates for all of their operations and forward them to the 
Controller of Timber Supplies (Board of Trade), who in turn would send them, with 
his overall proposals, to the War Cabinet for final agreement.67  
                                                 
65 TNA/LAB2/1488/LE37858/46/1914, notes on obtaining pit-props c. late August 1914.  
66 Maclean, Farming and Forestry on the Western Front, p. 96.  
67 TNA/MUN/4/3417, memo ‘Importation of Shooks’, 27 July 1917. 
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A common theme in correspondence throughout the war was the difficulties users 
had in providing satisfactory estimates of their future needs. The main reason was 
understandably changing situations in the context of the war. However, important 
users often relied on subcontractors who would send incomplete returns of their needs, 
or were likely to estimate amounts in excess of their realistic needs by way of 
‘protection’.68  Attempts by Lord Curzon’s Committee and the Directorate of Timber 
Supplies (War Office) to gauge overall requirements confirmed the very difficult 
nature of obtaining monthly estimates of the consumption of softwoods from the 
principal departments in the UK or France.69 On the 10 May 1917 Lord Lovat, then 
the Director of Forestry (GHQ), openly stated that he was not prepared to express any 
opinion on the likely timber situation in France after October due to the uncertainty of 
military operations upon which he had to base his estimates. He stated that ‘the Static 
period might by then have commenced – or it might not’70 and writing a few days later 
that; 
It is impossible to form a reliable estimate of the timber requirements of 
an army in the field. All estimates should be regarded merely as opinions 
at the time at which they are made, should be subject to frequent revision, 
and in calculating requirements of transport based on such estimates a 
liberal margin should be left for unexpected developments or shortages.71  
 
Lovat also pointed to examples of other factors that made estimation difficult, 
including quantities and timings of demands from the French Army being altered, 
often with sudden urgent demands. At the time of writing he gave the example of an 
additional 150,000 sleepers a month for the next three months being required, although 
he felt this would probably be altered again before a final requirement was decided 
                                                 
68 TNA/CAB/21/80, minutes of Lord Curzon’s Committee on Timber Supplies, meeting 10 May 
1917, p.7, pt. 10 ‘Admiralty Requirements’. 
69 Ibid., p. 3 and note and estimates from Bampfylde Fuller, Director of Timber Supplies (War 
Office), to Secretary Lord Curzon’s Committee on Timber Supplies, 15 May 1917.  
70 Ibid., p. 2. 
71 Ibid., letter Director of Forestry to Lord Curzon, 15 May 1917. 
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upon, and would need to be met at the cost of a reserve of timber that he had hoped to 
build up for the winter ahead. This reserve was already likely to be reduced by a 
proposed hospital accommodation hutting scheme, that he was still unable to get an 
estimate of requirements for.72  
In general, returns from departments on their existing stores and future needs were 
slow in being prepared, or not forthcoming at all, until well into 1918.73 Overall 
therefore the chances of accurately estimating future timber requirements were very 
slim, yet best attempts were clearly made in order to help those sourcing and managing 
it.   
Allocation of Supplies Based on Priorities. 
Allocation of supplies to different important users based on stated prioritisation 
was another control used by the HLOs to ensure adequate supplies where most needed. 
As seen in chapter 2, there were many different high level bodies involved at different 
times in various elements of the effort, so understandably there was confusion at times 
over who had the necessary powers to allocate or sanction supplies to different end 
users. Confusion over who was responsible for approving and allocating Ministry of 
Munitions timber supplies in the summer of 1917 were amongst the main reasons for 
the establishment of the Timber Allocation Subcommittee.74 From September 1917 it 
was their responsibility to work within the maximum import levels set by the War 
Cabinet and decide how these should be allocated. This was not just in terms of the 
end users but also in regards to specifying levels of different types of wood required 
                                                 
72 Ibid. 
73 TNA/CAB/40/23, for instance see notes of a meeting 19 January 1918 between Lieutenant J.X. 
Murphy, of the War Priorities Committee, and Mr E Batch, Secretary of the Timber Allocation 
Subcommittee. Also, see letter Chairman of Timber Allocation Subcommittee (Ball) to Secretary War 
Priorities Committee, 15 March 1918, reporting on timber situation. 
74 TNA/MUN/4/3417, memos on ‘Importation of Shooks’, 20 and 27 July 1917. 
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and from where this would be sourced.75 The Timber Allocation Subcommittee could, 
therefore, not only allocate supplies of timber to particular departments but also 
allocate shipping tonnage directly for the import of timber for a specific department.76  
The Timber Allocation Subcommittee received notification from the War 
Priorities Committee at the end of December 1917 that procedures for prioritizing the 
distribution of stores based on need was a priority.77   The War Priorities Committee 
therefore needed to be informed of any large allocations to any Allied units before 
they were carried out in case this affected schemes of allocation already in place. Even 
if the proposed allocation had already been approved by the Commission 
Internationale de Ravitaillement (International Committee of Supply), timber 
requirements had to be sent by the ‘Consuming or Supply Department’ to the War 
Priorities Committee, via the Timber Allocation Subcommittee, in regular 
statements.78  
However, disagreements over who received priority supplies continued, and in 
September 1918 the Ministry of Munitions and War Priorities Committee established 
a Joint Priority Board on which one representative from each of the Ministry of 
Munitions, Admiralty and War Office would ‘interpret’ decisions made by the War 
Priorities Committee, in timber terms the Timber Allocation Subcommittee, and give 
priority to individual orders. This board set priorities for ‘war and munitions work’ 
and if unanimous decisions could not be reached by these three representatives they 
referred the decision back to the War Priorities Committee.79 However, as a sign that 
                                                 
75 TNA/CAB/40/24, notes on Meeting of the Timber Allocation Committee, 28 February 1918. 
76 TNA/CAB/40/23, letter Chair Timber Allocation Subcommittee to Secretary War Prioities 
Committee, reporting on current timber situation, 15 March 1918. 
77 Ibid., letter Secretary War Priorities Committee to Secretary Timber Allocation Subcommittee 28 
December 1917. 
78 Ibid. 
79 TNA/CAB/40/23, letter Secretary War Priorities Committee to Timber Allocation Subcommittee 
Chairman, 23 September 1918. 
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timber shortages reaching crisis points were rare, by mid-March 1918 the Timber 
Allocation Subcommittee had had to deal with just one dispute between departments 
over shipping allocation, and this had been resolved fairly easily.80 Further evidence 
of this can be seen in that from July 1918 onwards the Timber Supply Department 
(Board of Trade) felt in a position that it could keep back a reserve stock for 
emergencies for government departments, whilst the rest of their stock was formed 
into a national stock of softwoods for allocation as seen fit. This was then made 
available for purchase by approved trade merchants and retailers under the ‘Timber
Control Order (1918)’.81  
In France and Belgium procedures varied slightly over the course of the war, if
adequate supplies could not be imported, or sourced, to meet the needs of each of the 
Allied Armies. The normal course of action was then that the British Commander-in-
chief and French and Belgian War Ministers would consult and determine what 
reductions might be possible from their demands, so as to help meet the most urgent 
requirements.82 If timber needs still could not be met, bodies such as the Commission 
Internationale d’Achats de Bois were to liaise with the commanders-in-chiefs to allot 
what supplies were available.83 It can be seen, therefore, that the HLOs where given 
powers to control forestry operations and, along with controlling bodies for other 
important resources, were expected to use them. The initial measures put in place tried, 
as much as was practical, to establish, monitor and prioritise stocks and requirements, 
                                                 
80 Ibid., letter Chair Timber Allocation Subcommittee to Secretary War Priorities Committee 
reporting on current timber situation, 15 March 1918. 
81  BT/71/3/55295, see memo 1 January 1919. 
82 TNA/BT/71/1/6456, ‘Draft Agreement Between the British and the French Governments for the 
Co-ordination of Requirements and Supply of Timber’, 15 November 1916, Clause 6; TNA/BT/71/21 
Bird, pp. 32-3. 
83 Brown, British Logistics, pp.133; TNA/BT/71/21, Bird, p. 31. 
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and then armed with this information to allocate supplies in the most efficient way for 
the war effort.     
 
Maximising Stocks 
The next group of controls to be looked at are those that tried to maximise the 
supplies that were available by various means such as stopping exports, economising 
use, salvaging or investigating alternative materials. Although achieving relatively 
small results, this group shows that all possible measures were being considered to 
make wood supplies last longer. Surprisingly, not all resources useful for the war effort 
were immediately restricted from exportation due to fears of shortages, and some that 
were initially stopped from being exported were later allowed again if it was 
determined supplies were adequate, although exports did generally reduce by late 
1916, if not always stop.84 As shown in chapter 1, Britain pre-war had been a large net 
importer of timber, rather than exporter, and as such this was not a great issue in terms 
of necessary controls. However, exports of timber from Ireland to the UK were 
regulated by the Board of Trade’s ‘Export of Timber (Ireland) Order, 1917’ of 4 
December. This was administered by the Assistant Controller of the Timber Supply 
Department in Dublin and required permits to be obtained before any round or sawn 
Irish timber, excluding pit-wood, could be exported to Britain. It aimed to prevent 
British and other nationalities' merchants from exploiting these resources, whilst still 
allowing scope for business with and in Britain.85 
From food rationing to steps to enforce economy in the consumption of paper,86 
economising was an obvious method to adopt to reduce imported tonnage and ensure 
                                                 
84 Dewey, British Agriculture, pp. 70-74; The Times, ‘Iron Contract for Argentina’, 10 July 1916, p. 5.  
85 London Gazette, 'Export of Timber (Ireland) Order 1917', n.p. (clipping seen in TNA/CAB/40/23); 
BT/71/3/55295, memo, 1 January 1919; TNA/BT/71/21, Bird, Appendix 1, p. 5. 
86 TNA/CAB/23/1/70, Minutes of War Cabinet Meeting 70, 16 February 1917, p. 2. 
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essential supplies were maintained. Any of the HLOs managing or reporting on timber 
were given a responsibility to ensure ‘economy in its use for all purposes’.87 A 
‘Cabinet Instruction on Economy in the use of Timber’ was approved on 16 February 
1917, based on reports from committees such as Lord Curzon’s.88 Three months later 
Directorate of Timber Supplies (War Office) estimates of consumption against stocks 
and production illustrated a need for priority recipients to reduce their use by fifty per 
cent, and called on the bodies to investigate immediately how they could do this.89 
Two months after this the War Cabinet ‘instructed’ all departments to report to the 
Directorate of Timber Supplies on the steps taken to reduce timber use, along with an 
estimate of the reduction they were expecting.90  Other attempts aimed at economising 
specific types of wood, such as that used for packing cases or wood used at the front, 
were also made, either through orders or advice.91 
Requisitioning as a means of obtaining resources is more associated with 
occupying forces, as Germany did behind the Eastern Front in order to obtain vast 
amounts of timber and other materials.92 However, all combatants had to resort to 
requisitioning supplies from their own countries too. It was felt powers to requisition 
were needed, as encouragement to producers of home grown timber, as they were in 
agriculture. As shown above, the first powers to be given in regards to the forestry 
                                                 
87 TNA/BT71/4/78217, War Office Memorandum No.913, 7 March 1917, p. 1 oint 2; 
TNA/BT/71/3/55295, memo regarding the control of timber during the war, 24 March 1919. 
88 TNA/CAB/23/1/70, War Cabinet Paper G.-124 in Minutes of War Cabinet Meeting 70, 16 
February 1917, pp. 2, 3. 
89 TNA/CAB/21/80, note and estimates from Directorate of Timber Supplies (War Office), to 
Secretary Lord Curzon’s Committee on Timber Supplies, 15 May 1917. Priority recipients seen as 
Admiralty, Shipping Controller, Air Board, Ministry of Munitions, War Office, Office of Woods, 
BEF and UK Railways; TNA/BT/71/21, Bird, p. 50. 
90 TNA/MUN/4/3417, memo ‘Importation of Shooks’, 20 July 1917. 
91 TNA/CAB/40/23, letter Chairman of Timber Allocation Subcommittee (Ball) to Secretary W r 
Priorities Committee, 15 march 1918, reporting on timber situation; TNA/BT/71/21, Bird, Appendix 
2, p. 1; BT/71/3/55295, memo of 1 January 1919; G.S.O, G.H.Q. Montreuil-Sur-Mer, p. 129. 
92 Liulevicius, War Land on the Eastern Front, pp. 7, 61, 63, 64-68 (quotes p. 66), 71, 72, 73,  
95-96 (89-92 on the ‘Movement Policy’ instigated to ensure supplies). 
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effort enabled requisitioning, and these were passed to successive HLOs to use as 
necessary.93 In early February 1917 the Army Council issued a DORA order giving 
notice that they intended to take possession of all stocks of sawn softwood timber in 
the UK, whether planed or un-planed, including sleepers. This was in order both to 
safeguard the resource for military purposes and to prevent further inflation in prices.94 
From this time onwards the government essentially ‘requisitioned’ most important 
stocks and supplies through permit schemes administered for national, or urgent 
civilian needs.95 To make it clearer, under Army Council Order ‘Timber’ of 3 May 
1917, any stocks of imported softwood larger than 250 standards in the UK were to be 
requisitioned to ensure all suitable stocks were only used for government purposes.96 
Any timber bought in Russia before 
 1 January 1917, that had not yet been shipped to the UK, was only to be sold to 
the Directorate of Timber Supplies at the War Office or their representatives 97 The 
order clearly specified that it did not affect timber already in stock in the UK and was 
intended to allow the Government to obtain the stocks covered, approximately 60,000 
standards (200,000 tons).98  However, the order caused 'acute controversy' and many 
merchants refused to sell, meaning the controls had to be compromised by the 
successor of the War Office Directorate of Timber Supplies, the Controller of Timber 
Supplies (Board of Trade).99 Just over a year later this was followed by the Softwood 
                                                 
93 TNA/BT/13/75, letter War Office to Board of Trade 12 June 1917; TNA/BT/71/21, Bird, Appendix 
1, pp. 1, 4; Dewey, British Agriculture, pp. 95, 96, 100, 101. 
94 TNA/BT/71/4/78217; TNA/BT/13/75 for copies of notice; TNA/BT/71/21, Bird, pp. 41-2. 
95 See Appendix to this thesis ‘Control Orders’; Latham, History of the Timber Trade Federation, p. 
67; TNA/CAB/40/23, 'Imported Softwood'. 
96 TNA/BT/13/75 Army Council Order of 7 May 1917; TNA/BT/71/21, Bird, Appendix 1, p. 3; Latham, 
History of the Timber Trade Federation, p. 67. 
97 TNA/BT/13/75, Note Guedalla to Controller Timber Supplies (Board of Trade), 25 June 1917; 
TNA/BT/71/21, Bird, Appendix 1, p. 3. 
98 TNA/BT/13/75, note Guedalla to Controller Timber Supplies (Board of Trade), 25 June 1917; 
TNA/BT/71/21, Bird, p. 3. 
99 TNA/BT/13/75, various correspondence; TNA/BT/71/21, Bird, Appendix 1, p.4. 
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Requisitioning Order, 1918 (22 July 1918) whereby all sawn and planed softwood 
arriving in the UK after this date was requisitioned. The only exclusions in this order 
were ‘box-shooks’, the sets of parts for packing cases that had been flat-packed to save 
space in transportation.100  
Most controls related to softwoods, but in August 1917 any stocks of mahogany 
and American walnut exceeding 5,000 super-feet in various forms, although not 
including veneers, were also requisitioned to fulfil Admiralty needs. First the trade 
had to complete returns of their stock for the Board of Trade, then following 
inspections by the Timber Supply Department (Board of Trade) carried out quickly by 
early September, the controls were relaxed and merchants allowed to sell those kinds 
not required. Controls were withdrawn on 30 November 1917 as it was discovered that 
there were actually residual stocks after the requisition.101  
The principles upon which Woodhouse’s Commission would allocate 
compensation for requisitioned timber were provided under DORA.102 Firstly, if a 
price had been set by a previous order the compensation would be determined on that. 
However, if a price had not been set a grower or producer would be compensated on 
the basis of cost of production plus an amount equivalent to a ‘reasonable’ pre-war 
profit. If the stock was requisitioned from a stockholder or ‘middle-man’ then 
compensation was based on their actual costs plus a reasonable pre-war profit 
amount.103 This sounds reasonably simple but calculating the cost of producing useful 
wood from standing timber under wartime conditions was difficult, and therefore 
                                                 
100 TNA/CAB/40/23, 'Imported Softwood’. 
101 Latham, History of the Timber Trade Federation, p. 67; TNA/BT/71/21, Bird, Appendix 1, p. 5.
102 TNA/BT/13/75, letter Guedalla to Controller Timber Supplies (Board of Trade), 7 June 1917.   
103 Ibid.   
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calculating the ‘actual’ value of loss sustained in many cases was too.104 However, it 
is clear that requisitioning of stocks, especially through permits and licences, was a 
major method the HLOs used. From August 1917, when the Army Council or Board 
of Trade bought either standing, felled or converted wood they would only pay a set 
price under DORA regulation 2B. If the seller felt this was insufficient they had to 
take their case to the Defence of the Realm Losses Commission which could consider 
compensation claims for ‘reasonable profit…subject to any limit on maximum prices’, 
showing that some negotiation was permitted and that some leeway allowed given the 
variety of produce in forestry works.105  
The collection of materials to salvage and reuse was an important element of the 
war effort on both the Home and Western Fronts. Materials from string, clothing, 
glass, metals, ammunition, waste paper and, of course, timber and wood were 
collected, sorted and reused.106 GHQ (France) established a Salvage Service, 
responsible for finding and reusing many different types of materials, including 
timber. 107 Units at all levels near the front or on the lines of communication would 
salvage timber of all kinds from old battlefields and work hard to save stocks in the 
face of enemy advances. Salvaged timber could either be directly re-used or converted 
as necessary at workshops on the lines of communication.108    
                                                 
104 TNA/BT/13/75, memo Guedalla to Ball 30 July 1917 and correspondence War Office to Board of 
Trade June 1917, including letter War Office Contracts Department to Controller Timber Supplies 
(Board of Trade) 7 June 1917; Dewey, British Agriculture, pp. 94-6, 100. 
105 TNA/BT/13/75, Statutory Rules Order, No.886 1(2) of 22 August 1917; TNA/BT/71/21, Bird, 
Appendix 1, pp. 1, 4.   
106 See for instance the poster ‘Pick ‘Em Up’ by A J Owen showing a soldier picking up a clip of rifle 
ammunition on a road near the front with the caption ‘Remember you are saving your own property’ 
(Art.IWM PST 13432) (The Dangerfield Printing Co. Ltd, London); TNA/CAB/23/1/70, Minutes of 
War Cabinet Meeting 70, 16 February 1917, p.3; Bosanquet, Our Land at War, p. 27. 
107 G.S.O, G.H.Q. Montreuil-Sur-Mer, p. 129. 
108 Bird and Davies, The Canadian Forestry Corps, p. 43; Nicholson, Canadian Expeditionary Force, 
p. 489. 
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A final means of maximising stocks can be seen in the search for alternative 
materials that would mean wood or timber would not have to be used from stocks, and 
forms in permit schemes, see below, often required the buyer to confirm that no 
‘substitute material’ was available.109 This was especially important in terms of 
building materials during the war, and in the post-war period. A great deal of research 
was carried out on timbers, as these were the largest material elements in the cost of a 
house, and a ‘severe and sustained’ timber shortage seemed inevitable. Suggestions 
included that more traditional timber roof frames be replaced by concrete or steel ones, 
and although researchers were not convinced by concrete they recommended that steel 
roofs produced in large standardised spans would probably be an ‘advantageous 
substitute for timber’ if necessary, but most wartime reports only called for more 
research.110 In France, at the first BEF Monthly Conference to estimate monthly timber 
requirements, on 1 September 1916, the possibility of using coal instead of wood for 
fuel, to save nearly 30,000 tons of imports, was also discussed. It was felt unlikely that 
enough coal could be obtained from French mines, but such was the need that the 
QMG was to approach the French anyway.111 
Maximising stores through these varied measures was therefore a small part of 
the overall effort to control wood and timber supplies. However, as shown above, the 
forestry HLOs did take control of the resource in several very important ways. These 
methods to control use, including obtaining the powers to control, trying to build as 
accurate a picture of the supply and demand situations, utilising permit or licence 
schemes to regulate uses and allocating supplies based on priorities were all essential 
to the overall success of the forestry effort. It has also been demonstrated that those 
                                                 
109 ‘Army Council Order: Imported Soft Wood’, London Gazette, 16 April 1917, pp. 3569-70,  copy 
in  Edinburgh Gazette, 20 April 1917, pp. 776-777. 
110 Swenarton, Homes Fit for Heroes, pp. 92-94, 105-111, 113-114. 
111 Brown, British Logistics, p. 133. 
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approaches used were not dissimilar to those undertaken, in terms of methods and 
timings, in controlling other resources. However, controlling use was only one 
category of options open to the HLOs, buying more and cutting more were equally as 
important to ensure there were any stocks to control. 
Buying More - purchasing throughout the war.  
As can be seen from Appendix ‘Control Orders & Notices’ there was overlap in 
many official orders and notices in terms of the product targeted and methods being 
utilised. For instance, one order could include controls relating to home grown timber 
as well as imports and exports, whereas some were solely about one or the other. Some 
were for softwoods, some hardwoods, some included both. Some initiated returns of 
stock, as covered above, and some, the details of which will be covered in this section, 
related to buying and selling in the UK, importing new stocks, and standard prices. It 
will illustrate that from the beginning of 1917, as intervention increased, the HLOs 
introduced tight controls on sales, involving a fair degree of form filling for seller and 
purchaser. However, those who could show that their requirements were for work of 
national importance could obtain adequate amounts if the current HLO approved. It 
also reinforces the argument made above that although authorities could introduce 
regulations in a panic, they were then prepared to discuss these with trade 
organisations and amend them as necessary to make more workable and effective. 
Overall, it will be seen that government HLOs and their contractors continued to try 
to purchase supplies, from the UK and abroad, as an important method to help the 
war’s timber effort.  
 
Buying UK home grown timber, or timber already imported into the UK  
The orders and notices that came out with regards to buying and selling timber in 
the UK were unquestioningly confusing at times to those in the trade. Definitions 
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might not be clear on types, quantities, actions allowed or actions restricted. On more 
than one occasion they had to be clarified in subsequent press notices. What they do 
all show, however, is that the HLOs were trying hard to ensure that the supplies 
available in the UK, whether or not brought directly by the Government Timber 
Buyers or one of their main departments, were only used for work of ‘national 
importance’. This term, from April 1917 at least, was defined as those works 
ultimately for, or for the good of, a government department, or for urgent repairs to 
public or private buildings or communications that might otherwise affect the health 
and safety of the public. It also included wood required for crates for the distribution 
of food and other necessities, but not luxuries or packing cases for export goods.112  
Common elements to control orders or notices regarding buying stocks in the UK, 
which shall be discussed here, included defining what was or was not allowed and to 
what type of wood or timber this applied. This was further confused by occasional 
‘exceptions’ and certainly in the early days by there being different HLOs responsible 
for granting permissions to applications once assured the work was of national 
importance. The system was streamlined by the introduction of the forestry 
management bodies at the War Office and then Board of Trade, but the forms required 
before and after a sale could still be onerous for purchasers and sellers, although they 
clearly represent these HLOs trying their hardest to keep track of the overall situation 
and determine where and for what the precious supplies could be used.  
From the 5 February 1917, consent in the form of a licence, permit or order from 
the Army Council, Admiralty or Ministry of Munitions was required to sell, remove, 
'secrete', or deal in anyway with sawn softwood timber.113 However, just two months 
                                                 
112 ‘Army Council Order: Imported Soft Wood’, London Gazette, 16 April 1917, p. 3570; 
TNA/BT/71/21, Bird, p. 42. 
113 TNA/BT/71/4/78217 and TNA/BT/13/75 for copies of notice; TNA/BT/71/21, Bird, pp. 41-2. 
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later a scheme specifically related to buying imported softwood was signed providing 
more detail and resulting from Timber Trade Federation consultations. Merchants 
could now not sell, in any single month, an amount of imported softwood exceeding 
one per cent of the timber they had had in UK stock on 1 April 1917.114 If they could 
sell an amount under this level they had to be satisfied that it was for work of national 
importance. If the individual sale amounted to more than one standard they had to 
receive a standard ‘Timber Control Form A’ from the buyer.115 Anyone wanting to 
buy imported softwood in a quantity greater than one per cent of the merchant’s stock 
at 1 April 1917 had to apply to the Directorate of Timber Supplies (War Office) on 
‘Timber Control Form B’ setting out why they needed it, or if for a government 
department giving details of the department and the work on ‘Timber Control Form 
C’.116 Some specialist timbers were also included in specific orders such as the ‘Teak 
and Lignum Vitae Permit Order’ (3 October 1917) which, in order to ensure supplies 
for the Admiralty, brought in the need for permits to sell or buy teak logs, planks, 
boards and decking, along with any Lignum Vitae. Again, small sales were exempted 
at this time. 117  
Yet in February 1918 the Timber Allocation Subcommittee still felt that controls 
of consumption of home grown timber were non-existent and therefore assumed a 
great deal of waste. It stated that if the war were to continue ‘for any considerable 
period’ it would have to rely ‘to a very great extent’ on home grown timber and 
therefore further immediate controls were ‘extremely urgent’.118 By April more 
encompassing orders were being released, such as the ‘Timber Order 1918’ (25 April 
                                                 
114 ‘Army Council Order: Imported Soft Wood’, London Gazette, 16 April 1917, pp. 3569-70,  copy 
in  Edinburgh Gazette, 20 April 1917, pp. 776-777. 
115 Ibid. 
116 Ibid. 
117 TNA/BT/13/75; TNA/BT/71/21, Bird, Appendix 1, p. 4.
118 TNA/CAB/40/24, Notes on Meeting of the Timber Allocation Committee, 28 February 1918. 
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1918) which restricted purchases of imported timber and laid the foundations for the 
July 1918 ‘Timber Control Order (1918)’, which as stated above was the pinnacle of 
timber controls, aimed to centralise all softwood purchasing, as well as ration 
distribution.119 Its clauses related to most facets of the softwood timber efforts, for 
both imported and home grown timber, although the most obvious method to control 
stock levels, and where they went, was to put sales and purchasing onto permit 
systems.120 Its first two clauses clearly stated that no one in the UK could 'buy, sell, 
receive, take or make delivery of, or enter into any transaction or negotiation in 
relation to the sale, purchase or transport of any timber with other parties’ either with 
parties outside the UK, for timber that had been imported, or for home grown timber 
whether standing or felled, unless it was in accordance with the terms of a specific 
permit granted by or on behalf of the Controller of Timber Supplies(Board of Trade). 
The order covered the types of timber listed in the ‘home grown timber Prices Order 
1918’ of 25 March 1918.  
However, the clauses of ‘Timber Control Order (1918)’ relating to sales of home 
grown timber did not include measures to control the sale of land with trees growing 
on it. For this the ‘Standing Timber Order (1917)’ would have to continue to be 
applied.121 At auctions of already converted timber grown in the UK, both auctioneer 
and whoever won particular lots needed permits from the Controller of Timber 
Supplies (Board of Trade), the auctioneer before the sale and the purchaser 
subsequently. If the purchaser was not granted a permit the Controller of Timber 
                                                 
119 TNA/BT/71/21, Bird, Appendix 1, p. 6; BT/71/3/55295, memo of 1 January 1919.  
120 Ibid. 
121 TNA/CAB/40/23, ‘Timber Control Order, 1918’; TNA/BT/71/21, Bird, Appendix 1, pp. 6-7; 
BT/71/3/55295, memo of 1 January 1919. 
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Supplies could, as an alternative, supply one to someone else who had bid at the 
auction and who was willing to pay an amount equal to the highest price bid.122
Further exceptions for home grown timber in the ‘Timber Control Order (1918)’ 
included that a sawmill purchasing wood in log form to convert for sale, or sawmills, 
merchants or retailers purchasing logs or timber for resale, did not require a permit if 
the purchaser gave the merchant a certificate that they were only going to convert 
and/or re-sell the wood.  It was also felt necessary to state that no permit was required 
if an estate used wood for the purposes of the owner.123   The price schedules in the 
order would not apply to existing stocks, the Controller of Timber Supplies to decide 
on the prices specific stocks imported pre-order could be sold at, on a case by case 
basis if applications were made.124 Furthermore, if the purchase was lower in value 
than £5 in any one week and a declaration was signed by the purchaser stating value 
of wood, and that it was for work of national importance or 'urgent necessity' a copy 
of a 'Declaration by Purchasers' form was simply to be kept by the seller for 
inspection/use by the Timber Supply Department (Board of Trade) as and when 
required. However, the merchant also had to supply details of the value of all imported 
timber they had sold in each transaction to the Timber Supply Department (Board of 
Trade) within seven days of the last day of the month in which the timber was sold.   
Other types of exemptions included, in regards to colliery or other types of mine, 
owners who could purchase manufactured pit-props or pit-wood, including sawn 
props, pillar wood, crowns and pit sleepers, without need of a permit, and these could 
be home grown timber or imports. However, they would need one to purchase either 
standing wood or other types of converted timber. Sellers could also provide up to five 
                                                 
122 Ibid. 
123 Ibid. 
124 The Times, 'New Timber Order', July 18 1918, p. 3. 
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standards of 165 cu/feet if they were given a ‘Timber Control Form B’ signed off by 
the Timber Supply Department (Board of Trade) or provided directly by the Admiralty 
or Ministry of Shipping as the timber was urgently needed for ship repairs. ‘Timber 
Control Form B’, and a completed ‘Timber Control Form C’, then had to be sent to 
the Controller of Timber Supplies.125 Orders and notices would also often allow 
permission to fulfil deliveries of orders made before the date of the notice.126 This is 
just a small selection of the variety within control orders and notices, to give an idea 
of the very complicated nature of trying to accurately define the many different types 
of wood required. See Appendix ‘Control Order & Notices’ for a fuller review of all 
those controls put in place. However, what is clear is that administrative management 
schemes were being tried and amended to arrive at the ‘Timber Control Order (1918)’ 
in July, which centralised a lot of previous controls introduced by various previous 
HLOs. It also shows the culmination of previous attempts to introduce licence or 
permit systems.     
It was from 1 April 1917 that rather than the Army Council, War Office or 
Admiralty issuing permits to enter in sales or purchases of imported timber, these 
permissions had to be obtained from the Directorate of Timber Supplies (War Office), 
as the current relevant HLO.127 When published in the London and Edinburgh Gazettes 
the notice included copies of the different Timber Control Forms that had to be used 
for applications and notifying the HLO for any transactions on imported softwoods, 
as well as some guidelines.128 To be granted permission to buy, all of the intended 
work had to be for one of the main government departments or for national importance, 
                                                 
125 TNA/CAB/40/23, ‘Timber Control Order, 1918’; TNA/BT/71/21, Bird, pp. 6-7; BT/71/3/55295, 
memo from 1 January 1919. 
126 TNA/BT/71/4/78217 and TNA/BT/13/75 for copies of notice; TNA/BT/71/21, Bird, pp. 41-2. 
127 ‘Army Council Order: Imported Soft Wood’, London Gazette, 16 April 1917, pp. 3569-70,  copy 
in  Edinburgh Gazette, 20 April 1917, pp. 776-777. 
128 Ibid.; TNA/BT/71/21, Bird, Appendix 1, p. 2.    
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as defined above. Timber Control Forms from this date required the buyer to self-
certify that the wood was required for ‘a Government contract or for work of national 
importance’, that their existing stocks were ‘insufficient’ to enable them to complete 
the work, and that no substitute material other than wood was appropriate or 
available.129  The purchaser had to complete the relevant Timber Control Forms but 
the merchant had responsibility to check the legitimacy of their approval.130 It was 
then the ‘Timber Control Order (1918)’ which extended this permit system to home 
grown timber as well as imported timber, on similar lines to that which had applied to 
imports for a year already.131   
Following the issue of ‘Timber Control Order (1918)’, completed copies of 
‘Timber Control Form C’ essentially became monthly returns of the sales merchants 
had made. Sales could still be made on the basis that a Timber Supply Department 
(Board of Trade) permit had been received, the sales made by a particular merchant 
totalled under £5 in one week, or the sale was to the Admiralty or Ministry of Shipping. 
‘Timber Control Form C’ required separate detail of each sale, for instance whether 
the sale was of imported or home grown timber and whether it was sold from 
‘National’ stocks or those belonging to the supplier themselves. It illustrated the desire 
of the Timber Supply Department (Board of Trade) to keep as accurate a record as 
possible of the sales situation.132 On 9 September 1918 a small amendment order to 
‘Timber Control Order (1918)’ gave the Controller of Timber Supplies power to vary 
the quantities of timber that could be purchased without a permit, in order to help the 
                                                 
129 Ibid.     
130 Ibid.    
131 The Times, 'New Timber Order', 18 July 1918, p. 3. 
132 TNA/CAB/40/23, ‘Timber Control Order, 1918’; TNA/BT/71/21, Bird, Appendix 1, pp. 6-7; 
TNA/BT/71/3/55295, Memo of 1 January 1919. 
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‘working’ of the permit-rationing scheme.133 These forms clearly show attempts to 
monitor and control stocks around the UK. 
Although guidelines and standard forms would be published in some of the 
notices from April 1917, confusion from the proliferation of materials and restrictions 
that could be included on a single order was occasionally added to through wording 
that firms and trade organisations found too vague. However, as stated above, 
complaints from the Timber Trade Federation could lead to clarification circulars and 
notices. 134 These could confirm points people had been unclear about, specify for how 
long a notice was going to be in place if this had been missing, but also introduce some 
new parameters. For instance instead of ‘no sales of more than two standards of soft 
sawn timber’ to any one person at any one time, it might give permission to sell 
individual lots under one standard at the merchants’ discretion, on the proviso that 
they were sure the wood was required for urgent civilian needs and the price was no 
more than it would have been for similar sales in the week ending 31 January 1917.135 
Satisfactorily defining and communicating orders to control sales of timber in the 
UK was clearly not an easy task, given the many branches of the forestry effort. 
However, the HLOs did their best, and gradually learnt to include trade expertise in 
the wording of such notices. Furthermore they were clearly trying to build up as 
accurate a picture of stocks as possible, and determine where these went to. Anyone 
not abiding by such orders could be guilty of an offence under the DORA, and false 
                                                 
133 TNA/BT/71/21, Bird, Appendix 1, p. 7. 
134 Ibid., p. 41. 
135 ‘Army Council Order: Imported Soft Wood’, London Gazette, 16 April 1917, pp. 3569-70,  copy 
in  Edinburgh Gazette, 20 April 1917, pp. 776-777; TNA/BT/71/21, Bird, pp. 41-2, 66, Appendix 1, 
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statements on a Timber Control Form were to be punished with either a £100 fine or 
six months in prison 136  
 
Importing Goods 
This tighter control over stocks in the UK, as well as increasing home grown 
timber production which will be covered below, was not only important due to serious 
shipping restrictions, but also as the UK’s financial position became increasingly 
worse. At times this, like the U-Boat threat, looked like it might cause Allied defeat. 
Areas such as foreign investment, gold reserves, debt to American banks and credit 
availability looked catastrophic at times.137 However, when the US entered the war its 
government paid overdrafts owed by Britain to US banks such as JP Morgan out of 
the first Liberty Loan, saving the credit of the Allies, and the US treasury itself started 
making advances to the Allies, making foreign purchasing of wartime supplies 
possible ‘in enormous quantities’, including timber.138 However, it is clear that even 
though the UK could financially continue to purchase timber from abroad, reducing 
amounts of imports of this particularly bulky product was important. Any available 
shipping space was needed for important resources that were not as readily available 
in forested parts of France and the UK, such as ammunition and American soldiers. 
Reduction in timber imports was therefore recognised as vital to easing shipping 
strain, but they did continue and were essential.139 
                                                 
136 TNA/BT/71/4/78217 and TNA/BT/13/75 for copies of notice; ‘Army Council Order: Imported 
Soft Wood’, London Gazette, 16 April 1917, pp. 3569-70,  copy in Edinburgh Gazette, 20 April 
1917, pp. 776-777; TNA/BT/71/21, Bird, pp. 41-2. 
137 Peter Dewey, 'The New Warfare and Economic Mobilization', in John Turner (ed.) Britain and the 
First World War, (London: Unwin Hyman, 1988), pp.82-3; Swenarton, Homes Fit for Heroes, pp. 50-
51, 53-54; Hendrick, The Life and Letters of Walter H. Page, Volume 2, pp. 269-72, 290. 
138 Ibid., p. 273. 
139 National Film Board of Canada, Images of a Forgotten War, Canadian Forestry Corps, 
<http://www3.nfb.ca/ww1/wartime-film.php?id=531249> [accessed 31 July 2016]; Bird and Davies, 
The Canadian Forestry Corps, p. 6, who give shipping restraints as main reason needed to appeal to 
Canada for lumbermen, as well as confirming that munitions, f od and other commodities needed 
shipping space. 
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As seen in chapter 1, Britain had been especially reliant on imports of timber, 
other essential products and numerous raw materials in the pre-war years. Many raw 
materials were simply not available in the UK but reasons for reliance on imports also 
included adherence to free-trade economic principles and, importantly for timber, a 
high confidence in the ability to maintain shipping routes. Although reliance on 
imports had been recognised by some as a weakness in times of war, no action had 
been taken to correct this.140 Chapter 2 then illustrated that the Timber Trade 
Federation had been trying to improve import arrangements with various nations or 
specific ports, such as St Petersburg, in the immediate pre-war years, and they had also 
hosted a visit from exporters of pine lumber from the Gulf Coast in 1911, worked on 
a Canadian reciprocity agreement, and investigated shipping problems from Riga on 
the Baltic.141 It has been argued that in 1914 and 1915 imports of wood still occupied 
between twelve to fourteen per cent of all shipping space entering British ports, 
although such amounts would reduce as self-sufficiency improved.142 As with other 
materials at this busy time it is hard to say that statistics of exact quantities are likely 
to be all encompassing or one-hundred per cent accurate for all times during the war. 
However, detailed records of timber-carrying ships were kept at the time, and once 
established the Timber Supply Department (Board of Trade) certainly registered 
imports so examples, for instance of the amounts imported in later years of the war, 
                                                 
140 See chapter 1; Bryan Ranft, 'The Royal Navy and the War at Sea', in John Turner (ed.,) Britain and 
the First World War, (London: Unwin Hyman, 1988), p. 64; Dewey, British Agriculture, pp. 3, 4, 7, 
15-18; A Committee Of The Royal Society, Cd.8421 The Food Supply Of The United Kingdom. A 
Report Drawn Up By A Committee Of The Royal Society A  The Request Of The President Of The 
Board Of Trade (1916 sitting, but ‘1917’ on published document), passim; Latham, History of the 
Timber Trade Federation, pp. 17, 63; Turner, British Politics, p. 102. 
141 Latham, History of the Timber Trade Federation, pp. 54-58 [The Gulf coast is taken here to be  
the pine belts from Florida around to Texas on the Gulf of Mexico, and a bit of Florida’s Eastern  
Coast, although could also have been from Mexico or Honduras as well]. 
142 E.G Richards, British Forestry in the 20th Century, p. xvii. 
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can be taken as reasonably accurate.143 Even the censor kept an eye on quantities of 
timber shipped, passing intercepted telegrams from various timber and shipping agents 
and/or merchants to the HLOs.144  
Chapter 2, when looking at the organisations involved, also briefly demonstrated 
that it was imports, especially of pit-wood, that received the first wartime attention by 
the HLOs in terms of sourcing new supplies from Canada and Newfoundland, as early 
as 25 August 1914.145 However, limiting imports of all kinds of materials became a 
general governmental policy from at least September 1915, and it is clear that the 
restrictions on shipping, further considered below, were closely linked to levels of 
German submarine activities, just as political emergencies and changes were.146  This 
section will expand on the detail of such issues in specific relation to timber and the 
controls that the HLOs instigated to try to maintain necessary supplies, whilst also 
abiding with restrictions placed on shipping space that, from January 1916, began to 
dramatically reduce the amounts that could be imported.147 Therefore a great deal of 
administrative effort was needed to keep up with the regularly changing context of 
shipping losses and resultant controls, yet once again this work was carried out 
thoughtfully, with some imaginative methods proposed, and ultimately successfully in 
order to make up the difference between the quantities of home grown timber available 
                                                 
143 TNA/MT/23/379, (file T16966, 1915 - Not MT23/379/8 as listed on TNA websit ). These records 
are very detailed shipping accounts; MT/23/381/14, for instance files T17816/1915 and T22278/1915, 
also has examples of importers trying to charter tonnage (for instance Dutch shipping) to get timber to 
the UK from places such as the White Sea in June 1915; TNA/BT/71/3/55295, memo regarding the 
control of timber during the war, 24 March 1919.  
144 TNA/PRO/10/98, Board of Trade Emergency Departments, Section 6 (Timber Supply 
Department), information "from C.P.C", derived from censored correspondence, concerning the 
Swedish, Norwegian, etc. timber trade, September 1917 - August 1918. 
145 See chapters 1 and 2 of this thesis; TNA/LAB2/1488/LE37858/110 and 18/1914, Telegrams of 10 
and 12 September 1914 from Colonial Office to Governor General and his reply, also of 22 October 
1914 from Board of Trade to His Majesty’s Trade Commissioner; 
TNA/LAB2/1488/LE37858/18,46,110,111 or 193/1914, passim; Cd.7728 Reports to the Board of 
Trade Upon the Supply of Imported Pit–Timber, passim; Cd.7729 Report on supplies of home-grown 
pit-wood in England and Wales, passim. 
146 Turner, British Politics, p. 84 
147 Ibid. 
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and those demanded by the war. It was especially vital to maintain some degree of 
forestry imports, as it was with other materials, earlier in the war as home grown 
timber efforts, such as establishing the CFC, finding forests for them to work in and 
building up production levels, all progressed.148 The section will also contribute to the 
overall argument that timber, like shipping space, did indeed become a highly 
managed and controlled materiel.  
To show these areas it will firstly briefly cover where in the world imports were 
obtained from and some issues with these in terms of planning future supplies, such 
as which months might certain shipping ports be frozen shut. As might be expected, 
or deduced from earlier chapters, traditional European sources gave way to higher 
levels of Canadian and American purchases, but they never stopped entirely. Then 
some contextual information on controlling shipping during the war will lead into 
shipping controls directly aimed to reduce the amounts of timber imported and how 
the timings of these can understandably be seen to reflect wider concerns i  regard to 
shipping. Following this, how controls related to purchasing imports were increasingly 
centralised and the measures taken to control imports of timber will be examined, 
illustrating the complex nature of such an administrative task, but that once again the 
Timber Trade Federation were involved by the State in amending early orders into 
more workable versions.  
Although imports were maintained from the more traditional and geographically 
closer Scandinavian suppliers, the ‘New World’ countries provided an increasingly 
important portion of British imports. Their potential was quickly seized upon, yet the 
overwhelming sense in reviewing the work and correspondence of the Board of Trade 
is that its sole priority was to obtain the necessary supplies as soon as possible, from 
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wherever they could still be sourced and shipped. Therefore, although some small 
quantities of specialist woods for specialist requirements, such as mahogany for 
aeronautical supplies were still imported from West Africa, or teak from Burma for 
the Admiralty, the main sources remained European countries but with trans-Atlantic 
imports increasing in importance.149 
Imports continued from Norway and Sweden throughout the war, although 
Swedish owners were occasionally reluctant to release their ships, due partly to 
submarines and also what the British saw as an ‘unfriendliness’ towards the UK at 
times.150 Shipments from the Baltic Sea States of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania had 
supplied a great amount of timber to the UK before the war, but were more vulnerable 
and closer to the routes expected to be blocked from August 1914. The Baltic, Black 
Sea and German ports were lost to British trade, and in terms of timber this was 
serious.151 However, the White Sea ports of northern Russia were utilised from the 
early days to bolster supplies, when not frozen shut.152 Timber Allocation 
Subcommittee proposals for 1918 imports included 734,000 tons of timber, excluding 
mining wood, for the Admiralty and Board of Trade from Scandinavia and Russia.153 
Baltic supplies being vulnerable meant the Board of Trade also increased imports of 
pit-wood from France, especially the Bordeaux and Bayonne areas, where they could 
be shipped from Bay of Biscay ports, as well as from Portugal and occasionally Spain 
from early in the war. These areas continued to supply wood of all kinds throughout 
                                                 
149 TNA/CAB/40/24, notes on meeting of the Timber Allocation Subcommittee, 28 February 1918. 
150 Ibid; TNA/CAB/21/80, Lord Curzon’s Committee on Timber Supplies, minutes of meeting 8 May 
1917, p. 5. 
151 TNA/CAB/37/123/21, Walter Runciman M.P., ‘Shortage of Merchant Shipping Tonnage’, 11 
January 1915, p. 2. 
152 TNA/LAB2/1488/LE37858/18/1914, note by C.F Rey (Secretary of Board f Trade) 24 August 
1914. 
153 TNA/CAB/40/24, notes on Meeting of the Timber Allocation Committee, 28 February 1918. 
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the war. Switzerland was occasionally mentioned as a potential source as well, but 
overland transportation was harder.154 
However, the most important change to occur in regard to where imports came 
from was the increased use of trans-Atlantic timber trade from Canada, 
Newfoundland, the east coast of America and the Gulf States.155 From August 1914 
the possibility of a supply of pit-props being obtained from Nova Scotia, New 
Brunswick and the north bank of the St. Lawrence River led to a request for prices 
from the Canadian Government and a joint fact-finding mission of mining and timber 
experts to Canada and Newfoundland.156 Certain types of timber imports from Canada 
were stopped in the height of the shipping crisis in April and May 1917, but these were 
temporary and imports continued at a high rate throughout the war. 157 By 1918 
proposals for imports often linked Canada and the USA together. For instance the 
Timber Allocation Subcommittee’s proposals to supply the main users in 1918 
included one for 464,500 tons from east coast Canada and America.158  
It should also be remembered that when making and enforcing timber shipping 
restrictions, as well as the ordering of imports, authorities had to consider the time of 
                                                 
154 Ibid; TNA/LAB2/1488/LE37858/46/1914, note by Rey to Sir H.L. Smith 19 August 1914 and note 
by Rey 24 August 1914; G.S.O, G.H.Q. Montreuil-Sur-Mer, p. 140. 
155 Swettenham, To Seize the Victory, p. 96. 
156 TNA/LAB2/1488/LE37858/18/1914, including for example, notes by C.F Rey (Secretary at Board 
of Trade) 24 August 1914 and 14 September 1914; TNA/LAB2/1488/LE37858/46/1914, notes 
regarding ‘Supply of Pit-Props’, n.d (c.late August 1914); TNA/LAB2/1488/LE37858/110 and 
18/1914, Telegrams of 10 and 12 September 1914 from Colonial Office to Governor General and his 
reply. Also see telegram of 22 October 1914 from Board of Trade to His Majesty’s Trade 
Commissioner; TNA/LAB2/1488/LE37858/18,46,110,111 or 193/1914, passim; Cd.7728 Reports to 
the Board of Trade Upon the Supply of Imported Pit–Timber, passim; Cd.7729 Report on supplies of 
home-grown pit-wood in England and Wales, passim; TNA/LAB2/1488/LE37858/110/1914 Copy of 
Cable from Secretary of State for Colonies to Canadian Government dated 25 August 1914.   
157 TNA/MUN/4/3417, memo, ‘Importation of Shooks’, 20 July 1917; TNA/CAB/40/24 notes on 
Meeting of the Timber Allocation Subcommittee, 28 February 1918: Pritchard, History of the Corps 
of Royal Engineers, pp. 559, 566 the RE Directorate of Works carried on placing orders for Canadian 
timber to be imported to France until Directorate of Forestry (GHQ) established April 1917. For the 
Passchendaele offensive large orders were placed for trench boards. In August 1917 375,000 were 
sent to the front, equal to 400 miles of duckboard paths across the broken ground. 
158 TNA/CAB/40/24, Meeting of the Timber Allocation Subcommittee, 28 February 1918. 
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year and weather prospects. Most timber imports were confined to summer and 
autumn as the ports they were sent from, such as on the White Sea, could be frozen in 
or at least affected by ice. In November 1916 the only effective import market left to 
the UK was Canada as the White Sea was frozen, and even when it was clear only 
approximately 10,000 standards per month could be obtained from there due to 
shipping and ‘other difficulties’.159 The Ministry of Munitions were keen to point this 
out to the War Cabinet in July 1917 following an April ban on exports from Canada. 
They felt they could make no more economies in so far as their needs for wood for 
ammunition packages. Therefore, if the embargo was not lifted and sufficient stocks 
imported before October the position would become critical as the majority of the 
Canadian ports handling timber could be ice-bound during the winter and early 
spring.160    
However, as in the case of the ban on Canadian imports in spring 1917, occasions 
when imports of wood to the UK and France were completely stopped were rare and 
short-lived. Recognition of its vital nature endured, timber often coming in fourth 
behind food, munitions and men in priorities of imports, yet there were understandable 
concerns.161 The Timber Trade Federation Importers’ Section feared during the early 
weeks of the war that timber being imported would be considered contraband. Early 
information from the British Minister at Stockholm led them to believe that whilst 
mining timber would be treated as contraband by the Germans, other types would be 
exempt from interference. However, near the end of November 1914 Germany 
declared that ‘all timber would be regarded as contraband’.162  Even before the 
                                                 
159 TNA/BT/71/21, Bird, pp. 33, 39. 
160 TNA/MUN/4/3417, memo ‘Importation of Shooks’, 20 July 1917. 
161 TNA/BT/71/21, Bird, p. 38; for creation of Lord Curzon’s Committee on Timber Supplies, see 
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commencement of an official German blockade the British Cabinet were discussing 
the vital nature of imports in conjunction with shortages in available shipping, and its 
higher prices, which had occurred almost immediately war broke out.163  
The number of British Merchant Navy ships available often varied depending on 
British and international need for transport to and from the UK, and a large proportion 
of British imports and exports of all kinds, about twenty-five per cent in January 1915, 
were carried in non-British registered ships. This complicated their wartime control.164 
Then, on the 4 February 1915 the German Government declared a blockade of the 
British Isles, saying they would sink any merchant ships under Allied flags in British 
waters, with only a narrow strip being allowed for neutral shipping along the Dutch 
coast and around the Shetlands.165 This was aimed to prevent commodities of all kinds 
from reaching or leaving the British Isles or Northern France in the necessary 
quantities. Although supplies were being severely affected by and during the summer 
of 1915 Asquith and the Cabinet took little practical action and their inaction helped 
in Lloyd George’s campaign for greater efficiency, more State intervention in 
important areas and eventually to his new coalition government.166  
At this stage Walter Runciman, Liberal MP and President of the Board of Trade, 
has been called ‘well equipped’ for his role of controlling shipping by historian Martin 
Pugh. However, being the son of a wealthy shipping company owner, and ship owner 
himself, he was criticised by the contemporary Tory press for his stance on allowing 
private merchant companies to continue with minimal State intervention, at a time 
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when shippers were seen to be making large profits. Runciman did not believe in 
‘business as usual’ once the war had started, but he also felt the State was limited in 
what it could achieve through complete intervention, especially in shipping. In an 
opposite stance to that taken by Lloyd George, Runciman felt no government 
department, however hard-working and well-intentioned, could efficiently organise 
such a large fleet given the many complexities.167 The Allies, with their vast empires 
to draw upon, had great scope for importing materials but Runciman’s January 1915 
report gives many valid reasons for the early reduction in merchant shipping 
available.168 The early German U-boat campaign did take a heavy toll on tonnage, and 
shipping space shortages were felt throughout 1915.169 However, this reduction in 
availability was severely added to by ‘blockages’ at British and French ports for 
several reasons, including the unprecedented quantities arriving and labour shortages 
in ports and on the railways leading out from them. ‘Bunching’ occurred on the 
quaysides, in warehouses and on ships, keeping ships in port for much longer to load 
and unload than would be the case under peacetime conditions. 170  
During 1916, at the same time as the quantity of timber requirements grew, 
submarines continued to cause shipping losses, with well over a million tons of British 
shipping being lost in total in 1916, causing the Shipping Control Board to consider 
carefully what materials should be prioritised. Those that could be obtained more 
locally, especially in France, were justly seen as primary targets for tighter controls, 
and therefore increased self-sufficiency.171 On the 23 November Germany repeated 
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their specific declaration that timber was considered contraband, and again this was 
largely to target pit-props to hinder the British coal mining industry, General 
Ludendorff even stressing the importance of disrupting British pit-prop supply in a 
speech in early January 1917.172 However, due to shipping space availability and the 
price of Scandinavian pit-prop timber having doubled since 1914, Britain’s imports of 
Scandinavian timber were already down by approximately twenty per cent by 
December 1916, and were reducing rapidly. Aware of these factors, and recognising 
the poor state of Britain’s forests, Holtzendorff was convinced that rising 
Scandinavian prices, greater restrictions to Scandinavian supplies, and a lack of 
availability of suitable home grown timber would force the British coal industry to 
collapse.173 However, he did not take into account the amounts of home grown timber 
that would actually be available or could be imported across the Channel from France, 
Portugal and Spain ‘with impunity’ thanks to the British Grand Fleet. The domestic 
construction of homes was also stopped and wood directed to the mines by the new 
management HLOs.174 Furthermore, the decision to brand wood as contraband had to 
be revoked just four months after November 1916. Following the first few months of 
unrestricted submarine warfare, Germany had had to conclude agreements with the 
main European neutral countries, including Scandinavian ones, which meant these 
nations could maintain their trade with the UK, including wood. However these four 
months, and the increase in U-boat activity that went with it, led to a ‘great dislocation’ 
of supplies from Scandinavia.175   
                                                 
172 TNA/BT/71/21, Bird, p.33; Herwig, 'Germany's U-Boat Campaign', pp. 192-196, (inc. fn 30 on 
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Once established in December 1916 Lloyd George’s War Cabinet had the final 
say in setting overall shipping restraints and maximum levels of imports. It was for 
the departments underneath them, such as the Ministry of Shipping, Admiralty, 
Ministry of Munitions, and with regards to timber the Directorate of Timber Supplies 
(War Office) then Timber Supply Department (Board of Trade) nd Timber Allocation 
Subcommittee, to make arguments to maintain supplies.  Into January 1917 the 
situation was clearly still desperate and about to become even worse. At a War Cabinet 
meeting on 11 January discussions centred on combating the ‘present serious shortage 
of tonnage’ which was being exacerbated by the Governments of France and Italy 
putting pressure on their British counterparts to obtain more tonnage to ship increased 
amounts of coal to these allies.176 However, even with heavy tolls on shipping during 
1915 and 1916, it was claimed by Captain Miles in his volume of the History of the 
Great War Based on Official Documents for this period, that it had been recognised 
that the submarine ‘promised no decisive effect without recourse to the politically 
doubtful expedient of unrestricted warfare’.177  Whether or not this was accepted by 
contemporary senior British planners, Germany did declare unrestricted submarine 
warfare on the 1 February 1917.178 
The most commonly quoted result of this action is that on 3 February the USA 
severed diplomatic relations with Germany, declaring war on them on the 6 April.179 
The decision to adopt unrestricted submarine warfare therefore not only pressed the 
Allies into securing many of their natural resources closer to home, which in terms of 
timber they could, but would also bring many more lumberjacks to France, namely the 
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US 20th Engineers. Allied and neutral shipping losses resulting from submarines more 
than doubled between January and April 1917 in regard to numbers of vessels sunk, 
and trebled in regard to gross tonnage lost. However, April was the peak of losses, 
although that was not known at the time, and losses remained high throughout the 
summer, affecting planning for shipping availability.  Although the convoy system 
was introduced as a general strategy in May 1917, and losses steadily reduced, the 
submarine campaign continued throughout the rest of the war. Yet in December 1917 
there were just eighty-five sinkings, compared to one hundred and seventy in April.180 
However, throughout 1917 government departments still fought to have their demands 
for allocation of merchant shipping space met, and as 1917 progressed both shortage 
of maritime transport available and dependence on neutral shipping increased.181  
Permits to ship materials were not always straightforward to obtain, as shown 
above for buying and selling in the UK, and other cargos often took priority over 
timber. In February 1917 the War Cabinet instructed the Shipping Controller to create 
a scheme to provide enough shipping for Britain to supply France and Italy with coal 
on a regular basis, as this was the ‘imperative need’. Moreover, that import amounts 
as a whole had to be reduced even further to provide a margin of safety and the War 
Cabinet believed additional restrictions ‘could best be made in timber’.182 Sweden and 
Norway between them had some 190,000 tons of shipping space available to export 
softwood in May 1917, yet licences to import were refused even though requested by 
the Directorate of Timber Supplies (War Office). Lord Curzon’s Committee on timber 
controls stated that uncontrolled use of these ships should not be approved unless it 
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was clear that the vessels could not be used in any way for food or munitions, and that 
the Ministry of Shipping would have to be asked to confirm whether this was the 
case.183 The shipping of essential supplies was vitally important and a massive task, 
put under strain by insufficient tonnage and then an unrestricted submarine blockade. 
It is clear that controls over shipping materials increased from late 1916, but especially 
from February 1917, and that much responsibility fell on the Shipping Controller and 
his staff.    
Buying Foreign Timber and Importing it. 
Therefore, having illustrated the very demanding context of the overall shipping 
situation, this section on measures to buy sufficient foreign timber will move on to the 
controls specifically related to elements of the forestry effort, whether purchasing or 
shipping. It will be seen that as shipping restrictions necessarily grew, HLO controls 
tightened through licence schemes and occasional stoppages of wood product imports.  
Furthermore, as was seen in controls relating to uses or buying timber in the UK, the 
trade were once again unhappy at some of the wording with early orders, but were 
gradually included in amending or writing future orders. The licensing committee for 
imports at the Board of Trade did not originally have representation from the trade on 
it, but would eventually.184 The wording of ‘The Prohibition of Imports (No.6) 
Proclamation’, at the end of March 1916, was said by the Timber Trade Federation 
historian to be another example of the early ‘uninstructed methods of the Government’ 
as it was some time before it was decided and confirmed that plywood, planed and 
prepared or tongued and grooved boards were not to be treated as ‘wood 
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manufactures’.185 Yet the overriding theme of those orders and notices illustrated 
below is that although efforts were being made to create shipping space whilst still 
importing as much timber as possible, the numerous controls and their amendments 
meant the situation often altered and became confusing for the imported timber trade.   
An order of 10 January 1917 meant permits from the Board of Trade were needed 
to charter neutral tonnage, or buy goods on terms which included freight. Initially this 
was limited to goods weighing over 1,000 tons but this limit was removed in March, 
so that permits were needed for any chartering of tonnage or for ‘freight-included’ 
purchases. Although not directed specifically at imports of timber, the Board of Trade 
had to clarify the requirements to the Timber Trade Federation in a letter of the 24 
February, which interestingly, in an age of steam and diesel-powered shipping, also 
allowed for the permit-free shipment of timber from Canada in sailing vessels.186  
However, as can be seen in Appendix ‘Control Orders & Notices’, the first 
specific import controls including timber were also introduced in January and 
February 1916. Proclamations and Statutory Rules Orders were introduced, 
prohibiting imports of hardwoods, furniture woods and veneers unless licences were 
obtained from the Board of Trade.187 Widening the net, ‘The Prohibition of Imports 
(No.6) Proclamation’ prohibited, from 30 March 1916, the import of beech, birch, elm 
and oak timber or furniture woods, without a licence.188 It was then not until February 
1917 and the German resumption of unrestricted submarine warfare, that the War 
Cabinet approved a total reduction of 500,000 tons of imports per month. This 
included measures such as the total prohibition of many paper items, but also that no 
less than 200,000 tons (forty per cent) of this figure must be made through reductions 
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of timber imports. It is not surprising therefore that this was the same meeting at which 
the establishment of the Directorate of Timber Supplies (War Office) was confirmed 
to absorb the roles of the Home Grown Timber Committee and other timber-related 
bodies.189  
Furthermore, just three days later the War Cabinet were told by the Shipping 
Controller that another report into shipping was likely to conclude the need for further 
restrictions above the 500,000 tons a month agreed already.190 These necessary 
reductions in overall shipping and the War Cabinet focus on timber led Lord Curzon’s 
Committee, now really concentrating on timber, to conclude that the total shortage of 
shipping for 1917 would be equivalent to a reduction of imports by 8m tons over the 
year, as opposed to the 6m tons previously thought.191 Curzon was therefore asked to 
reconvene the interdepartmental Committee on the Restriction of Imports under Sir 
Henry Babington-Smith. In order to investigate how best to reduce timber imports by 
a further 100,000 tons per month on top of the 200,000 tons per month reduction 
agreed three days earlier, they were instructed to prepare two alternative programmes 
for submission to the War Cabinet that would enable the reduction of either 250,000 
or 500,000 tons of timber imports per month.192   
February 1917, therefore, unsurprisingly proved a busy month for import 
restrictions on forestry produce. An Army Council Order of 4 February 1917 
essentially acted as a brief ban on imports as no one from that date was to be allowed 
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to buy, sell or deal in sawn softwood timber, including sleepers, which were not 
already in the UK.193 Some concessions were, however, quickly made to the Timber 
Trade Federation, and a system of applying for licences from the War Office for 
foreign transactions was introduced. 194 On 8 February the Importers’ Section of the 
Timber Trade Federation held a meeting at which they acknowledged that the 
Government’s actions in terms of preventing further inflation of prices had worked. 
However, they suggested that until Swedish imports were more readily available again 
the Government should allow imports of softwood to come into the country freely.195 
So in what smacks of self-interest, yet can also be said to have wanted to improve 
supplies necessary for the war effort, the Timber Trade Federation was happy with 
stopping inflation through setting maximum prices; but not with further layers of 
bureaucracy. They noted that ‘the country would best be served by allowing all 
softwood to come in freely, without the delay and hindrance to buyers of obtaining a 
licence for buying and to sellers of obtaining licences for selling and chartering’.196  
On the 21 February 1917, amongst the dire warnings being given about the drastic 
import cuts that would be needed from various reports from Babington-Smith’s 
Committee, the Shipping Controller, admirals and Directorate of Timber Supplies 
(War Office), the War Cabinet unsurprisingly decided that a report was needed on 
obtaining much more timber from France, which will be covered below. However, all 
imports of timber without a War Office licence, or later on a Department of Import 
Restrictions, part of the Board of Trade, licence on the recommendation of the Timber 
Supply Department (Board of Trade), were confirmed as prohibited through a 
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proclamation on 23 February.197 The Directorate of Timber Supplies (War Office) felt 
it was not safe to commit to any large reductions in imports in February 1917 as the 
spring months should be used for imports, but agreed that it was ‘desirable to bring 
the imports under control with a view to reductions in future’.198 To achieve this he 
recommended that imports of all kinds of timber could in the future be prohibited, but 
that at this stage they should be ‘freely licenced’.199 Bampfylde Fuller felt that it would 
be undesirable to set up a separate licensing system for wood products, but that it 
would be ‘indispensable in the near future’.200 The effort in the work required to set it 
up in the short term would be outweighed in the longer term, therefore this 
administrative work should be done so systems were in place for when it was really 
necessary.201 
To illustrate the tightening of import controls following the recently introduced 
unrestricted submarine campaign and these high-level responses, we can look to the 
mid-March 1917 Board of Trade announcement that general import licences for many 
different classes of wood would be revoked on 2 April. From that date on, special 
licences would be required for each consignment rather than type of wood.202 
Furthermore, on 23 April the War Cabinet published their decision that, with the 
exception of timber cargoes that had already been loaded or were in the process of 
being loaded, 
…no further timber should be shipped until the sanction of the War 
Cabinet has been obtained and that such sanction would not be given until the 
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Department desiring such timber had fully established the urgent necessity for 
this importation before the War Cabinet.203  
 
On the 27 April 1917 the PM gave a speech indicating an even more drastic 
prohibition of timber imports due to lack of tonnage, although around that time 
concerns were raised that ships were returning from Scandinavia without any ballast, 
or bringing less important items than timber back. From its early days in February 
1916, the Commission Internationale d’Achats de Bois had proved valuable in 
identifying ships of different allied nations returning from timber producing areas such 
as Archangel, having dropped off military supplies, which could return with timber.204 
HLOs, such as Lord Curzon’s Committee, were keen from early 1917 that ‘ballast 
voyages’ be granted licences for timber imports, as long as foodstuffs or munitions 
were not displaced.205  Furthermore, there were concerns that the absolute banning of 
any imports of timber to save shipping space had led to the stoppage of supplies of 
essential special woods, such as that required for manufacturing aircraft.206 The 
Timber Trade Federation, in spring 1917, definitely wanted greater freedom to import 
more without the levels of bureaucracy created by the permit/licence systems, 
although pleased that such systems were helping to stem inflation of prices, as shown 
below.207 
As shown, December 1916 was a major turning point in the management of 
forestry, as it was in the political management of the war, including increased 
centralisation and controls of timber and many other materials. In this month the 
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continued importance of timber in relation to the lack of shipping was reiterated.208 
On 3 May 1917 even the export of shooks from Canada by the Ministry of Munitions 
were stopped by the Director of Munitions Sea Transport unless departments had War 
Cabinet approval.209 Furthermore, on 15 May it was announced that as softwood was 
required even more urgently from Scandinavia than pit-wood, 50,000 tons would be 
imported to the north-east ports of England before the 15 September, but after that 
date import licences would not be granted. Later this amount was doubled so that 
75,000 tons could be imported to Humber ports and 25,000 to ports between the 
Humber and the Tyne before mid-September.210  
However, adding to any confusion, just seven days later an Army Council Order, 
that also regulated prices of imports of softwoods from Norway, Sweden and even 
Denmark which was not actually a timber-producing country, once again allowed 
some importation of timber. This would be permitted only on the strict condition that 
the shipping space used was definitely not needed for food or munitions, and any such 
shipping availability was to be occasionally ‘announced’.211 Yet in July 1917 Lord 
Curzon’s Committee still had to state that, ‘The whole policy of the Restriction of 
Imports would be upset unless a rigid limit was placed upon the importation of 
Timber’.212 Furthermore, at the same time the Canadian authorities were instructed by 
the Admiralty to close down all exports of timber. This caused serious concerns about 
shortages and, it was alleged, a knock-on effect in Canada where a backup of timber 
waiting to be shipped at ports and on the railways forced many sawmills to stop 
working and lose employees. This damaged some major firms’ ability to produce to 
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their maximum limits for ‘some time to come’.213 As previously stated such complete 
bans were therefore quickly examined and generally short-lived.  
For instance, concerns over ‘special’ woods for bodies such as the Admiralty were 
raised in Lord Curzon’s Committee and it was therefore agreed that the Directorate of 
Timber Supplies (War Office) and subsequently the Controller of Timber Supplies 
(Board of Trade), could issue special permits for the importation of timber not 
otherwise obtainable in the UK. Furthermore, these special permits were to be issued 
for any timber already contracted to be shipped before the end of May 1917.214 The 
situation regarding controlling and limiting imports of timber between February and 
May 1917 was perceptibly hectic and confusing, but efforts to clarify were being made 
to enable as much timber as possible still to be imported, most of the time.   
Two months later, on 20 July, the Board of Trade announced a further regulation 
to authorise more timber shipments. Imports from Canada and the USA could be made 
in neutral 'sailing' ships, or as 'deck loads' on any vessel under a general licence.215 
This included the importation of mahogany and hardwoods in neutral ‘steamers’ and 
as deck loads, although ‘little advantage could be taken of this concession’.216 Adding 
to the complex nature of the allowances and conditions under which particular types 
of wood could be imported, it was announced on 6 September 1917 that timber could 
be imported from the USA or Canada in either an un-requisitioned space under deck 
of British or Allied liners or steamers, or in neutral steamers if approved by the Inter-
Allied Chartering Executive, as long as this did not displace food or munitions.217   
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Such complex concessions were not popular with the timber trade as they took a 
lot of effort and time to arrange and as demand was still high enough to sell on a lot 
more than they were importing. This was true even though permit systems had 
curtailed civilian use as any timber allocated had to be for government orders or work 
of national importance.218 In the case of shooks the Admiralty was not prepared to 
relax its instructions to the Canadian authorities until after July 1917 at the earliest. 
This was even though experts at the Ministry of Munitions and War Office felt they 
could be stored on and between decks of ships and that shipping in this form of 
premade case boards, of which there were 21,000 tons on order in Canada, saved 
fifteen to twenty per cent in shipping space.219 Turner points to May 1917 as being the 
end of Lloyd George’s coalition’s ‘honeymoon period’, and early to mid-1917 clearly 
saw a great deal of panic controlling of imports, amongst which timber featured most 
heavily.220 This resulted in more confusion and annoyance in the trade, and it is easy 
to see why at times, yet consultation by the HLOs with trade bodies did result in clearer 
definitions.    
In 1918 the submarine campaign was still considered serious, some staff officers 
even blaming it for a lack of wooden defensive material during the German spring 
offensive, even though losses of timber in 1918 only amounted to approximately 2,800 
standards, as compared to the 12,700 standards that were lost to U-Boats in 1917.221 
However, initially the new maximum figure for imports for 1918 set by the War 
Cabinet was to be 1m tons down on the 1917 amount imported, but on 15 February 
1918 they reduced the amount by a further 200,000 tons. Therefore sanctioned imports 
for 1918 were set at 2,875,143 tons, a reduction of 1,200,000 from the 1917 total 
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imports of 1,675,000 tons of wood of all types.222 This equated to nearly a forty-two 
per cent reduction. Although a significant reduction, largely viable thanks to 
improving amounts of French and home grown timber production, the need for more 
tonnage for natural resources including timber was still an issue being discussed at the 
highest level up to the end of the war.223  
In March 1918 it was announced that the general licences that had covered the 
importation of a diverse range of specialist wood materials, including shooks, 
Canadian wood and pine blocks for making matches, would be replaced by more case 
specific permits from 2 April, and on 1 May the general licence allowing deck cargoes 
of timber was also cancelled.224 Finally, as a result of the increasingly acute timber 
position and following long-term detailed discussions amongst the HLOs, the wide-
ranging ‘Timber Control Order (1918)’ was introduced in July. This brought together 
many elements regarding the purchase of imports from previous directives, such as 
those outlined above, to be administered under the Timber Supply Department (Board 
of Trade).225  
A press notice on 7 June 1918 had already announced that a ‘rationing scheme’ 
was to be introduced and invited importers, merchants, retailers, agents, brokers and 
shippers whose transactions in imported softwoods, sawn and planed, averaged over 
100 standards per annum  during the years 1912-14 to apply to register and be included 
in the scheme.226 Another press release on the 18 July stated that the Board of Trade 
were preparing the way for a rationing scheme for imported softwood and that this 
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scheme would begin on the following Monday, 22 July.227 The ‘Timber Control Order 
(1918)’ confirmed that from now on no person could ‘buy, sell or enter into a contract 
to buy or sell, any timber that had been imported’ into the UK unless in accordance 
with a permit they had been granted by the Controller of Timber Supplies (Board of 
Trade). Exceptions included if the purchase was for timber lower in value than £5 in 
any one wek, in which case a declaration had to be signed by the purchaser giving 
the value of the wood bought and declaring that it was to be used for work of national 
importance or 'urgent necessity’.228 With regard to buying wood in the UK, the 
‘Timber Control Order (1918)’ proved the zenith in terms of controlling timber 
imports and essentially stopped all private importation without permits.229 
Early Timber Trade Federation concerns included that there was not the incentive 
for private firms to purchase and import foreign timber since, as seen above and in 
chapter 2, the government had made arrangements for its departments to supply timber 
to each other, rather than through the usual trade channels, and these would become 
increasingly centralised.230 Yet the numerous control orders and HLO-trade 
discussions outlined above suggest that private imports would continue, except for a 
few brief periods, as long as the material imported was allocated towards war purposes 
and therefore the appropriate licence was granted. However, in a similar but much 
later scenario to the Government Timber Buyers based in the UK being given 
responsibility for buying the majority of government timber from August 1914 
onwards, purchasing supplies in the USA and Canada were centralised under the new 
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British War Mission in the spring of 1918. By March 1918 the Timber Supply 
Department (Board of Trade), on Timber Allocation Subcommittee recommendations, 
were attempting to centralise all state requirements to be purchased from the USA or 
Canada. Supplies would be purchased through the British War Mission in the US or 
the Imperial Munitions Board in Canada.  
The British War Mission in Washington was a high-level delegation to try to stop 
diplomatic misunderstandings between the two countries following a visit by the 
highly experienced ‘elder statesman’ Balfour, who had been Foreign Secretary since 
December 1916.231 The Timber Supply Department (Board of Trade) required a 
special representative to be attached to the British War Mission in the USA, and, as 
previously stated, Lieutenant-Colonel Reginald Beckett of the CFC and with 
connections to the important timber firm Dobell, Beckett & Co. was appointed in 
January 1918. He was to deal with all matters relating to timber in the US and Canada. 
Branch V of the Timber Supply Department (Board of Trade) dealt specifically with 
purchases and transport of foreign timber, especially from North America, and they 
now liaised with the Washington Mission and the Imperial Munitions Board in Canada 
through Lieut. Col Beckett. 232  
The effectiveness of these measures to control and centralise timber import 
matters, as well in producing more home grown timber,  can be seen in that even with 
massive increases in amounts required in the war effort by 1916, imports were half the 
1913 figure, so around 5.8m tons, and by 1918 they would be less than 2m  tons.233
However, this section has shown that imports were still important and required a great 
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deal of management at high-levels across government and the trade. Although the 
convoy system decreased losses, the situation with regards to lack of tonnage remained 
a serious drawback to resource availability, including timber, throughout the rest of 
the war and a few other materials remained higher priorities. 234 Yet the forestry 
concerned HLOs had to continue making ‘representations’ to the Ministry of Shipping 
for tonnage to meet requirements, and taking steps, as they did with home grown 
timber, to ensure it was appropriately allocated.235 Any complete bans did not last for 
long and many orders or notices were quickly amended in conjunction with 
appropriate experts if found to be impracticable. However, given the nature of timber 
supplies in terms of requiring orders well in advance alongside the changing priorities 
that the war threw up, another clear conclusion is that managing import controls for 
this resource led to regular amendments to quantities and types allowed, creating 
confusion for those in the trade.        
Price controls 
A final set of controls included under the ‘buying more’ category, along with home 
grown timber and imports, are those that related to the prices that could be paid for 
timber. The best known cases of profiteering, however, came in munitions 
manufacturing, especially in regards to artillery shells.  As in these shell contracts, 
forestry supplies undertaken by the Government Timber Buyer had not been put out 
to tender, therefore no competitive bidding had taken place.236 However, although as 
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Front, 1914-1918, (Washington, D.C.: German Historical Institute, 2000), p.401; Marc Frey, 
'Bullying the Neutrals: The Case of the Netherlands', in Roger Chickering and Stig Förster (eds.) 
Great War, Total War: Combat and Mobilization on the Western Front, 1914-1918, (Washington, 
D.C.: German Historical Institute, 2000), p. 239; See for example of debates the Hansard, House of 
Commons Sitting, 14 January 1918, col. 122. 
235 TNA/BT/71/21, Bird, p. 54. 
236 Swettenham, To Seize the Victory, pp. 132-3. 
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seen in chapter 2 there were some complaints that Meyers had been given too much 
responsibility early in the war, and questions over prices were raised in Parliament, 
the potential for profiteering by landowners and merchants was largely kept at bay by 
measures put in place by the HLOs, especially in terms of maximum prices. The first 
of these did not come until 5 February 1917, as concerns over supplies were high by 
then, as seen above. Following an Army Council notice, prices were not to exceed 
those common during the week ending 3 February 1917. This week, Monday 29 
January to Saturday 3 February, is often identified by either the week beginning or 
ending dates.237 Other Statutory Rules Orders also often related to controlling other 
elements of the forestry effort, and included clauses or sections limiting amounts paid 
either in single transactions, or over a set amount of time, or to a particular section of 
the trade.     
Examples include the ‘Standing Timber Order (1917)’ which introduced a limit 
of £300 in any three months on purchases of this resource and fixed maximum prices 
for larch, spruce, and scots pine. It was introduced in July 1917 to restrict profiteering 
as prices rose, and to ensure wood bought was quickly converted. However, loop-holes 
in it had to be closed by the ‘Timber Control Order (1918)’.238  The Army Council 
Order ‘Timber’ of 3 May 1917 fixed the maximum price the Directorate of Timber 
Supplies (War Office) would pay to stockholders of Russian (White Sea) softwoods 
not yet shipped to the UK at no more than ten per cent more than it had been purchased 
for, and the 'rationing' scheme included in the ‘Timber Control Order (1918)’ 
essentially consisted of a schedule of maximum prices.239 
                                                 
237 TNA/BT/71/4/78217 and TNA/BT/13/75 for copies of notice; TNA/BT/71/21, Bird, pp. 41-2. 
238 Ibid, Appendix 1, p. 4; Latham, History of the Timber Trade Federation, p. 67. 
239 TNA/BT/13/75, note Guedalla to Controller Timber Supplies (Board of Trade) 25 June 1917; 
TNA/BT/71/21, Bird, Appendix 1, p. 3. 
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Agriculture can once again provide comparisons with forestry in terms of reasons 
why prices rose and with regard to the measures discussed, rejected or implemented. 
Measures that were introduced for wood prices included applying maximum or 
minimum prices and price freezes, set to those commonly charged on a specific date 
for specific products. Price increases naturally followed resource shortages and 
increased transport costs, especially in shipping due to reductions in tonnage space, 
increased needs, growing cost of ‘War Risk’ marine insurance, government economic 
policies and the subsequent high rates of inflation. Some products were affected more 
than others, but measures were needed for most resources, particularly those heavily 
reliant on imports such as timber.240 
As mentioned above, Rey (Board of Trade) held discussions with the Timber 
Trade Federation and shipping and rail companies in August 1914 to establish rates 
relating to the supply of pit-wood.241 The Home Grown Timber Committee also 
secured ‘very favourable’ prices for the government. These were, however, still 
occasionally affected by contractors other than the Government Timber Buyers being 
willing to pay higher prices to fulfil government work.242 From May 1916 it was also 
noted that the high price rises in building materials, especially timber, adversely 
affected the trade when temporary buildings were urgently required. Ultimately 
concrete was allowed to replace wood in these structures, yet the high prices of more 
modern building materials continued until the post-war boom turned into recession in 
winter 1920/1.243 However, it was only in June 1916 that the Home Grown Timber 
                                                 
240 TNA/CAB/37/123/21, Runciman, 11 January 1915, pp. 1-6; Dewey, British Agriculture, pp. 5, 24, 
32, 71, 80, 81, 86, 93-4 for examples of agricultural materials’ price rises, controls, farmers’ 
responses such as rationally growing what would make them the most money; Turner, British 
Politics, pp. 172-3. 
241 TNA/LAB2/1488/LE37858/18/1914, note by Rey, 24 August 1914. 
242 TNA/BT/71/21, Bird, p. 18. 
243 Swenarton, Homes Fit for Heroes, pp. 48-49, 51, 52, 58-9, 115, 129, 130 (correspondence between  
Treasury and War Office in July-August 1915, PRO T161/68 s5222/2 as used in Swenarton, Homes  
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Committee and Timber Trade Federation agreed a list of maximum prices for different 
types of fir felling and converting work.244  
It was then not until the 4 February 1917 Army Council Order, whereby timber 
use not for schemes of national importance was stopped, that maximum prices for 
purchases were introduced. As stated above, prices for specific types were not to 
exceed those accepted at week ending 3 February.245 Just four days after this order on 
purchases in the UK, the importers section of the Timber Trade Federation also 
acknowledged that government actions to prevent further inflation of their prices, 
seemingly meaning the restrictions on imports and shipping introduced in March 1916 
and January 1917, had worked. 246  
The price elements of the 4 February order were then  reinforced by the Army 
Council on 7 May, instilling the same limit, that prices could not exceed those ‘current’ 
during the week ending 31 January, specifically for imported softwoods.247 Apparently 
as an afterthought to this order, the Army Council twelve days later ordered that 
softwood imports from Norway, Sweden and Denmark were actually allowed again, 
if shipping was available. Such imports could now be sold again as long as stocks were 
less than 250 standards in size as these, as seen above, would have been requisitioned 
by the government. With regards to prices, however, the Army Council recognised 
that import cost increases left merchants unable to sell at prices restricted to those of 
week ending 31 January 1917, as per the 7 May order, without making a loss. 
Therefore foreign softwoods could now be sold at these prices, plus a thirty-three per 
cent increase on the understanding that profit would be no more than ten per cent. Ball 
                                                 
Fit for Heroes, p. 201, endnote 9).  
244 Latham, History of the Timber Trade Federation, p. 66.  
245 Ibid., p.67; TNA/BT/71/4/78217 and TNA/BT/13/75 for copies of notice; TNA/BT/71/21, Bird,  
pp. 41-2. 
246 Ibid., p.43. 
247 Ibid., Appendix 1, p. 3; TNA/BT/13/75, Army Council Order of 7 May 1917;  
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argues that the order’s wording was confusing for many, and his argument is certainly 
justified.  Not least of the confusion came about as Denmark was not actually a timber 
exporting country, as already noted. Furthermore, at a time when timber was most 
urgently needed, a number of holders of old stock, below 250 standards, now decided 
to keep it back in the hope that further price concessions would come. This was an 
issue not dealt with until the extensive ‘Timber Control Order (1918)’ was imposed 
fourteen months later.248  
On the 14 May 1917 when asked in parliament if the government would ‘consider 
the advisability of fixing maximum prices for various grades of timber, as has been 
done in the case of certain other commodities’ due to wartime conditions increasing 
prices, the Under-Secretary of State for War, replied that it was not proposed to do so 
for home grown timber at that time.249  However, as a sign of the increasing problem, 
the first attempt to set prices for home grown timber, although not including Ireland, 
came less than two months later. Introduced to stop timber merchants paying too much 
for standing or felled wood the ‘Home Grown Timber Prices (Great Britain) Order, 
1917’ of 4 July 1917, created a schedule of maximum prices for some coniferous 
timber. As a first attempt it only covered quite specific products, such as certain sizes 
of sawn spruce, scotch fir and larch. Later home grown timber orders would be more 
comprehensive.250 
The 4 July order had set maximum prices for quite specific types of timber. 
However, four months later the ‘Home Grown Timber Prices Order 1917’ (note that 
no longer includes ‘Great Britain’ so applied to whole of UK) of early December 1917, 
replaced it and established a more comprehensive set of maximum prices for all home 
                                                 
248 Ibid., Army Council Order 'Soft Wood', copy from London Gazette, 22 May 1917, p. 4943; 
TNA/BT/71/21, Bird, Appendix 1, pp. 3-4. 
249 Hansard, House of Commons Sitting 14 May 1917, col. 1331. 
250 TNA/BT/71/21, Bird, Appendix 1, p. 4; Latham, History of the Timber Trade Federation, p. 67.  
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grown timber, no matter what stage it was at. It also gave prices for all of the usual 
trade sizes. If a type, size or state was not covered in the order it would be set on a 
case by case basis by the Controller of Timber Supplies (Board of Trade) with expert 
advice. The order even allowed for price weightings for sawmills and retailers in 
certain locations.251 This order was then itself replaced just over three months later on 
25 March 1918 by the imaginatively entitled ‘Home Grown Timber Prices Order, 
1918’. The prices remained similar, but the Controller of Timber Supplies (Board of 
Trade) now 'certified' specific mills in port and city locations to be allowed to charge 
a higher price than 'ordinary' mills in towns or the country. These 'certified' mills were 
usually those that had been adapted to work on imported timber, but were now having 
to use more home grown timber.252  
The regulation detailed above that allowed imports from North America in neutral 
'sailing' ships or as 'deck loads' on any vessel with a general licence also regulated the 
price of such imports as of 20 July 1917. The price was to be based on the same 
assumption used for those timbers imported from Scandinavia, in that the 'current' 
prices were taken to be as those 'ruling in Liverpool Port' rather than the Irish Ports 
during the last week of January 1917.253  With regards to home grown timber, 
however, the Timber Trade Federation still felt in October 1917 that the government 
entering into competition had forced up prices. They had appealed ‘on patriotic 
grounds’ for more production and set a schedule of maximum prices, meaning a loss 
for ‘port mills’, home grown timber producers and merchants, which actually resulted 
in a reduction of production according to the Timber Trade Federation, who again felt 
under consulted before the measures were introduced.254   
                                                 
251 TNA/BT/71/21, Bird, Appendix 1, p. 5. 
252 Ibid., p. 6; BT/71/3/55295, memo of 1 January 1919. 
253 TNA/BT/71/21, Bird, p. 54. 
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The ‘Timber Control Order (1918)’ which covered all softwoods, imported or 
HG, and as seen previously brought many threads of the timber effort together, 
included several clauses related to sweeping price controls. It gave the Controller of 
Timber Supplies powers to set maximum prices for buyers and sellers of imports, to 
vary these from time to time, and introduced several new price schedules. Stocks of 
imported softwood already in the UK could still be sold in accordance with price 
restrictions in force immediately before the order if the necessary permits had been 
granted by the Timber Supply Department (Board of Trade). Those with stocks 
imported from Norway, Sweden or Russia before 15 May 1917 or from Canada or the 
USA before 19 July 1917 had to make a return of these stocks to the Timber Supply 
Department (Board of Trade) who might then authorise them to sell at a price fixed by 
the Controller of Timber Supplies.255 This really did centralise control over price 
setting in the hands of the Controller of Timber Supplies and his staff at the Timber 
Supply Department (Board of Trade).   
However, pit-wood would be treated slightly differently, as HLOs in terms of the 
mine industries needed to be involved, and this led to separate debates. Up to May 
1917 guidance was issued by the Coal Controller to collieries and price disputes were 
dealt with through arbitrations.256 The May 1917 Army Council orders relating to the 
shipping and prices of imported softwoods should have meant that at least foreign pit-
wood was restricted to end of January 1917 prices. However, there were still concerns 
in Parliament in June that pit-prop prices had risen to three or four times their pre-war 
costs due to HLOs going into the market, competing with others, but being able to fix 
the prices they would pay. This, it was argued, was done at times on ‘very insufficient 
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255 TNA/CAB/40/23, ‘Timber Control Order, 1918’; TNA/BT/71/21, Bird, Appendix 1, pp. 6-7; 
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data’ meaning ‘extraordinary’ costs sometimes being paid for it. Therefore 
government departments were setting costs too high and forcing market prices up, 
hampering other mine owners’ efforts.257  
Viscount Haldane recommended ‘controlled’ prices, as introduced for other 
resources. He felt being able to do so was one of the reasons centralisation of resources 
under the War Office and then Board of Trade bodies had occurred. He therefore 
wanted prices reduced by the Board of Trade to ‘something not more than double’ the 
pre-war costs, with its ‘power of control’ used to ensure ‘moderation in the prices 
charged for the timber sold’.258 However, the Earl of Selborne replied that Haldane’s 
intimations that the prices of pit-props had been a price fixed by landowners earlier in 
the war was not accurate, prices being market-led by imports until these were stopped 
in favour of home grown timber. Once imports stopped, prices could be regulated by 
the government, and this he stated they were now correctly doing.259 Lord Curzon, in 
defence of policy, added that his committee had been primarily concerned with 
continuing to get pit-props for mining and had concentrated on securing larger 
supplies, focusing on labour and haulage. The question of prices was to be addressed 
after this, but he had ‘ceased to deal with the matter’.260 However, ‘The Pitwood Order, 
1918’ of 29 July, just a month after this debate, gave more definite legal force to the 
May 1917 arrangements, as the ‘Timber Control Order (1918)’ did, and the Controller 
of Timber Supplies was given powers to vary the maximum prices as he felt necessary 
through press notices.261  
 
                                                 
257 Hansard, House of Lords Sitting, 26 June 1917, Viscount Haldane and Earl of Selbourne, cols. 
637, 640-1. 
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Purchasing Controls - Conclusion 
The ‘Timber Control Order (1918)’ and its pit-wood equivalent can be seen as the 
culmination in terms of orders to control the sales and purchases of timber essential 
for the war effort. The notices, orders, regulations that proceeded this were at times 
confusing, and were definitely bureaucratic burdens on many, but they were well 
intentioned. In general they were precisely worded, all encompassing, strict and aimed 
at centralising knowledge and control of what was happening to stocks of timber 
already in the UK or to be bought and delivered to the UK or France. They were often 
disliked by the trade, seen as government intervention into market forces, but given 
the vital need for this resource they were reasonable and sensible measures at the times 
introduced. Furthermore, trade concerns were listened to by the HLOs and 
amendments made if necessary. These permit systems for sales and purchases, put in 
place and amended at times during the war, essentially acted as rationing and 
allocation schemes for timber. Permits issued by the Controller of Timber Supplies 
under the ‘Timber Control Order (1918)’ for the sale or purchase of imports or home 
grown timber could specify the uses that timber could be used for, as well as the district 
in which it could be used, or resold, along with ‘any other conditions which the 
Controller may see fit to impose’ and under DORA were legally binding.262  Buying 
more timber and controlling sales most definitely remained important roles for the 
HLOs in ensuring efficient supplies.  
Cutting more 
Given the lack of shipping space and general transport problems already detailed 
it is clear why greater production closer to the end-users was so obviously needed. 
Although not at their peak, shipping space shortages were felt throughout 1915, and 
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towards the end of that year was when the need for improving levels of UK and French 
home grown timber productions were increasingly accepted.263 This section will 
therefore look at the methods used by the HLOs to improve home grown timber output, 
firstly in the UK, and then in France. It should also be remembered that how the HLOs 
looked to find the labour to work the areas of woodlands, acquired through the 
methods laid out below, will be covered in chapter 4. 
In the UK 
The poor state of the UK’s woodlands in 1914 were indicated in chapter 1, but 
obviously some areas still existed even if generally small and/or not well managed in 
terms of timber extraction.264 By 1914 oak was still reasonably popular in plantings, 
as were other broad leaved hardwoods. The growing properties and/or commercial 
uses of beech, ash and wych elm made these species popular. Elm was not generally 
planted in organised woodlands, as enough of it occurred naturally, especially in new 
hedgerows. Many of the principal species, mentioned above, were also established as 
‘miniature woodlands’ in new hedgerows as well as plantations, producing a range of 
timber types and sizes for local use and serving to shelter and enclose agricultural 
land.265 However, although occasionally used in France during the war, hedgerow and 
roadside trees did not make for efficient large-scale timber operations, whereas 
plantations of softwoods allowing for a high degree of clear-felling were ideal for the 
quantities required at speed, but to reiterate, these were rare.  
                                                 
263 Bird and Davies, The Canadian Forestry Corps, p.6; TNA/BT/71/3/55295, memo regarding the 
control of timber during the war, 24 March 1919. 
264 See chapter 1 of this thesis; Board of Agriculture and Fisheries; Office of Wo ds, Forests and 
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In the decades before the war the home grown timber trade centred, and some 
argue flourished, largely on hardwoods such as oak, ash, elm and beech, and these had 
Timber Trade Federation and other trade representation looking to further their aims 
in the pre-war years. The overall goals of, and arguments regarding, the forestry 
profession had also expanded in the pre-war years. However, very few practical 
improvements had been made.266 Nevertheless, in late 1916 and early 1917, at the 
height of the shipping crisis, Lord Curzon’s Committee felt that there should still be 
enough timber in the UK and France to meet the needs of the war effort for several 
years, if adequate labour could be found quickly enough.267 Furthermore, in January 
1918 within debates over the need to build more shipping due to increasing demands 
for material imports, there were also still calls for the nation to provide much more 
‘material within its own shores, such as timber, in order to prevent the use of too much 
tonnage from abroad’.268  
There were several measures the HLOs could use to stimulate the official 
production of home grown timber. In August 1914 they looked to reduce transport 
rates, and they quickly forbade the unofficial cutting of timber by the numerous new 
military units being organised or trained around the UK. Then the ‘Standing Timber 
Order (1917)’ not only meant permits were needed to purchase most types of standing 
timber, as detailed above, but the permits were also intended to stop timber being 
bought by those who could not start working the timber for war purposes quickly 
enough.269 At times the onus was even put back on the end-users. When measures had 
                                                 
266 See Introduction to this thesis; Latham, History of the Timber Trade Federation, pp. 23, 53-4, 57. 
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to be put in place to get adequate supplies for South Wales collieries, it was proposed 
that mine owners should find any spare labour and lorries they could to carry out such 
work, even though both were in great demand by the army.270  
However, the main HLO methods used to ensure production of more home grown 
timber were to utilise Office of Woods trees, purchase parcels of private woodlands 
and use any labour they could obtain to convert it, and finally encourage and help large 
landowners to exploit their estates.271 The ‘principal’ duties of Board of Trade officers, 
taken on from the Boards of Agriculture via the Home Grown Timber Committee and 
the War Office, were to 
…make flying surveys to ascertain what forests are suitable for 
exploitation; to value the timber and conduct preliminary negotiations with 
proprietors, reporting results to headquarters; to draw up simple working 
plans in order to safeguard proprietors' interests; and to see that these 
working plans are observed by the labour staff engaged on extraction. In 
some cases they will also control the labour staff.272 
 
Landowners of all sizes could sell, or occasionally give, standing timber to the 
governing bodies. Files show that at least 1,101 such contracts were entered into just 
by the Home Grown Timber Committee between February and June 1916, varying 
greatly in locations and sizes of land.273  
Bird stated that by 1917 UK home grown timber had provided more than fifty per 
cent of the country’s timber, and an even higher percentage of pit-wood, and the 
Timber Allocation Subcommittee estimated home grown timber output in the UK for 
March 1918 to March 1919 would provide thirty-five per cent of the UK’s timber 
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needs.274 Both figures are well up from the seven per cent that domestic produce 
contributed to the UK’s overall timber use in 1913 275  It can be seen, therefore, that 
although imports were still vital and, as will be seen below, French timber produced 
by the CFC was the main source for the Western Front, the timber produced in the UK 
was an important contribution to the overall British forestry effort.       
In France 
However, it was clear that due to shipping restraints on imports, delays at French 
ports and on railways, and the bulky nature of wood that the BEF, and its allies, 
becoming more self-sufficient nearer the Western Front made perfect sense.276 A  seen 
in chapter 2, British felling of French trees began early in the war and procedures were 
quickly put in place between the allies for this. Yet it was only in late 1916 that 
discussion led to a firm diplomatic agreement to clarify the terms in which more and 
more lumbermen, mainly Canadian, could be put to use in France. This agreement 
came into force on 15 November 1916, citing as its raison d'être the ‘shortage of 
freight’.277  
It will be seen in this section that the situation did gradually improve, and the 
armies on the Western Front were eventually able to rely on French timber for the vast 
majority of their needs. Due to increasing shipping concerns in early-to-mid 1917 and 
increasing French concerns over the future state of their forests, agreements and 
                                                 
274 TNA/BT/71/21, Bird, p.1; TNA/CAB/40/24 Notes on Meeting of the Timber Allocation 
Committee, 28 February 1918. 
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measures had to be altered and refined, leading to a slightly amended agreement in 
October 1917.278 Furthermore, although nearly becoming self-sufficient the Allies did 
have to rely on varying levels of imports into France throughout the war, either to 
make up shortfalls or because specific types could not otherwise be obtained. The 
focus of the HLOs, however, remained the utilisation of French forests and woodlands 
as much as possible. When the Signal Service requested imports of the ‘long English 
poles’ as preferable to using the ‘shorter French poles’, they were quickly instructed 
by Lord Curzon’s Committee to use whatever poles were available in France.279 
It is clear that the French forestry profession and much of their forests were in a 
significantly better state for timber production than the UK’s in 1914. A tradition of 
close control of forest resources and high standards by the State, for the good of the 
nation, had existed for a hundred years. Following the French Revolution old forest 
regulations had been abolished and ‘an environmental Reign of Terror’ followed, with 
cutting and burning leaving many communal forests in ruins and alpine slopes bare. 
Thankfully for the 1914-18 Allies, the French State then acted and sponsored 
reforestation, strict rules being drawn up under Napoleon to ensure national self-
sufficiency, and cementing the union between forestry and the nation-state in 
France.280 Furthermore, from a practical standpoint, ninety per cent of French forested 
land remained behind the front and out of the combat zone.281 Trees in the huge pine 
forests planted under Napoleon in the South of France, from which the locals made 
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money from resin and turpentine, went ‘sterile’ after forty years of being worked and 
therefore represented ‘millions of trees ready to be cut’.282  
Colonel McDougall’s 23 June 1916 report for the War Office on utilising French 
forests, see chapter 2 on establishment of the Directorate of Forestry (GHQ), Comité 
Interallie des Bois des Guerre and War Timber Commission, had also recommended 
some practical points on utilising French forests. Beech woods, those generally being 
worked at the time by Royal Engineer Forestry Companies and various labour units, 
should only be used for ‘rough’ timber for mines, roads and firewood. It was 
unsuitable for many of the uses at the Front. Therefore good quality, well-priced, pine 
forests should be obtained for the CFC to work. Finally, given the perceived 
prolongation of the war and the increasing needs for timber, many more lumbermen 
could be put to work than the previously suggested 1,000.283  
On 29 September 1916, as timber supplies were still not satisfactorily reaching 
the armies, a British Mission, was sent to France to meet officials in regards to 
supplying the BEF.284 The mission was comprised of J. Sutherland, Director of the 
Home Grown Timber Committee, F.R.S Balfour of the Home Grown Timber 
Committee, Frank Baines (later Sir) of various roles including at the Office of Works, 
and James Eggar of the Office of Works. The CFC was represented by Colonels 
McDougall and Rathburn, along with Majors Hepburn, McDonnell and Miller.285 
Amongst others they met with the French Minister of War, the Dir cteur de Génie 
(Director of Engineering) General Chevalier, and Commandant Joseph Thiollier, 
Inspecteur des Eaux et Forêts (Inspector of Water and Forests). The mission also 
inspected various forests including in Brittany, Normandy and the Jura, discussing 
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arrangements for felling with the relevant French forestry officers in each area.286 
Previous negotiations from mid-August, between the Director of Army Contracts and 
the French Minister of War, and a conference at British GHQ, had already led to a 
draft agreement before the mission was arranged, but a version was now agreed and 
‘put in force’ as of 15 November 1916.287 This illustrates good levels of liaison 
between relevant allied experts.  
However, even with this in place and increasing numbers of lumbermen heading 
to France, dire warnings from various sources regarding the drastic cuts to shipping 
prompted the War Cabinet to decide that a report was needed on how to obtain even 
more timber from France. The Directorate of Timber Supplies (War Office) had also 
strongly recommended that employing more Canadian lumbermen in France was a 
policy to be ‘pursued with the greatest possible energy’.288 The Cabinet therefore 
requested that the Secretary of State for War organise a senior officer, assisted by a 
timber expert, to go to France, investigate the situation and report back on three central 
questions: whether the total requirements of all kinds of timber could be obtained in 
the vicinity of the Western Front, what labour the Army could provide, and whether 
the transport system in place was adequate for this. If not, they were to report on what 
actions were needed to make the timber supply adequate.289 By May 1917 Lord Lovat,  
the Director of Forestry at GHQ in France, was reporting that following the agreement 
a joint committee had been established in Paris and that standing timber had been 
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secured for a further six CFC companies. However, he still felt the position, although 
improving, was ‘far from satisfactory’.290 
In October 1917 an amended agreement between the French and British was 
drafted to replace the 15 November 1916 agreement. It took effect from 1 October 
1917, although was not signed by all parties until early 1918, and still cited shortage 
of vessels as the main cause of difficulties in supplying the military services with 
sufficient timber.291 The exact terms of the November 1916 and October 1917 
agreements can appear confusing. Elements such as numbers of personnel or units 
allotted, which army the produce would go to, and if and how compensations were to 
be made, can appear slightly different between drafts and copies. This is mainly 
because subtle changes were made during extensive negotiations before each 
agreement.292 The negotiations do, however, show the diplomatic efforts undertaken 
to arrive at a forestry agreement that would suit both the practical needs of the Allies 
and the environmental concerns of the French.  
For example, in drafts of the November 1916 agreement, one CFC battalion was 
to be placed at the disposal of the French and given a pi e forest ‘to strip’, earlier 
lumber units having been unofficially ‘loaned’.293 Haig, however, was concerned at 
the prospect of handing CFC men over to the French in case it hampered current local 
BEF production.294 In the final November 1916 agreement it was therefore simply 
stated that an area that could occupy a maximum of 2,200 Canadian lumbermen would 
be allotted to the British. This area, according to Maclean, had all been provided before 
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the final agreement was signed.295 If more lumbermen could be raised then the French 
Government would try to assign more forest.296 In the October 1917 agreement 
wording regarding amounts of land to be provided or number of forestry troops to be 
used became slightly vaguer. However, the French confirmed they would ‘endeavour 
to place at the disposal of the British…forest coupes reasonably sufficient to allow the 
fulfilment of the requirements of the’ BEF.297  
In the initial drafts of the November 1916 agreement the timber produced by the 
single CFC battalion were to be split equally between the two armies and the forests 
and their timber provided free of charge to the British Government.298 However, in the 
ratified agreement all timber would go to the British unless the French Military 
Transport service felt that forest locations meant it was logistically sensible to 
exchange it for French supplies elsewhere on the lines of communication.299  If more 
than the 2,200 lumbermen were raised and the French managed to provide more 
coupes, then the British would either refund the value of the cuttings at ‘cost price’ or 
the produce would be ‘evenly divided’ between the two armies.300  Which option was 
taken was decided by the War Timber Commission on a case by case basis.301 Lovat 
estimated that in July 1917 of the 95,000 tons produced they would give the French 
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7,000 tons, nearly seven and a half per cent. In August 12,000 tons, or eleven per cent 
of the 107,000 production targets, and in September 18,000, or sixteen per cent of the 
112,000 tons hoped for were to be sent to the French Armies.302  
Under the October 1917 agreement fifty-six CFC companies were singled out for 
special arrangements whilst any other forestry and labour units could carry on work 
for the British Army, under conditions not dissimilar to the November 1916 terms.303 
Ten of the fifty-six were to work coupes which the British had bought from, or 
through, the French Government. The produce would be ‘exclusively reserved’ for the 
BEF.304 The remaining forty-six companies were supplied coupes for free by the 
French, the British Government paying the costs of felling, transporting to sawmills 
and loading onto trucks. The produce being equally divided between the two nations’ 
armies. Additional transport was to be provided by the nation the timber was going to, 
as were funds for any further costs, but the forestry units were also responsible for 
maintaining access routes.305  
The October 1917 agreement does seem to allocate a greater proportion to the 
French than its predecessor, perhaps because timber shortages were keenly felt on the 
eastern flank of the French armies abutting Switzerland. Here there were plenty of 
trees but no one to cut them.306 Hill states that an agreement was reached that if the 
CFC produced timber in the Vosges and Jura mountains for the French Armies there, 
‘treble’ that amount would be given over to the British in standing timber behind their 
lines.307 The CFC did carry out extensive work in these areas, but no such official 
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agreement regarding triple quantity compensations has yet been found. Although 
perhaps looking to stress the close relationship between Canada and France, Hill in 
1919 argued that even though the majority of their produce had gone to the British the 
‘best record’ of the CFC came from the work they had done for the French Armies, in 
these areas and the Landes and Girondes regions south of Bordeaux.308  This might 
also be due to the suitable nature of the forests for logging. 
The importance of conserving French forests, however, was never forgotten in the 
agreements. Alongside the establishment of a reconstruction subcommittee on forestry 
during the war, and the subsequent establishment of the Forestry Commission, it is the 
British Empire forces’ use of French woodlands that best illustrates contemporary 
concerns over good forestry management. Since early 1915, after damage to the first 
forests exploited by the British in the Pas-de-Calais and Nord departments, the French 
military command had added a forestry team to its military liaison-mission at GHQ to 
try to stop the ‘anarchic exploitation of the forests’.309 Lord Curzon told the House of 
Lords in June 1917 that the French had ‘handed over to us for control large timber-
growing areas in France’ to supply all of the Allies in France.310 However, it was 
clearly not that simple. French environmental and sustainability concerns were key 
factors in the negotiations and terms of both the 1916 and 1917 agreements. The 
French were reluctant, even with the pressure of supplying the war effort, to allow 
unmanaged cutting, preferring, where possible, to insist on good forestry practices.311  
 At the height of the submarine menace, the Directorate of Timber Supplies (War 
Office), which had recently taken on overall responsibility for the timber effort, was 
very keen for more use to be made of French forests. It noted that the ‘French Forest 
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Department’ had not yet allowed cutting in forests close behind the front, only those 
in accordance with their regular well-managed scheme. They saw these areas as the 
most useful in relieving supply congestion and asked the War Office to urge the French 
to allow ‘unrestricted’ clear-cutting of the forests and woods nearest the front, while 
recognising that this would ‘sacrifice their future for a certain number of years’.312 At 
the mid-August 1916 GHQ conference to consider additional British use, French 
authorities were only prepared to grant rights to woodlands that had reached maturity 
and were included in their ‘conservative forest management policies’.313 The original 
coupes allocated were therefore small, could potentially be situated within larger 
forests and were distributed throughout France. These did not lend themselves to 
efficient timber work.314 However, the British mission of September 1916 made it 
clear that they wanted a minimum of 500 hectares to enable a continuous operation, 
as well as having good transport links and storage near the BEF area, and the CFC 
would clearly have preferred to work in clear-cutting areas.315  Nevertheless, under the 
‘scientific principles’ of French State forestry many areas could only be thinned. In 
the Jura, for example, the British and French agreed that for rapid production the 
minimum 500 hectares would be in compact blocks/coupes of 150-200 hectares, from 
which at least 200 cubic metres per hectare could be felled.316    
It was in the 15 November 1916 agreement that the French did agree to try to 
locate areas that could be clear-cut, and some did occur in plantation scots pine forests. 
However, if this was not possible, such as in native oak and beech woods, then French 
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forestry regulations had to be adhered to, as the work was ultimately under their 
control.317 Although the 1917 agreement acknowledged that there were ‘special cases’ 
where particular French forestry regulations could be exempted to improve operational 
efficiency, for instance if an area particularly suited Canadian methods or the 
equipment available to the unit onsite meant the regulations could not be followed. 
Such areas would be investigated and the British had to agree to either carry out, or 
pay for, replanting.318 Additional French foresters were also employed by their 
government following the November 1916 agreement and establishment of the 
Directorate of Forestry (GHQ) in March 1917. They were given powers to authorise 
or prohibit the felling of trees by the British in state-owned forests, as well as to 
regulate private forests in which the British were working under contract with the 
owners. It was for the Directorate of Forestry (GHQ) to negotiate with the French as 
to which areas could be worked, and in conjunction with them prepare ‘sawing 
specifications’. In theory only trees marked by the Commission Forestière 
d’Expertises could be felled, and only once specifications and marking was complete 
would entry rights be authorised for that specific area. The CFC or Royal Engineer 
Forestry Companies would then assume responsibility for the operation. 319 
A sign, however, that environmental concerns grew amongst the French 
authorities can be seen in the wording of the October 1917 convention which, although 
very similar in meaning to its predecessor, states clearly, unlike the earlier agreement, 
that 
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As the resources of the French forests are not unlimited, the French 
Government reserves the right to determine the selection of the coupes 
and to regulate the supply so as to: 
1. Ensure the satisfaction of its own requirements as well as those 
of the other allied Armies 
2. Safeguard the general interests of the Country’s forestry 
resources.320    
 
The French State owned a lot of wooded land, although during the war, as in 
Britain, the government also looked to purchase private wooded land to allocate to 
forestry units. At times they had difficulty persuading land owners, especially in the 
south of France, to part with forested land seen as a long-term livelihood rather than a 
means of short-term profit, even if a very good price was offered.321 As seen above in 
the 1916 agreement, any forestry work was to be carried out as per French regulations, 
yet by the end of 1917 more specific delineations were introduced. In state forests, or 
those belonging to communes or public bodies, regulations remained as per the French 
Forestry Authorities’ wishes. However, if the French Government had allocated land 
purchased from private owners the British had to agree to adhere to any clauses the 
owner had required, ‘technical or otherwise’. This was on the understanding that the 
Directorate of Forestry (GHQ) would have agreed to these before the purchase was 
completed by the French.322 
As Tim Cook concludes, having to take the positions of all parties into account 
when in a coalition often makes relations vulnerable to ‘fissures under sustained 
pressures’.323 Whilst it is clear that the work in France greatly reduced transport strains 
and kept the armies adequately supplied, the processes and relationships did not 
necessarily always run smoothly. Hodicq says that the use of French forests by the 
                                                 
320 TNA/RECO/1/374, ‘Convention Relative to the Exploitation of the French Forestry Resources’, 20 
October 1917, Article 1. 
321 Hill, 'Canadian Forestry Corps Work in France', p. 1200. 
322 TNA/RECO/1/374, ‘Convention Relative to the Exploitation of the French Forestry Resources’, 20 
October 1917, Article IV (A&B). 
323 Cook, At the Sharp End, p. 406. 
Page 242 of 386 
 
 
British was the ‘perfect illustration of the military and commercial cooperation 
between the Allies nations during the war,’ but relations were not always as cordial as 
would have been hoped for by either party, the French at times despairing at the work 
carried out.324  
Lovat, as the head of British forestry in France, also had some irritations due to 
his French counterparts. Amongst other problems, such as lack of skilled personnel in 
the field, Lovat felt that in attempting to establish and run the Directorate of Forestry 
(GHQ) the French, although allies, were not always proving ‘friendly’ or ‘reasonable’, 
often holding ‘different business principles’ to the British and creating ‘minor 
difficulties’.325 For instance, and as a further illustration of the ‘impossible’ nature of 
estimating timber requirements for armies in the field, the French had recently 
‘presented their wholly unexpected demand’ for fifty per cent of CFC produce. A 
compromise was reached, but French requirements, which they had hoped to have by 
July, could not be fulfilled until September.326 He also complained that the French 
were holding up the purchase of woods for the CFC as they felt that the British 
Government had carried out a ‘breach of faith’ over a small amount of silver spruce 
promised to them for airplanes. He tried without success to tell them that that was 
‘Fuller’s affair’, meaning Bampfylde-Fuller the Director of Timber Supplies at the 
War Office, but to no avail.327 
When the American lumbermen arrived, skilled French foresters were in short-
supply and due to the cheapness of timber in the USA compared with France, they 
came with very different ideas on logging techniques and forestry practices. At first 
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the French and American forestry personnel did not get on, because the men of the 
20th Engineers were more likely to destroy young trees unnecessarily or fell trees 
during optimum growth periods. However, John Jeanneney argues that most 
disagreements were resolved and effective relationships grew, and it appears the same 
for British Empire forestry units. 328    
Brown concludes that through the November 1916 agreement this particular 
logistical problem was resolved ‘quite well’, unlike others at the time. As seen in 
chapter 1, except occasionally in local areas near the front, supplies were maintained 
well.329 However, the simple fact that it was accepted that imports would still be 
required illustrates that it was accepted that self-sufficiency would never truly be 
reached. Under the November 1916 agreement the British also agreed to ‘share 
proportionally’ with the French any tonnage that the ‘Admiralty’ allocated to the War 
Timber Commission or Commission Internationale d’Achats de Bois for imports to 
France. Rates for this shipping were to be the same for the French and British 
governments.330 Lovat estimated that the Directorate of Forestry (GHQ) would 
gradually increase its monthly outputs from May to September 1917 as more 
Canadians arrived. He hoped that by the end of September they might be independent 
from needing additional supplies to be shipped to them. However, up to then they were 
still dependant on imports to make figures up to the estimated requirements of 125,000 
tons per month. He also felt that 9,000 tons (2,000 in sawn, 7,000 in poles) should 
continue to be shipped monthly from the Bordeaux ports to Northern France until July, 
by which time the Directorate of Forestry (GHQ) should be able to supply the poles. 
After that time he felt the 7,000 spare tonnage per month should be used to carry 
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sleepers from Bordeaux to Northern France to reduce that tonnage needing to be 
brought across the channel.  
Shipping of imports was also continually needed as certain materials could not be 
obtained in France. 4,000 tons per month of suitable pitch pine, the usual demand from 
inland transport in France, was not grown there, although standard gauge sleepers 
could be produced. Seasoned wood for hutting, required in May 1917 at 5,000 tons 
per month but likely to increase come winter and with a new hospital building policy, 
could not be produced and seasoned in France. Lovat saw these two amounts as being 
permanent requirements and estimates on ‘the safe side’ to ‘secure against all 
eventualities’. However, he also requested a safety margin of 20,000 shipping tons to 
be available for August to October 1917 for imports from England to meet unexpected 
requirements.331 Lovat accepted in this request that his superiors would think he was 
‘erring on the side of caution,’ but argued his position succinctly in that he was ‘the 
largest timber merchant in the world, with no stock of implements, little or no reserve 
of timber, and a client to deal with who must have what he demands’. He was, 
however, as often occurred, still asked to liaise directly with the Shipping Controller 
as previous estimates had requested more tonnage than had been required and it was 
clearly the shipping space that was most worrying to the authorities throughout most 
of the war.332  
Discussions of the possibility of stocks and reserves being established in France 
give a more positive picture of the efforts there. These stocks and reserves were 
mentioned on occasion by various bodies, though only if more could be obtained than 
required through imports and French timber. The 15 November 1916 agreement 
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stipulated that if surpluses could be obtained, the War Timber Commission and 
Commission Internationale d’Achats de Bois were to organise stores in France.333 
Lovat felt he could build up sufficient stocks of fuel-wood for the 1917/18 winter if 
minor difficulties ‘mainly connected with the French’ were overcome, whilst noting 
that requirements for fuel jumped from 3,500 to 26,000 tons p/m during the winter. 
Also a stock of 30,000 road-slabs, enough ‘for the ordinary requirements of an 
advance’, could be built up from French forests as these slabs could be used over and 
over again. Lovart’s desire to create this stock of road-slabs further illustrates the 
importance of timber in an advance and also GHQ’s desire to salvage and reuse wood. 
Standard gauge sleepers could also be produced in France, and Lovat hoped to produce 
a reserve of 500,000 of these by increasing production gradually, yet massively, from 
20,000 in April 1917 to 250,000 in August 1917.334  Lovat felt that after September 
1917 his Directorate of Forestry (GHQ) would be able to supply anticipated demands 
‘almost’ independently from imports from overseas, though as seen above certain 
amounts of purchases did continue to arrive at French ports, even if some were from 
Bordeaux.335   
As well as the forests allocated to British Empire forestry units, contracts therefore 
continued to be made for the supply of French timber from the French Forestry 
Authorities either by the HLOs in London or those such as the RE Directorate of 
Works (Foden Contracts), QMG, and then Directorate of Forestry (GHQ) in France. 
The Bordeaux forests were particularly key as timber could be shipped up to northern 
ports and contracts ranged from 4,000 to 12,000 tons per month via this route. 
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However, in May 1916 the 9,000 tons per month which Lovat had wanted to continue 
to be shipped to Northern France from the Bordeaux ports were being held up. 
Shipping constraints were leaving 20,000 tons in store at Bordeaux which Lovat felt 
would greatly help the June 1916 position, possibly as stocking up for the Somme.336 
The French were, however, keen to stick to agreed procedures. In response to a 
question, the QMG was informed on 3 September  by the French major-general 
responsible for the areas behind the front, that  authorisation for purchases of timber 
by the British Army could not be delegated even to high ranking French administrative 
officers. Purchases had to follow the procedures established by the agreement in 
February 1916 that established the Commission Internationale d’Achats de Bois. 
Therefore requests for permission to purchase were to go to the French Mission at 
British GHQ to either the Commander-in-chief if in an Army area, or to the Minister 
if outside of these areas.337 Yet in October 1917, probably due to workload for senior 
officials, it was agreed that operational questions would be referred to the Director of 
Forestry, Inspecteur General du Service des Bois (Ministry of Armament) or Directeur 
General des Eaux et Forêts (Ministry of Agriculture) to settle between them, but that 
any of these could delegate their powers to officials or committees at any time.338      
Under the 15 November 1916 agreement, centrally increasing forestry work in 
France, the Allies confirmed the previous arrangements made between the French 
Ministry for War and the Office of Works, that they would also continue buying timber 
through the Commission Internationale d’Achats de Bois. Furthermore, as seen in 
chapter 2, it was under the November agreement that the War Timber Commission 
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was established, a body that would quickly become more executive in purpose.339 Th  
French and Belgian Ministers for War and the British Commander-i -chief would 
submit their requirements for the armies in the field and other ‘various services’, along 
with the urgency of these, to the War Timber Commission at least three, but ideally 
six, months in advance.340 For instance, monthly conferences were established by the 
BEF to determine current needs, the first meeting in September 1916 requesting 
approximately 100,000 tons, nearly 72,000 tons of which was not already contracted 
for. The War Timber Commission were to keep track of requirements and amounts 
produced in British and French forests, or obtained from any other sources, and keep 
the Admiralty informed of shipping requirements. They would also make suggestions, 
based on information gathered, on further methods to affect economies in freight to 
the relevant forestry or transport bodies.341 Haig saw that requirements were drawn 
up, although he would have preferred the War Timber Commission as an advisory 
body rather than one that could exert any power over his forces. He already felt the 
BEF was more dependent on the authorities in London for meeting their needs than 
the French Army was on Paris. Haig was also concerned that if there were a shortfall 
in supplies reaching the BEF, there would be no local responsibility to fix this.342 The 
British Commander-in-chief also agreed not to make further purchases in France 
without French permission, with the exception of small local purchases by Corps or 
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Divisional Chief/Commanding Engineers in Army areas, a promise he restated in 
October 1917.343  
As already noted, British GHQ did already have a system of obtaining permissions 
from the French to cut some of the BEF’s timber needs in France, and units had been 
in French forests since the early days of the war. However, the diplomatic agreements 
of November 1916 and October 1917 outlined above were clearly about three key 
areas. Firstly, to massively expand forestry operations nearer the front and to do this 
quickly as importing got harder but demands from both armies did not abate. Secondly, 
and undoubtedly very importantly to the French Forestry Authorities given their 
nation’s long standing affinity with forests and woodlands, to ensure as high and 
professional a level of control over the work of the Canadian and British units to help 
secure sustainability. The fact timber was needed in unprecedented quantities and 
therefore work needed to be at unprecedented speeds was not lost on the French 
authorities, and concessions were made to this. However, forestry HLOs and units in 
France were never going to be given free reign over French trees, and understandably 
so. Thirdly, although as much would be taken from French woodlands as possible, this 
was unlikely to be enough at certain times or in all the forms required. Therefore 
centralised purchasing and supplies to the two armies remained a vital element of the 
effort and a great deal of administrative work went into ensuring this facet of the 
coalition worked as well as possible.    
Ending State Intervention and Controls 
The summer of 1917 marked the peak of government commitment to intervention 
into agriculture, a much earlier date than for forestry which continued increasing until 
                                                 
343 TNA/BT/71/1/6456, ‘Draft Agreement Between the British and the French Governments’, 15 
November 1916, Clause 7; TNA/RECO/1/374, ‘Convention Relative to the Exploitation of the French 
Forestry Resources’, 20 October 1917, Article V; TNA/BT/71/21, Bird, p. 33. 
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the end of the war. In terms of numbers of timber-related controls released monthly 
during the war, the level of details included in individual orders, and the range of items 
covered it can be seen that controls continued to grow and be adapted from January 
1917 throughout the war.344   
The facts that stocks were established at times in both Britain and on the continent 
and that shortages were never crippling to the war effort indicates how well the 
controls put in place worked. Different ministries had their own reasons for either 
expanding, maintaining, reducing or ending the controls they had put in place over 
their industries or materials, and these were largely for practical reasons rather than 
doctrinal belief that state control was superior to laissez-faire.345 As seen in chapter 2, 
Addison, Minister in charge of Reconstruction at this time and known to have free 
trade predilections, believed in the positive value of involving businessmen in 
decision-making and implementation. Yet other ministers felt it was better for them to 
make decisions about controls with input from business. Similarly, some industries 
were unhappy at the thought of partnership with government, even an anti-socialist 
one, whilst others looked to take advantage of government’s dependence on them to 
get involved and help define limits of intervention policies following the war. Debates 
in industries such as shipbuilding, steel, housing and many others would be well 
discussed throughout Parliament and business. Overall in 1918 and 1919 businesses, 
ministries and ministers in favour failed to come up with a plausible, combined, strong 
political case for extending boundaries of state intervention.346 The war did illustrate 
productivity problems in UK industry as a whole, as well as in forestry, and left hopes 
and fears regarding the ability of politicians on all sides to achieve the levels of 
                                                 
344 See Appendix to this thesis, ‘Control Orders & Notices’; Dewey, British Agriculture, pp. 99-101.  
345 Turner, British Politics, p. 362. 
346 Ibid., p.388. 
Page 250 of 386 
 
 
reconstruction and change promised in the post-war period in conjunction with 
industries, trades and unions.  However, through the Standing Council on Priority, 
composed mostly of businessmen, any overly rigid controls seen to restrain the 
development of trade were very quickly ended, and even though some controls 
followed more slowly, there was a ‘pell-mell rush to decontrol,’347 which included the 
timber trade.  
The Timber Trade Federation in October 1918, as government and many business 
organisations did during the war, looked to the post-war period. They felt that further 
state controls or dealing in timber after the war as ‘neither defensible nor necessary’ 
and would be ‘unfair and disastrous’ to the trade.348 So although happy to help as much 
as they could, the Timber Trade Federation were arguing that better results could be 
achieved if they were still more involved in the methods introduced to improve 
supplies. There was also mention that future unfair controls ‘would be resisted’, 
suggesting threats of non-cooperation.349  As with many other raw materials, all timber 
controls, except in regard to pit-wood, were withdrawn by the end of March 1919.  
The ‘Timber Control (Amendment No.2) Order 1918’ on 5 December 1918, was the 
initial major step towards ending controls. It withdrew permits for home grown timber 
sales and revoked various parts of the ‘Timber Control Order (1918)’. It allowed for 
the purchase of up to £100 worth, in any one calendar month, of imported softwood 
without a permit, as long as it was needed for work of 'national importance or urgent 
necessity’. Form A still had to be forwarded to the Timber Supply Department (Board 
of Trade) giving details of all transactions during the month and declaring that the 
timber was needed for work of national importance. Nonetheless, the ‘Timber Control 
                                                 
347 Ibid., pp. 362-363, 389; Swenarton, Homes Fit for Heroes, pp. 83-96. 
348 Resolution No.3 of Timber Trade Federation meeting of 17 October 1917, as quoted in Latham,  
History of the Timber Trade Federation, p. 68. 
349 Ibid., p. 75. 
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(Amendment No.2) Order 1918’, the ‘Timber Control Order (1918)’ itself, and many 
other wartime timber controls were revoked by a notice on 5 March 1919, under the 
‘Articles of Commerce (Relaxation of Restriction) Order, 1918’. Priority now became 
to get rid of softwood stocks accumulated during the war.350 
However, pit-wood  and ‘semi-manufactured’ wooden articles such as box-shooks 
remained under some control as they either continued to be, or were made subject to, 
import licences. However, this was not applied to such semi-manufactured goods from 
British Empire territories, and this restriction on manufactured goods did not last long 
as many were needed in the UK urgently. The ‘Pitwood Order 1918’, which gave 
Controller of Timber Supplies power to give notices altering maximum prices, was 
superseded by the ‘Pitwood Order 1919’ on 10 April 1919, which fixed new maximum 
prices for imported and home-grown pit-wood. Notices had preceded this order in lat 
January 1919 announcing that import licences would now be granted for supplies from 
Spain, Portugal, Scandinavia, Finland and Newfoundland for imports to certain 
districts, and giving new maximum prices for these. This Order also allowed for the 
controls of pit-wood to be transferred from the Timber Supply Department (Board of 
Trade) to the Mines Department at the Board of Trade. All control of pit-wood ended 
in the autumn of 1919 and all import restrictions into the UK were lifted in September 
1919. 351 
 
Conclusions on the Methods Used by the HLOs. 
In terms of forestry the British Government had to take a tighter rein as the war 
progressed, due to the poor state of pre-war forestry, essential nature of the resource 
                                                 
350 Ibid.; TNA/BT/71/21, Bird, Appendix 2, pp. 1-2, 73; ‘Timber Control (Amendment) Order, 1918’, 
The London Gazette, 6 December 1918, p. 14481. 
351 TNA/BT/71/21, Bird, p. 73, Appendix 1 p.7, Appendix 2 p.2; BT/71/3/55295, memo of 1 January 
1919. 
Page 252 of 386 
 
 
and lack of shipping tonnage. Wider debates have and will continue to take place about 
the benefits and drawbacks of government policies on centralisation at differing times 
and for different fields, from agriculture to munitions. However, this chapter has 
outlined that forestry was very much a ‘controlled’ resource, especially and 
unsurprisingly under Lloyd George’s coalition. It was often under similar measures as 
agriculture although not necessarily at similar times, due to the very different natures 
of the crops. Furthermore, with negotiations, trials, errors, and clarifications between 
politicians and the trade, the measures put in place to control this resource were 
sensible, appropriate to the wider context of the war, open to amendments and 
ultimately therefore fair and effective.  
Firstly stock levels and requirements, notoriously difficult to estimate accurately, 
had to be established for numerous types of wood, and as seen this was an important 
role for numerous organisations. The powers to control, from restricting areas of trade 
such as imports to requisitioning land and facilities to produce timber, had to be 
established and passed from body to body, and a great deal of administrative effort 
went into getting these correct. The immediate assumption might be that in a war 
requiring such vast quantities of supplies to be shipped around the world the bulky 
nature of timber would lead to complete stoppages of its shipping. However, it has 
been shown that although restrictions of certain types at specific times were put in 
place, these were generally short-lived if the type was essential. Timber was only 
behind food and munitions in the shipping priority lists. Some areas of Europe 
managed to maintain exports to Britain and France, although it was the recognition 
and increased use of the ‘New World’s’ timbers that stands out.  
Increases in home grown timber were also recognised as vitally important, and 
measures and controls were put in place to increase quantities produced and ensure 
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that they, along with imports, were bought and sold solely for work of national 
importance related to the war effort. Common measures included permit systems, 
price setting and stock inspections. Sensible measures in encouraging economy and 
salvage of wood were also introduced, along with investigations into alternative 
materials. Finally, it was the method which was decided upon reasonably late, at the 
beginning of 1916, of putting as many trained lumbermen as possible in woodlands as 
close to where the timber was required which was the most important innovation. Even 
with the pressing nature of the work, environmental concerns remained, with French 
authorities at least. Furthermore the coalition worked well together, if not always 
harmoniously, to get over cultural and professional differences. Whether in England, 
Scotland and then France it was this method that paid the most dividends, and it is to 
the establishment and management of the different forestry units by various HLOs that 
we now turn. 
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Chapter 4: Establishing and Structuring the Skilled Forestry Units. 
The preceding chapters have concentrated on the important elements of who, why 
and how in regards to the administrative establishment, growth, management and 
control of the forestry effort. At the sharp end of the process, however, numerous 
forestry units were required, and establishing and refining the structures of these to 
increase efficiency were amongst the most important actions the HLOs had to take. It 
is these methods that the HLOs this chapter will therefore examine. No single review 
comparing the reasons behind, and actions taken to ensure, the establishment of all of 
the forestry units exists in the historiography. In correcting this, the chapter will also 
reinforce common themes in the thesis. These include that sensible solutions were put 
forward and actions taken to solve the problem of too few timber experts available to 
supply the war’s needs. Also, although springing from various sources, the units that 
provided the solutions gradually came under the overarching forestry HLOs. Finally, 
in establishing and then managing these units appropriate personnel were utilised.    
To illustrate these central themes, as well as outlining the processes used, the 
chapter will firstly provide a section on the contextual elements of manpower concerns 
relating to industry, agriculture and the forces that would have been necessarily present 
in the minds of those organising the units. This focuses on Britain and Canada, the 
main sources of forestry labour. It will be seen that whilst those in some forestry roles 
were exempt from military service, the numbers required, along with the introduction 
of specialist units from the empire and increasing use of women, meant there were not 
the same high levels of concern amongst forestry planners as there were in regard to 
agricultural and industrial workers.   
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The chapter is then split into four main themes. These concern initiating, raising 
and expanding the units, funding the units, staffing the units especially at senior officer 
level, and finally structuring the units in terms of where they sat in the civilian 
administrative or military command structures, as well as the flexibility they were 
allowed in their own sizes and frameworks. In each of these themes, when relevant 
information has been located, the units will be compared in a set order based 
chronologically on when they or their predecessors originated. The central units 
covered within the research in this chronological order are the Royal Engineer Forestry 
Companies, Women’s Forestry Service, Canadian Forestry Corps (CFC), 
Newfoundland Forestry Corps and New England Sawmill Units.  
In illustrating who originally requested the units, and why this happened when it 
did, it will be seen that, similarly to the HLOs managing them, there was no one 
instigator. Rather, numerous different bodies heard of the need for more timber, from 
varying sources, and tried to help. Following on from that naturally comes an overview 
of the administrative work to organise, recruit or transfer personnel to create the 
necessary bodies, such as training women as measurers, planning to recruit Canadian 
lumbermen, or transferring whole newly formed Canadian infantry units to a ‘forestry’ 
status. An outline of what proportion of the overall effort each of the units represented  
will then show that whilst the CFC were the main formation each of the others made 
a valid contribution, whether in terms of numbers employed, output, or, as becomes 
clear below, in positive morale effects on contemporaries. 
Although not always a prominent or regular feature in histories, it will then be 
shown that in this unprecedented effort discussion was required over who would fund 
these units at different stages. It will be seen that originators, such as the Canadian 
Government or New England States, were generally keen to pay to recruit and equip 
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such units, whilst British Government departments were so desperate for them that 
they were also happy to pay any additional or ongoing wage, transport, 
accommodation and maintenance costs where necessary. Reviews of those chosen to 
command the units by the HLOs, with some examples of more junior officers and even 
non-commissioned officers (NCOs), will confirm that suitable experts were once 
again used.  
Where the units were placed in the overall frameworks controlling the effort, and 
how they were allowed some fluidity in their unit structures, depending on the 
locations they were put to work in, will then finish the chapter. These small and 
specialist units fitted into the administrative structures more easily than some larger 
formations, such as military CEF units in Britain, as they were often simply considered 
specialist branches of the engineering or supply arms. They had their own controlling 
HLOs in the War Office or Board of Trade, and although discussion took place over 
where they would be controlled from, their separate, specialist and urgent task led to 
getting boots in the forests being the priority. Nonetheless, their places in the 
management structures were established quickly to ensure that urgent goals could be 
met in the most efficient manner. Overall it will be shown that although it was 
decidedly original to have so many different forestry specific units within a war effort, 
initiating, raising, officering and structuring them were managed in a resourceful 
manner by the HLOs. 
General manpower concerns 
In terms of labour the British Government lacked mechanisms to count men, or 
women, leaving certain trades to join others or the forces, or those leaving the military 
for industry. This was especially true in the early days of war. The Board of Trade did 
carry out eighteen ‘sample surveys’ to gauge numbers joining the forces from specific 
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jobs, yet only one of these ‘Z8’ reports survives. Furthermore, the reliability of the 
information submitted for this report differed from firm to firm and by industry. This 
was especially true in agriculture, and forestry was rarely considered a separate form 
of employment.1  
 Therefore, exact figures such as British foresters and woodsmen leaving, or 
returning to, their trades during the war are impossible, yet when those statistics 
available for forestry or agriculture are used in conjunction with other sources they 
can help give an idea of where this area sat in the overall context of wartime labour 
issues that the HLOs had to face.2 The major issue in attempting to become more self-
sufficient in terms of wood supplies, alongside sourcing enough standing timber, was 
undoubtedly the lack of manpower to cut and convert it. As seen in the previous 
chapters, however, it was widely recognised that more labour, skilled and unskilled, 
directed towards forestry would improve self-sufficiency, in turn saving precious 
shipping tonnage, especially from the beginning of 1916.3 Much has been written on 
the overall issue of obtaining more labour and directing it towards priority needs in 
the military, factories, fields or mines. From the initial ‘rush to enlist’, through the 
Derby Scheme and on to conscription, a great deal of detail can be found.4 This brief 
section will illustrate the most important issues regarding the general manpower 
question that did have, or could have had, an impact on forestry. Especially concerns 
over dilution of expert roles and any relevant exemptions from the Military Service 
Acts.  
                                                 
1 Board of Trade, Cd.9164 Report of the Board Of Trade on the Increased Employment of Women 
During the War in The United Kingdom. With Statistics up to April 198, passim, for instance see pp. 
3-4, 6, 12, 14; Dewey, British Agriculture, pp. 38, 40-43, 45-47, 51, 55, 57 fn 15, 85, 86. 
2 Ibid., pp. 36, 43-44, 56, 85. 
3 Hansard, House of Lords Sitting 23 May 1917, col. 288, ‘Forestry labour in UK to save on timber 
import tonnage’; also see chapter 2 of this thesis. 
4 Noakes, Women in the British Army, pp. 61-2, Grieves, The Politics of Manpower, 1914-18, passim. 
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Britain’s role in the coalition was not simply to provide troops and a naval 
blockade, but also munitions, essential raw materials, shipping and increasingly large 
amounts of financial credit or loans, for herself and her allies. Such priorities naturally 
competed with each other, and is one of the reasons why this thesis is so important to 
our understanding of the war. From early on, labour shortages were created by the 
rapid increase of government orders, as well as employee enlistment in the armed 
forces.5 Manpower allocation between the armed forces and vital industries was 
therefore a major challenge throughout this ‘total’ war. Debates and disagreements 
over the possibilities and details of measures and concerns were considerable. They 
included the overall management of organisations of labour, industrial as well as 
military conscription, allocation of skilled and unskilled labour within the civilian 
workforce, manpower ‘ceilings’, the use of women and schoolchildren, trade unions 
and other labour movements’ concerns over dilution, increasing the mobility of labour, 
and post-war concerns. Such matters were common concerns in the British and 
Canadian parliaments. They also became ‘prevalent’ in public psyches.6 
No single HLO was specifically given the overall roles of locating all additional 
labour and at the same time controlling all available manpower, or definitively 
adjudicating between concerned parties. This led to weak administration and 
confusion.7 For instance, industrial conscription, although discussed, could not be 
introduced for various reasons, not least Lloyd George’s promise to Labour MPs that 
it would not be if they would back him as Prime Minister.8 Workforce ‘dilution’, for 
instance the introduction of more unskilled men or women and non-union workers, 
                                                 
5 Turner, British Politics, pp. 369-70; Dewey, British Agriculture, p. 4. 
6 Turner, British Politics, pp. 64-111 (esp. 82, 84), 88, 128, 165-70, 191-92, 174-6, 262, 344, 368- 87, 
369 fn 120; Dewey, British Agriculture, pp. 39, 109. 
7 Turner, British Politics, pp. 165-7, 170, 267, 263, 376. 
8 Ibid., passim, or see pp. 166, 167, 170 for examples. 
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was very unpopular in certain areas of the country and in particular industries. It 
proved to be one of the main causes of industrial unrest, but these objections were 
generally overcome and dilution continued or even increased, aiding production 
throughout the war.9  
The main policies introduced included increasing the use of women, and even 
schoolchildren at certain times of the year. Home Army reservists and soldiers still in 
the UK were also sometimes used to help in agriculture and industry. The various 
HLOs also sought to improve production by protecting workers in certain roles felt 
essential to the war effort. Furthermore, various ways of allocating manpower to where 
it was most needed were also attempted, for instance increasing the use of unskilled 
men and those unfit for military service, so as to allow skilled workmen to be 
reallocated to improve production. The use of Irish and colonial labour as well as 
enlisted soldiers in training or as labour battalions in agriculture, factories or dock 
work, was recognised as ‘dilution’ but at times seen as the only answer.  
There was resistance to certain methods but in most industries and agriculture, 
even though there were serious concerns and some loss of production, the labour force 
did cope through expansion, restructuring, new working methods and tighter 
controls.10 All this can be seen in the forestry effort and in agriculture. As early as May 
1915 the War Office told recruiting offices not to accept skilled farm workers, and the 
National Register, a survey of the national labour force carried out in autumn of 1915, 
‘starred’ some professions for exemption, including some in skilled agricultural 
roles.11 The introduction of the Trade Card Scheme in November 1916 which handed 
responsibility to the trade unions themselves for determining which workers were 
                                                 
9 Ibid., pp. 80, 107-8; Swenarton, Homes Fit for Heroes, p. 50. 
10 Latham, History of the Timber Trade Federation, p. 64; Turner, British Politics, pp. 84, 171, 175-
176, 262; Dewey, British Agriculture, pp. 17, 48-51, 83-7, 100, 103. 
11 Ibid., pp. 38-9. 
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entitled to exemptions on the grounds of craft identity. In forestry this meant the 
Timber Trade Federation. During 1915 the English Timber Section of this federation 
spent a lot of time dealing with which occupations in the trade should be reserved. For 
instance, in the home-grown timber trade at this time, mill sawyers, timber carters, 
hauliers and wood fellers were all reserved. They were protected by badges issued by 
the Ministry of Munitions.12 
The first Military Service Act was passed in January 1916, becoming operative 
from 2 March for single men aged eighteen to forty-one. Certified occupations were 
still protected and this list included some lower levels of skills previously not 
protected, but clearly not all could be.13 In February 1916, at the time Britain was 
asking Canada for lumbermen, military recruitment targets in Britain were not being 
met, yet some industries were starting to suffer because of over-enlistment, a crisis 
that would continue into the middle of 1916. General conscription was finally enacted 
on 25 May, providing compulsory enlistment of all males between eighteen and forty-
one, subject to specific exemptions for those in reserved occupations as well as for 
medical unfitness or conscientious objection.14 
Canada’s establishment targets, the total number of service personnel it wanted to 
recruit, equip and train, also meant voluntary enlistment was no longer going to be 
adequate, especially when increases in monthly enlistments began to fall again after 
May 1916. Furthermore, although the pre-war stagnation in business and high levels 
of unemployment had reduced during 1915, by the beginning of 1916 many worried 
about the negative effects that further enlistments or conscription would have on 
Canada’s skilled working population, especially in important industries such as 
                                                 
12 Latham, History of the Timber Trade Federation, p. 64. 
13 Noakes, Women in the British Army, p. 61; Dewey, British Agriculture, pp.5, 39-40. 
14 Turner, British, pp.59, 81, 83, 85, 86, 89, 94,109; Cregier, ‘McKenna, Reginald (1863–1943)’, n.p. 
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forestry and agriculture. Although conscription was forced through, becoming law on 
29 August 1917, Borden’s Government, like his British equivalents, still had problems 
with manpower until the end of the war.15 
In Britain questions of providing more protection for agriculture, as well as other 
industries, were raised at the end of 1916 and into the early months of 1917. 
Discussions between the War Cabinet, Secretary of State for War, President of the 
Board of Agriculture and Fisheries and engineering trade unions or organisations over 
further exemptions did not always resolve issues and there were strikes in some 
industries. In agriculture another 30,000 men were taken for military purposes in mid-
January 1917, the Government promising to provide an equal amount of soldiers to 
work on the land.16 Amidst the arguments during early 1917 it was becoming 
increasingly apparent that an effective production policy and labour requirements did 
go very closely hand in hand. A great deal of wrangling took place in the War Cabinet 
between supporters of using labour in the military or in civilian industrial or 
agricultural roles.17 
For three weeks from 2 April 1917, labour organisations, War Office officials and 
relevant ministers held negotiations regarding the severe need for more men in the 
forces, and which roles should still be considered exempt from conscription.18 The 
War Cabinet decided to introduce a new Schedule of Protected Occupations in early 
May, although the Department for National Service was ridiculed for failing to 
introduce industrial compulsion and matching important jobs with the necessary 
                                                 
15 Nicholson, Canadian Expeditionary Force, pp. 215-19, 221, 231, 342-346; Cook, Shock Troops, p. 
369; Swettenham, To Seize the Victory, pp. 193-4.  
16 Dewey, British Agriculture, p. 106; Turner, British Politics, pp. 128-9, 166, 175. 
17 Ibid., pp. 175, 176; Dewey, British Agriculture, p. 106  
18 Turner, British Politics, pp. 167-70; Peter Dewey, War and Progress: Britain 1914-1945 (Harlow 
and New York: Longman, 1997), pp. 40-1; Committee on Civil Defense, 5 March 1918 (PRO CAB 
24/44 GT 3639) as used in Swenarton, Homes Fit for Heroes, pp. 74, 203 fn 18.   
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skilled men.19 If a potential recruit was considered essential for farm work their 
County Agricultural Executive Committee they had up to three weeks to find a suitable 
replacement, either to take up work on the farm or go into the military in their place. 
Only from 27 June 1917 was farm labour fully protected against the demands of the 
army.20 It was agreed that no man listed as working on areas of national importance 
on 1 June 1917 could be called up, or even medically examined, without the consent 
of their County Agricultural Executive Committee. This for the first time brought 
agriculture in line with other fully protected occupations such as munitions and 
mining. This state lasted for nine months, until the German 1918 spring offensives, 
and meant that before that the County Agricultural Executive Committees were 
especially busy, and powerful.21  
Military Service Act (No.2) became law on 18 April 1918, extending the age 
limits for military service to those between seventeen and fifty-one and it included 
Ireland for the first time. 22 Two days later the Ministry of National Service also 
withdrew exemptions granted to agriculturalists between eighteen and twenty-three 
years old and in medical grade 1 or category A.23 The Board of Trade also considered 
proposals to withdraw exemption certificates of men under twenty four and medically 
fit still who were working for them following Military Service Act (no.2), calculating 
the number of men they employed who would be affected. Separate debates were also 
needed with respect to Board of Trade employees in Ireland.24 However, as the 
German territorial advances were eventually halted and the situation on the Western 
                                                 
19 Turner, British Politics, pp. 167-8, 170. 
20 Dewey, British Agriculture, pp. 2, 38-9, 106. 
21 Ibid., pp. 99-100,106. 
22 Turner, British Politics, pp. 264, 284-5, 287, 288. 
23 Dewey, British Agriculture, pp. 101, 107. 
24 TNA/BT/13/84 (E35241 & E32690), Military Service Act Exemption Certificates, withdrawal, 
1918. 
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Front once again stabilised for the Allies, ‘deliberate efforts were made to return 
skilled men from the army to essential jobs in industry’.25 Yet even before this, private 
forestry firms were also requesting specific soldiers to be released from duty for 
timber-felling, indicating that not all timber production could ever be totally 
centralised. For instance, one Scottish coal company requested in February 1918 that 
the Timber Supply Department (Board of Trade) in Scotland ‘obtain the release of a 
wood-feller from the Army’, proposing to pay him very well (‘£4:10/- a week and a 
9/- bonus’) to cut pit-wood. The Assistant Controller of Timber Supplies (Scotland), 
however, felt that taking back skilled men ‘from operations dealing with heavier 
timber’, which suggested he was in a Royal Engineer Forestry Company in either 
England or France working under the Timber Supply Department (Board of Trade), 
was not the best use of this resource. Sir Stirling Maxwell also suggested that it would 
now be acceptable to limit any pit-wood operation to no more than ‘two skilled men 
of military age’.26   The matter of the coal company paying wages ‘out of all reason’ 
to take men away from more important operations, while the army, or Timber Supply 
Department (Board of Trade), could not pay such amounts, was passed by Ball on to 
the Coal Mines Department to take up with the particular company.27    
The Timber Trade Federation were again busy with labour issues in 1918 when a 
Sawmilling and Employers of Labour Section was established. The Ministry of Labour 
consulted the Timber Trade Federation over proposals put forward by the National 
Federation of Sawmilling Associations requesting an Industrial Council for the 
sawmilling industry. Following negotiations the Sawmilling Industry Council 
                                                 
25  Grieves, The Politics of Manpower, 1914-18, pp. 193-199.  
26 TNA/BT/71/2/24668, letter, Stirling Maxwell (Assistant Controller of Timber Supplies) to Ball 
(Controller Timber Supplies), 26 February 1918.   
27 Ibid., also letter, Ball (Controller Timber Supplies) to Sir Richard Redmayne, 28 February 1918 
[Redmayne at this stage was chief technical advisor to the Controller of Coal Mines]. 
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gradually took shape.28 Debate also continued between the Ministry of National 
Service and Timber Supply Department (Board of Trade) as to the exact roles of 
employees in what were classed as ‘composite’ firms, those with several roles in the 
timber industry, and eventually, by July 1918, strict guidelines were set in terms of 
what roles did constitute a valid exemption from National Service. The Timber Supply 
Department (Board of Trade) Labour Inspectors could therefore follow the lines of 
demarcation for employee roles in composite firms as set out in black and white.29  
A great deal of effort was clearly made to try to get the correct quantity and qu lity 
of manpower to the correct position, either on the Home or Battle Fronts. Although 
this did not always work especially efficiently, overall the efforts must be seen as a 
success as supplies, human and material, did, in the majority of cases, get to where 
they were needed. This was not an easy task, given the unparalleled scale of materials 
required. Furthermore, roles within the timber trades were at times considered 
equivalent to those in other industries and therefore important enough to be named and 
protected for the war effort, but the numbers involved were much fewer and therefore 
rarely considered separately. 
Initiating, raising and expanding the units 
With the contextual situation regarding human resources in mind, the following 
review of the bodies requesting or responsible for originating forestry units show that, 
although there were eventually HLOs centrally responsible for the effort, the units 
each grew more organically from the suggestions or actions of different organisations. 
These ranged from the existing military structure of the Army’s engineer and supply 
                                                 
28 Latham, History of the Timber Trade Federation, p. 71. 
29 TNA/BT/71/4/72058, letter E. H. Blakesley, Timber Supply Department (Board of Trade) to Major 
Peterson, Labour Supply Department (Ministry of Munitions), 19 July 1918. See note that Timber 
Supply Department Labour Inspectors would follow the lines of demarcation for employee roles in 
composite firms as set out in STA.7D para. 7.  
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elements deciding more timber was needed, to female volunteer organisations and 
American public bodies. However, all would eventually need the approval of the 
British military or Government before being put into place.        
Looking through the History of the Great War Based on Official Documents series 
indicates that, as previously stated for the HLOs in terms of purchasing and allocating, 
there was no one organisation or body in the RE or Army Service Corps responsible 
for felling, collecting and allocating wood in France until well into 1917. The massive 
expansion of the RE and Army Service Corps is well-documented, and many existing 
or new units get regular mentions, from field companies to requisition, pay, drainage, 
gas and printing work, to name just a few, but not so forestry. Initially, however, before 
such numbers of experts could be organised, the establishment of specific forestry 
units was driven from those near the front lines, as would be expected, and this was 
the case for the Royal Engineer Forestry Companies. The earliest example of 
Canadians officially working on forestry duties is from September 1915, when the RE 
Directorate of Works in France asked for a detachment of lumbermen to work in local 
forests. This was made up from 101 Squadron at the Canadian Remount Depot in 
France, and eventually three such units were created. When the Remount Depot was 
disbanded in April 1916 it was these three detachments, left with no parent unit, which 
became No.1 Canadian Forestry Company.30 At this time there were also several 
adhoc forestry companies drawn from infantry battalions working for their parent 
divisions, as opposed to the Directorate of Works.31 The first mention of a specific 
forestry unit in the History of the Great War Based on Official Documents comes in 
the 1916 Appendices, with reference to the closing before an advance of ‘sp cial’ RE 
                                                 
30 Broznitsky, Russians in the CEF, n.p. 
31 Ibid. 
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establishments, including sawmills, and it seems clear that such units simply grew out 
of urgent necessity.32 
The initial realisation of the benefits of a WFS, as with women’s roles in other 
vital areas, were not so naturally accepted or acted upon and some struggles and 
passing of time were required before advances in agricultural roles allowed to women 
resulted in the WFS. The ‘total wars’ of the twentieth century led to significant 
changes in gender roles, the clearest example of recognition of such from the First 
World War being the extension of the franchise in 1918 to include some women for 
the first time, partly due to women’s wartime efforts and arguably as the war provided 
a convenient reason to do so given the pre-war suffragette movements. Women were 
no longer so clearly viewed in terms of the domesticated ideal of previous periods.33 
As with the overall manpower question, there has been much written on the changing 
roles of women during and after the war. The themes addressed centre on what these 
changes were, how they were received, potential adverse moral effects on women, to 
what extent new roles lasted as soldiers returned, to what extent women were happy 
to return to more home-based work and what the long-term effects on society were.34
The historiography largely focuses on industrial roles, to a slightly lesser extent to 
roles in agriculture, and occasionally to increases in numbers in transport services and 
                                                 
32 I went through any engineering work in all of them, no mention of timber matters until closing of  
Sawmills before an advance in the Appendix VIII of the 1916 volumes, p. 98. For small selection of  
examples of other RE/ASC work and establishments see, History of the Great War Based on Official  
Documents, 1914, vol.1, pp. 417, 427; History of the Great War Based on Official Documents, 1914,  
vol.2, pp. 7, 161, 473-488; History of the Great War Based on Official Documents, 1916, vol.1,  
pp. v, 65, 66; History of the Great War Based on Official Documents, 1916, vol.2, pp. 541, 575;  
Colonel G.H. Addison, The Work of the Royal Engineers in the European War, 1914-1919: The  
Organization and Expansion of the Corps, 1914-18 (Chatham: Institution of Royal Engineers, 1921),  
passim; Pritchard, History of the Corps of Royal Engineers, pp. 174-5.   
33 Noakes, Women in the British Army, passim, for instance see pp. 1-19, 63. 
34 For examples, History of the Great War Based on Official Documents, 1916, vol.1, p. 154; History 
of the Great War Based on Official Documents, 1917, vol.1, p. 17; Beckett, The First World War: 
Essential Guide to Sources, pp. 203-4; Noakes, Women in the British Army, pp. 15-16. 
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clerical roles.35 Surprisingly, however, given the very manly perceptions of forestry 
work, Monty Python’s version excepted, there is relatively little on the WFS.36  
Women struggled to be accepted in new roles, especially more militaristic ones 
behind the fronts, even when their labour was in dire need, at times many struggling 
to be allowed to ‘do their bit’. Much early war work, even with lots of offers for help 
in other roles, was restricted to ‘traditional feminine spheres of activity’.37 However, 
women increasingly provided vital work in many roles, especially into the second year 
of the war. This was well recognised by the end of the war and has been since.38 
Common contemporary debates included what acceptable roles were, how women 
should be employed, for instance whether directly under service regulations or 
attached through separate organisations, pay and responsibility levels, discipline, and 
whether volunteer recruitment or conscription was preferable. Women new to an 
industry were also often given a lower status. For instance 200 women were thought 
needed to replace 143 men in clerical and domestic work.39 
During the early stages of the war women’s contributions came mainly through 
numerous volunteer organisations.40 Early committees on women’s employment in 
agriculture investigated lightweight roles, such as vegetable preserving or jam making, 
                                                 
35 Cd.9164 Report of the Board Of Trade on the Increased Employment of Women, p. 16; Noakes, 
Women in the British Army, pp. 15-16, 45-6, 73, 75-77, 79-81. 
36 Ibid., passim; Moira Petty, 'They Came, they Sawed, they Played Conkers: Women's Timber Corps 
1942-1946', Saga Magazine, (November, 2012), pp. 40-45; Emma Vickers, 'The Forgotten Army of 
the Woods: The Women's Timber Corps during the Second World War', Agricultural History Review, 
59 (2011), pp.101-3, [Vickers gets most of her First World War info mation from ‘F18/230, C.W. 
Bird, ‘Supply and Control’’ which seems to be a copy of the same document I have used under 
BT/71/21 Bird, circa. 1922)]. 
37 Noakes, Women in the British Army, pp. 17, 46, 51. 
38 Ibid., passim, for instance see pp. 1-19, 63; Ministry of Reconstruction, Cd.9228: Final Report of 
the Civil War Workers’, Committee on Substitute Labour, (London: HMSO 1918), pp. 3-4; Beckett, 
The First World War: Essential Guide to Sources, p. 207; Dewey, British Agriculture, pp. 43, 45, 46, 
51, 55; Cd.9164 Report of the Board Of Trade on the Increased Employment of Women, pp. 3-6 for 
example of complicated nature of calculating exact figures. 
39 Noakes, Women in the British Army, pp. 64-71, 76-7, 80. 
40 Ibid., pp. 17, 46, 51. 
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with certainly no mentions of forestry.41 Yet as early as March 1915 women had 
started work in some roles in Scottish forests, cutting and preparing large quantities of 
hazel rods which the navy needed. The Arboricultural Society and the advisory 
committee of the National Relief Fund in Scotland also looked to see if women could 
be used in other forestry work.42 The first central signs of changes in attitudes towards 
female labour were seen in parliamentary debates in 1915, which were followed by 
the introduction of the National Registration Act under which the occupations of 
women between sixteen and sixty-five were to be recorded in August 1915, the same 
as for men. Nonetheless, this did not lead to placing many women in more vigorous 
roles, compared with the numbers wanting such work.43 As a sign of the early lack of 
central control and direction in the use of women in the war effort it has even been 
argued that these volunteer organisations were one of the factors that led to some 
50,000 women, who had undertaken pre-war paid work, becoming unemployed by 
March 1915, especially in textiles.44  
At the beginning of 1916 voluntary organisations were still trying to break down 
anti-feminine bias and spread recruitment.45 In agriculture the initial response was 
disappointing, so in February 1916, in a joint Boards of Agriculture and Board of 
Trade initiative, Women’s County War Agricultural Committees were formed to carry 
out systematic recruitment work. Successes were dependent on local energy and 
initiative, which was variable, as the Board of Agriculture and Fisheries had no powers 
of compulsion over them once established.46 At the time that male conscription began 
                                                 
41 Central Committee on Women’s Employment, Cd 7848, Interim Report, 1915, pp.9-42. 
42 Scottish Advisory Committee on the Administration of the National Relief Fund in Scotland, 
Cd.8129, Report up to 31 March 1915, pp. 9, 10. 
43 Noakes, Women in the British Army, pp. 52-59. 
44 Ibid, p. 41. 
45 Dewey, British Agriculture, p. 55; Cd.9164 Report of the Board Of Trade on the Increased 
Employment of Women, passim. 
46 Ibid., p.13; Dewey, British Agriculture, p. 52. 
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in March 1916, debates over the use of women were changing, some calling for 
legislation to force women into war work. Official bodies such as the War Office, 
which had refused female labour early in the war, were now also welcoming it and the 
Women’s Services Committee urged organising more female labour in non-combat 
positions wherever possible.47 Within this context it was the Women’s County War 
Agricultural Committees, Board of Agriculture and Fisheries and Board of Trade who, 
as will be detailed below, pushed for the WFS, as a sub-section of the Women’s 
National Land Army, and this was officially established on 1 August 1917.   
However, even with the very gradual inclusion of women in the forestry effort 
and a handful of Royal Engineer Forestry Companies growing from absolute necessity 
near the front, it was Canada that would have to provide the bulk of the manpower 
required to obtain the necessary quantities of wood and timber. As shown in the pre-
war forestry section in the introduction to this thesis, Canada was greatly superior to 
the motherland in terms of lumber producing skills and resources, and was therefore 
the natural choice to turn to in order to contribute the majority of resources needed in 
response to the continued and growing requests for lumbermen and sawmills.48 
Although some Royal Engineer Forestry Companies and Canadian Forestry 
Companies were already at work close behind the Western Front, it was not until the 
end of 1915 that those in Britain, such as the Home Grown Timber Committee who 
suffered from a lack of necessary labour, especially skilled, were thinking of the pool 
of trained lumbermen in Canada. The Home Grown Timber Committee approached 
the Director of Forestry in Ottawa with a view to obtaining men to work in the UK, 
along the same lines as those who had been employed to work in the UK munitions 
                                                 
47 Noakes, Women in the British Army, pp. 61-64, for instance Noakes uses TNA, War Office162/30 
Sir George Newman: Report of the Women’s Services Committee, 14 December 1916, p. 6
48 Hill, 'The Canadian Forestry Corps', pp. 300-1. 
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industries. However, it was decided that it would be better to raise a military unit, 
rather than employ civilians, to exploit British home grown timber and this meant 
official communications.49  
Therefore in January 1916 relevant communications between the British and 
Canadian Governments began.50 It was, however, an urgent telegram, sent by the 
Colonial Secretary to the Governor-General of Canada on the 15 February 1916 that 
asked if the ‘Canadian Government would assist in the production of timber for war 
purposes’, as due to lack of shipping space sufficient Canadian timber could not be 
imported.51  Furthermore, the main difficulty in utilising UK forests was finding 
sufficient skilled forest workers, at least 1,500 of whom were therefore needed very 
urgently, preferably as a ‘Battalion of Lumbermen…formed of specially enlisted 
men’.52 Hill states that the ‘potential’ for an overseas body of Canadian lumbermen 
had been suggested prior to this by ‘the well-known Canadian lumberman Alexander 
McDougall’ who would become CO of the CFC, but that this idea was not particularly 
well-received by the Imperial War Commission at the time.53 Unfortunately, Hill does 
not state when or how this idea was put forward, and no evidence of it has been found, 
although it is clear, as he also points out, that it was only when the shipping situation 
worsened that this telegram was sent.54  As will be seen below in exploring the rapid 
growth of the CFC, the telegrams continued requesting more and more men for 
forestry.55  
                                                 
49 Bird and Davies, The Canadian Forestry Corps, p. 6.  
50 Telegram Perley to Borden 11 January 1916, as stated in Nicholson, Canadian Expeditionary 
Force, p. 499. 
51 Hill, 'The Canadian Forestry Corps', Appendix 2, p. 300. 
52 Bird and Davies, The Canadian Forestry Corps, pp. 5-7; Nicholson, Canadian Expeditionary 
Force, p. 499.  
53 Hill , 'The Canadian Forestry Corps', Appendix 2, p. 300. 
54 Ibid. 
55 Telegram 6 March 1916, Colonial Secretary to Governor-General of Canada, as quoted in Bird and 
Davies, The Canadian Forestry Corps, p.5. 
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Unlike Canada, Newfoundland was not initially invited to contribute forestry 
expertise by the British Government. The 2 March 1917 War Cabinet was attended by 
high level representatives of many of the larger Dominions and Colonies as well as 
high level British politicians and staff officers. Sir Edward Morris, the Premier of 
Newfoundland, reported that a director of the Anglo-Newfoundland Development 
Company, Mr Beeton, had suggested that the 1,500 ‘mostly’ skilled timbermen 
working for that company in Newfoundland could be quickly re-stationed in British 
forests.56 This offer of a non-combatant military Forestry Corps, along similar lines of 
employment and organisation to the CFC, was gratefully accepted. Negotiations were 
therefore officially opened by a telegram from the Colonial Office to the Governor of 
Newfoundland on 2 April 1917.57 
Finally, the Massachusetts Committee on Public Safety, formed in 1917 in 
anticipation of the United States’ involvement in the war which it officially entered on 
6 April 1917, was ultimately responsible for the establishment of the New England 
Sawmill Units.58 Therefore a brief history of that massive organisation here provides 
                                                 
56 TNA/CAB/23/2, Minutes of a Meeting of the War Cabinet (no.85), 2 March 1917, point 12; The 
Anglo-Newfoundland Development Company was formed to establish a paper-mill in Newfoundland 
when Alfred Harmsworth (Baron Northcliffe) felt he needed an alternative paper source for his 
family's newspaper and publishing businesses, due to instabilities in Europe. Harold Harmsworth 
(Lord Rothermere) and Mayson Beeton carried out investigations and felt Grand Falls had great 
potential, including access to lumber the potential for hydroelectricity and access to a deep-water port. 
In January 1905, the Harmsworths formed the Anglo-Newfoundland Developm nt Company. The 
mill was constructed and opened in 1909, another one under the Reed Company opening in 1912 at 
Bishop’s Falls. This is clearly why there were so many lumbermen and companies in the Grand Falls 
and Bishops Falls area of Newfoundland, and why the Harmsworths and Beeton could call on so 
many. See: James Hiller, ‘The Origins of the Pulp and Paper Industry in Newfoundland’, Acadiensis: 
Journal of the History of the Atlantic Region, Vol.XI, No.2 (Spring 1982), pp. 50-58, 60, 62-6.   
57 TNA/CAB/23/2, Minutes of a Meeting of the War Cabinet (no.85), 2 March 1917, point 12; 
TNA/BT/71/1/13676, Telegram colonial Office to Governor of Newfoundland, 2 April 1917, letter 
Directorate of Timber Supplies (War Office) to Under Secretary of State colonial Office, 19 April 
1917, Telegram Governor of Newfoundland to the Secretary of State for the colonies, 15 April 1917, 
memo Directorate of Timber Supplies (War Office) to Adjutant General 25 May 1917, letter 
Controller Timber Supplies (Board of Trade) [Board of Trade having just taken over from War 
Office], to Adjutant General 1 June 1917.  
58 For an extensive history of the Committee and its activities, including a chapter on ‘Committee on 
New England Sawmill Units’, see George Hinckley Lyman, The Story of the Massachusetts 
Committee on Public Safety, February 10, 1917 - November 21, 1918 (Boston, Wright and Potter 
Printing Co. State Printers, 1919), passim. 
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some context, and also interesting comparisons with the efforts of British HLOs 
related to the forestry effort explored in chapters 2 and 3. On 9 February 1917, 
Governor Samuel McCall named one hundred citizens from the state to serve on the 
Central/General Committee, with James Storrow appointed as chairman. McCall, 
recognising that US involvement in the war was at least ‘possible’, hoped this would 
help prepare the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, and potentially the wider country, 
through its plans and if it came to it, which it did, its actions.59 Central aims included 
securing and marshalling adequate supplies, equipment and resources for the State’s 
civilians and important bodies, especially its military organizations.60  
To achieve this, their initial actions were similar to those described earlier in this 
work. They established or included HLOs and subcommittees, gave them 
responsibility, and where possible substantial powers to coordinate specific important 
areas, such as transport, agriculture or labour. Most of these committees then began 
by surveying the State’s existing stocks and natural resources.61 To maximise efficacy, 
as also seen in the British Government’s efforts, such centralised overarching 
organisations required an increasing network of subcommittees a  different local levels 
and with interconnected facets.62 
                                                 
59 Brenda Howitson and Abigail Cramer, ‘Historical Note’ in Guide to Ms. coll. 106 - Massachusetts 
Committee on Public Safety Records (State Library of Massachusetts, Special Collections [SLMSC] 
Department, Prepared July 1998, updated August 2012), p. 2; SLMSC, Records of the Massachusetts 
Committee on Public Safety February 10 1917 to Novemb r 20 1918, Box 1, Meeting of February 14, 
1917, and others.  
60 SLMSC, Records of the Massachusetts Committee on Public Safety…Report of Executive 
Committee, November 1, 1917 (Boston), p. 3. 
61 Ibid., p. 3; SLMSC, Records of the Massachusetts Committee on Public Safety…February 10 1917 
to November 20 1918, Box 1, ‘First Meeting of Provisional Committee, Meeting of  February 
10.1917’ and notes from very frequent meetings in February 1917, and throughout rest of war (Boxes 
1 & 2); Howitson and Cramer, ‘Historical Note’, p. 2. 
62 Ibid.; SLMSC Records of the Massachusetts Committee on Public Safety…February 10 1917 to 
November  20 1918, Boxes 1&2, for instance see folder 14, ‘Correspondence & Reports of & to 
Committee Feb 20 1917 to April 30 1917’, includes Meeting of April 16, 1917 and letter to the State 
Council of Defense for California (date 30 April 1917) giving the reasons behind the formation, 
structure, actions, achievements of the Massachusetts Committee on Public Safety up to that point, 
pp. 1-10; SLMSC, Records of the Massachusetts Committee on Public Safety, Report of Executive 
Committee, November 1, 1917 (Boston), passim.  
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The idea of such a ‘State’ council looking into their wartime footings was one that 
did not appear to meet with much approval or support from the National Council of 
Defense until after war had been declared. They then quickly realised ‘that better 
results would be obtained if the bulk of the preparedness work were done by and 
through such committees’.63 Committees utilised methods similar to those seen in 
relation to the British forestry effort, namely regulation of exports, distribution 
systems, controlling speculation and profiteering, prevention of waste, and education 
work.64 Just ten days after the USA’s entry into the war, the Massachusetts Committee 
on Public Safety was advised of the Allies’ great need for lumbermen. In the Executive 
Committee meeting of 16 April 1917, Colonel William Gaston, Chairman of the 
Finance Committee, raised a private telegram he had received from Lieutenant-
Colonel Vernon Wiley, of Army Contracts in London. It suggested he raise a battalion 
of New England lumbermen for immediate service in Europe because ‘Timber for 
forces in France urgently calls for skilled lumbermen’.65 Although Wiley’s suggestion 
to Gaston was a private one, Gaston himself recognised the situation ws ‘critical’, 
and once he saw how the Massachusetts Committee on Public Safety were prepared 
to act very quickly on the idea he was happy that they officially pass it on to the 
relevant British authorities, at that time the Secretary of State for War and Director of 
Timber Supplies at the War Office, as the ‘very desirable initiative should appear 
yours’.66 
                                                 
63 Ibid. 
64 Howitson and Cramer, ‘Historical Note’, p.2; SLMSC Records of the Massachusetts Committee on 
Public Safety, February 10 1917 to November 20 1918, Boxes 3&4 solely devoted to work of the 
Food Administration Committee. 
65 TNA/BT 71/2/13713, telegram Colonel Wiley, Army Contracts Department Lo don, to Gaston, n.d 
(c.15 April 1917); SLMSC, Records of the Massachusetts Committee on Public Safety, especially 
‘Meeting of April 16, 1917’ and ‘Meeting of Feb 28, 1917’, p. 61, point no. 6.  
66 TNA/BT 71/2/13713, for instance telegram from Colonel Wiley, Army Contracts Department in 
London, to Gaston on 20 April 1917. 
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Therefore, it can be seen that the initial ideas to raise specialist forestry units came 
from various sources within existing British, Newfoundland and American military or 
governmental bodies. It will now be shown that whilst this led to different HLOs 
taking responsibility for their establishments, growth and early administration, their 
management became centralised under the main military and government forestry 
HLOs after they began and then expanded their operations.  
The following section therefore gives details of important events and timings in 
regards to the raising of each of the units, to illustrate how this was carried out, as well 
as differences and similarities between them. There are difficulties in establishing 
exact numbers of membership of some of the units, as with estimates of their overall 
production, but figures quoted are used to give an idea of their growth over time. 
Furthermore, summaries at the end of each unit highlight what can be deduced from 
these figures and a table at the end of the section allows a close overall comparison of 
the statistics. Principally, the CFC was undoubtedly the main forestry unit in terms of 
numbers employed and production, but the Royal Engineer Forestry Companies, 
WFS, Newfoundland Forestry Corps and New England Sawmill Units also each made 
important contributions to the overall effort. Furthermore, the establishment and 
growth of each unit, whilst different in many ways, came from the increasing 
recognition of the urgent importance of this resource, and a realisation that an 
untapped supply of men or women existed, of experienced experts and those willing 
to learn and work hard.        
The RE Directorate of Works formed a Forestry Branch in the autumn of 1915 
and a small unit providing firewood, wiring picket posts and light timber joined the 8th 
RE Labour Battalion who had been transferred to the lines of communication to carry 
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out road-making and forestry operations.67 There were no official Royal Engineer 
Forestry Companies listed as existing on 1 August 1916, yet by early summer 1916, 
as Canadian lumbermen started to arrive in Britain, there were five basic and 
underequipped RE operations behind the lines, under the control of the RE Directorate 
of Works.68 In August 1917 all Royal Engineer Forestry Companies came from 
Regular or Special Reserve Units, none from Territorial ones, although the 1918 
figures were combined.69 The establishment of a Royal Engineer Forestry Company 
was sanctioned on 11 May 1917, although the majority were already at work in France 
by then, and this equalled four officers and 110 other ranks.70 By the summer of 1918 
there were eleven Royal Engineer Forestry Companies working in France and these 
carried on until the end of the war.71 
Few details have yet been located giving the amounts of timber felled or 
operations worked on solely by women. As well as general problems over labour 
figures discussed above, issues of proving exact number of women in the forestry 
effort are not helped by the fact that those in the WFS were not always covered 
separately by either Board of Trade reports, or in Boards of Agriculture figures as they 
were not employed by farmers.72 However, what can be seen is that arguments within 
the wider historiography of their taking on positions that they were not associated with 
                                                 
67 Lieutenant colonel Edward De Santis, ‘Royal Engineer Labour Battalions’, Reubique, n.d, pp. 1-2 
<http://www.reubique.com/labourbt.htm> [accessed 16 February 2012], taken from The Work of the 
Royal Engineers in the European War, 1914-1919. Work Under the Director of Works (France) (The 
Institution of Royal Engineers, Chatham, 1926), p. 185. 
68 Pritchard, History of the Corps of Royal Engineers, pp. 165-6, 559; Bird and Davies, The Canadian 
Forestry Corps, pp. 10, 34; TNA/BT/71/21, Bird, pp. 3, 30, 39; Hodicq, Exploitation of Timber by the 
British Army in Northern France, n.p; Maclean, Farming and Forestry on the Western Front, p. 97. 
69 Addison, The Work of the Royal Engineers, pp. 61-71, especially 62, 64-5, 68-69; Pritchard, 
History of the Corps of Royal Engineers, pp. 38-42. 
70 TNA/CAB/21/80, Report by Lovat to Curzon, 15 May 1917, p. 2; Addison, The Work of the Royal 
Engineers, pp. 23-4. 
71 Ibid., pp. 61-71, especially 62, 64-5, 68-69; Pritchard, History of the Corps of Royal Engineers, pp. 
38-42. 
72 Cd.9164 Report of the Board Of Trade on the Increased Employment of Women, p. 14. 
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before the war are added to by forestry. No evidence links women with work such as 
measuring and felling in the pre-war years, but these were roles which a small number 
would take on from the summer of 1917.  
Attempts were made during and just after the war to illustrate the scale, 
effectiveness and future prospects in terms of female employment. However, many 
were classed by the business of their employer, rather than their exact role. For 
instance a clerical role in a timber merchant might be categorised under headings such 
as ‘forestry’, ‘sales’ or ‘agriculture’ depending on the particular classifications within 
various censuses, returns or surveys. Furthermore, ‘Substitute Labour’ figures during 
the war could also include older men who had returned to work alongside women, and 
at times those women ‘registered’ did not necessarily equate to those actually 
working.73 Many women in the furniture industry were known to be making 
ammunition boxes, but they would appear under ‘Furniture’ or ‘Wood Trades’ in 
industrial returns.74 Increases in female employment in the ‘Wood Trades’ were 
therefore more to do with increases in areas such as ammunition box and aircraft 
production than forestry.75  
As seen above, within the overall questions about obtaining and directing 
manpower, increased female roles are often prominent. The Women’s County War 
Agricultural Committees focused on drawing up registers of women willing to work 
in agriculture, training schemes, and contacting farmers and Labour Exchanges to 
encourage their use.76 There were government inducements by the spring of 1916 
including cheap clothing supplies, armlets to show your contribution to the war effort 
                                                 
73 Ibid., passim (Just for England, Wales and Scotland as Irish figures not the available); Cd.9228: 
Final Report of the Civil War Workers’, Committee on Substitute Labour, pp. 3-4; Dewey, British 
Agriculture, pp. 54, 55. 
74 Cd.9164 Report of the Board Of Trade on the Increased Employment of Women, p. 8. 
75 Ibid., p.6. 
76 Dewey, British Agriculture, pp. 52-3. 
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and eventually certificates signed by the Presidents of the Boards of Agriculture and 
Trade, stating that ‘women working on the land contributed as much to the war effort 
as did the soldiers or sailors’.77 However, more centralisation and systematic 
recruitment were still required and in March 1917 the more organised Women’s 
National Land Army was established.78  
Wartime female agricultural workers were largely employed in lighter work such 
as dairy work or gardening, but they were frequently reported to be working in more 
‘manual’ roles such as ploughing.79 Such heavier types of work were not believed to 
have been undertaken in large amounts, especially by the Women’s National Land 
Army, but when it was it was ‘highly commended by farmers’.80  However, 
agricultural work was often not popular amongst women and recruiting was slow, for 
several reasons.81 It might have seemed an appealing and healthy choice, especially 
when compared with factories, but work in the countryside was hard for anyone not 
accustomed to it. Other occupations, especially munitions, were also in high demand 
and provided better pay and shorter hours.82 Nonetheless, the Women’s National Land 
Army, naturally associated with forestry type roles, grew from earlier voluntary 
organisations, and the Women’s County War Agricultural Committees aimed to 
provide more systematic and rigorous recruitment, definite terms of employment and 
better training. The aim was to establish a permanent, skilled and mobile force for both 
agricultural and forestry work.83 Women recruited to the Women’s National Land 
                                                 
77 Ibid., p. 53. 
78 Cd.9164 Report of the Board Of Trade on the Increased Employment of Women, p. 13; Noakes, 
Women in the British Army, pp. 17, 46, 51, 68. 
79 Ibid., passim, for instance see p. 81; Dewey, 'The New Warfare’, pp. 75-6; Dewey, British 
Agriculture, p. 109; Cd.9164 Report of the Board Of Trade on the Increased Employment of Women, 
p. 14. 
80 Ibid. 
81 Noakes, Women in the British Army, pp. 52-59, 64, 172 fns 20 & 21. 
82 Dewey, British Agriculture, pp. 50, 51, 55; Cd.9164 Report of the Board Of Trade on the Increased 
Employment of Women, p. 13. 
83 Ibid. 
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Army through the Boards of Agriculture were ‘drafted into one of three services’, to 
the War Office Forage Section, to farms where they were employed by farmers but 
remained under Boards of Agriculture control, or to the ‘Timber Cutting Section’ 
under the Board of Trade.84 It was from March 1917 therefore that the Board of Trade 
officially administered women carrying out forestry work, but still coming under the 
umbrella of the Women’s National Land Army.85 Recruitment into forestry and 
timber-cutting roles became more active in the summer of 1917 as the Board of Trade 
confirmed that there was both a high demand for, and scarcity of, timber workers in 
the UK. They were therefore ‘experimentally’ training women in the relatively light 
roles of timber measurers, pit-wood or top cutters and clerks.86 
The WFS was officially formed on 1 August 1917 under the Department for 
National Service, but consisted of just twenty-five measurers and twenty timber 
cutters.87 Experienced men over military age who came forward were also being 
utilised alongside them in ‘work of a more arduous nature for which women are 
unfitted’.88 However, the push to recruit female forest workers was put forward as one 
of the reasons for a slight decrease in casual female workers in agriculture in the 
summer of 1917, suggesting the WFS was recruiting more, although it could also be 
due to better organised male seasonal labourers such as soldiers still in the UK, POWs 
and schoolboys during holidays.89  
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Included in agricultural figures were somewhere between 16,000 and 28,000 
members of the Women’s National Land Army by November 1918. They had been 
recruited from various classes and occupations and were working mainly on farms, 
but ‘a small cohort’ had been directed to forestry as part of the WFS.90 Based on the 
figures available, however, it can be argued that approximately 3,000 women carried 
out some form of forestry work for the WFS, either officially or non-registered, from 
August 1917 to the end of the war.91   
As stated above, females were also increasingly employed in the ‘Wood Trades’. 
These went from 44,000 in July 1914 to 78,000 by April 1918.92 Within these figures 
in 1914 just 1,500 were shown as employed in ‘sawmilling’, and these were likely to 
have been clerical roles. However, this figure had grown to 8,000 by April 1918 and 
included approximately 5,100 who had taken over roles previously held by males, 
suggesting women were likely to be carrying out manual roles in the sawmills of 
private firms.93 These 5,100 women, probably converting wood to timber, can 
therefore be considered to have aided the 3,000 working under the WFS, giving a 
reasonably sized female contribution to the overall forestry effort. They might not have 
matched the CFC for numbers employed or production, yet the above shows that the 
3,000 of the WFS, and up to 5,100 other females in related roles, would clearly have 
helped to keep timber companies staffed as well as surveying, felling and converting 
a considerable amount of timber. They also provide an illustration of how women 
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could successfully take over traditionally very male roles.94  The WFS was raised by 
HLOs who pressed for females to be allowed to contribute to the war effort, and saw 
that there was a dire need for skilled and unskilled female workers in forestry, as well 
as in the agricultural work with which they are more often associated.  
However, the bulk of the wood produced from a single source for the British 
Empire’s war effort came from the CFC, as the original small Canadian forestry units 
in Europe would become. Being large in land area but small in population Canada had, 
since confederation in 1867, concentrated on ‘subduing nature and developing the 
country’.95 Given the lumber trade that therefore existed in the forests of Canada it 
made sense that it was this Dominion to which the UK turned to solve this vital supply 
need.96  
There was little question that Canada would help the Mother Country at the 
outbreak of war, although she had the constitutional right to decide what form her 
participation would take.97 Furthermore, the largely Anglo-Saxon nature of Canadian 
society, except in Quebec, did not automatically mean all would happily support the 
war effort.98 In the decades before 1914 there had been tensions between nationalism 
and imperialism in Canada, and the Prime Minister, Sir Robert Borden, and his cabinet 
were initially ‘decidedly less’ than enthusiastic for war.99 Also, her fighting forces 
were generally ‘ill-prepared’ for the war.100 The Militia included a small Corps of 
Engineers and Signals, but nothing approaching a separate forestry unit as of July 
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1914.101 Furthermore, in 1913 stocks of engineering motor vehicles and horse-drawn 
wagons were ‘almost entirely lacking’, and this situation would prove extremely 
difficult to rectify once war had begun as much of this equipment was historically 
purchased from Britain, and the British War Office now had a priority claim on it.102  
There had been changes in the political and military command and control of the 
Dominion’s armed forces in the decades before the war, and the Department for, and 
Ministers of, the Militia had a huge amount of power.103 The Minister of Militia from 
1911 to November 1916, when he was forced to tender his resignation, was the 
characterful ‘enthusiastic champion of Imperial defence’, Colonel (later Honorary 
Lieutenant–General) Sir Sam Hughes.104 Hughes can be seen as dynamic, but the 
overwhelming impression from the historiography is much less favourable. Hughes 
believed Canadian men had ‘the innate skills of war bred into them’, being able to 
‘ride like cowboys and shoot like hunters’, even though most were town or city 
dwellers, rather than frontiersmen.105 He appears inflexible, power-hungry, unwilling 
to delegate, a poor administrator, self-opinionated and unwilling to listen, although 
occasionally also easily misguided and blind to overwhelming evidence.106 Hughes 
became the Canadian equivalent of the Army Council in one man and, like Kitchener 
in the UK, abandoned pre-war mobilisation plans for much of the CEF, often leading 
to confusion and extra workload. However, non-infantry arms and services, as the CFC 
would become, followed the basis of existing mobilisation plans more closely, which 
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must have helped.107 The CFC was also a much smaller force, formed after the lessons 
of eighteen months of mobilisation had been learned. They were raised and shipped in 
relatively small sections, and were a specialist body whose practices were based on 
civilian expert knowledge and experiences. Moreover, it will be seen that given the 
urgency and increasing scale of requests from London, logical and practical solutions 
were used by the Canadian HLOs responsible.  
It should first be noted here that one particularly forestry-specific element in 
recruitment that had to be considered by these organisers was that of the season of the 
year. Similarly to how there were peaks and troughs in recruitment during the 
perceived ‘rush to the colours’ in 1914, due to factors such as the individual’s need to 
put family and professional affairs in order, the UK and Canadian Governments 
recognised in 1916 and 1917 that, in recruiting professional lumbermen, the time of 
year would be important. These men were, after all, harvesting a natural resource.108 
In the initial telegram of 15 February 1916 to the Governor-General of Canada 
requesting a battalion of lumbermen, as recorded earlier, the UK Government had 
noted that although at that time the lumber season would be in progress in the forests 
of North America they felt ‘sure that men would enlist even at sacrifice of present 
employment if the reason of the appeal were made known to them’.109 However, it 
was the following year, in March 1917, as more and more lumbermen were required, 
that the Minister of Overseas Military Forces of Canada, Sir George H Perley, had to 
remind Lord Derby, then Secretary of State for War and in overall charge of solving 
manpower issues for the war effort, that only after the middle of April would large 
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numbers of lumbermen be coming out of the Canadian forests, potentially making it 
possible to meet the latest request for 2,000, and possibly more.110    
Nevertheless, a follow up to the initial British request, a telegram on 29 February 
1916, was met by the Canadian Department of Militia and Defence confirming it had 
authorised the establishment of the 224th Canadian Forestry Battalion four days 
earlier, and that these men would be provided as soon as possible. 111 It was suggested 
by the British that the men should be enlisted into the CEF and sent to Europe in small 
companies ‘under competent supervision’, although by 6 March the need was so 
desperate that it was asked if lumbermen could be sent in batches of fifty, rather than 
waiting for whole units to be formed.112  
Indeed, a small advance party of two subalterns and fifteen men had arrived in 
England by 17 March, yet there are confusing accounts of exactly when the first 
Canadian lumbermen arrived or started work. Some suggest that operations, which 
must have been small scale, had started at the Virginia Water Camp in Surrey by 12 
April, with detachments gradually being sent elsewhere in England and Scotland.113 
By mid-April 1916 some 1,600 men had been recruited ‘from all parts of the 
Dominion’, and $250,000 worth of machinery, including mills and lorries, had been 
bought, but these were waiting in Quebec.114 The first major draft of 400 of all ranks, 
under Lieutenant-Colonel McDougall, arrived in England on the 28 April, the first 
timber then being produced by the Canadians in Britain on 13 May 1916, at Great 
Windsor Park, which does include Virginia Water. The second and third drafts arrived 
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by the end of May, after which time 1,600 Canadian lumbermen were working in 
Britain.115 Such swift recruitment, equipping, shipping and beginning of operations 
can only suggest clear and efficient high level management by those tasked by the 
Canadian Government with fulfilling the British request, including McDougall. 
Once the British saw the benefits of the first lumber units they naturally wanted 
to increase their numbers.  Additional requests were therefore cabled, even before the 
second and third drafts had arrived, requesting an additional 2,000 lumbermen and 
necessary plant.116 The Canadians again agreed, initially thinking of sending them in 
small units due to the urgency, but by June two new forestry battalions, the 238th and 
242nd,  were formed with 1,000 men in each decided upon as a structure. The 238th 
arrived in England in September 1916.117 
It was around this time that McDougall and others were suggesting taking on 
additional work in France, as seen in chapter 3. It was suggested that it would be 
worthwhile to form a further battalion, raised from French Canadians and equipped to 
work on pine forests, unlike the 242nd which was better equipped for beech woods. 
However, rather than a new battalion of French Canadians being raised, the 230th, 
formed as an infantry battalion from French Canadians, was diverted to forestry in 
early November 1916.118 On the 6 November another telegram was sent from London 
asking for a further 2,000 men and suggesting that these should mainly be men ‘unfit 
for combatant service’.119 At the end of November the War Office asked if the 119th 
and 156th Battalions, then forming, could also be made available for forestry to make 
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up the 2,000 men requested.120 The fact that these battalions had been intended for 
other purposes, but were ‘converted’ to forestry units suggests, firstly, that the main 
need was for wood rather than fighting men at this time, and secondly that forestry 
units could be made up of non-experts, although with experienced men in important 
positions.  
However, requests for more did not stop. At the end of November 1916 the War 
Office asked that a further 5,000 lumbermen be recruited, and again that these be 
particularly French Canadians.121 Furthermore, it was not only new units that could be 
recruited as or diverted to forestry roles. On the 8 December a routine order from the 
General Officer Commanding Canadian troops in Great Britain permitted the transfer 
of officers with any type of experience in lumbering or managing men in the 
construction trades, and of NCOs and men with experience of any stages or processes 
within lumber felling, milling or transporting. CFC officers were sent around the 
various Canadian Bases in Britain and the men selected transferred to the CFC Base 
Depot.122 In March 1917, as it was being agreed by the Canadian Government that the 
5th Canadian Division could go to France, the subject was complicated by the ‘urgent 
demand for lumbermen to be taken out of the present strength of the Fifth Division’, 
and this required further discussions between Derby and Perley.123  
By the end of December 1916, just ten months after the initial British request, 
there were some 3,038 Canadians engaged in forestry work, 133 officers and 2,905 
other ranks in fourteen companies. The majority of these were still working in Britain, 
eleven companies as opposed to only three in France.124 Yet in the coming six to 
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twelve months this number would grow, and the balance would swing towards 
operations in France. By June 1917 the desired CFC establishment stood at ninety-six 
companies, a total of 17,000 men. Of these, forty companies, or 7,000 men, were 
intended to work in Britain and fifty-six, 10,000 men, in France. At this time 11,000 
were actually at work in Europe, 2,000 were waiting to be transported from Canada 
under previous arrangements, and it was hoped that another 2,500 could be enlisted 
there.125 Indeed, the shipping of skilled lumbermen from Canada to Europe as and 
when they could be recruited continued throughout the war.126 However, in June 1917 
the remaining 1,500 recruits were to be made up from men already enlisted in the CEF 
but transferring, or those who were unfit for front-line combatant service.127 For 
instance the 126th Company at Ampthill received an Adjutant in June 1917 and a Mill 
Officer in September, both having been wounded at Vimy Ridge in the spring.128 
There are debates over the exact size that the CFC ended up.  Bird and Davies in 
1919 stated that the establishment of the CFC was set at 17,000, which it achieved by 
June 1917, and retained until the armistice.129 However, R. Hill in 1920 stated that by 
June 1917 there were 18,000 Canadian men working for the CFC.130 Swettenham put 
the figure at 22,000 in November 1918, whilst others suggested as high as 24,000, not 
including attached labour, by the end of the war.131 By the armistice some official 
sources said 12,127 Canadians, in fifty-six Companies were working in France and 
9,967 in ‘England’, giving a total of 22,094 CFC, with an additional 9,353 attached 
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labourers giving 31,447.132 There are also some disagreements with regards to the split 
between those working in Britain and France by the end of the war. In Britain it seems 
there were somewhere between nearly 10,000 and 12,000 men, whilst in France 
somewhere in the region of 12,000, although it seems likely both of these sets include 
some of the attached transport or labour personnel.133 
Nonetheless, this work has taken the most commonly quoted and conservative 
figures of sixty companies in France and forty-one in Britain, encompassing 17,000 
men; to which should be added approximately 16,000 ‘attached’ personnel at peak 
times including members of the Army Service Corps, medical personnel, transport 
troops, labour units and POWs. At the start of 1917 a Canadian Corps division 
included approximately 19,000 men, given a CFC size of 17,000 it would equate to 
just under the size of one Canadian Corps division. 134 The desired establishment of 
17,000 was certainly reached, and almost certainly exceeded at times, to what degree 
depending on who was included.  
This 17,000 was still a relatively small unit. The CEF, including the Canadian 
Corps, Cavalry Brigade, railway troops and the CFC, stood at just under 150,000 in 
July 1918.135 Yet, as argued throughout, these relatively few in the CFC made a vital 
contribution to the overall continuation of the war because of the specialist forestry 
roles they undertook.136 A small but vital and unprecedented force had been 
established, recruited, equipped and put to work in both Britain and France extremely 
                                                 
132 ‘Report of the Overseas Military Forces of Canada’, pp. 369-70 as quoted in Nicholson, Canadian 
Expeditionary Force, pp. 499-500. 
133 Ibid.; Swettenham, Canada and the First World War, p. 123.  
134 No Author, ‘Canadian Forestry Corps’, n.p; Bird and Davies, The Canadian Forestry Corps, p. 9; 
National Film Board of Canada, Images of a Forgotten War; Cook, Shock Troops, p. 18.    
135 Ibid., pp. 17-18, 41, 403; Nicholson, Canadian Expeditionary Force, pp. 485-510, see pp. 499-500 
for CFC; Swettenham, To Seize the Victory, p. 237. 
136 Cook, At the Sharp End, p. 4; Swettenham, Canada and the First World War, p. 121. 
Page 288 of 386 
 
 
quickly, and were then rapidly expanded to meet growing needs. It was clearly a 
success story of organisation and high-level efforts. 
As the WFS is important within the historiography of the roles of women during 
the war effort, due to the male-only perceptions of timber work held by many, so the 
smaller Newfoundland Forestry Corps were important in terms of being a separate 
entity formed from within this fiercely imperial colony. Newfoundland had not joined 
the Canadian Confederation when it had formed in 1867, and it was therefore still a 
British colony in 1914.137 As did its fighting forces, its Forestry Corps maintained a 
separate identity from Canadian or other British units, and its 500 men converted over 
1,200 acres of Scottish woodland.138 Like the CFC, the Newfoundland Forestry Corps 
was to be organised as a military unit, but with some ‘special terms and conditions’. 
It would be a non-combatant force of skilled workmen, ineligible for the Royal 
Newfoundland Regiment or the Royal Naval Reserve, and raised solely to work in UK 
forests. No unmarried man of military age and fitness could be enlisted as ‘their place’ 
was seen as in the ‘fighting forces’.139 Similarly to Kitchener’s ‘Pals’ battalions and 
the Canadian approach, the promise of working alongside those you worked with at 
home, perhaps with the same foreman as NCO, was intended to assist recruitment. A 
foreman could be ranked as sergeant, or even as a commissioned officer. The 
companies making up the structure of the corps would also not be too widely dispersed 
from each other.140 
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Recruitment was undertaken by the Newfoundland Patriotic Association with 
enlistment for the duration, although men with skills that became especially required 
in Newfoundland could be released after six months. Physical and age requirements 
were ‘modified’ to allow most of those unfit for the Royal Newfoundland Regiment 
to join, and only elementary military drill was to be required. Poor standards in drill 
were not to be allowed to slow the despatch of companies once formed.141 Initial hopes 
were for a minimum of 1,500 Newfoundland Forestry Corps men, yet by April 1917 
the Governor of Newfoundland felt they could raise four companies each of a hundred 
‘expert woodmen’, with two additional ‘forestry’ companies of miners and 
railwaymen, if wanted. 142 However, the potential for enlisting other such engineering 
professionals into separate forestry specific units was not taken up.143 Newfoundland’s 
ministers then approved a decision by the Newfoundland Patriotic Association to raise 
five companies, each of one hundred timbermen, and to dispatch these by 15 May if 
transport could be supplied, and recruit more timbermen as required.144 Although 
some still hoped that not less than 1,500 would ultimately be raised, estimates of actual 
recruits fluctuated between 400 and 500, with dates of arrival between the beginning 
of June and end of August 1971.145 While there was some talk of cutting pit-wood in 
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Wales, Scottish woodlands were clearly the preferred location as it was felt they would 
most resemble a Newfoundlander’s natural working environment.146 
The five companies were quickly raised and the first ninety-nine men left 
Newfoundland on 19 May 1917. Operations began at Craigvinean in the first week of 
August 1917, and a second draft of 177 officers and men arrived at Dunkeld, with their 
CO Major Sullivan, in the last week of August.147 Additional numbers were then sent 
over in small parcels, such as forty-three foresters embarking on 3 October and 
nineteen on 6 February 1918.148   
Some 498 Newfoundland Forestry Corps personnel were enlisted in 
Newfoundland during the war, and another two were accepted in Britain, yet by the 
end of war Sullivan actually had just 450 men in Scotland, due to losses, repatriations 
and transfers.149 The Newfoundland Forestry Corps, like many other units, had also 
sought additional labour, such as German POWs, for some time.150 However, on 14 
November 1918 it was allocated fifty more from the Reserve Battalion of the Royal 
Newfoundland Regiment, then at Winchester, its orders to France having been 
                                                 
146 TNA/BT/71/1/13676, letter Assistant Director Timber Supplies (TS3) to C.G.Penney and Prof. 
H.A, Pritchard (district officers for the Directorate of Timber Supplies, War Office), 14 May 1917. 
147 Higgins (revised), Newfoundland and Labrador in the First World War, n.p; TNA/BT/71/1/13676, 
‘Report of logging operations at Craigvinean’, Lieut. Cole, Dunkeld, 11 August 1917, memo 
Directorate of Timber Supplies (War Office) to Adjutant-General 25 May 1917, letter Controller 
Timber Supplies (Board of Trade) to Adjutant-General 1 June 1917, memo Beeton to Murray 
(Controller Timber Supplies, Section 3), 5 June 1917, letter Controller Timber Supplies to Stirling 
Maxwell (Assistant Controller of Timber Supplies, Scotland) 8 August 1917, telegram Governor of 
Newfoundland to Secretary of State for the Colonies, 5 August 1917, and memo Beeton to Controller 
Timber Supplies 29 August 1917; The National Archives, ‘Keepers Gallery; Newfoundland’, c.2015 
<http://blog.nationalarchives.gov.uk/blog/keepers-gallery-newfoundland/> [accessed 27/2/18], n.p.   
148 Ibid., correspondence between Assistant Controller of Timber Supplies (Scotland) and 
Newfoundland Forestry Corps, 6 October 1917, 7 Feb 1918 and 14 June 1918. 
149 Ibid., letter Beeton (now Chief Administrative Officer Newfoundland Forestry Corps) to 
Controller Timber Supplies (Ball), 14 November 1918; Higgins (revised), Newfoundland and 
Labrador in the First World War, n.p. 
150 TNA/BT/71/1/13676, memos within the Timber Supply Department (Board of Trade) 21 & 22 
November 1918; letter Controller Timber Supplies to Assistant Controller of Timber Supplies 
(Scotland), 23 November 1918; letter Controller Timber Supplies to Beeton 23 November 1918, letter 
Assistant Controller of Timber Supplies (Scotland) to Controller Timber Supplies, 20 November 
1918.  
Page 291 of 386 
 
 
countermanded, to bring the Forestry Corps total back up to 500. However, Sullivan 
had wanted a total strength of 650 to complete work assigned before the end of summer 
1919. The Minister of Militia had given permission for up to three hundred to be 
transferred, further voluntary transfers also suiting men of the Royal Newfoundland 
Regiment who would prefer to be repatriated to Newfoundland during the spring.151 
However, these were waiting on higher level schemes of demobilisation to be 
finalised, and do not appear to have taken place.152 
When the war ended some 6,000 Newfoundlanders had proceeded overseas or 
were in training, and others had served in the navy or with British or Canadian units. 
The total of 550 trained foresters, or engineers, raised or transferred into the 
Newfoundland Forestry Corps therefore represent nine per cent of the c lony’s known 
wartime effort, a relatively high proportion.153 Furthermore, although a small number 
in comparison to the approximated 3,000 of the WFS or 17,000 of the CFC, the 
island’s foresters clearly made an important contribution to the forestry effort as well 
as confirming their status as a colony of Britain as opposed to being part of the 
Dominion of Canada. 
One area of skilled forestry labour that did not require precious empire manpower 
was the New England Sawmill Units. It will be seen that their very quick establishment 
once the USA had entered the war was due to the forethought of civil servants and 
then businessmen in Massachusetts, the Massachusetts Committee on Public Safety as 
                                                 
151 Ibid., letter Controller Timber Supplies to Assistant Controller of Timber Supplies (Scotland), 19 
November 1918. 
152 Ibid., letter Assistant Controller of Timber Supplies (Scotland) Stirling Maxwell, to Controller 
Timber Supplies (Sir James Ball), 25 November 1918 and letter Beeton to Con roller Timber 
Supplies, 14 November 1918. 
153 Ibid., memo (Directorate of Timber Supplies (War Office) to Adjutant General 25 May 1917, letter 
Controller Timber Supplies (Board of Trade) to Adjutant General 1 June 1917; letter Beeton to 
Controller Timber Supplies, 14 November 1918; Higgins (revised), Newfoundland and Labrador in 
the First World War, n.p.; TNA/CAB/23/2, Minutes of a Meeting of the War Cabinet (no.85), 2 
March 1917, point 12. 
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shown above. At the 16 April 1917 Executive Committee meeting of the 
Massachusetts Committee on Public Safety, at which Wiley’s telegram to Gaston was 
read, the Massachusetts State Forester, Mr Rane, was able to report that he estimated 
500 men could be divided into fifteen portable saw-mill units, to produce 
approximately 10,000 feet a day, ‘if not sawed to small dimensions’.154 James J. 
Phelan, a Boston Banker and ‘an outstanding figure in national and religious 
philanthropies’ who would become the driving force, personally obtaining funds and 
arranging assembly of the New England Sawmill Units, then informed the committee 
of the current labour conditions in the lumber business. 155 Lumbermen had been very 
scarce in New England since the beginning of the war, although he did not say why, 
yet he felt there would be no difficulty in recruiting two or three hundred men as this 
was the particular time of year ‘when men were coming out of the woods after the 
winter operations’.156 The Massachusetts Committee on Public Safety therefore 
backed the establishment of a Sawmills Subcommittee to investigate possibilities.157  
Many well-known New England lumbermen and State foresters would help in the 
efforts, and as well as Phelan the Sawmill Committee included private and State 
Government representatives. W.R. Brown, an important North American forester both 
before and following the First World War, Manager of the Berlin Mills Company and 
                                                 
154 SLMSC, Records of the Massachusetts Committee on Public Safety, Boxes 1& 2, especially 
meetings of February 28 1917 (p. 61, point no.6) and April 16 1917; BT 71/2/13713, telegram 
Storrow (Chairman Massachusetts Committee on Public Safety) to Colonel Wiley, Army Contracts 
Department in London, 17 April 1917. 
155  No Author, ‘James J. Phelan, Lay Trustee, Awarded Laetare Medal’ in The Notre Dame Alumnus 
(Indiana, The Alumni Association of the University of Notre Dame, April 1931), p. 263; Lyman, The 
Story of the Massachusetts Committee on Public Safety, p. 158; SLMSC, Records of the 
Massachusetts Committee on Public Safety, Boxes 1& 2, especially meetings of April 16 1917 and 
February 28, 1917, p. 61, point no. 6. 
156 SLMSC, Records of the Massachusetts Committee on Public Safety, meetings of 16 April and 18 
May 1917; TNA/BT/71/2/13713, telegrams Storrow to London 17 April 1917 [this folder contains a 
lot of detail, in forms of various correspondence, on the establishment of the New England Sawmill 
Units]. 
157 SLMSC, Records of the Massachusetts Committee on Public Safety, Boxes 1& 2, ‘Meeting of 
April 16, 1917’; Lyman, The Story of the Massachusetts Committee on Public Safety, p. 158. 
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President of the New Hampshire Timberland Owners Association, became its 
Chairman. H.G. Philbrook, Vice-President of the Connecticut Valley Lumber 
Company, its Treasurer and Rane as Secretary.158 Plans were quickly amended to send 
ten fully equipped units. Funding was agreed by the New England States themselves, 
the Massachusetts Committee on Public Safety and the lumber interests of the 
northeast. Each of the six states provided one unit, the remaining four made possible 
by Massachusetts Committee on Public Safety and private/business subscriptions.159 
Therefore, just one week after Gaston raised the request, a reply was sent to Wiley 
offering the British Government ‘the services of New England in assembling men and 
material for ten complete working portable saw-mill units’.160 Each unit would consist 
of thirty volunteer civilian ‘experienced’ lumbermen led by a ‘capable man’, with 
cooks and blacksmith. Each unit would come with ‘portable saw-mill, ten suitable 
horses, harnesses, wagons, saws, axes, other tools and camp equipment, including all 
necessary spares, so they were ready for ‘business on landing’. Such preparedness 
certainly pleased the civilian British authorities.161 Once the offer was officially 
                                                 
158 Ibid.; Perley W Churchill, ‘W.R. Brown; Modern Pioneer’, in The Brown Bulletin, (Brown 
Company – Berlin, New Hampshire, USA), September 1955, pp. 3, 10, 11; SLMSC Records of the 
Massachusetts Committee on Public Safety, Boxes 1&2, throughout, but especially see the meeting of 
27 July 1917 and the address of Governor Samuel W McCall to the Massachuetts Committee on 
Public Safety on 20 November 1918. 
159 TNA/BT/71/2/13713, New Englanders, Raising and Transportation of Units, various 
correspondences, April 1917 to October 1918; SLMSC Records of the Massachusetts Committee on 
Public Safety, Boxes 1&2, passim; No Author, ‘The New England Sawmill Units in Scotland’ in 
Simmons and Davies, (eds.), Twentieth Engineers, France, n.p. 
160 TNA/BT 71/2/13713, telegram  Storrow to Wiley, 22 April 1917;  SLMSC, Records of the 
Massachusetts Committee on Public Safety, meeting of 23 April 1917 as reprinted in ‘Report of 
Executive Committee’, November 1, 1917 (Boston), pp. 4-5. 
161 TNA/BT 71/2/13713, telegrams Storrow to Wiley, 17 and 22 April 1917; TNA/BT/13/88 
(E36139), copy of standard contract between New England Sawmill Unit me  and British 
Government, 15 June 1917; Lyman, The Story of the Massachusetts Committee on Public Safety, pp. 
156-163; TNA/BT/71/1/13676, memo Directorate of Timber Supplies (War Office) to  Assistant 
Director Timber Supplies (TS3), 26 May 1917; No Author, ‘New England lumbermen did twice the 
work at half the cost’, The Northern Times, 25 November 2010 (updated 29 November 2011) 
<https://www.northern-times.co.uk/Features/Times-Past/New-England-lumbermen-did-twice-the-
work-at-half-the-cost-7991.htm>  [accessed 10 July 2015], n.p, much of this article is taken from 
Lyman, The Story of the Massachusetts Committee on Public Safety, pp. 156-163. SLMSC, Records 
of the Massachusetts Committee on Public Safety, meeting of 23 April 1917 as reprinted in ‘Report of 
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accepted by the War Office, War Cabinet, and Board of Trade, Phelan secured formal 
authorisation from the Federal War Department to raise the units.162 This illustrates 
that the US Government recognised the urgency of the need for timber. As well as 
beginning to raise their own massive timber forces, they were prepared to allow 
suitable men to help their new allies as soon as possible. Governors of four of the six 
New England States confirmed they would cooperate with the scheme, so now, having 
the backing and involvement of the British, their government, State Governors and 
industry, the Massachusetts Committee on Public Safety appointed a larger 
consultative committee of twenty-three men which was to oversee the assembly and 
sending of the New England Sawmill Units.163 The chairman, vice-chairman, treasurer 
and secretary remained as above, but nineteen other men were named. These seem 
wisely chosen, including the State Foresters of Maine, Connecticut, New Hampshire 
and Rhode Island, alongside high ranking men from lumber, paper or manufacturers 
of wood products or their trade associations, and a Boston & Maine Railroad 
representative.164 
This committee could also look for help to a general Recruitment Subcommittee 
which established further subcommittees in major cities.165 The Massachusetts State 
Board of Trade organised pledges from its constituent bodies, including some lumber 
                                                 
Executive Committee’, November 1, 1917 (Boston), pp. 4-5; Hendrick, The Life and Letters of Walter 
H. Page, Volume 2, p. 291. 
162 TNA/BT 71/2/13713, telegrams Directorate of Timber Supplies (War Office) to Sir Cecil Spring 
Rice (British Ambassador in Washington) to inform Storrow, 5 and 7 May 1917; TNA/CAB/23/2/50 
Minutes of War Cabinet meeting May 4 1917, p. 2 ‘Timber: Labour Supply’; Lyman, The Story of the 
Massachusetts Committee on Public Safety, pp. 156-7; SLMSC, Records of the Massachusetts 
Committee on Public Safety, meeting of 14 May 1917. 
163 Ibid., Maine, New Hampshire, Vermont, Massachusetts – but not Connecticut or Rhode Island at 
this point. 
164 SLMSC, Records of the Massachusetts Committee on Public Safety, meetings of 14 and 18 May 
1917 and ‘Index of Committees’; Lyman, The Story of the Massachusetts Committee on Public 
Safety, p. 158. 
165 SLMSC, Records of the Massachusetts Committee on Public Safety, see for instances the papers 
and letters ‘of the Recruiting committees of the various Massachusetts cities, towns and counties’ 
regarding establishment and work of committees, dated 9 March 1917- 26 May 1917. 
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associations to support the Massachusetts Committee on Public Safety, and for 
military recruitment the National Security League, in mobilising ‘the human resources 
of our Loyal Commonwealth’ and placing ‘every man in the old Bay State on record 
as to where he can best serve his country in her hour of need’.166 Although not a 
military organisation, each of the men that these committees managed to recruit into 
the sawmill units, had individual twelve-month contracts with the British Government, 
expiring on June 15, 1918.167 
On 22 May 1917 Storrow met the British Ambassador in Washington and 
informed him that the ten units, approximately 360 men, 120 horses and full 
equipment, could be assembled at Boston and ready for shipment by 2 June. The 
British Government prepared a standard contract between individual woodsmen and 
themselves which would be signed on the day of departure. It included that they would 
be treated as civilians, and pay would as far as possible conform to scales then 
‘prevailing in New England’, commencing on the date of departure and ending when 
they arrived back in New England. New England Sawmill Unit members could 
contractually expect the same standards of travel, accommodation, medical care and 
rations as a British Army private on duty, but it was agreed he would only be asked to 
work on ‘logging or mill work’ within the UK. 168 Furthermore, substitutes for 
                                                 
166 SLMSC, Records of the Massachusetts Committee on Public Safety, letter from Massachusetts 
State Board of Trade to Constituent Bodies, 16 March 1917. 
167 TNA/BT/13/88 (E36139), copy of standard contract between New England Sawmill Unit men and 
British Government, 15 June 1917. SLMSC, ‘Board of Trade Journal’, 21 March 1918, as quoted in 
Records of the Massachusetts Committee on Public Safety, meeting of 29 April 1918; 
TNA/BT/71/1/13676, memo Directorate of Timber Supplies (War Office) to  Assistant Director 
Timber Supplies (TS3), 26 May 1917; Lyman, The Story of the Massachusetts Committee on Public 
Safety, p. 159; No author, ‘World War I: New England Sawmill Units in Scotland’, 
http://www.20thengineers.com/ww1-book-neunits.html [accessed 3/9/2013]. 
168 TNA/BT 71/2/13713, telegrams Storrow to Wiley, 17 and 22 April 1917;  TNA/BT/13/88 
(E36139), standard contract between New England Sawmill Unit men and British Government, 15 
June 1917; Lyman, The Story of the Massachusetts Committee on Public Safety, pp. 156-163; 
TNA/BT/71/1/13676, memo Directorate of Timber Supplies (War Office) to  Assistant Director 
Timber Supplies (TS3), 26 May 1917; No Author, ‘New England lumbermen did twice the work at 
half the cost’, n.p.; SLMSC, Records of the Massachusetts Committee on Public Safety, meeting of 23 
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passports would be provided, they would not be asked to leave the UK, take on military 
duties, or work on anything other than logging or milling timber. They would be 
suitably accommodated, provided with clothes and medical assistance, and returned 
within a year from date of contract to a New England port.169 Another contract between 
the British Government and the Massachusetts Committee on Public Safety 
indemnified the committee of all responsibility and liability in connection with the 
New England Sawmill Units once accepted at the port of departure, and that the British 
agreed to provide suitable transport to convoy the units, preferably from Boston.170 
There was, however, some embarrassment at the British embassy in Washington 
which felt London had produced a ‘deplorable impression’ following delays in 
accepting the extremely kind offer. This may have been caused due to breakdown in 
communications between different bodies. It was at the time when responsibility for 
forestry was transferring from the War Office to Board of Trade. Or perhaps it was 
just one telegram of 7 May 1917 from the Foreign Office accepting the offer which 
had gone astray. Fortunately, although ‘anxiously awaiting’ an official reply, the 
Massachusetts Committee on Public Safety carried on with arrangements, and the 
Foreign Office and Controller of Timber Supplies (Board of Trade) reconfirmed by 
telegram that the misunderstandi g was regretted, but that they were ‘urgently in need 
of New England assistance’ and very grateful.171  
                                                 
April 1917 as reprinted in ‘Report of Executive Committee’, November 1, 1917 (Boston), pp. 4-5; 
Hendrick, The Life and Letters of Walter H. Page, Volume 2, p. 291. 
169 TNA/BT/71/2/13713, telegram, Rice (UK Ambassador in Washington) to Secretary of State for 
Foreign Affairs, 21 May 1917, this was passed on to Army Council ad then Directorate of Timber 
Supplies (War Office). 
170 Ibid. 
171 TNA/BT/71/2/13713, telegram Mr Barclay (UK Embassy in Washington) to Ball (Controller 
Timber Supplies (Board of Trade), 27 May 1917 and reply following a telephone conversation with 
Foreign Office, 31 May 1917, and telegram to Sir Cecil Spring Rice (British Ambassador in 
Washington) from Foreign Office on 1 June 1917. 
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Even before the units had left Boston, the British Ambassador, Sir Cecil Spring-
Rice, passed on the thanks of the British War Office and their ‘high appreciation of 
the very welcome co-peration of the New England States in this matter…’ The 
Ambassador stated that, ‘I wish to add a word of personal thanks to the gentlemen who 
initiated a movement of such immense practical importance to the successful 
prosecution of the great struggle, in which our two nations are so happily united’.172 
This gives an idea of the importance the War Office and parts of the British 
Government attributed to the timber effort, and the value of American help in this 
respect as soon as possible.   
The only requests the British had during the process were that someone be named 
in charge of the units and be the central point of contact in official dealings, and that 
someone be sent to London as soon as possible to settle preliminary arrangements 
regarding arrival of the force.173 These were satisfactorily fulfilled. As noted above, 
Beeton became Officer in Charge in London. Furthermore, D.P Brown of the Berlin 
Mills Company, almost certainly a relative of its manager and Massachusetts 
Committee on Public Safety Chairman W.R. Brown, was appointed General Manager 
of the units until they were established in Scotland, when he resigned to return to the 
US and enlist. His position was taken on by Edgar C. Hirst, State Forester of New 
Hampshire, who had two assistant managers recruited from New England lumber 
firms.174 
                                                 
172 SLMSC, Records of the Massachusetts Committee on Public Safety, Meeting of 21 May 1917 and 
letter British Ambassador Washington to Mr Storrow dated May 16, 1917 as reprinted in ‘Report of 
Executive Committee’, November 1, 1917 (Boston), p. 5.  
173 TNA/BT 71/2/13713, telegram, Directorate of Timber Supplies (War Office) to Secretary of State 
for Foreign Affairs for transmission to British Ambassador Washington, 26 May 1917. 
174 Lyman, The Story of the Massachusetts Committee on Public Safety, pp.161-2; No author, ‘World 
War I: New England Sawmill Units in Scotland’. 
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Having obtained the now necessary agreement from the War Office, the 
Controller of Timber Supplies (Board of Trade) arranged with the Ministry of 
Shipping to get the 360 men on the ‘first escorted Canadian Liner carrying troops’ and 
the 120 horses and 350 tons of equipment on the SS Etonian, leaving Boston on 27 
June.175 New England’s ‘unique gift ’ to ‘Old England’ had been proposed, recruited 
and equipped in remarkably quick time, just two months.176 Lovat called the raising 
of the 348 to 360 men for the ten New England Sawmill Units ‘the best sporting event 
that has come to my attention during the war’, and being amongst the first Americans 
to arrive in an already war weary Britain meant that they had a positive effect on the 
nation’s psyche, as well as providing a valuable contribution to the empire’s timber 
efforts in the brief period, June 1917 to June 1918, that they were working for the 
British Government in Scotland.177 
Four days after they landed, and still ten days before they would cut anything, the 
US Ambassador wrote to his son that alongside the positive effect on Allied morale in 
the UK and France of the arrival of some of Pershing’s troops, the New England 
foresters had ‘caused a furor [sic] of enthusiasm’.178  When the first units arrived at 
Liverpool most of the municipal buildings were flying the American flag in honour of 
their arrival on their national day, and crowds cheered the new arrivals.179 The 
                                                 
175 TNA/BT/71/2/13713, various correspondence Controller Timber Supplies (Board of Trade), 
Ministry of Shipping and Washington, 31 May to 8 June 1917. 
176 No Author, ‘The New England Sawmill Units in Scotland’ in Simmons and Davies, (eds.), 
Twentieth Engineers, France, n.p. 
177 Lyman, The Story of the Massachusetts Committee on Public Safety; pp. 156, 158, 159; 
TNA/BT/71/2/13713, letter Director of Military Sea Transport to Controller Timber Supplies (Board 
of Trade), 16 June 1917; SLMSC, Records of the Massachusetts Committee on Public Safety, meeting 
of 5 June 1917, letter from Cecil Spring Rice (British Ambassador in Washington) to James J Phelan 
(Massachusetts Committee on Public Safety Saw Mill Units) attached to Records of the 
Massachusetts Committee on Public Safety, meeting of 27 July 1917; No Author, ‘The New England 
Sawmill Units in Scotland’ in Simmons and Davies, (eds.), Twentieth Engineers, France, n.p.; 
TNA/BT/71/1/13676, Memo Bampfylde Fuller (Directorate of Timber Supplies (War Office)) to  
Assistant Director Timber Supplies (TS3), 26 May 1917. 
178 Hendrick, The Life and Letters of Walter H. Page, Volume 2, p. 291. 
179 Letter from New England Sawmill Unit member to home, dated 9 July 1917, as quoted in Lyman, 
The Story of the Massachusetts Committee on Public Safety, p. 164. 
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Massachusetts Committee on Public Safety whose work had led to the units’ existence, 
themselves saw it as fitting that  
…the first expedition which left New England in aid of the nation from 
which New England has taken her name, her traditions, and from whose 
Islands a large part of her population has sprung, should have been a 
pioneer expedition…to aid the Allies in supplying the western front of war 
with necessary lumber and material manufactured from the historic forests 
of England and Scotland.180 
 
By March 1918 the Board of Trade was also labelling the efforts as ‘one of the 
striking incidents of the story of how the timber problem has been dealt with’, the New 
England Sawmill Units having ‘put up some remarkable records, their total output 
being well ahead of what was estimated’.181 Furthermore, according to the editors of 
the contemporary history of the US 20th ‘Forestry’ Engineers, the New England units 
were credited by the British Government with ‘doing twice the work at half the cost 
of any organization producing lumber for war service’.182 Although, as former 
members of the 20th Engineers, Perez Simmons and Alfred Davies should be expected 
to relate this sort of praise to their former comrades. George Lyman also had reason 
to be biased, as the writer of the history of the Massachusetts Committee on Public 
Safety, yet his claim that the New Englanders produced ‘more feet of lumber…per 
man per day than…any similar organization in Great Britain’, seems slightly more 
plausible, even though it is still impossible to accurately verify it.183
The New England units certainly did produce significant amounts of timber. Some 
60,000 sleepers, and a great deal of pit-wood and timber, either sawed to specific 
                                                 
180 SLMSC, Records of the Massachusetts Committee on Public Safety, ‘Report of Executive 
Committee’, November 1, 1917, pp. 3-4. 
181 SLMSC, ‘Board of Trade Journal’, 21 March 1918, as quoted in Records of the Massachusetts 
Committee on Public Safety, meeting of 29 April 1918.  
182 No Author, ‘The New England Sawmill Units in Scotland’ in Simmons and Davies, (eds.), 
Twentieth Engineers, France, n.p. 
183 Lyman, The Story of the Massachusetts Committee on Public Safety, p. 161. 
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dimensions for military constructions or passed to re-sawing plants to be turned in 
munitions boxes. The total production, during approximately nine and a half months 
of operations, was 19,673,100 foot board measures (one foot, by one foot, by one inch 
of rough or sawn wood) of timber of all sorts.184 
This was clearly recognised by contemporaries as well ahead of expected output 
and as ‘signal service’.185 Furthermore, important contemporaries with knowledge of 
the effort felt that as civilians working under wartime pressures these small portable 
units provided a very good output. This could largely be attributed to their being free 
from some of the constraints of a military unit, or even forestry units. Although 
relatively small in number and short-lived, the speed with which these units were 
recruited, equipped, shipped and put to work is indicative of the manpower and 
equipment resources the USA could, and would, bring to the Allies. The timber they 
produced contributed to the overall effort, and once American forestry units were 
active in France, many of these men transferred to these.  A  Sir Stirling Maxwell, 
Assistant Controller of Timber Supplies (Scotland), wrote, th  ‘gift’ of the New 
England Sawmill Units, so ‘generously designed’ by the Massachusetts Committee on 
Public Safety, ‘has most happily achieved its object. It has provided us in time of need 
with timber we could not otherwise have produced’, as well as bequeathing to the 
British ‘valuable plant and horses’.186 These voluntary units were undoubtedly, 
therefore, a significant but non-standard element in regards to how, where and by 
whom timber was sourced. In many respects the establishment of these units illustrates 
                                                 
184 Ibid.; No author, ‘World War I: New England Sawmill Units in Scotland’. 
185 TNA/BT/71/21, Bird, Appendix 1, p. 4; Board of Trade Journal article, and letter Ball to Mr. 
Lewis, both as quoted in Lyman, The Story of the Massachusetts Committee on Public Safety, pp. 
164-5. 
186 As reproduced in Ibid., pp. 162-3. 
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elements both in keeping with, and very different to, those behind the more military 
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The central conclusions drawn from examining how these organisations went 
about establishing these units are that although some were based on military structures, 
the Royal Engineer Forestry Companies, CFC, and Newfoundland Forestry Corps, and 
some along more civilian lines, WFS and New England Sawmill Units. All except the 
Royal Engineer Forestry Companies were raised from scratch in surprisingly quick 
time following the realisation that their services were urgently needed. Taking the CFC 
as the prime example, the quick action in an ‘unexpected direction’ taken by the 
Canadian Government, in terms of establishing and recruiting the first forestry 
battalion, was seen as an example of ‘the energy, rapidity and “hustle” for which the 
Canadians are famous,’ and of Canada’s willingness ‘to assist the Motherland in any 
unexpected direction’.187 Furthermore, each of the units established can be seen to 
have contributed to wider aspects of either gender or national themes in the 
historiography. The roles women played in a traditionally manly sphere would lead to 
even greater responsibilities in the timber effort of the Second World War.188 The 
Newfoundland and Canadian New England States’ forestry contributions can take 
their place alongside their military efforts in their proud communal memories of the 
war and how it affected their self-image. This is true not only for the efforts in raising 
these units but also, as shall now be shown, in regards to their funding. 
                                                 
187 Bird and Davies, The Canadian Forestry Corps, p. 5; Hill, 'The Canadian Forestry Corps', 
Appendix 2, pp. 300-1. 
188 Vickers, 'The Forgotten Army of the Woods: The Women's Timber Corps during the Second 
World War', passim. 
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Funding the units  
Funding for smaller elements of the war can be overlooked in the historiography, 
yet agreements on paying for the forestry units were important, and prove to be 
interesting, as these units could fall in a liminal space between military and civilian 
efforts. Although arguments over funding could have been protracted, many of the 
founding HLOs took it upon themselves to fund the raising and equipping of their 
units, then either continuing to fund their maintenance or passing such costs on to the 
British Government. It would then be agreed whether the War Office or another HLO, 
such as the Timber Supply Department (Board of Trade), should fund these costs. 
Canada was not a wealthy country at the start of war and would have to obtain 
loans from Britain, the USA, and the Canadian people themselves in forms of war 
bonds to pay for its war effort.189 When the Canadian Government approved the 
raising of volunteers for overseas service it was felt that the CEF would be part of an 
Imperial contingent, and in the heady patriotism of 1914 it ‘demanded the right to pay 
for the CEF’. Later it would change its mind, as it became clear that it would owe 
hundreds of millions of dollars to bodies including the War Office. Much haggling 
ensued.190 
Initial financial arrangements for the CEF had been that the Canadian 
Government would cover its ‘equipment, pay and maintenance’ whilst in Europe.191 
In March 1915 formal discussions opened between the two governments, the 
Canadians still insisting that they pay ‘the entire cost in every particular of their own 
contingents’, but formal agreement was not drawn up and agreed until January 1917. 
Under this agreement Canada would pay for their troops’ pay, allowances, pensions, 
                                                 
189 Cook, At the Sharp End, p. 32. 
190 Ibid., p. 36; Cook, Shock Troops, p. 45. 
191 Nicholson, Canadian Expeditionary Force, p. 359. 
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cost of transporting troops and equipment to Britain, and reimburse Britain for the 
costs of all supplies and stores issued to them in Britain and for transporting Canadian 
troops and materials on British railways. With regards to accommodation, whether 
huts or billets, and barrack and hospital stores the British Government would make no 
charge. A ‘maintenance rate’ for Canadian troops in France and Belgium was also 
agreed at a ‘capitation rate’ of six shillings per Canadian per day. Yet this became 
complicated by the rising costs, especially of ammunition leading to disagreement and 
negotiation stretching in to the 1920s.192 Altogether the Canadians paid the British 
Government C$252,567,942 for costs relating to her overseas contingent.193  
In his initial request for lumbermen the Colonial Secretary emphasized its urgent 
nature by informing the Governor-General that ‘Incidence of cost will be arranged as 
agreeable to the Canadian Government’.194 However, standard military clothing and 
equipment along with specific forestry machinery and tools, which were mainly 
bought before leaving Canada, was paid for by the Canadian Authorities. They bore 
these costs for initial equipment, and also pay, allowances, pensions and transportation 
to England, much like their fighting forces.  Furthermore, not being ‘troops’ of the 
Canadian Corps, but part of the CEF, it is unclear if the CFC were included within the 
figures to be charged the ‘capitation’ rate discussed above, although it would certainly 
seem unfair to charge them for elements such as the artillery shell portion. By mid-
April 1916 when the first 1,600 men had been recruited ‘from all parts of the 
Dominion’ and $250,000 worth of machinery, including mills and lorries, had been 
bought and were waiting in Quebec, what is stressed in the historiography and 
                                                 
192 Ibid. 
193 Ibid., pp. 359-61; Cook, Shock Troops, p. 597. 
194 Telegram of 15 February 1916, Colonial Secretary to Governor-General of Cnada, as quoted in 
Bird and Davies, The Canadian Forestry Corps, p. 5; Hill, 'The Canadian Forestry Corps', Appendix 
2, pp. 300-1. 
Page 305 of 386 
 
 
apparent in primary sources is that provision of food and accommodation for the CFC 
whilst in Britain was undertaken by the War Office, with additional tools and 
machinery purchased in the UK being paid for by the British Government.195 Bird and 
Davies state that during the early stages of establishment ‘Everybody concerned was 
far too busy getting on with the work to stop to discuss details of payment’.196 
However, debates over who paid for what in terms of forestry equipment and upkeep 
of units would continue. It was not until January 1917 when the matter was finally 
officially agreed along the lines indicated above. That is, the Canadians would fund 
the initial personal and forestry equipment, transport to Europe, pay, pensions and 
allowances. The British would pay for all other expenses, such as maintenance and 
replacement of forestry machinery and other work-related costs.197 
In Newfoundland the Newfoundland Patriotic Association similarly agreed to 
meet the costs of the initial companies until they embarked, the men picked would 
bring their own tools, and as with the CFC the British were to cover future 
maintenance costs.198 Unlike the civilian New England Sawmill Units, however, it was 
the War Office who would assist with transporting and housing costs, and the 
Newfoundland Forestry Corps would use the army for rations and ‘a certain proportion 
of its stores and supplies’.199 Individuals’ expenses including pay, board, clothing, 
additional equipment as well as complete sawmills, transport, separation allowance 
and pension on the Newfoundland pension scale, were to be borne by the British 
Government. For the first contingent this arrangement would begin from the date of 
                                                 
195 Bird and Davies, The Canadian Forestry Corps, pp. 5, 10; Nicholson, Canadian Expeditionary 
Force, p. 499. 
196 Bird and Davies, The Canadian Forestry Corps, p. 10. 
197 Ibid. 
198 TNA/BT/71/1/13676, telegram Governor of Newfoundland to the Secretary of State for the 
Colonies, 18 April 1917; Higgins (revised), Newfoundland and Labrador in the First World War, n.p. 
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departure as the Newfoundland Patriotic Association had provided funding up to that 
point, but for most it was from the date of enlistment. The arrangement would be in 
place until the date the men were returned to Newfoundland.200 
The New England Sawmill Units were the most obvious example of public and 
business funding of forestry units. Some funds for Massachusetts Committee on Public 
Safety work came through the ‘generosity of civilians’, US$100,000 contributed by 
November 1917, but US$2,000,000 of public money was appropriated by the 
Massachusetts State Legislature for ‘emergency war expenses’ and disbursed by the 
Governor and Council on the recommendations of the committee. From this would 
come the US$12,000 that Massachusetts would contribute towards its sawmill unit. 
However, much of the money that individual States contributed could be reimbursed 
by Federal Government.201 
Rane’s initial rough estimate to equip fifteen units had been from US$100,000 to 
US$150,000,202 and estimates to equip ten saw units were US$80,000 which gives an 
average of US$6,665 to $10,000 per unit.203 The Committee on Public Safety were 
initially prepared to pay up to US$10,000 to get each New England Sawmill Unit ‘to 
steamer side’ for the British.204 Yet by 21 May each of the six New England States 
had been asked to subscribe the cost of one saw mill unit, approximately US$12,000. 
In the case of Massachusetts this would come from the Emergency Appropriation 
Fund.205 Additional expenses in raising the units had come to US$6,000 by 3 August, 
                                                 
200 Ibid., telegram Colonial Office to Governor of Newfoundland, 2 April 1917, memo Directorate of 
Timber Supplies (War Office) to Assistant Director Timber Supplies (TS3), 26 May 1917. 
201 SLMSC, Records of the Massachusetts Committee on Public Safety, ‘Report of Executive 
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but subscriptions were now being received.206 By 10 September total subscriptions 
amounted to US$129,176. These included US$12,000 each from Connecticut, Maine, 
Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Vermont and US$6,200 from Rhode Island. Seventy-
seven firms and individuals had contributed the remaining US$62,961 in gift amounts 
ranging from US$10 to US$5,000, and US$14.50 had been received in interest.207  
Although a ‘few’ more bills might have been forthcoming, for which the Treasurer 
of the Massachusetts Committee on Public Safety agreed to meet up to US$12,000 
from their General Funds if necessary, these subscriptions would be spent on 
organising, equipping and getting the sawmill units to a suitable port.208 The striking 
element in comparing high-level agreements with regards to funding the forestry units 
is therefore the keenness that many involved showed towards paying to raise and send 
these formations overseas. Unlike with the CFC and Newfoundland Forestry Corps,
once in Britain the Timber Supply Department (Board of Trade) would not get 
financial help from the War Office with their contractual duties of paying, transporting 
from New England port to site and back, feeding, generally supplying and housing 
these units. 209   
                                                 
206 Ibid., meetings of 3 August 1917, 10 September 1917 and 15 July 1918. 
207 SLMSC, Records of the Massachusetts Committee on Public Safety, meeting of 10 September 
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Staffing the Units  
Having seen how they were funded, the chapter now continues to show that the 
men and women put in charge by the HLOs, or in positions of power within them,  
were suitable for the tasks required.  
A major part of the establishment of the units was clearly the responsibility of 
senior officers and the continued management of these officers, their subalterns and 
NCOs. Fortunately, as seen in terms of the membership of leading positions in the 
HLOs, sense prevailed and both senior officers and those in positions of responsibility 
below them were taken from appropriate civilian roles. An early telegram from Britain 
to Canada made it clear that men recruited for forestry units should be experienced in 
all stages of forestry and milling work, although such requirements in recruitment did 
not last beyond November 1916.210  It has been argued that the Canadian forces overall 
recruited officers from a less narrow social background than the British.211 However, 
it is also argued that all of the units in the CFC were commanded by men who had 
given up ‘big salaries’ to join,212 suggesting a degree of experience and knowledge, as 
well as good social standing. The Germans had realised the good sense in employing 
an expert to manage their massive and vital forestry works in the Eastern forest of 
Bialowies and engaged the Bavarian Forestry Councillor, Major Escherich.213 
Similarly, examples of the professional and personal backgrounds of some of the high-
ranking ‘makers’ of the CFC illustrate that, as well as generally having engineering 
qualifications, these men had held high level positions in lumber or other engineering 
or transport companies.  
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As recorded above, Alexander McDougall was given charge of commanding all 
Canadian forestry work from its outset in February 1916, being officially recognised 
as in command from September 1916. He was well-known in the Dominion for having 
wide experience in powerful positions and renowned for his organisational abilities. 
Born in Ontario, to a father who was at one time the Auditor-General of Canada, he 
was educated in Ottawa, Toronto and then Cornell University (Ithaca, NY, USA) in 
civil engineering. His career before the CFC included working on and managing large 
scale projects in bridge, electrical, canal and railroad work, as well as general 
engineering consultancy work for private companies and the Canadian Government. 
From 1907 onward this included his time as a managing director of the Eastern 
Construction Company, and several other companies, which he had formed with 
family members and friends.214 He was essentially commander of the CFC from the 
beginning, gaining promotions, new job titles and numerous honours as the Corps 
expanded. He was promoted from Colonel to Brigadier-General (Temporary – whilst 
in this role) on 1 April 1917, being gazetted as Director of Timber Operations on the 
same date.215 He became Director General of Timber Operations in both Britain and 
France from June 1917. Furthermore, as a sign of appreciation for his efforts, and 
clearly reflecting the importance attributed to the hard work carried out by the men 
under his command, he was promoted to Major-General on 20 December 1918, 
received the decoration of Companion of the Most Honourable Order of the Bath 
(C.B.) in the King’s New Year Honours 1918, and a few months into 1919 the French 
Légion d’Honneur.216 
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His Deputy/Assistant Director of Timber Operations, Brigadier-General William 
Bernard Rickart Hepburn, C.M.G, M.P, was also born in Ontario, and his family had 
run a steamboat company for many years leading him to go into navigation and 
steamship companies once educated. He had reached company presidency positions 
by 1911 when he was elected into the Canadian House of Commons as a Conservative 
Unionist Member for Prince Edward County. He would retain this post, by a large 
majority, in December 1917 whilst away with the CFC.217 He joined the 224th Forestry 
Battalion as Major in the spring of 1916, and as the Corps grew his responsibilities 
also grew until he managed, as Deputy-Director, its detailed work in Britain and 
France.218 
Col. Gerald Verner White, C.B.E, Director of Timber Operations in Great Britain, 
was also born in Ontario, a common theme, with a father in politics. He graduated 
from McGill University, Montreal, with a Bachelor of Applied Science in Mining 
Engineering in 1901 and was employed by mining and railway companies until 
entering the lumber business in 1904, where he stayed until 1916, eventually becoming 
a Director of the Pembroke Lumber Company. He was also elected to the House of 
Commons in 1906, for the constituency of North Renfrew, Ontario, a post he held until 
the General Election of 1917 in which he did not stand. He also had some previous 
military experience, being a Lieutenant then Captain in the 42nd Lanark and Renfrew 
Regiment between 1904 and 1915, holding a field officer’s certificate.  He enlisted for 
overseas service on November 1915, and was appointed Second-in-Command, 130th 
Battalion CEF, as a Major. However, when the 224th Forestry was formed in February 
1916 he was offered Second-in-Command of that battalion, which he accepted and 
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headed overseas with it in May 1916. When McDougall was promoted to Temporary 
Colonel in September 1916, White took charge of the 224th and subsequently became 
Director of Timber Operations for Great Britain, giving him control over all CFC work 
in the British Isles.219   
The Director of Timber Operations in France, Brigadier-General John Burton 
White, D.S.O,  was born in the province of Quebec, not far from Gatineau just on the 
French Canadian side of the Ottawa river. He was educated in public and high schools 
and then at Ottawa Business College, before going into the lumber business. By 1914 
he had been manager of three lumber companies, director of a pulp and paper 
company, and had been the Director of the Canadian Forestry Association.220 J hn 
White, like Gerald White, also had military experience before joining the CFC, having 
been a Major in the Duke of York's Royal Canadian Hussars. However, he left Canada 
as a Major in the 224th Forestry Battalion on 16 April 1916, before returning on the 16 
July to raise and command the 242nd Forestry Battalion with the rank of Lieutenant-
Colonel. On 14 June 1917 he was appointed Director of Timber Operations (France), 
giving him control of all CFC operations directly feeding the Western Front.221 He 
also returned as commander of the CFC efforts in Scotland in the Second World 
War.222 
Another important position was that of Chief of Technical Staff, given to 
Lieutenant-Colonel David Bishop Campbell (MBE), the one ‘non-Canadian-born’ 
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senior officer covered here, as he was from Scotland. He was first educated in Glasgow 
but then at ‘Technical College, Portland, Oregon’ from where he was employed in the 
lumber manufacturing business, residing in Vancouver for fourteen years. In 1908, 
however, he established a private mill architect and egin ering business ‘dealing 
exclusively with Saw Mill and Wood Working plant, and designing new machinery of 
various types’.223 These included labour-saving devices for handling lumber once in 
the mills, shingle machines and machines to prepare shingle timber; a ‘great many of 
which’ were still in use in British Columbia in the post-war years.224 Bishop enlisted 
in the 224th in March 1916, heading to England in May, steadily rising through the 
ranks and becoming Lieutenant-Colonel in December 1917. 
Therefore, those officers who would grow to have overall command of the CFC 
had held very high level positions in engineering or transport companies, as well as 
often in politics, suggesting that they were well-suited for such overarching roles 
between the HLOs, high level military commanders, politicians and the forestry 
companies. Furthermore, the three officers with most direct ‘hands-on’ responsibility 
for overseeing the Corps’ work and equipment, White, White and Bishop, all had had 
high level experience in the lumber industry and two of them had some previous 
militia experience. All of their honours received in the New Year’s Honours Lists 
towards or just after the end of the war, were for their wartime forestry work.225 
Officers of such specialized units within the RE were obtained either by 
transferring existing officers from other branches, if they had the correct qualifications 
or experience, or commissioning suitable civilians of less than forty-five years of age 
with appropriate engineering backgrounds. These recruits would be given temporary 
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commissions as lieutenants or captains, and sent to France to be trained in the duties 
of the directorate they would come under, alongside any military training considered 
necessary.226 The officer in charge of the first recognised Canadian lumber cutting unit 
in France was Lt. Harold Hellmuth, a thirty-three year old civil engineer from Toronto 
who was placed in charge of a detachment of thirty-five ‘skilled’ workers from 101 
Remount Squadron in September 1915, cutting their first trees on 3 October 1915 near 
Rouen.227 By December 1916 the types of men the Canadian General Officer 
Commanding Canadian Forces in Britain was looking to transfer from existing 
Canadian Army units in reserve bases in Britain into the CFC included officers with 
‘Actual experience in lumbering operations in its various branches, logging, 
manufacturing, shipping, grading, etc., also experience in the handling of men in 
construction work’.228 Furthermore Major A.B.R. Kenny, CO of 126th Company CFC, 
had by 1918 nearly 15 years military experience with the Canadian Militia and CEF, 
including as a recruiting officer in Ontario. However, he had also had seventeen years 
of experience as a ‘lumberman’ in Eastern Canada, and qualities attributed to him by 
Sergeant Porter of the YMCA included his ability to lead and handle the men as well 
as his industrial and military experiences.229  Such recruitment of suitably experienced 
officers from the forestry industry would continue in the Second World War CFC.230  
It was a similar picture in the Newfoundland Forestry Corps where due to the 
recruitment procedures men in the companies were often led by foremen and managers 
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they were used to.231 Major Sullivan led the Corps, and each company was 
commanded by a captain and two subalterns. If not from Newfoundland industries, 
then officers came from those Royal Newfoundland Regiment officers no longer fit 
for frontline service.232  
NCOs in the CFC and Newfoundland Forestry Corps were often experienced, a 
sergeant generally being equivalent to a bush foreman, although an experienced 
foreman could make commissioned officer.233 With regards to NCOs and men invited 
to transfer to the CFC from combat units stationed in Britain in December 1916, those 
requested were those with any experience as ‘mill hands, logging foremen, sawyers, 
filers, saw hammers, engineers, firemen, and all other branches of the Lumber Trade, 
felling, transport, manufacture and shipping of finished timber’.234 Similarly the Royal 
Engineers felt that supplies of tradesmen for their specialist units, as forestry workers 
would have been, were sufficient up until the beginning of 1917 as volunteers with 
particular skills preferred to enlist in the RE. From then on, however, protection from 
conscription for many skilled workmen, including some in forestry roles, led to some 
shortages. However, if of correct age and medically fit they could still be conscripted 
but their professional trade body could try to get them sent to a relevant RE unit. 
Furthermore, whilst shortages felt by the RE included blacksmiths, carpenters, and 
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bricklayers, the forestry professions were not mentioned. The RE were happy to move 
specialists and other tradesmen as required.235 When the Directorate of Forestry 
(GHQ) was being established, in March to April 1917, and the Royal Engineer 
Forestry Companies were expanding from five to eleven companies, it had been 
recognised in London that appropriate skills were important, so Royal Engineer 
Forestry Companies were given skilled NCOs as well as other ranks and 
attachments.236  
Whilst, as seen above, the WFS could not at this time call on many females 
experienced in forestry or engineering, the voluntary organisations it largely evolved 
from initially looked to increase the employment of educated women, especially 
teachers and students. Although they did later widen their scope to include clerks, shop 
assistants and domestic servants, higher roles remained largely class-based, as was 
probably the case in the other forestry units where educated men, already high-up in 
industry, tended to fill senior roles.237 The Women’s Army Auxiliary Corps was 
organised ‘along army lines’ and overseen by the War Office, but had ‘controllers’ or 
‘administrators’ rather than officers, and these were still chosen from the upper classes 
who largely supervised the welfare of Corps members. Grades were closely linked to 
social class, the majority of members being working class or lower-middle class and 
primarily with domestic, clerical or industrial work experience, unlike members of the 
Voluntary Aid Detachments many of whom came from the middle and upper 
classes.238  Similarly the 1942 Women’s Timber Corps is said to have attracted from 
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all levels of society, from university graduates, ballet dancers and sales assistants to 
Hebridean fish workers.239  
It is clear, therefore, that where available appropriately experienced skilled men 
were placed in the forestry effort in leading positions, from commanding officers to 
NCOs. Where this was not possible in the WFS, a structure adopted by other women’s 
services was utilised, one based on class and therefore tiered according to levels of 
education.   
Structuring the units. 
With regards to the units’ places within the command or management structures 
of the empire’s efforts, the WFS and New England Sawmill Unit as strictly civilian 
units were slightly different in that they were not so firmly placed within the military 
structure. However, it can also be seen that they were essentially often overseen by the 
same HLOs in terms of high level directions, such as requirements and where put to 
work, especially, as seen in chapter 2, as the forestry effort became more centralised. 
Furthermore, although not necessarily all military organisations, some aspects of 
military-style structures naturally suited the operational set up of forestry units. In this 
respect some similarities can be seen across all of the units. It is easy to see that at 
times they were all considered as similar to a specialist arm of the engineering or 
supply arms of the military, even if raised, contracted, funded and managed as civilian 
units. It will also be seen that their specialism, and recognition of its urgency at the 
beginning of 1916, led to a degree of flexibility in structuring individual units, based 
on experience in their civilian operations and the geographical spaces they were 
working in.  
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As described earlier, within the overall military hierarchy forestry began in the 
pre-war military supply and engineering structures, yet the forestry effort soon grew 
sufficiently, as with many other specialities, to require separation within the massively 
expanding British Army.  Also as seen in chapter 2, up to the end of 1915 the French 
Forestry Authorities supplied the RE Directorate of Works with much of their timber 
needs. However, from then onwards they also began allocating areas from which the 
RE could arrange cutting and transport themselves, all under control of the RE 
Directorate of Works whose Forestry Branch had formed in the autumn of 1915.240   
However, these units transferred from the RE Directorate of Works to the Directorate 
of Forestry (GHQ) at the beginning of May 1917, as the CFC units working in France 
had in March 1917, themselves often simply expanding existing Royal Engineer 
Forestry Company operations as they arrived. 241 
In France the CFC worked separately, as did those cutting and converting trees 
‘in the immediate vicinity of the zone of military operations’, until March 1917 when 
the Directorate of Forestry took overall control of all forestry matters on the Western 
Front. Essentially, this simply led to CFC staff liaising with the Directorate of Forestry 
(GHQ) in terms of requirements, as opposed to HLOs in London.242 I  May 1917 it 
was stated in the House of Commons that the CFC in France were ‘under the 
Commander-in-chief’ who indicated the ‘location of forestry operations and the sizes 
and types of timber required’, essentially meaning they were under the control of the 
Directorate of Forestry (GHQ). Nevertheless, the operations themselves were ‘entirely 
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Engineers, pp. 165-6, 559; Bird and Davies, The Canadian Forestry Corps, pp. 10, 34; 
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the Royal Engineers, pp. 61-71, especially 62, 64-5, 68-69. 
242 Hansard, House of Commons Sitting 10 October 1916, col. 7 
Page 318 of 386 
 
 
conducted’ by the CFC under the direction of their own ‘Canadian Forestry Staff’.243 
However, it can also be seen that the REs were ultimately responsible for the 
Directorate of Forestry (GHQ). They were therefore ultimately responsible for the 
Forestry Control Unit for each Army area as well as the Forestry Group and individual 
forestry units on the lines of communications.244 So command of operations in France 
remained under a specialist new body, but within the Royal Engineers’ structure.  
The Newfoundland Forestry Corps, WFS and New England Sawmill Units, 
working as they did only in Britain, came under the direction of the Directorate of 
Timber Supplies (War Office) then Timber Supply Department (Board of Trade), 
although as with other forestry units  the companies worked directly under the control 
of their own officers, NCOs or Controllers.245 With regards to the Newfoundland 
Forestry Corps, Beeton, who had been instrumental in their establishment, was 
attached to the governing HLOs to represent their interests in arrangements made with 
the Newfoundland Government, and was allowed direct communication with 
Newfoundland’s governor.246  He would subsequently become the liaison between the 
British authorities and the Newfoundland foresters, being referred to as the ‘Officer in 
Charge of the Newfoundland Forestry Corps’. He addressed questions directly with 
the British and Newfoundland authorities, such as those relating to record-keeping or 
pay, but refused any remuneration for himself. He was not given a rank, as those 
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244 Addison Work of the Royal Engineers, pp. 61-71, especially 62, 64-5, 68-69; Pritchard, History of 
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actually in the Corps were, but by November 1918 his title was Chief Administrative 
Officer for the forestry corps.247 Beeton based himself near the HLOs in London.  
The New England Sawmill Units also maintained close liaison with the Board of 
Trade where they were based, around Ardgay in Ross-shire (now Sutherland).248 
Seven of the mills worked in timber on the extensive Balnagown estate of Sir Charles 
Ross, inventor of the infamous Ross rifle, and three mills on Andrew Carnegie's 
nearby Skibo estate.249 However, there were also Board of Trade employees stationed 
in Ardgay to liaise with the units, and as winter 1917/18 approached the Board of 
Trade office and New England Sawmill Unit hospital and veterinary services moved 
into the ‘roomy’ Ardgay House. However, at times these American teams might also 
have worked at sites at least as far west as Strathcarron, some sixty miles due west of 
Inverness, and in early 1918 they transferred to a camp at the 800 acre Drummond Hill 
forest, 25 miles east of Dunkeld, where they worked until January 1919 when 
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Phelan (Massachusetts Committee on Public Safety Saw Mill Units) attached to notes of meeting of 
27 July 1917; No Author, ‘The New England Sawmill Units in Scotland’ in Simmons and Davies, 
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operations began closing.250 Initially they produced timber for France, but later all of 
their output was taken by war industries in Britain. 251  
Therefore the position of forestry units within the command structure appears to 
have been straightforward. This is even true for the CFC whose fellow Canadians in 
the CEF, especially in Britain, would have often found themselves confused about 
their command structure. There were numerous commanders competing against each 
other for influence and control whilst often having unclear and overlapping 
responsibilities. Cook calls this a ‘Byzantine administrative structure’ largely with 
Hughes at the centre of the chaos until his resignation in November 1916, following 
which there was gradual clarification under the Minster for Overseas Military Forces 
Canada and his ministry.252 Although it took some time to correct all the confusion as 
it would for any organisation ‘established in the panic of war and only a few months 
old’, further centralisation of Canadian HLOs to administer all Canadian Forces 
overseas did occur.253 The CFC were certainly not considered part of the Canadian 
Corps of fighting men as engineer, signalling, Canadian Army Service Corps, and field 
                                                 
250 TNA/BT/71/4/77699, see correspondence between Duke of Atholl, Beeton of he Newfoundland 
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ambulance units were by November 1918.254 However, forestry units and their 
hospitals were often recognised as part of the miscellaneous ‘Canadian Units’ or 
Canadian forces ‘Outside the Corps’, in France or Britain by 1918, that made up this 
CEF.255  
However, as stated above, this early confusion, followed by gradually increased 
centralisation, clarity and Dominion-based control and leadership did not affect the 
efforts to command and control Canada’s forestry units. Their establishment due to 
British requests, coupled with the nature of their work behind the lines, in locations 
where the sites being worked decided on the unit structure, made overall command 
easier to apportion and unit structures smaller and more fluid and based on the working 
structure which the experienced lumbermen in the units were used to. For a short time 
the Canadian units were initially administered by branch F.W.5 of the Fortifications 
and Works Directorate at the War Office, yet the Home Grown Timber Committee, 
Directorate of Timber Supplies (War Office) and finally Timber Supply Department 
(Board of Trade) naturally took on the organisation and allocation of their work, as 
each HLO became responsible for the effort. As such much of the above confusion 
experienced by other CEF formations was avoided. 256 Indeed the initial Canadian 
forestry HQ was established for a short time at the offices of the Home Grown Timber 
Committee, from whom they ‘received great assistance’ early in their work.257 
In non-forestry matters the CFC received their orders from the General Officer 
Commanding Canadian Forces. For matters of discipline, from May 1917, CFC units 
came under the General Officer Commanding in the military district in which they 
                                                 
254 Nicholson, Canadian Expeditionary Force, pp. 499, 545. 
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Sitting 10 October 1916, col. 7. 
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were employed.258 Where they worked and what type of timber they were to produce 
was determined by the current managing HLO, often in conjunction with CFC officers. 
However, it was always the intention that in regards to forestry matters the Canadian 
forestry units would work under the direct command of one expert Canadian officer, 
and this came to be McDougall throughout the war.259  
Allocation of work to forestry units, as well as contractors, could be confused in 
the earlier stages of the war, but once centralisation under the War Office or Board of 
Trade had occurred the route for timber requests seem much clearer. For instance in 
terms of an order best carried out by the CFC, the current managing body (War Office 
then Board of Trade) asked Corps HQ in London for a certain amount and type of 
wood in certain sizes. Depending on where McDougall’s staff considered the request 
could best be fulfilled, this filtered through the structure outlined above (and see 
structure graph below). For instance, Base Depot in England or HQ in Paris-Plage, 
passed orders or part orders to a Group or District HQ, who in turn passed them down 
to the most appropriate companies, who cut, milled and shipped as best they could.260  
With regards to finding the most efficient structure for forestry units, in the vast 
majority of cases smaller appeared better, although this would depend on the size and 
geography of the land being utilised. Although in terms of the CFC, overall control 
and management was maintained through a strict hierarchical structure that developed 
under the HLOs. The structure below McDougall as CO and his staff included national 
HQs, base depots, districts in the UK and groups then districts in France. However, 
the Canadians quickly realised that the original battalion structure should be changed 
                                                 
258 Hansard, House of Commons Sitting 8 May 1917, Mr Forster (Cons). 
259 Ibid., 10 October 1916, col.7. 
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to smaller units. These were essentially companies that could be sent from Canada as 
recruited in smaller numbers and locally managed under company or detachment 
strengths in the forests depending on how the specific location could best be utilised. 
Similarly the establishments of each of the even smaller ‘units’ from New England 
depended on the local conditions.261 
However, to understand a successful structure and how this came about in 
discussions amongst the HLOs and the main forestry force, the CFC provide the 
majority of examples. Colonel McDougall’s June 1916 report on the possibilities in 
France, based on his four-day trip to the timber-cutting operations already being 
carried out by Royal Engineer Forestry Companies directly for specific armies, not 
only recommended the high level organisation and agreements discussed in the 
previous chapters, but also smaller units. The battalions then being raised in Canada, 
McDougall believed, should be sent to France in units of 150 to 200 men composed 
of the necessary numbers of each type of skilled personnel and fully equipped. 
Essentially a complete forestry operation in one company providing flexibility in 
terms of administration, and was also more practical, given the often isolated work 
created by locating and using suitable forests, meaning a degree of ‘decentralisation’ 
was efficient.  Following the 29 September 1916 British mission to France to discuss 
the use of Canadian forestry units, McDougall further recommended to the Canadian 
Adjutant-General that, as a Directorate of Forestry was being formed at GHQ, it would 
be sensible to form an all-encompassing body that any forestry units arriving from 
Canada could be easily absorbed into, and that this should be designated the Canadian 
Forestry Corps (CFC). This was put into effect by Hughes, officially embodied, and 
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initial actions taken during November 1916. The existing battalions were officially 
broken up into companies, which together formed the corps, and this structure 
continued in both the UK and France until the CFC was disbanded. 262 Men could now 
be sent to England in small units where McDougall would build up a reserve and form 
into skilled companies to be sent where needed. Between May and September 1917 
the belief was that this would amount to two companies a week, which would all be 
sent to France to bring the number up to the desired total of fifty-six companies.263  
An overall structure for the CFC, mainly in Britain, was agreed by the War Office 
in January 1917, based on experiences of the previous months of forestry work. 
Between late 1916 and mid-1917 a structure was also agreed for French operations, 
all of which was superseded, or ratified, by an order in December 1917.264 This would 
represent the structure of the Canadian elements of the forestry effort to the end of the 
war. It allowed for the Directorate of Timber Operations for Britain and France under 
McDougall, plus an Audit and Accounting Department, a Forestry Branch, Technical 
Equipment and Supplies Branch, Transport Department and a Base Depot in Britain. 
There were then Technical Warehouses, District HQs, and companies in Britain and 
France, with an additional Mechanical Branch in Britain and Forestry Branch, District 
Workshops, and Group HQs in France. The following structural chart will clarify: 265 
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McDougall commanded the Canadian foresters in both Britain and France mainly 
from the CFC offices in London but also from their HQ at Paris-Plage, Le Touquet. 
However, a Paris Office, also known at times as the Paris Detachment or the Forestry 
Branch, was established on 24 June 1917. Initially this office was established for 
administrative work such as compiling statistics and translating contracts. However, 
given its central location its usefulness was quickly recognised and its duties 
expanded. It became a connecting hub between CFC HQ at Paris-Plage and the Group 
HQs that controlled the CFC companies all over France. Meetings between 
McDougall and his Group or District Commanders, or conferences between interested 
parties, took place here. From August 1917 the ordering of small parts of machinery 
and equipment, generally urgently needed to complete or repair an installation, which 
had been carried out by the Directorate of Forestry (GHQ) was also taken on by the 
office, reducing the number of links in the supply chain. 266   
As operations expanded in Britain, and then France, it was necessary to establish 
District and eventually in France also Group structures to aid the administrative work. 
There were, in both countries, attempts to keep CFC men in a particular ‘district’, the 
main reason seemingly being ease of establishment administration, but also reducing 
transport of troops and allowing men to get to know the area they were working in and 
the local authorities. There was a lot of administrative effort put in to keeping track of 
where CFC men were as individuals. There were fairly frequent nominal rolls created 
at different unit levels and sent upwards in the chain-of-command, but there was also 
a great deal of correspondence created if queries arose regarding an individual’s 
whereabouts or status. Details where often requested about an individual or small 
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group of foresters in regard to transfers between units, physical location if in a small 
detachment, hospital stays, travel arrangements including if they had returned to 
Canada, and temporary or permanent changes in rank or the job specification they 
were most recently fulfilling for their unit.267 
Eventually there were six districts established in Britain, and a brief chronological 
review shows the geographical areas that were considered most important to the 
forestry effort, as well as how their operations naturally spread-out as more timber was 
required.268 On 15 May 1916, No.51 District was established with its HQ at Edinburgh, 
its HQ later moving to Nairn and then Inverness. By the end of the war it was in charge 
of operations from just below Inverness northwards. On 6 November 1916, No.52 
District HQ was established at Carlisle in Cumberland and would cover southern 
Scotland down to the English Midlands. On the same date, No.53 District was set-up 
and based in London to oversee London, the East Midlands, Suffolk and Norfolk and 
the southeast of England. In November 1917 its HQ moved to Egham, Surrey. The 
next district established was No.54 District with an HQ in Southampton in August 
1917. It covered the West Midlands, Wales, South West England and Southern 
England, including the Isle of Wight. In November 1917 the amount of work being 
carried out in Scotland led to No.55 District being established, with an HQ in Stirling. 
This split Scotland in two, and whilst No.51 took Inverness areas and northwards, 
No.55 took on operations in central and some of southern Scotland, not covered by 
No.52. The final ‘District’ was established on 16 August 1918, as No.56, yet rather 
than a geographical area this HQ, at East Sheen in Surrey, was tasked with managing 
those companies now solely constructing airfields.  
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The British district HQs typically consisted of between three and six officers, 
twenty-nine other ranks, and five Canadian Army Service Corps other ranks to manage 
the operations in their designated areas. Each was ideally commanded by a Colonel 
with a Major as second-in-command, captains or honorary captains as Adjutant, 
Quartermaster, Transport Officer and a Lieutenant serving as a Messing Officer.     
Growth of CFC operations was quick in France, with new district and Group HQs 
being established in suitable areas as companies arrived or were taken under the CFC’s 
control. By the end of May 1917 there were twenty-two companies in France, 
operating under either the Central Group HQ (Districts 1 & 2) at Conches-en-Ouche 
in the Eure department of central Normandy or District Six which had been formed at 
Gerardmer, in the Vosges. In June and July sixteen more companies arrived and two 
new district HQs were established at Alençon (No.1 District) and Orleans (No.4 
District). In August eight more companies arrived and District No.9 HQ was 
established at Albert to administer the companies working solely for the British 
Armies in the ‘Armies Group’. District No.5 HQ was formed at La Joux in the Jura, 
and District No.12 at Facture in the Gironde. In September three further companies 
arrived, and No.2 District HQ was established at Conches.269  
October 1917 was a month that saw an additional increase in numbers of 
lumbermen working in France as well as some further centralisation of control of the 
efforts in French forests under the CFC. Six more companies were sent from England 
to France and two Canadian units that had been working there since June 1916, as 
Nos. 1 and 2 ‘Forest Parties’ under GHQ, were taken over by the CFC and renamed 
Nos. 1 and 2 Forestry Companies. Furthermore, a unit that had been known as the 
Noyon Detachment was re-organised and reclassified as the Eclaron Detachment and 
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tasked with working directly for the French Armies. The Eclaron Detachment then 
became No.10 District, as part of the Armies Group, in February 1918, before the 
Marne Group was established in early June 1918, with its HQ in the Paris offices, to 
administer No.10 District and the newer No.11 District. No.11 District, like District 
No.56 in Britain, consisted of roving companies constructing aerodromes for the 
RAF.270 In November 1917 the Jura Group was formed to control Districts 5 and 6. In 
February 1918 the Bordeaux Group, with their HQ in the city, was formed to 
administer No.12 District, whose operations had been growing in the Maritime Pine 
forests of the Gironde and Landes regions in southwest France.   District No.12 HQ 
were relocated from Bordeaux to Facture, where it had already established 
Quartermaster Stores, Motor Transport Park and Technical Warehouse.271 
This brief chronological run through of the establishment and structural changes 
in CFC administrative operations illustrates the rapidity with which companies were 
rushed to where they were needed but also how their managing structures were altered 
so as to most efficiently handle rapidly expanding operations.   
At the bottom of this administrative structure, however, came the companies at 
work in the forests and woodlands. The initial suggestion by the British Government 
in early 1916 was that a Canadian Forestry Battalion would consist of 700 fellers, 450 
sawyers and assistant sawyers, 250 carters and hauliers, and 100 enginemen.272 This 
gave a total of 1,500 men, compared to 1,000 to 1,200 in a Canadian infantry battalion 
at that time. As noted earlier, Canadian forestry units were officially structured in this 
battalion system until the end of November 1916, yet it was soon after initial arrivals 
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began landing in England that a system of allocating them as independent companies 
was put in place. This shows a degree of decentralisation in terms of units on the 
ground allowed by those managing them, as would have happened in the forests of 
Canada for efficient production.  
Forestry Companies and detachments would generally be smaller than those in 
the fighting arms, but were still able to be self-sufficient in their roles when working 
in conjunction with larger units, in company, district or group areas. Each company 
could run one or more operations close together in a specific area by splitting into 
detachments.273 It must again be stressed that, due to the differing nature of each 
operation, exact numbers in a company could vary due to timings and the specific 
location being worked. An advance party, arriving before the main body of the unit, 
could be as small as four Officers and thirty-two other ranks. However, this would 
quickly increase in the following weeks.274 A company’s strength would then rise and 
fall slightly as officers or other ranks joined or were struck off from the unit’s 
establishment, like any other military unit. Records of such comings and goings were 
the main content of many CFC company war diaries. For example 125 CFC Company, 
who worked at Woburn Sands, Bucks, had an advance party of four officers and thirty-
two other ranks who arrived in the area on 18 August 1917 and began felling three 
days later. By the end of August its strength had increased to one hundred and twelve 
other ranks.275 During September the strength was increased by one officer and eighty 
other ranks, but the following month one officer was struck off and eleven other ranks 
added. On the 1 November the strength was therefore six officers and 181 other ranks, 
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alongside 105 German POWs. During December, 20 other ranks and a three-ton lorry 
were added and two horses struck off.276 On the 1 January 1918 the company contained 
seven officers and 202 other ranks, although losing four officers, three struck off, one 
joining the 12th Canadian Reserves, and one replacement coming in by the end of 
February, leaving four officers and 181 other ranks.277 On 9 May 1918, in reaction to 
the German spring offensives, nine of the company’s other ranks transferred to the 
infantry, and on the 15th four ‘Poles’ were ‘segregated’ possibly due to fears over 
Bolshevism or because they were joining Haller’s Polish volunteers, but just over a 
week later the 125 CFC Company received eighteen replacements, and so the comings 
and goings continued in this and other forestry units.278  
However CFC Companies in Britain generally hovered around 165 to 180 men, 
plus six officers under a major. The second in command was often a captain and each 
of the other officers being in charge of a particular element of the operation, such as 
the mill, transport or attached labour.279 Yet other operations could have up to just over 
200 men, or in the early days of the war even around 300 men, although these were 
gradually reduced to below 200 other ranks.280 Nonetheless, some companies could 
consist of as few as 100 men, of whom just approximately twenty would be ‘skilled 
woodsmen’ centrally based on an estate and running detachments at various sites.281 
In France numbers in a company were commonly slightly larger, reflecting the 
easier working environment of the larger, scientifically managed, French forests. 
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Taking an average of companies in the Bordeaux Group, depending on whether 
fourteen or sixteen were companies in the Group at a particular time, shows that a CFC 
company existed of between five to seven officers and 178 to 203 other ranks.282 
Companies could also be loose structures, and examples exist of companies coming 
together to run different parts of the same operations, for instance logging a particular 
area but transporting to a different company’s sawmill. Some companies spent all of 
their time in France logging, whilst others solely worked on sawing, if that was what 
the area required to achieve maximum output although the majority appear to have 
carried out both. 283 
NCOs would also play important roles at the operations, with sergeants or staff-
sergeants often in charge of extremely important facets such as log-scaling, 
mechanical or horse transport, the engine room or shipping that were needed to keep 
mills supplied and lumber-yards clear.284 Sometimes NCOs also commanded 
detachments, when companies were split due to the nature of their current operations. 
This was regular practice in both Britain and France in logging and aerodrome work, 
some even establishing their own well-furnished camps.285 
It is also noteworthy that the much smaller self-contained sawmill units from New 
England were often seen as particularly useful in terms of flexibility in the areas they 
worked, a typical size would be between twenty-nine and thirty-four men. Typically 
there would be four or five of each of head choppers, second choppers, swampers and 
teamsters. At the mill would be a foreman, clerk, millwright, sawyer, unloader and 
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scaler, roll-on man, take-away man, checker, fireman, slab-and-fuel man, teamster and 
lumber sticker. With cook, cook’s assistant and blacksmith in addition.286 
So, although as shown above, structures and establishments within military or 
support formations at different levels altered as the war progressed and changed in 
nature, the numbers involved in a particular forestry operation under a particular 
company would rise and fall depending on the type of work available at the site being 
operated on, as well as numbers of spare men available from other relatively nearby 
companies as their operations grew, peaked, decreased and then tidied up and moved 
on.  
As stated above two slightly different structures operated in terms of CFC work 
in the Army Areas and in terms of aerodrome work. Companies working in the ‘Army’ 
or ‘War’ areas were generally more mobile and spilt into even smaller detachments 
than those further behind the lines. Such units would work at supplying wood from 
wherever they could, from recaptured destroyed forests and roadside trees, and 
salvaging timber from old battlefields now deserted, for instance after the German 
retreat to the Hindenburg Line.287 In May 1917 it was decided that the six companies 
then working spread out in Army areas should have a district HQ to administer them. 
An HQ with technical warehouse and stores were therefore established at Albert, on 
the Somme. The units carrying out such works were added to either by CFC 
Companies, such as Nos.1 and 2 mentioned above taken over by the CFC from other 
forestry work, or in October 1917 by detachments classified as ‘Fuel Groups’ which 
were operated mainly using Indian labour but overseen by CFC Officers and NCOs.288  
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The Noyon Detachment (a group of companies, as mentioned above), transferred 
between July and September 1917 to the French Army Areas. Some officers, NCOs 
and even men ending up decorated with the Croix de Guerre, and the unit was highly 
recommended by General Humbert whilst he was in command of the French 3rd 
Army.289 
Aerodrome work began for the CFC as Major-Gen Trenchard of the RAF urgently 
requested it through the Air Ministry. Two CFC companies constructed and prepared 
aerodromes for the RAF at nine sites in France, others being added later. The first two 
companies were organised in England and arrived in France in early June 1918 and 
got to work as quickly as possible. To administer the work it was decided to organise 
a special District and No.11 was formed to control the companies put on airfield 
construction work in July.290 
Some example results. 
There were some important effects resulting from the establishment of these units 
both in terms of the forestry effort and social perceptions of forest uses, which will be 
detailed more in later works. For instance it would not be until the end of November 
1917 that the first of the USA’s eventual 18,000 forestry engineers sawed their first 
boards for the AEF in Europe, showing the usefulness of the actions of the 
Massachusetts Committee on Public Safety.291 Furthermore when the contracts 
belonging to the men from New England expired on 15 June 1918 some returned to 
the USA, some enlisted in other branches of the US forces, but 87 enlisted in Scotland 
or London for the huge US 20th ‘Forestry’ Engineers, and the mills and equipment and 
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horses that the New England Sawmill Units had supplied were left in Scotland for use 
by civilians working for the Board of Trade.292 In terms of women in post-war forestry 
roles the establishment and use of the WFS illustrated that forestry was another area 
within which they could make a significant contribution, even if the profession, like 
many others, maintained most roles and positions as male only. Women coming into 
a greater number of forestry roles would happen much quicker in the next world war, 
although they were still considered more suited to lighter aspects of the job and it was 
once again the threat of submarine blockade that saw them more wholly accepted from 
March 1942.293 
A final conclusion is that the efforts to organise and equip the CFC in such quick 
time, followed by their contribution to the war effort once in Europe, should take their 
rightful place alongside the work of other units of the CEF. As Tim Cook argues, 
1914-1918 appears as ‘Canada’s war of independence’ due to its sacrifices and 
achievements and in 1931 Canada was granted greater autonomy, within the British 
Commonwealth.294 The CFC should be seen as contributing towards the feelings of 
pride and increased nationhood, as well as the greater autonomy on the world stage, 
which Canada took from the war.295 
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The main points that can be taken from this chapter in terms of the establishment 
and then management of the forestry effort continue to back other main themes 
running throughout the thesis. No single review comparing the reasons behind and 
actions taken to secure the establishment of all of the forestry units exists in the 
historiography, but this chapter has rectified that. Furthermore it has shown that in 
terms of numbers employed the CFC were indeed the major unit, but that each of the 
other forestry units made important contributions to the effort in the numbers 
employed, the amounts produced and with positive effects on the wider aspects of 
national and gender history. As with much in terms of the high level war effort, there 
was no single body who originated all of the possible solutions in terms of where the 
actual fellers and saw millers would come from. Instead the suggestions came from 
governments, national and local, on both sides of the Atlantic and the military and 
volunteer organisations, each being conceived or growing at different times depending 
on the context of the war. The measures put in place to enact the solutions were also 
through a variety of bodies. However, all had to take into account manpower concerns, 
seasonal issues, funding arrangements, relevant people to lead the units, overall 
position in command structures, and best unit structures.  
In these aspects it has been shown that sensible and fast methods were used to 
establish and grow the units and funding did not prove too much of an obstacle to this. 
The majority of the originators were happy to raise, equip and some even maintain 
their forestry units, and British government departments were happy to cover any costs 
not taken on by the instigators, such as the transport, wages and accommodation of the 
New England Sawmill Units. Forestry units were also led in their recruitment stages 
and then officered at all levels by appropriately skilled and experienced personnel, as 
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was seen in terms of the HLOs above them. These units, unlike some others such as 
the rest of the CEF in Britain, fitted easily into their command structure, as once the 
majority had been formed centralisation under HLOs, such as the War Office and 
Board of Trade, took place. Finally, in a reflection of peacetime forestry operations 
the units on the ground were allowed to adapt, in terms of unit size and structure, to 
best suit the environment they were in and the work that needed doing.  
Overall this chapter has shown that in respect of the forestry units themselves, the 
raising and management of these specialist bodies was undertaken with a great deal of 
logical thought and administrative effort, as was seen in previous chapters concerning 
the establishment of the HLOs and their methods to secure wood supplies.  
  




The British Empire’s efforts to supply wood and timber to industries in the UK and 
the Allied Armies on the Western Front during the First World War has, since the 
immediate post-war years, been largely ignored. The conduct and continued fighting 
of this war was reliant on the supply of adequate amounts of all sorts of resources, as 
much as on military strategies. In some respects, for instance human resource use or 
financially, this war can be argued to have been fairly ‘total,’ but in regards to forestry 
‘total’ is not the most accurate term, as there were standing trees left around the world 
on 11 November 1918. Nevertheless, it is an apt word to describe much of the effort 
given by the HLOs, as well as those working in the forests, to obtain this material.  
To improve our knowledge and understanding of this vital element in the struggle 
for victory, the many different facets relating to the efforts will need focusing on. 
Therefore, many different historical approaches, or areas, will have to be adopted over 
numerous investigations. Primarily these will involve environmental, political, 
military, social and cultural aspects. However, to begin tackling this important facet 
of the war effort, this academic study has focussed on the overarching organisations 
that established and controlled forestry from national, governmental and senior 
military perspectives and positions. It is believed that this will provide a footing on 
which further elements relating to the work and effects of the forestry effort, at all 
structural levels and in all spatial settings, can be constructed. 
The measures put in place to manage forestry supplies were impressive and on 
the whole as clear and effective as could have been hoped for. This is especially true 
given the pre-war poor state of UK woodlands, massive UK reliance on imports and 
concerns over worldwide deforestation. In addition there were the unexpected and 
unprecedented wartime levels of wood use, with recognisable and troublesome spikes 
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in late 1914 and from mid-1916 onwards, and the often dismal transport situations 
during the war. Shifts in the wider conditions in the fighting of the war altered forestry 
needs and pressures. However, even with occasional confusion and duplication of 
roles, the high level administration bodies recognised these and then discussed, 
prioritised and restructured accordingly. Although at times appearing overly 
bureaucratic, especially the number of committees and subcommittees for different 
materials, sources, end uses and end users, lessons were learnt and acted upon. The 
controlling structure was improved upon as the war progressed, with the Timber 
Supply Department (Board of Trade), Directorate of Forestry (GHQ) and Timber 
Allocation Subcommittee illustrating the evolutionary end results of this process. This 
can be seen as a result of a good degree of common sense in terms of the 
appropriateness of expertise sought out and used, and continuity in this through the 
myriad of restructurings. This is not something that has always been apparent for other 
important elements of the British war effort.  
Throughout the war, although especially up to the end of 1915, record-keeping of 
total fellings, production, transport, stocks and use were haphazard. Original hopes of 
arriving at a set of unequivocal and exact totals for the overall effort, for instance of 
all the acreage cleared in a particular country, has not been possible. However, it has 
been shown that the HLOs did achieve much greater levels of self-sufficiency, and on 
the whole maintained adequate supplies, even as use levels rose. This is especially 
identifiable from mid to late 1916 as the wider war and political situation led to firmer 
official measures to address concerns over both immediate and post-war supplies of 
timber.  1917 and 1918 saw usage continue to grow, imports drop, yet supplies catch 
up. This was due to the initiatives the HLOs introduced to improve self-sufficiency. 
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At varying times during the war these included successful measures in controlling 
stocks, purchasing supplies and increasing State production in Britain and France.  
Statutory powers were given either directly or by proxy to the HLOs to control 
many aspects of this supply challenge. Efforts to collate information on stocks and 
requirements proved a complicated task due to the numerous bodies, private and 
public, involved. However, thorough attempts to do so were made and these aided 
prioritisation of, and allocation towards, more essential purposes through permit 
systems on selling and buying stocks, economising non-war usage, rationing supplies, 
controlling prices and looking to alternative materials.  Furthermore, although 
available shipping tonnage was drastically reduced and controlled, purchasing and 
importing stocks from various Allied or neutral nations remained a vital means of 
securing additional supplies, especially in the early years of the war. 
However, the most important new source obtained by the HLOs was the increased 
use of home grown timber, both British and French, which clearly resulted from 
practical needs as use continued to increase but imports were increasingly strangled 
by the submarine campaign. British woodlands and the better maintained for timber 
production French forests being harvested by specially formed Canadian Forestry 
units, were the primary reasons why supplies were maintained. Production from 
geographical areas nearer to where the supplies were needed dramatically increased. 
Therefore, establishing forestry units to carry out the work required in the forests as 
efficiently as possible can be seen as another central method undertaken by the HLOs. 
The most important of these was clearly the CFC, although smaller yet important 
contributions were also made at important times by the Royal Engineer Forestry 
Companies, Newfoundland Forestry Corps, New England Sawmill Units and 
Women’s Forestry Service. With regards to manpower shortages adversely affecting 
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forestry work there were nowhere near the levels of concerns as were raised amongst 
agricultural and key industry planners and controllers. However, those in charge of 
forestry were still often searching for greater numbers of skilled staff, as well as labour 
to assist in the forests. Some UK forestry roles were eventually protected against 
conscription, but it was Canada that provided an invaluable source of suitably 
experienced forestry officers, NCOs and other ranks, as Newfoundland and New 
England did in smaller quantities. These experienced men were formed into 
independent units but also at times effectively acted as cadres onto which massive 
amounts of un-forestry-skilled labour from many different sources could be attached. 
The calls for more and more lumbermen from Canada further illustrated the 
importance of wood and timber and how, as 1916 progressed, the importance of 
securing essential resources was increasingly realised.  
The examples given of the organisation undertaken by those individuals or bodies, 
of varying nationalities or professional positions, onto which responsibility for the 
recruitment, structuring, equipping, transporting and occasionally maintenance of 
these new types of units fell, whether military or civilian, also illustrate keenness to 
help in unexpected directions as well as clear and business-like measures undertaken. 
Once working in Europe these forestry units adapted relatively easily into civilian and 
military chains of command, also largely due to the structure managing HLOs 
established for the effort. They also benefitted from the independent nature of those 
used to working on self-contained forestry operations in Canada. Ultimately the 
combination of the controls and measures put in place by the HLOs did work, even 
producing a surplus stock by the armistice. 
In achieving this, environmental concerns could not be of paramount importance 
given the urgent needs, yet they were not completely ignored. Environmental concerns 
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were a part of pre-war calls for better scientific forest management, but in wartime 
priority had to be given to obtaining the necessary levels of vital supplies. The HLOs 
therefore had little leeway to prioritise good practice and long-term woodland 
management as the war effort consumed increased levels of wood. However, they 
were not completely forgotten by all, or always abandoned in favour of maximum 
production. Concerns were raised by some in the UK, such as Stebbing, but most 
noticeably by the French Forestry Authorities. They insisted on trying to keep some 
control over exactly what locations or types of tree were used as increasing amounts 
of their standing timber was identified for conversion. Although examples of 
understandable frustrations can be seen at times as the two priorities clashed, a solution 
was generally found between those tasked with sourcing supplies and those looking to 
the long-term health of the forests.    
As with other wartime resource management exertions, the forestry effort 
necessarily followed changing contexts in the military and political running of the war.   
Whilst some aspects of the forestry effort can be seen as generally following the 
maxim ‘business as usual’ up to mid-1916, the poor state of pre-war forestry and 
dramatic increase in uses and usage, especially in mining and hutting timber, in the 
very early stages of the war resulted in some concerns and war specific measures being 
taken by managing bodies.  However, such measures were not drastic in comparison 
with what would follow after more widespread recognition of the long-term and 
increasingly material reliant nature of the war during 1916. Forestry control 
experienced rapid structural and methodological changes in the latter stages of that 
year, and that concurs with the common argument that Lloyd George’s coalition 
government and War Cabinet, from December 1916, resulted in closer, more 
centralised and structured controls.  
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The post-war sudden and long-lasting alterations to senior level perceptions of the 
importance of proper forestry and management of this resource in Britain, and to a 
lesser degree around the empire, was not wholly without precedent. The centralisation 
of management seen after the war in the establishment of the Forestry Commission 
had precedents in calls for this before the war and then examples of it increasing during 
the war with the reorganising of responsibilities between HLOs to improve efficiency 
as and when recognised as needed. Good pre-war precedents, often resulting from the 
needs of imperial settings although also never fully fulfilled by 1914, included 
progress in regards to training professionals. Several management bodies were already 
sharing high-level staff, and liaising over similar forestry roles, namely the Office of 
Woods, Boards of Trade, and sections within the Development Commission. In terms 
of forestry the war was definitely an accelerator of change in woodland management, 
not the single facilitator. In this respect it marries up with much of what has been 
concluded regarding other aspects of the war.  
Whilst this thesis concentrates largely on administrative and political 
management aspects, as well as any environmental concerns of those responsible for 
the overarching establishment and then control of this effort, it has been stated 
throughout that it is seen as a basis for future works on the area of forestry and how 
this affected, and was affected by, the war. Some suggestions for these include a 
detailed study of the geographical, social, professional and personal backgrounds of 
the forestry unit personnel, the specific forestry methods they utilised, the importance 
and make-up of labour units attached to them, the many logistical issues they 
encountered and attempted to overcome. Furthermore, a particularly interesting and 
important area of research that could utilise this thesis would be to compare exactly 
Page 344 of 386 
 
 
how and to what extent the efforts detailed here did affect those measures introduced 
to forestry management in the interwar years.  
However, it has now been shown that, in terms of the forestry effort to maintain 
the British Empire’s struggle during the war, mighty organisations with clear and 
sensible administrative and management procedures did indeed grow from tiny, 
unhealthy, and unorganised pre-war beginnings, or ‘acorns’. These various high level 
bodies were ultimately responsible for ensuring that sufficient supplies of wood were 
maintained where vitally needed, and through practicable methods they established 
the means to achieve this. 
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F.B.M; ‘Foot Board Measure’ or ‘Board Foot’ is a common timber measurement not 
used so much by the timber industry in Britain, but a standard measure at the time in 
North America. 1 FBM = 1 foot x 1 foot x 1 inch of rough or sawn timber; as 
opposed to 1 Cubic Foot = 1 foot x 1 foot x 1 foot (12 x 12 x 12 inches). 1 Foot = 12 
inches = 30.48 centimetres 
An FBM is therefore equivalent to 0.002360 of a cubic metre; so by way of example 
350,000 FBM equals 826 cubic metres of timber.1  
1 ‘Load’ (British) of; 
 Hewn softwood timber = 50 cubic feet of standing timber 
 Pit Props = 50 cubic feet of standing timber 
 Hardwood Timber = 40 cubic feet of standing timber 
 Sawn or split wood = 60 cubic feet of standing timber2 
1 ton of pulp wood = 100 cubic feet of standing timber3 
1 ‘Standard’ (British) = 1 Petrograd standard of sawn timber comprising 165 cubic 
feet, weighing approximately 3.3 tons of softwoods such as fir’.4 
                                                 
1 Bird and Davies, The Canadian Forestry Corps, p. 33; Rodney, p. 8 
2 Cd.8881, Reconstruction Committee, Forestry Sub-Committee, Final Report, p. 33. 
3 Ibid. 
4 CWB, p.7 
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Hoppus foot – ‘a measure of volume from log to converted timber, accounting for 
loss. It is an imperial measure, sometimes used in the hardwood trade, and not in the 
softwood market. A Hoppus foot includes the rounded edges from which the cubic 
volume has to come. Therefore a Hoppus foot is larger than a cubic foot, i.e. there 
are fewer Hoppus feet in a cubic meter of timber. 
1 m3 = 27.736074 Hoppus feet 
1 m3 = 35.31467 Cubic feet 
1 H ft. = 0.03605 Cubic meter 
A Hoppus girth tape is used for measuring the Hoppus volume of logs, in 
conjunction with a booklet of Hoppus Tables. The tape is used to measure the girth 
in the middle of the log, giving the result in quarter girth (QG) inches. The length of 
the log is then measured in feet. One then turns to the relevant page of girths in the 
tables and looks down the central column for length in feet. Looking across the row, 
you then choose according to whether it was an exact QG inch, a quarter, half, or 
three quarters, to get the right reading’.5 
Time – Natural Forest Year 
According to the 1914 report of the joint forestry branches of the Board of 
Agriculture and Fisheries and Office of Woods a natural ‘forest year’ in the UK = 1st 
October to 30th September. 
This also coincided with the academic year for which the Board of Agriculture and 
Fisheries awarded educational grants to various institutions.
                                                 
5 Clive Ellis Hoppus foot definition, http://www.woodland-management.co.uk/hoppusfoot.html  
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Controls and Notices 
Date of 
Order 
Name Type of Wood (if specified)  What related to?    Specific Details 
NA A Royal proclamation  




Prohibiting the importation of hardwoods, furniture woods and ‘Veneers, 
except under licence.  
15/2/1916 
Statutory Rules Order 
(S.R.O) 1916 No.77; The 
Prohibition of Imports 
(Paper, Tobacco, furniture 
woods and Stores) 
Proclamation  




Prohibited the import of furniture woods, hardwoods and veneers without a 
licence from the 1 March 1916 onwards 
30/3/1916 
Statutory Rules Order 
(S.R.O) 1916 No.196; The 
Prohibition of Imports 
(No.6) Proclamation  
Beech, birch, elm and oak 
timber; and furniture, 
manufactured joinery and other 




Prohibited, as of the 30 March 1916, the import of beech, birch, elm and oak 
timber; along with furniture, manufactured joinery and other wood 
manufactures except lacquered wares without a licence. 
12/4/1916 
Order No.231 of 1916; of 
12 April 1916. No.20 
NA Requisition 
Empowered the Army Council to take land, trees, buildings and plant; 
including water supply or 'motive power' and to provide housing for the 
purpose of 'felling and converting timber’. This was done as the Home 
Grown Timber Committee (established in November 1915) needed to have 
compulsory powers to encourage home grown timber production. However 
at the time these powers had to be 'administered through one of the War 
Departments’. 
29/12/1916 
Ministry of Munitions 




Order (under Defence of the Realm Act regulation 30A) introduced by the 
Ministry of Munitions requiring permits for the sale of second-hand rilway 
material, which included sleepers. 





Name Type of Wood (if specified)  What related to?    Specific Details 
10/1/1917 
1917, No.5, Order of the 




Permits needed from Board of Trade to charter neutral tonnage, or buy goods 
on terms including freight. Initially this was limited to goods weighing over 
1,000 tons but this was removed on 13 March 1917 (so permits needed for 
any chartering of tonnage or contracts that included freight in them)  
4/2/1917 
Order (Army Council 
Under Defence of the 
Realm Act regulation 
4/2/17) 
Softwood (Sawn timber) Inc. 
Sleepers 
Requisition 
notice of intent to take possession of all stocks of soft sawn timber, planed 
and un-planed, including sleepers, in the UK 
4/2/1917 
Order (Army Council 
Under Defence of the 
Realm Act regulation 
4/2/17) 
Softwood (Sawn timber) Inc. 
Sleepers 
Prices 
Holders could not sell more than two standards of soft sawn timber, planed 
and un-planed, including sleepers, in the UK to any one person at any one 
time, and the price was not to exceed those during the week ending 3/2/1917. 
Although in point 3 permission was given to fulfil deliveries of existing 
contracts. 
4/2/1917 
Order (Army Council 
Under Defence of the 
Realm Act regulation 
4/2/17) 




Holders could not sell more than two standards of soft sawn timber, planed 
and un-planed, including sleepers, in the UK to any one person at any one 
time, and the price was not to exceed those during the week ending 3/2/1917. 
Although in point 3 permission was given to fulfil deliveries of existing 
contracts. 
4/2/1917 
Order (Army Council 
Under Defence of the 
Realm Act regulation 
4/2/17) 





essentially a ban on imports as no one allowed to buy, sell or deal in (or offer 
to buy, sell, deal in) soft sawn timber, planed and un-planed, including 
sleepers, not already in stock in the UK 
4/2/1917 
Order (Army Council 
Under Defence of the 
Realm Act regulation 
4/2/17) 




From this date needed consent in licence permit form or order from the 
Army Council, Admiralty or Ministry of Munitions to sell, remove, 'secrete' 
or deal with sawn softwood timber, planed and un-planed, including 
sleepers, in the UK other than how directed by the Army Council Order of 
5/2/1917 anyone would be guilty under the Defence of the Realm Act 
regulations.  





Name Type of Wood (if specified)  What related to?    Specific Details 
23/2/1917 
S.R.O 1917, No.183 






Banned, amongst other products, from the 23 February 1917, the importation 
of wood and timber of all kinds including hewn, sawn, split, planed or 
dressed, as well as bamboo baskets and basket-ware; EXCEPT with a 
licence. 
2/4/1917 
Order (Army Council 
Under Defence of the 






all persons engaged in the purchase or sale of timber to furnish such 
particulars as to their business as may be required by or on behalf of the 
Director of Timber Supplies’.[1] 
14/4/1917 
Army Council Order - 





Merchants could not; 1. sell in any month an amount of imported softwo d 
exceeding one per cent of the amount of timber they had in stock in the UK 
on 1 April 1917; 2. sell imported softwood unless satisfied needed for work 
of   national importance, or if the individual sale amounted to more than one 
standard they received from the buyer a 'Timber Control Form A' (as printed 
in the London & Edinburgh Gazettes) upon which the buyer had to self-
certify that the wood was required for 'a Government contract or for work of 
National importance (guidelines for what constituted this were set out on 
Form A) and that the existing stocks in my possession are insufficient to 
enable me to carry out this work. I further certify that no substitute marial 
is available. The nature of this work is as follows’. False statements were to 
be punished under the DORA with either a £100 fine or six months i prison   
14/4/1917 
Army Council Order - 





Anyone wanting to buy imported softwood in a quantity greater than one per 
cent of the merchants stock at 1 April 1917, had to apply to the Directorate 
of Timber Supplies (War Office) on 'Timber Control Form B' setting out 
why they urgently needed it for work of national importance (as set out on 
'Timber Control Form A'), or if for a government department give details of 
the department and work on 'Timber Form C' (to be attached to Form B 
when making the application), and confirming that no substitute materials 
were available. 
14/4/1917 
Army Council Order - 





Any actual amounts of imported softwood  timber provided by the merchant 
to be kept a note of on the permit  





Name Type of Wood (if specified)  What related to?    Specific Details 
24/4/1917 
Army Council Order - 
Packing Cases 
Packing Cases Use/Consumption 
Prohibited the manufacture of cases and crates or the use of new cases and 
crates for packing certain goods. Three schedules were given listing types of 
goods. Goods in Schedule A could not be packed in new cases or crates and 
included many objects from 'Athletic Outfits', 'Handkerchiefs (in paper 
parcels)', to all sorts of cotton, linen and wool items, including underwear 
(although not silk hose or half hose).  
3/5/1917 
Army Council Order - 
Timber 
Russian (i.e. Softwoods) 
Sales & 
Purchasing 
Any timber that had been purchased in Russia before the 1 January 1917, but 
that had not yet been shipped to the UK, was to only be sold to the 
Directorate of Timber (War Office) or his representatives. It also stated that 
none of this Russian timber could be sold for more than 10% higher than the 
price at which it was bought.    
3/5/1917 
Army Council Order - 
Timber 
Russian (i.e. Softwoods) Prices 
Any timber that had been purchased in Russia before the 1 January 1917, but 
that had not yet been shipped to the UK, was to only be sold to the 
Directorate of Timber (War Office) or his representatives. It also stated that 
none of this Russian timber could be sold for more than 10% higher than the 
price at which it was bought.    
7/5/1917 
Army Council Order - 
Imported Softwood Prices 
Imported Softwoods Prices 
Prices of imported softwoods limited to those of week ending 31 Jan 917, 
stating that 'no person shall sell any imported softwood at prices exceeding 
those current during the week ending 31st January 1917…' 
7/5/1917 
Army Council Order - 
imported Softwood 
Requisitioning 
Imported Softwoods Requisition 
Government requisitioning any stocks of imported softwood over 250 
standards in size; the Order itself stating that under the DORA regulation the 
Army Council 'hereby take possession of all stocks of Imported Softwood of 
250 Standards and upwards held by merchants and agents in the United 
Kingdom at the date hereof’.  





Name Type of Wood (if specified)  What related to?    Specific Details 
19/5/1917 
Army Council Order 
'Softwood' Regulating 
Prices of Imports of 
softwoods from Norway, 
Sweden and Denmark 
Imported Softwoods From 
Norway, Sweden and Denmark 
Imports / 
Shipping 
 Some importation of timber allowed again where shipping space was not 
needed for food or munitions. Any such available shipping was announced 
occasionally until all private importation of timber was stopped by the 
Timber Order 1918 (July).                                             
19/5/1917 
Army Council Order 
'Softwood'  Regulating 
Prices of Imports of 
softwoods from Norway, 
Sweden and Denmark 
Imported Softwoods From 
Norway, Sweden and Denmark 
Prices 
Imports allowed again by same order (if shipping available) and the Order 
states that the Army Council now [further to Order of 7 May 1917] deemed 
'it desirable that the sale of Soft Wood imported from Norway, Sweden or 
Denmark after the 15th day of May 1917, should be permitted on certain 
conditions other than those contained in the said [7 May] Order' in regards to 
pricing. The rising costs of imports meant that merchants could not sell at the 
prices allowed by the order of 7 May 1917, which restricted prices to those 
of week ending 31 January 1917, without making a loss. Therefor  this 
Order also allowed that imports of softwoods after the 15 May 1917 could be 
sold at the 31 Jan prices, plus an increase of one-third, subject to a limitation 
of profit of no more than ten per cent.  
4/7/1917 
The Home Grown Timber 
Prices (Great Britain) 
Order, 1917 
Certain kinds of HG coniferous 
timber 
Prices 
Set a schedule of maximum prices for certain kinds of converted coniferous 
timber. First attempt to fix prices for home grown timber, and as such only 
covered quite specific types of timber such as certain sizes of sawn spruce, 
Scotch fir and Larch. It was introduced as it was felt that maximum prices 
for sawn timber would stop timber merchants paying too much for their 
standing or felled wood. However, later home grown timber orders would be 
more comprehensive. This order also did not apply in Ireland. 
4/7/1917 
The Home Grown Timber 






Required persons to furnish particulars of their timber business when called 
on to do so by the Controller of Timber Supplies(Board of Trade) 





Name Type of Wood (if specified)  What related to?    Specific Details 
4/7/1917 
The Standing Timber 
(United Kingdom) Order, 
1917 
Standing home grown timber 
Sales & 
Purchasing 
Permits now needed to purchase any standing timber, except that bought 
with land, or in small quantities. Aimed at stopping speculation for profits 
and purchase of wooded land by people who could not start working it for 
timber on a satisfactory scale within a short time period. Many loop holes in 
this Order had to be closed in the Timber Control Order of 1918.  
20/7/1917 ? ? 
Imports / 
Shipping 
Announced a regulation that imports of timber from Canada and the USA 
could be made in neutral 'sailing' ships; or as 'deck loads' on any vessel under 
a general licence. The price of such imports was to be based on the same 
assumption of those for timber from Scandinavia where the 'current' prices 
were taken to be as those 'ruling in Liverpool Port' rather than the Irish Ports 
during the last week of January 1917.  
22/8/1917 
(S.R.O) Statutory Rules 
and Order, 1917, No.886 
All Prices 
When Army Council or Board of Trade 'acquired' timber (standing, felled or 
converted) they would pay a price determined under Defence of the Realm 
Act regulation 2B, i.e. if agreement could not be reached the price laid down 
by the Tribunal set up to consider compensation claims, (Defence of th
Realm Losses Commission) allowing reasonable profit but subject to any 
limit on maximum prices. 
24/8/1917 
Mahogany and Walnut 
Order  
Mahogany & Walnut Requisition 
Board of Trade requisitioning all stocks of mahogany and walnut that 
exceeded 5,000 super feet of these woods in particular states (not including 
veneers). First step was to inform the trade that they had to furnish the Board
of Trade with returns of their stock. 
3/10/1917 
Teak and Lignum Vitae 
Permit Order 
Teak & Lignum Vitae 
Sales & 
Purchasing 
Brought in Permits for the sale or purchase of teak logs, planks, boards and 
decking and any Lignum Vitae, small sales being exempted, in order to 
ensure supplies for the Admiralty's requirements. 





Name Type of Wood (if specified)  What related to?    Specific Details 
4/12/1917 
Export of Timber (Ireland) 
Order, 1917 
Irish home grown timber 
Sales & 
Purchasing 
Administered by the Assistant Controller of the Timber Supply Department 
(Board of Trade) in Dublin, this Order required permits to be obtained, by 
applying to him, before any round or sawn Irish home grown timber could be 
exported to Britain. Its aim was to prevent British and other nationalities' 
merchants from exploiting Irish timber resources, whilst there was still scope 
for business in Britain. This order excluded pit-wood.  
4/12/1917 
Home Grown Timber 
Prices Order 1917 
home grown timber Prices 
Attempted to set a more comprehensive set of maximum prices for all home 
grown timber, no matter what stage it was at, and to give them for all of the 
usual trade sizes. If a size was not covered in the Order special prices would 
be arrived at by the Controller of Timber Supplies (Board of Trade) on a 
specific case basis acting on expert advice. Price weightings were also 
allowed in cases of town sawmills and retailers.    
15/3/1918 
The Timber (Returns) 
Order 1918 
All Haulage 
Required anyone engaged in 'felling, hauling, purchasing or selling timber' to 
send details of their business to the Controller of Roads and Bridges.  
15/3/1918 Timber Haulage Order NS Haulage 
Timber haulage placed under the control of the Road Control Officers, under 
the Controller of Roads and Bridges. Road damage was a major concern and 
hindered production, and this Order therefore enabled the minimisation of 
congestion and damage to roads as routes and types of vehicles could be 
prescribed by the officers in liaison with local highway and other authorities.  
20/3/1918 
The Rattan and Malacca 





Brought these materials under control of the Board of Trade, due to the 
difficulty the Ministry of Munitions was having in getting hold of them. 
20/3/1918 






Amongst other things, prohibited the import of Rattan and Malacca Canes, 
except under licence. 





Name Type of Wood (if specified)  What related to?    Specific Details 
25/3/1918 
The Home Grown Timber 
Prices Order, 1918 
home grown timber Prices 
Similar to 1917 home grown timber Prices Order but the Controller of 
Timber Supplies(Board of Trade) now 'Certified' specific  mills in Port and 
City locations  as being allowed to charge a higher price than 'ordinary' mills 
in towns or the country. These 'certified' mills were usually those that had 
been adapted to work on imported timber, but were now having to use home 
grown timber    




To restrict private purchasing of foreign timber for importing to lay the 
groundwork for an Order of 16 July 1918, that would centralise purchasing 
and ration distribution. 
27/4/1918 
Summary Offences. Order 
No.496  
NA Powers 
In order to facilitate more complete control, this Order empowered the Board 
of Trade 'to direct that contraventions of orders issued by the Board under 2E 
or 15C shall be summary offences’. 
7/6/1918 Press Notice 




Timber Supply Department (Board of Trade) announced in the press that 
were arranging a rationing scheme  and inviting those firms (importers, 
merchants , retailers, agents, brokers and shippers) whose transactions in 
imported softwoods averaged over 100 standards per annum  duringthe 
years 1912-14 to apply to register and be included in the scheme. Deadline 
for application was June 18th. 
26/6/1918 Press Notice NS 
Rationing 
Through Permits 
Controller of Timber Supplies (Board of Trade) announced rationing scheme 
in the press, giving an explanatory notice of it.   





Name Type of Wood (if specified)  What related to?    Specific Details 
16/7/1918 
The Timber Control Order 
1918 
Softwoods; Imported (inc. 




1. No person in UK to 'buy, sell, receive, take or make delivery of, or enter 
into any transaction or negotiation in relation to the sale, purchase or 
transport of any timber outside the United Kingdom except under and in 
accordance with the terms of a Permit granted by or on behalf of the 
Controller' (Controller of Timber Supplies (Board of Trade)) // 2(a&b) and 
15. No person to buy, sell or enter into a contract to buy or sell, any timber 
that had been imported into the UK UNLESS this was in accordance with a 
Permit they had been granted by the Controller of Timber Supplies(Board of 
Trade), OR if the purchase was for timber lower in value than £5 i any one 
week AND a declaration was signed by the purchaser stating value of wood 
and that was for work of National Importance or 'urgent necessity' This 
'Declaration by Purchasers' form was to be kept by the seller for 
inspection/use by the Controller of Timber Supplies (Board of Trade) as and 
when required. Furthermore, the person selling wood without a permit as 
under £5 in value still had to supply details of the value of imported timber 
sold in each transaction, to the Timber Supply Department (Board of Trade) 
within a set timeframe, a maximum of 7 days after the last day of the month 
in which the timber was sold.  // Several further exceptions (in regards to 
selling and purchasing imports or home grown timber) were allowed under 
this order. They were [15(b)] whereby if the Admiralty or Ministry of 
Shipping needed timber urgently for the repair of ships, and they themselves 
provided the seller with Timber Control Form B (as written by the Timber 
Supply Department (Board of Trade)) then the seller could provide an 
amount up to five standards of 165cu/feet. The certificate would then be sent 
to the Controller of Timber Supplies together with a completed Timber 
Control Form C, essentially a monthly return of the sales they had made 
under form A (less than £5 in value per week), Form B (supplies less than 
five standards sold to Admiralty or Ministry of Shipping for urgent repairs) 
and those that were sold as Timber Supply Department (Board of Trade) 
permit had been received from the purchaser. Form C kept each type of sal
separate as well as Imported/home grown timber and whether wood was sold 
from National Stock or the suppliers own stock, illustrating the desire of the 
Department at the Board of Trade to keep a good record of the situation in 
the country at this time. However, A colliery or other mine owner could 
purchase manufactured pit-wood (including sawn props, pillar wood, cr wns 
and pit sleepers), and pit-props without need of a permit, although they 





Name Type of Wood (if specified)  What related to?    Specific Details 
would need one to purchase either standing wood or converted timber other 
than that listed above. // (CWB) Established scheme of centralised 
purchasing of foreign timber 





Name Type of Wood (if specified)  What related to?    Specific Details 
16/7/1918 
The Timber Control Order 
1918 
Softwoods; home grown timber 
(Not including Timber growing 
on  land being sold) 
Sales & 
Purchasing 
6 (a&b).  Nobody to sell or enter into contracts to buy any standing or felled 
home grown timber (of the types in the home grown timber Prices Order 
1918, UNLESS purchaser had a permit with specific terms and conditions to 
be adhered to, from the Controller of Timber Supplies(Board of Trade) // 7.  
No one to offer by tender any home grown timber (standing or felled) for 
sale unless under terms of a specific Controller of Timber Supplies permit // 
8. No sales of home grown timber (standing or felled) at auctions unless both 
auctioneer had a permit from the Controller of Timber Supplies; and then 
whoever won particular lots was also subsequently granted a permit. If they
were not granted a permit the Controller of Timber Supplies could give one 
to another person who bid at the auction and who is willing to pay an equl 
amount to the highest price that had been bid //  15. Sales of home grown 
timber, as with imported wood, that did not exceed a value of £5 in any one 
week did not need a permit, although any person selling wood without a 
permit as under £5 in value still had to supply details of the value of home 
grown timber supplied, to the Timber Supply Department (Board of Trade) 
within 7 days of the end of the month within which the sale was made. // 14. 
Any sale or purchase of logs or converted timber covered by the descriptions 
given in Schedules B,C or D of the home grown timber Prices Order 1918 
needed to be under the terms of a permit issued by the Controller of Timber 
Supplies, EXCEPT when a sawmill was purchasing wood in log form to 
convert for sale; or if a sawmill, merchant or retailer were purchasing logs or 
timber for resale they did not need a permit AS LONG AS the purchaser 
gave a certificate that they were only going to convert and/or re-sell the 
wood. If such a certificate was received the seller could sell the wood // 15. 
The exceptions listed above in regards to urgent sales for shipping repairs or 
sales for mining purposes also applied to home grown timber as well as 
imported, and it was noted in the Order that no permit or certificate would be 
needed if an estate used wood for the purposes of the owner.     





Name Type of Wood (if specified)  What related to?    Specific Details 
16/7/1918 
The Timber Control Order 
1918 
Timber growing on land being 
sold (excluding hedgerow trees, 
but including all trees of 'pit-




10. Anyone selling land (in separate plots or as a whole) upon which more 
than 10,000 cu/ft. of timber growing on it (not including hedgerows), had to 
submit all details to the Controller of Timber Supplies(Board of Trade) 
before completion of sale. This to also include the full name and address of 
the purchaser, and if the Controller of Timber Supplies did not issue permit 
permission the timber aspect of the sale would be null and void //11. If land 
with more than a total of 10,000 cu/ft. on it (as a whole or in parcels) b ing 
offered at auction then either the auctioneer of seller had to submit details to 
the Controller of Timber Supplies including a valuation of the timber based 
on Schedule A of the home grown timber Prices Order 1918, and again a 
permit had to be issued to allow the timber to be included in the land sale. 
Furthermore the purchaser may, if stated by the Controller of Timber 
Supplies in the permission permit to the seller or auctioneer, also need to 
obtain a permit before the sale was completed and included the timber 
elements.      
16/7/1918 
The Timber Control Order 
1918 
Softwoods; Imported or HG Prices 
3. 'The Controller may by notice under his hand fix the maxium prices at 
which any Imported Timber may be sold, and may by a like notice vary such 
prices from time to time’.  // 4. Nobody allowed to buy or sell imported 
timber at a price higher than the than those fixed by this Order // 4. Stocks of 
imported softwood already in the UK on the date on the Order could still be 
sold in accordance with price restrictions in force immediately before this 
Order; as long as the purchaser had a Permit from the DTS(Board of Trade)
// (CWB) Several schedules of maximum prices for imported softwoods 
were issued under this scheme // 4. Those who held stocks imported fr m 
Norway, Sweden or Russia before 15 May 1917 or from Canada or the USA 
before the 19 July 1917 had to make a return of these stocks to the Controller 
of Timber Supplies (Board of Trade) who might then authorise them to sell, 
to a buyer with a Permit, at a particular price fixed by the Controller of 
Timber Supplies. 





Name Type of Wood (if specified)  What related to?    Specific Details 
16/7/1918 






As well as the Form C under the Timber Control Order 1918, whereby 
sellers had to furnish the Timber Supply Department (Board of Trade) with 
all of their sales details, the   Order also specified that anyone in the 'engaged 
in the purchase, sale, transport, conversion,, or manufacture of timber of any 
description shall furnish such particulars as to their business or transactions 
as may be required from time to time by or on behalf of the Controller’.  
NA 





Notice in press that the Board of Trade were preparing way for a rationing 
scheme for imported softwood by issuing the Timber Control Oder, 1918; 
and that this scheme would begin on the following Monday (22nd July 
1918). The 'rationing' scheme for imported softwoods essentially consisting 
of the schedule of maximum prices (would not apply to existing stocks), 
Controller of Timber Supplies (Board of Trade) to decide on prices specific 
stocks imported earlier could be sold at on case by case basis if applications 
made; Permit system being extended to home grown timber as well, on 
similar lines to that which had applied to imports for a year already.  (See 




All sawn and planed softwood 
(excluding Box Shooks) 
Requisition 
Board of Trade giving notice that would be taking 'possession...of all 
descriptions of Sawn and/or Planed Softwood (excluding Box Shooks) 
arriving in the United Kingdom on and after the 22nd July, 1918’. After the 
date of this notice (22/7/1918) holders of such stocks were not allowed t  
enter into any transactions or transfers (such as Bills of Lading) for such 
timber. Also, holders of any stocks of this type were requested to send all 
details to the Government Timber Buyers at Salisbury House, E.C. 
29/7/1918 The Pitwood Order, 1918 Pitwood Prices 
Pitwood imports had been under special licence since 15 May 1917, and 
prices had been dealt with by arbitration ('notably the Acland Award as to 
Home Pitwood supplies for Scotland, 16th June, 1916) and by directions 
issued by the Coal Controller to collieries in a letter dated 19 December 
1917. However, this Order gave more definite legal force to these previous 
arrangements as power was taken by the Controller of Timber Supplies to 
vary the maximum prices by Notice.  The order was superseded by the 
Pitwood Order 1919 of the 10 April 1919. 





Name Type of Wood (if specified)  What related to?    Specific Details 
9/9/1918 
Timber Control 




A small amendment giving the Controller of Timber Supplies (Board of 
Trade) power to vary the quantities of timber that could be purchased 
without a permit, although only a small amendment was felt necessary to aid 
the working of the rationing/Permit scheme.   
26/9/1918 
Statutory Rules and Order, 
1918. No.1234 - The Fuel 




Gave the terms on which fuelwood could be bought and sold to substitute for 
coal which was rationed at this time. There was only small amounts of 
fuelwood available in the locations it was needed for burning at this time due 
to lack of transport to bring the wood into towns. However, in rural areas a 
'considerable quantity' of wood was burnt as fuel.   
28/11/1918 
The Packing Case and 




Had been in preparation at the signing of the Armistice. Cleared up some 
details of the permit system in regards to wood for packing cases as there 
was still a great shortage of such wood as the war ended. However, this 
Order was short lived and was revoked on 27 December 1918. 
5/12/1918 
Timber Control 
(Amendment No.2) Order, 
1918 
home grown timber 
Rationing 
Through Permits 
Permits for home grown timber sales were withdrawn, which left just the 
home grown timber Prices Order as the only control of UK timber. Revoked 
Part II (home grown timber) of the Timber Control Order, 1918 and stated 
that Paras 15 & 16 of Part III of the Timber Control Order, 1918 would no 
longer apply to home grown timber (and so in terms of home grown timber 
revoked these as well) 
5/12/1918 
The Timber Control 





Sales of hardwood, including plywood, in the UK were permitted without 
control, although purchases for imports of hardwoods were still controlled. 
5/12/1918 
Timber Control 




A notice released on the 5 December allowed for the purchase of up to £100 
worth (in any one calendar month) of imported softwood without a permit, as 
long as it was needed for work of 'national importance or urgent necessity’. 
Form A still had to be forwarded to the Timber Supply Department (Board 
of Trade) giving details of all transactions during the month and declaring 
that was for work of national importance.  





Name Type of Wood (if specified)  What related to?    Specific Details 
5/12/1918 
The Home Grown Timber 
Prices (Amendment) Order 
1918 
Sleepers Prices 
Maximum prices for sleepers were amended, but at this time home grown 
timber prices in general had to stay under controls.  
27/12/1918 
The Timber Control 





Ended the need for permits for dealing in hardwoods abroad.   
27/12/1918 
The Timber Control 





Ended the need for permits for dealing in imported softwoods in this country. 
27/12/1918 
The Timber Control 





Merchants could once again sell to one another in the UK without the need 
for a permit, this weakened the rationing arrangements remaining 
27/12/1918 
The Rattan and Malacca 





Revoked the Order of 20 March 1918; but permits for transactions outside of 
the UK were maintained until this Order, like many others was revoked on 5 
March by a notice under the Articles of Commerce (Relaxation of 
Restriction) Order 1918.  
4/2/1919 Max Prices Notice  Imported Softwoods Prices 
A new schedule of maximum prices for imported softwoods was issued on 
this day, the same day that the rationing arrangements were also officially 
brought to an end by notice.   
10/4/1919 Pitwood Order 1919 Pitwood Prices 
Fixed new maximum prices for imported and home-grown pit-wood. N tices 
that had pre-ceded this Order in late January 1919 announcing that Impor
Licences would now be granted for supplies from Spain, Portugal, 
Scandinavia, Finland and Newfoundland for imports to certain districts, and 
giving new maximum prices for these. This Order also allowed for the 
controls of pit-wood to be transferred from the Timber Supply Department 
(Board of Trade) to the Mines Department at the Board of Trade. All control 
of pit-wood ended in the autumn of 1919.   
 
